J. CHELAMESWAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is filed with a prayer as follows:"to issue a direction, orders or a writ; more appropriately one in the nature of a writ of habeas Corpus coupled with a writ of mandamus and declare the proceedings of the 2nd Respondent dated 21. 12. 2002 convening a Summary general Court Martial (comprising of respondents No. 3,4 and 5) for the trial of the petitioner, detenue herein on the charges enumerated in the Charge- sheet dated 20. 12. 2002 and consequential proceedings of the Summary General court Martial held at field from 21. 12. 2002 till 26. 12. 2002 resulting into conviction and sentence of the petitioner herein to (a) Reduced to Ranks, (b) to suffer Rigorous imprisonment for four years and (c) to be dismissed from service and his detention to suffer Rigorous imprisonment under the custody of 7th respondent herein as being unwarranted, illegal, unlawful, unjust, unnecessary and ultra vires; and consequently direct the 7th respondent herein to produce the petitioner/detenue hereinbefore this hon ble Court and set him at liberty. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner is a soldier of the indian Army, who was tried by a summary general Court-Martial for charges under sections 376 (2) read with 450 and 376 (2) read with Section 511 of Ranbeer Penal code, that is the Penal of law of Jammu and kashmir. ( 3 ) IT is agreed at the Bar that the above-mentioned two provisions correspond verbatim to Sections 376 and 511 of the indian Penal Code. Section 450 of the ranbeer Penal Code once again is identical with Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code. The last charge against the petitioner is under Section 48 of the Army Act, which section makes it an offence for any person subject to the Army Act to be found in a state of intoxication whether on duty or not. ( 4 ) IN substance, the petitioner is accused of house trespass and attempting to commit rape of a girl i. e. , below 12 years of age. The petitioner joined the service in indian Army in Madras Regiment and at the relevant point of time, he was serving 8th Battalion, Jammu and Kashmir Light infantry. It appears that the petitioner before the commission of offence, was working as Naik in the Army. Another Officer by name Capt. The petitioner joined the service in indian Army in Madras Regiment and at the relevant point of time, he was serving 8th Battalion, Jammu and Kashmir Light infantry. It appears that the petitioner before the commission of offence, was working as Naik in the Army. Another Officer by name Capt. B. Ravi was posted in another neighbouring unit where the said officer was living with his family. ( 5 ) A young girl, aged below 12 years, engaged by Capt. B. Ravi for domestic assistance and the said girl was also an inmate of the house. The petitioner admittedly went to the abovementioned capt. Ravi s house on 5. 2. 2002 at about 17. 00 hours and is alleged to have committed the various offences described earlier. The petitioner has his own version of the events that transpired at that point of time. ( 6 ) WE are not concerned with the controversy on facts of the case for the reason that we are not sitting in appeal against the order of conviction recorded by the Court-Martial. ( 7 ) THE further admitted facts are that the petitioner was caught by Cspt. B. Ravi and others and made over to the higher authorities. Thereafter, a summary General court-Martial was held and the petitioner was convicted for the various offences mentioned earlier and sentenced to under rigorous imprisonment for a period of four (4) years. Pursuant to which, the petitioner now is lodged in the Central Prison, rajahmundry. ( 8 ) THE 1st respondent is the Union of india. The 2nd respondent herein is the general Officer (Commanding) who constituted in to the summary General court Martial . Respondents-3 to 5 are the members of the Court-Martial. 6th respondent is the Judge-Advocate of the Court-Martial. ( 9 ) AT the outset, it must be mentioned that the affidavit filed in support of the present writ petition, is given by the wife of the petitioner. Though in the verification, the deponent of the affidavit stated that the contents of the affidavit are true to her personal knowledge, by the very nature of the facts contained therein, most of the facts could not have been true to her personal knowledge for the reason that admittedly she was not present at the time of Court- martial. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner - Mr. Saxena made two submissions, viz. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner - Mr. Saxena made two submissions, viz. , firstly, in view of the fact that the offence of attempt to commit rape is a "civil Offence", the same should have been tried by an Ordinary Criminal Court and not by Court-Martial and secondly, number of irregularities were committed in; the conduct of the trial by the summary general Court-Martial . The further details of the allegations or irregularities would be considered at the appropriate place in this judgment. ( 11 ) ALL the respondents were served. A counter-affidavit on behalf of Respondents-1 to 6 is filed by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment wherein various allegations made in the writ petition, are denied. ( 12 ) BEFORE we deal with the submissions made by the learned Counsel on either side, we deem it appropriate to survey briefly the various provisions of the relevant Statute (Army Act ). ( 13 ) THE Army Act 1950 deals with the commission, appointment and enrollment of members of the Indian Army. The conditions of service of the members, the various privileges that are granted to the various members of the services, the offences and punishments thereof, if committed by a member of the service, the constitution of the Courts-Martial their procedure etc. , are prescribed in the Act. ( 14 ) SECTIONS 34 to 70 of the Army Act, occurring in Chapter VI of the Act, define various offences. These various offences defined under the above mentioned provisions, are offences that could be committed by any person subject to the army Act. ( 15 ) APART from the various offences mentioned therein, the Parliament recognized the fact that a person who is subject to the provisions of the Army Act, could also commit an offence against any law in force in the country, which offence, if committed by a person other than a person who is subject to the provisions of the Army Act, would in the normal course, be tried by the ordinary Criminal Courts of the country in accordance with the appropriate procedure applicable for the trial of such offences. Such offences are defined as civil offences under Section 3 (2) of the Army Act in the following words:"civil Offence" means an offence, which is triable by a Criminal Court. Such offences are defined as civil offences under Section 3 (2) of the Army Act in the following words:"civil Offence" means an offence, which is triable by a Criminal Court. The expression "criminal Court" itself is defined under Section 3 (8) of the Army Act. "criminal Court" means the Court of ordinary criminal justice in any part of India. ( 16 ) THE Courts-Martial are invested with the authority to try any person subject to the Act for any offence punishable under the Act. The various categories of Courts- martial and their jurisdiction would be considered later. ( 17 ) SECTION 69 of the Act creates a legal friction by which a person subject to the Army Act, committing any civil offence, is deemed to be guilty of an offence against the Army Act and is liable to be tried by a court-Martial and punishable by it. Section 69 reads as follows:"69. Civil offences: Subject to the provision j of Section 70, any person subject to the Act who at any place in or beyond India commits any civil offence shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and, if charged therewith under this section, shall be liable to be tried by a Court-Martial and, on conviction be punishable as follows, that is to say, (a) If the offence is one which would be punishable under any law in force in india with death or with transportation, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, other than whipping, assigned for the offence, by the aforesaid law and such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned; and (b) In any other case, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, other than whipping, assigned for the offence by the law in force in India, or imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned. "section 70 of the Act incorporates certain exceptions to the Rule contained under section 69. Section 70 reads as follows:"70. "section 70 of the Act incorporates certain exceptions to the Rule contained under section 69. Section 70 reads as follows:"70. Civil offences not triable by Court- martial: A person subject to this Act who commits an offence of murder against a person not subject to military, naval or air force law, or of culpable homicide not amounting to murder against such a person or of rape in relation to such a person or of rape in relation to such a person, shall not be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall not be tried by a Court- martial unless he commits any of the said offences: (a) while on active service, or (b) at any place out side India, or (c) at a frontier post specified by the central Government by notification in this behalf. " ( 18 ) THE substance of Section 70 is that whenever a person who is subject to the army Act, commits an offence of murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder or rape against a person who is not subject to Military, Naval or Air Force law, (for the sake of convenience, hereinafter referred to as a "civilian") such an offender shall not be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the Army Act and should; not be tried by court-Martial. However, this exception is subject to further clarification that the offences described above, if committed by a person subject to the Army Act while on active service or at any place out side india or at a frontier post the exception contained in Section 70 (1) is not available and such an offence would still be an offence against the Army Act and triable by the courts-Martial. ( 19 ) ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner herein was tried by a Court-Martial but not by an ordinary Criminal Court. The legal nature of the Court-Martial would be discussed later as it would be relevant for the second submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 20 ) THE submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that in view of the facts alleged against the petitioner that he attempted to commit rape of a civilian , the case of the petitioner falls under Section 70 of the Army Act, thereby requiring the petitioner to be tried by an ordinary Criminal Court, but not by a court-Martial. The issue is covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in madanlal v. Union of India, Military Law journal 1999 SC 145. In an identical situation, dealing with the identical submission, their Lordships held that:". . . . . . . . IN this view of the matter, the conclusion is irresistible that in respect of an offence of attempt to commit rape, the jurisdiction of the Court-Martial cannot be said to be ousted by virtue of Section 70 of the said act. " ( 21 ) THEREFORE, we do not see any merit in the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 22 ) WE shall now examine the second submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner regarding certain irregularities that were said to have been committed in the procedure adopted by the respondents for convicting and sentencing the petitioner. ( 23 ) BEFORE we take up the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard, we are of the opinion that it requires to briefly out line the scheme of the Courts-Martial under the army Act. ( 24 ) CHAPTER X of the Army Act deals with the establishment, composition and the jurisdiction of the Courts-Martial and allied matters. Section 108 provides that there shall be four kinds of Courts-Martial viz. , 1. General, 2. District, 3. Summary General and 4. Summary. Sections 109 to 112 of the act authorize the various authorities specified in each one of those sections to convene a court-Martial in the same order of the courts-Martial described above. ( 25 ) SIMILARLY, Sections 113 to 116 deal with the composition of the various Courts- martial mentioned above in the same order as mentioned above. ( 26 ) SECTION 117 of the Act deals with the dissolution of Courts-Martial. Section 118 deals with the powers of the General and summary General Court-Martial. Section 119 deals with the powers of District Court- martial and Section 120 deals with the powers of the Summary Court-Martial. Section 121 embodies the principle of atrafoi acquittal, guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India, which once again finds expression insofar as Civilians are concerned under Section 300 of Code of criminal Procedure. Section 122 provides for the period of limitation for the trial of any offence by the Court- Martial. Section 121 embodies the principle of atrafoi acquittal, guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India, which once again finds expression insofar as Civilians are concerned under Section 300 of Code of criminal Procedure. Section 122 provides for the period of limitation for the trial of any offence by the Court- Martial. ( 27 ) IT may not be necessary to discuss all the other provisions of the Act for the purpose of the present case except Section 125 of the Act, which provides that when a criminal Court and Court-Martial have concurrent jurisdiction in respect of an offence in a case such as the one before us, it shall be in the discretion of the "commanding Officer" to decide before which of the two Courts, the proceedings shall be initiated. ( 28 ) CHAPTER XI of the Act deals with the procedure of Courts-Martial. Chapter xii deals with the confirmation and revision of conviction and sentences imposed by the courts-Martial. Chapter XII deals with the execution of the sentences. Chapter XIV deals with the pardons, remissions and suspension of the sentences. ( 29 ) RULES are made under the Army act by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred on the Central government by virtue of Section 191 of the army Act called Army Rules, 1954. Chapter V of the Rules deals with the investigation of charges and trial by Courts- martial, which is sub-divided into six sections. Chapter VI of the Rules, deals with the courts of Enquiry. ( 30 ) SECTION 1 of Chapter V, deals with the procedure that is required to be followed in preparing the charge. Rules 22 to 27 deal with the procedure for the preparation of the charge and connected matters. Rule 28 deals with the framing of charges. Rule 29 deals with the contents of the charges etc. ( 31 ) A perusal of Rule 22 shows that even before a charge-sheet is prepared, preliminary enquiry is required to be conducted by the Commanding Officer in the presence of the accused and in such an enquiry, the accused is to be given the opportunity to cross-examine any witness, who is proposed to be examined at the trial before the Court-Martial and also opportunity to call any witness in his defence. The said Rule also enables the Commanding officer to dismiss the charge, if in the opinion of the Commanding Officer that there is no sufficient evidence against the accused. Rule 22 (3) stipulates that if the commanding Officer is of the opinion that the charge has to be proceeded with, he shall follow one of the four alternative courses prescribed under the said sub- rule depending upon the facts of the case. One of the options, is to dispose of the case under Section 80 of the Act, the second option is to refer the case to appropriate superior Military authority, and the third option, is to adjourn the case for the purpose of having evidence reduced to writing. If the said third option is availed by the commanding Officer, Rule 23 prescribes the procedure for taking down the summary evidence. After the summary evidence is record as per the provisions of Rule 23, the commanding Officer shall consider the same and once again called upon to take decision in one of the three alternatives mentioned under Rule 24 viz. , the first is to remand the accused for trial by a Court- martial, the second is to refer the case to the proper superior military authority and third option is that if the Commanding officer thinks it desirable, rehear the case and either dismiss the charge or dispose of it summarily. ( 32 ) IF the Commanding Officer is of the opinion that the accused is required to be tried by a Court-Martial, then the commanding Officer is mandated to take necessary steps for convening of an appropriate Court-Martial relevant for the case, which depends upon the nature of the offence alleged against the accused and the rank of the accused person. ( 33 ) RULE 33 deals with the various rights of the accused to prepare his defence. The details of which may not be necessary for the present except to take note that the accused person is entitled to have legal advise and also interview any witness, whom he may wish to call in defence. ( 34 ) RULE 34 requires that the accused shall be informed of every charge of which he is to be tried and must be given an opportunity of securing the presence of the witnesses, whom he desires to call in his defence. ( 34 ) RULE 34 requires that the accused shall be informed of every charge of which he is to be tried and must be given an opportunity of securing the presence of the witnesses, whom he desires to call in his defence. ( 35 ) SECTION 2 of the Chapter V deals with the procedure at the trial etc. , of the court-Martial. The details of which may not be necessary for the present case, except to take note of one provision i. e. , rule 41, which obligates the Court-Martial to satisfy itself that it is legally constituted. Rule 42 also obligates the Court-Martial to satisfy itself that in respect of each of the charges, required to be tried by it are made against a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court-Martial and that each charge discloses an offence under the Act and further such charges are framed in accordance with the law. Rule 44 enables the accused to raise an objection regarding the membership of any one of the members of Court-Martial and the procedure that is required to be followed upon such a challenge/objection. If all the above mentioned requirements of the rules are satisfied the members of the Court- martial are required to take oath as provided under Rule 45. Only then the accused is required to be arraigned before the Court- martial. On such arraignment, the charge upon which the accused is arraigned, are required to be read over and if necessary, translated to him and the accused is required to plead separately with reference to each of the charges. Even, at that stage, under Rule 49, the accused is given the liberty to object any one of the charges either on the ground that the charge as framed against him, does not disclose an offence under the Act or is not framed in accordance with the rules, which objection when raised, the Court-Martial is bound to consider and take an appropriate decision depending on the merits of the objection either to proceed with the trial or to adjourn and report to the Convening authority. ( 36 ) IF none of the objections mentioned so far, are there, then only the Court- martial is to proceed with the trial of the accused. ( 36 ) IF none of the objections mentioned so far, are there, then only the Court- martial is to proceed with the trial of the accused. Rule 52 requires the recording of the plea of the accused with reference to each of the charges framed against him. In a given case, if the accused pleads guilty, the court-Martial is required to follow the procedure contemplated under Rule 52 (2), (2a) and 3. Sub-rule 4 mandates that the plea of "guilty" even if made shall not be accepted in cases where the accused is liable, if convicted, sentence of death. ( 37 ) THE procedure that is required to be followed upon plea of guilty , is provided under Rule 50 (4) and the plea of not guilty is provided under Rule 50 (6 ). ( 38 ) THE other rules deal with various other circumstances, with which, we are not concerned with in the present case. ( 39 ) FROM the above, it is clear that an elaborate procedure conforming to the norms of natural justice at every stage, is provided for the trial of an accused person by a Court-Martial. Though the said procedure may not be identical with the procedure adapted for the trial of a Civilian by the ordinary Criminal Courts, it is the procedure established by law for the trial and punishment of the persons who are subject to the military Law and are accused of an offence punishable by the Courts- martial. ( 40 ) AN argument was advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that such a procedure which is different from the normal procedure for the trial and punishment of civilians under the law of the land i. e. , the Criminal Procedure Code, would be inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution under articles 14 and 21. ( 41 ) WE do not propose to go into question whether such a procedure would be inconsistent with the fundamental rights guarantee under Articles 14 and 21 of the constitution of India. ( 41 ) WE do not propose to go into question whether such a procedure would be inconsistent with the fundamental rights guarantee under Articles 14 and 21 of the constitution of India. But, assume for the sake of argument that such a procedure is inconsistent with the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, even then, the petitioner would not any way be benefited for the reason that Article 33 of the Constitution recognizes the need to treat the members of the Armed Forces and various other categories of persons enumerated therein differently for the purpose of the fundamental rights contained in Part III. Article 33 enables the Parliament to determine to what extent, any of the rights conferred by Part III may be "restricted or abrogated" in order to ensure "proper discharge of their duties and maintenance of discipline among them". ( 42 ) IN fact, this aspect fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in a case reported in Priti Pal Singh v. Union of india, AIR 1982 SC 1413 . Their Lordships dealing with an objection that the procedure prescribed under the Army Act and Rules for the trial of an offender, is inconsistent with the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution, repelled the challenge and held as follows:"while investigating and precisely ascertaining the limits of inroads or encroachments made by legislation enacted in exercise of Power conferred by Article 33, on the guaranteed fundamental rights to all citizens of this country without distinction, in respect of armed personnel, the Court should be vigilant to hold the balance between two conflicting public interests namely necessity of discipline in armed personnel to preserve national security at any cost, because that itself would ensure enjoyment of fundamental rights by others, and, the denial to those responsible for national security of these very fundamental rights which are inseparable adjuncts of civilised life. Article 33 confers power on the Parliament to determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by Part III shall, in their application to the members of the Armed, forces, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline amongst them. Article 33 confers power on the Parliament to determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by Part III shall, in their application to the members of the Armed, forces, be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline amongst them. Article 33 does not obligate that Parliament must specifically adumbrate each fundamental right enshrined in Part III and to specify in the law enacted in exercise of the power conferred by Article 33 the degree of restriction or total abrogation of each right. That would be reading into Article 33 a requirement which it does not enjoin. In fact, after the Constitution came into force, the power to legislate in respect of any item must be referable to an entry in the relevant list. Entry 2 in List I : Naval, Military and air Force and any other Armed Forces of the union, would enable Parliament to enact the army Act and armed with this power the Act was enacted in July, 1950. It has to be enacted by the Parliament subject to the requirements of Part III of the Constitution read with Article 33 which itself forms part of Part III. Therefore, every provision of, the Army Act, enacted by the Parliament, if in conflict with the fundamental rights conferred by Part III, shall have to be read subject to Article 33 as being enacted with a view to either restricting or abrogating other fundamental rights to the extent of inconsistency or repugnancy between Part III of the Constitution and the Army Act. This is no more res integra in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in Ram Samp v. Union of India, (1964) 5 SCR 931 = ( AIR 1965 SC 247 ) in which repelling the contention that the restriction or abrogation of the fundamental rights in exercise of the power conferred by Article 33 is limited to one set out in Section 21 of the act, this Court observed as under (at p. 251of AIR) : "the learned Attorney-General has urged that the entire Act has been enacted by parliament and if any of the provisions of the act is not consistent with the provisions of any of the articles in Part III of the constitution, @ page-SC1424 it must be taken that to the extent of the inconsistency parliament had modified the fundamental rights under those articles in their application to the person subject to that Act. Any such provision in the Act is as much law as the entire Act. We agree that each and every provision of the Act is a law made by parliament and that if any such provision tends to effect the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution, that provision does not, on that account, become void, as it must be taken that Parliament has thereby in the exercise of its power under. Article 33 of the Constitution made the requisite modification to affect the respective fundamental rights. Section 21 merely confers an additional power to modify rights conferred, by article 19 (l) (a) and (c) by Rules and such rules may set out the limits of restriction. But the specific provision does not derogate from the generality of power conferred by article 33. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission that the law. Prescribing procedure for trial of offences by Court-Martial must satisfy the requirement of article 21 because to the extent the procedure is prescribed by law and if it stands in derogation of Article 21, to that extent article 21 in its application to the Armed forces is modified by enactment of the procedure in the Army Act itself. " ( 43 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner next argued that even those various procedural safe guards contemplated under chapter V of the Rules discussed earlier in this judgment, have not been followed in the case of the petitioner. " ( 43 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner next argued that even those various procedural safe guards contemplated under chapter V of the Rules discussed earlier in this judgment, have not been followed in the case of the petitioner. ( 44 ) WE have already pointed out that the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is sworn to by the wife of the convict Venkateswarlu, the allegations in the affidavit are mostly omnibus in nature and at times even inherently inconsistent - for example in paragraph 20 of the affidavit it is stated that the convict was taken to the Quarter Guard immediately after the incident wherein he was kept under "closed arrest for weeks together" - whereas at paragraph 24, another statement is made that the convict was kept in custody for a period of about 10 months. ( 45 ) AT paragraph 22 it is stated that a hearing as required under Rule 22 of the Indian Army Act 1950 was arranged without the convict being supplied with the copies of the charge-sheet and without informing him of the charges leveled against him. In fact, at the stage of enquiry under rule 22 of the Indian Army Act 1950, the charge-sheet is not yet been prepared, as we have already examined earlier. It was an enquiry prior to the framing of the charges. ( 46 ) AT paragraph 26 another omnibus statement is made stating that the convict has not been given any opportunity to put up his defence and to examine any witness on his behalf. We must state that it would be difficult for any Court to enquire into the matter only on the basis of such omnibus statements made by a person who has no personal knowledge of the facts contained in those statements and also a person who does not disclose the source of such information. ( 47 ) IN the verification statement filed by the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the deponent states that the contents in all the paragraphs of the affidavit are true to the best of her personal knowledge, which, in our view, is itself is a contradictory statement. Admittedly, the deponent of the affidavit was not present along with the convict either at the time of the incident or during the course of the proceedings before the Court- martial. Admittedly, the deponent of the affidavit was not present along with the convict either at the time of the incident or during the course of the proceedings before the Court- martial. Further, there was no contemporaneous evidence of the facts alleged in the affidavit regarding the non- compliance with the procedure prescribed under the Indian Army Act 1950 and the rules thereof. ( 48 ) IN spite of this, in view of the fact that the case involves the liberty of a citizen of the country of course subject to such restriction imposed by virtue of his being a member of the Indian Army, we called upon the respondents to produce the original records pertaining to the Court-Martial. Accordingly, the respondents produced the records. We have perused the records thoroughly and we are satisfied that the convict in fact was given an opportunity to obtain the legal assistance if he so chooses, for which through the letter dated 19. 12. 2002 the convict expressed his unwillingness to hire any "civil legal advisor" in defence of his trial proceedings. ( 49 ) IN fact, by another letter-dated 19. 12. 2002, the victim expressed his willingness to accept Major A. S. Chandal as his defending officer during the trial. ( 50 ) ALL the respondents have filed an elaborate counter-affidavit. At paragraph 23 of the counter-affidavit, the respondents detailed the procedure that was in fact followed in the case of the convict, in obedience to provisions of the Indian Army act 1950 and the Rules thereunder. From the record, we also find a mercy petition dated 26. 12. 2002 in fact was filed by the convict. Apart from the content of the said mercy petition, a fact that is required to be noticed is that it was also signed by the defending officer referred to earlier along with the convict. ( 51 ) IN the circumstances, we do not see any reason to find fault with the procedure adopted by the respondents in conducting the Court-Martial against the petitioner herein. ( 52 ) IN the result, the writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, without costs. ( 53 ) BEFORE parting with the case, we must place it on record our appreciation of the pains taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-Capt. KM. Saxena in assisting the Court.