ORDER: This application is filed under O.39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., for issuance of Judge’s Summons restraining the respondents from in any way carrying out the proposed amendments as stated in the agenda circulated along with the notice dated 16.7.2002 to be considered at the Special General Meeting to be held on 8.8.2002 at Mumbai or any subsequent dates. The proposed amendment sought to be effected is set out in the petition schedule. 2. Earlier by an order of this Court dated 7.8.2002, ex parte interim injunction was granted. 3. This application, suit and the elaborate submissions advanced by both sides are all about Cricket. First respondent - Board of Control for Cricket in India is the body, which controls the cricket in India. For better appreciation of the points urged, we may refer to the objects of first respondent Association, its membership and the background in which the present suit arose. I.First respondent - Board of Control for Cricket in India (for short referred to as the ‘Board’). First defendant/first respondent Board is a Non-Profit Making Autonomous Association having its head office at Mumbai. The objects of the Board are: (a) To control the game of Cricket in India and give its decision on all matters which may be referred to it by any State, Regional or other Associations; (b) To encourage the formation of State, Regional or other Cricket Associations and the Organisation of Inter-State and other Tournaments; (c) .... (d) .... (e) To promote the game throughout India by organising Coaching Schemes, Tournaments, Exhibition Test Matches and by any other manner; The Board has its own resource of funds and also assets by way of immovable properties. It has got powers to sell, manage... dispose of or otherwise deal with any property of the Board. The powers of the Board in detail is not the germane for disposal of this application. II.Membership and jurisdiction of Members: Members of the Board shall be confined to (a) Full Members; (b) Such Associate Members as may be promoted as Full Members and (c) Associate Members. Only the State Associations fostering the game of Cricket in the respective States in the Country are to be Members of D1 Board. Accordingly, State Centrally Governed Bodies are the full Members. The names of the State/Full Members are indicated in the Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of D1 Board. Only the State Associations fostering the game of Cricket in the respective States in the Country are to be Members of D1 Board. Accordingly, State Centrally Governed Bodies are the full Members. The names of the State/Full Members are indicated in the Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of D1 Board. Bihar Cricket Association (for short referred to as ‘BCA’) having its office at Keenan Stadium, Jamshedpur is also one such Full Member (Sl.No.5). D2 - Tamil Nadu Cricket Association is also one of the Full Members of the Board (Sl.No.27). No independent Club playing cricket in any State is a Member of the First Defendant except National Cricket Club and Cricket Club of India, which are the Founder Members of the First Defendant. In fact, National Cricket Club or Cricket Club of India are not Clubs affiliated with any other State Association. There is no direct affiliation to the Board as a Full Member. Associate Member: The Central Controlling Body for Cricket in any State within the territory of India which may hereafter be affiliated shall be an Associate Member. Bifurcation of States: In 2001-2002, D1 Board faced with a peculiar situation with regard to granting new Affiliations in view of Bifurcation of States Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The above three States had been bifurcated as follows: Bihar as Bihar and Jharkhand; Uttar Pradesh as Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal;Madhya Pradesh as Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh. Since one of the objects of the Board under its Memorandum of Association was to encourage as many States to play the game of Cricket and in doing so, it should help those States where Cricket was not quite developed, to come up through a smooth process of transition. With this philosophy as the foundation, the Board considered to grant affiliation to all the six States - Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh. The category of affiliation for such bifurcated States however, would depend on the cricketing standards prevalent in that particular bifurcated State. In other words, if a State was bifurcated, either both components could be Full Members or both could be Associate Members or one could be Full Member and the other could be Associate Member. The category of affiliation for such bifurcated States however, would depend on the cricketing standards prevalent in that particular bifurcated State. In other words, if a State was bifurcated, either both components could be Full Members or both could be Associate Members or one could be Full Member and the other could be Associate Member. Since the existing Rules and Regulations of the Board with regard to new Affiliations were not equipped to deal with the peculiar scenario arising out of division of States, it was thought fit necessary to amend the relevant Rules and Regulations with regard to new affiliation. III.Proposed Special General Body Meeting on 8.8.2002. Notice circulated on 16.7.2002: To consider and adopt the proposed Amendments to the Rules and Regulations of the Board, a Special General Body Meeting of BCCI was proposed to be held on 8.8.2002. To that effect, a Notice was circulated on 16.7.2002. The proposed Amendment was enclosed along with the Notice and circulated among the Members. The prosed Amendment is now set forth in the Schedule to the Judge’s summons. Now, this proposed Amendment is sought to be injuncted and implemented from being carried into effect. Since the dispute relates to BCA, we may briefly refer the BCA. BCA havings its office Keenan Stadium, Jamshedpur is the Full Member of D1 Board (sl.No.5). BCA having its office at Patna, whose cause the applicant/plaintiff is said to be espousing, is neither a Full Member nor an Associate Member of D1 Board. IV.Bihar Cricket Association - Keenan Stadium, Jamshedpur: This Association at Jamshedpur is the Governing State Body of the State of Bihar affiliated to D1 Board. It has its office at Jamshedpur and functioning from there, BCA, Jamshedpur also held discussions on 18.3.2001 and considered, the bifurcation of the State as Bihar and Jharkhand. The Rules and Regulations of Cricket Association of Jharkhand (CAJ) was also taken up for discussion. It was also proposed to hold election for the various posts of Cricket Association of Jharkhand in sometime in May/June, 2001. V.Bihar Cricket Association represented by its Secretary, Mr.Ajay Narayan Sharma, having its office at Patna: This Association having its office at Patna (applicant in the Impleading Application A.No.3576 of 2003) is neither a Full Member nor an Associate Member of D1 Board. This Association claims to be the Governing State Body of Bihar. V.Bihar Cricket Association represented by its Secretary, Mr.Ajay Narayan Sharma, having its office at Patna: This Association having its office at Patna (applicant in the Impleading Application A.No.3576 of 2003) is neither a Full Member nor an Associate Member of D1 Board. This Association claims to be the Governing State Body of Bihar. According to this Association, elections were held in this Association on 26.5.2001 and Mr.Laloo Prasad Yadav was elected as the President of Bihar Cricket Association, Patna. Ajay Narayan Sharma is said to be the Secretary of this Association. Now, the applicant/plaintiff espouses the cause of BCA, Patna which claims to be the Full Member of D1 Board. According to the applicant/plaintiff, BCA having its Headquarters at Patna will continue as existing Member of D1 Board and that the new comers including Cricket Association, Jharkhand would have to make a fresh application for affiliation to D1 Board. Further case of applicant/plaintiff is that to that effect in the Meeting held on 25.8.2001, the then Chairman of D1 Board has given the Ruling as noted below, which was approved by all the Members present at the Working Committee Meeting. “Thereafter, Chairman gave a ruling that considering all the facts of the case Bihar Cricket Association having its headquarters at Patna will continue to exist as Bihar Cricket Association. Whosoever is in the management in the Bihar Cricket Association will be entitled to attend the Annual General Meeting of BOCI. MP and UP Cricket Association will continue as the existing members of the Board. The new members like Chattisgargh, Uttaranchal and Jharkhand will make application to the Board for affiliation. The ruling of the Chairman was approved by all the members”. 4. Case of the applicant/plaintiff is that the above ruling of the then President of D1 Board is clear and conclusive. Further case of applicant/plaintiff is that it would clearly reveal that BCA, Patna is not a new entity requiring from affiliation. D1 originally proposed the Amendment, but later deleting “BCA” is arbitrary, illegal and beyond the powers of D1 board. Thus, the applicant/plaintiff assails the proposal to ‘delete BCA’ as illegal and arbitrary and seeks for an injunction in carrying out the proposed Amendment as envisaged in the Agenda circulated along with the Notice dated 16.7.2002. 5. D1 originally proposed the Amendment, but later deleting “BCA” is arbitrary, illegal and beyond the powers of D1 board. Thus, the applicant/plaintiff assails the proposal to ‘delete BCA’ as illegal and arbitrary and seeks for an injunction in carrying out the proposed Amendment as envisaged in the Agenda circulated along with the Notice dated 16.7.2002. 5. The averments in the affidavit is strongly opposed on the ground that the plaintiff has no locus standi to file in the application. According to D1 Board, the applicant, who is not the Member of the first Defendant has nothing to do with the subject matter and activities of D1 Board. No enforceable right of the applicant is affected by the Proposed Amendment. Even the Tamil Nadu Cricket Association/R2/D2 to which the applicant is affiliated has not raised any objection to the Proposed Amendment of Rule 6 of D1 Board. While so, applicant/plaintiff has filed this suit and application for injunction with ulterior motive, suppressing the material facts. The applicant has no locus standi, right or authority to espouse the cause of either the BCA or any other members. The counter affidavit refers to the various proposed Amendments sought to be introduced. 6. Reiterating the averments in the Affidavit, the learned senior counsel, Mr.N.R.Chandran for the applicant/plaintiff submitted that the respondents having not filed the application for revocation of the ‘leave to sue’ earlier granted cannot re-agitate the same in this application. Submitting that when the activities of D1 Board stretches all around India, plaintiff Club being a Member of D2 - Tamil Nadu Cricket Association has got every locus standi to ask the Court to review the activities of D1 Board, the public organisation. In an injunction application the main test being the balance of convenience, it is submitted that the interim injunction granted on 7.8.2002 is necessarily to be sustained. The learned senior counsel, further submitted that any deletion of name of the Member “BCA” would have serious consequence on the future membership and functioning of the Board. 7. Taking serious exceptions to the leave to sue granted by this Court and contending that no part of cause of action has arisen in Chennai, the learned senior counsel for D1 submitted that the suit itself is not maintainable. 7. Taking serious exceptions to the leave to sue granted by this Court and contending that no part of cause of action has arisen in Chennai, the learned senior counsel for D1 submitted that the suit itself is not maintainable. Submitting that the dispute arising in this applicationwas earlier dealt with by Division Bench of the Patna High Court, where the Chief Justice of Patna High Court had dismissed the Writ Petition in CWJC No.8975 of 2002, it is submitted that the applicant/plaintiff had deliberately suppressed the earlier series of litigation in this matter. Taking serious objections to the locus standi of the plaintiff in filing the suit, the learned senior counsel further submitted that the applicant/plaintiff is only a proxy for the actual players behind the screen. When that being so, it is submitted that the injunction cannot be granted merely for the sake of asking it and the Judicial Discretion to be wisely exercised in granting ex parte order of injunction. Relying upon various decisions, the learned senior counsel for D1 inter alia submitted that the plaintiff has no prima facie case to espouse the cause of BCA, Patna and when neither balance of convenience nor hardship is proved, the earlier interim injunction granted cannot be sustained. Placing reliance upon Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994)4 S.C.C. 711 , it is submitted that merely because the plaintiff Association having its office at Chennai happened to receive the Notice circulated or that the Meeting was held in Chennai on 29.9.2001 cannot give rise to cause of action to the Courts in Chennai. 8. Upon careful analysis of the rival submissions, in my considered view, the following points arise for determination: (1) Whether the applicant/plaintiff has established strong prima facie case and balance of convenience in order to grant temporary injunction in its favour? (2) Is there any sufficient justification to sustain the earlier interim order granted on 7.8.2002? 9. Before going into the facts and merits of the legal submissions, an interesting question arises in ones minds as to who is the applicant/plaintiff having its office at Chennai, who is said to have been so greatly affected by the activities of the Cricket Club in Bihar. Applicant/plaintiff is Nethaji Cricket Club claims to be an Affiliated Member of D2 - Tamil Nadu Cricket Association. Applicant/plaintiff is Nethaji Cricket Club claims to be an Affiliated Member of D2 - Tamil Nadu Cricket Association. The plaintiff Association claims to be in existence since 1959 and claims to be one Time Champion in V Division Championship and also in IV Division Championship. It claims to be the First Team affiliated to D2/Tamil Nadu Cricket Association. Further the plaintiff claims to be involved in activities in promoting the culture of Cricket amongst the youngsters in Tamil Nadu and is said to have been taken active participation in promotion of Cricket in the State of Tamil Nadu as a Member of D2. 10. As noted earlier, only the Central Governing Body of the State can alone be the full member of D1 Board. There shall be no direct affiliation to the Board as a Full Member. In fact, even any Central Controlling Body for cricket in any State which may thereafter be affiliated shall only be an Associate Member. Thus, the applicant/plaintiff is neither member of D1 nor an Associate Member. The applicant/plaintiff being not Member of D1 Board in any capacity has nothing to do with the subject matter of activities of D1. When not being the member of D1 Board, how can the applicant/plaintiff claim to be affected by the proposed Amendment to Rule 6 or deletion of BCA or otherwise. It is pertinent to note, even Tamil Nadu Cricket Association - D2, to which the plaintiff is said to be affiliated has not raised any objection to the proposed amendment. It is difficult to comprehend as to why the applicant/plaintiff should file this suit and the application as an Intruder. 11. Plaintiff Club claims to be promoting the culture of Cricket amongst the youngsters in Tamil Nadu and claims to be taking active participation in the promotion of Cricket in State of Tamil Nadu as a Member of D2 Association. The plaintiff’s claim of locus standi in filing the suit on the ground of promoting Cricket is so slender a claim, to maintain the suit. Who is not interest in promoting the Cricket amongst cricketers? A Local Association, School/any Sport Association.... why not the Amateur players on the wayside are all interested only in promoting the culture of Cricket. It may be that the plaintiff Club has some Organised Activities. The wayside Amateur players may not be so organised for want of funds and other reasons. A Local Association, School/any Sport Association.... why not the Amateur players on the wayside are all interested only in promoting the culture of Cricket. It may be that the plaintiff Club has some Organised Activities. The wayside Amateur players may not be so organised for want of funds and other reasons. The question that arises for consideration is whether such a claim of plaintiff’s Club that it is interested in promoting Cricket is sufficient to provide locus standi to the plaintiff. In this context, the questions arise whether the plaintiff has got any enforceable right of which it can complain of the violation. Further question arises is that the violation of right is so serious to invoke original jurisdiction of this High Court and obtaining interim injunction restraining D1 Board from effectuating the proposed Amendment. 12.IV. Importing the concept of Public Interest Litigation to Civil Suits: We may straightaway point out that we are not dealing with any Public Interest Litigation nor can it be imparted to civil suits. In exercising the Original Jurisdiction, the Court is called upon to try all suits of civil nature (Sec.9, C.P.C.). In the present days, to meet the challenges of time, Judicial Activism has opened up new dimension for the judicial process liberalising the principles of locus standi. Even in the area of PIL, the Higher Courts are vigilant that the Court process is not to be abused by an Interloper. 13. Under Sec.9, C.P.C., Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature. Suits fall under two categories: those which are of a civil nature and those which are not. Suits falling under the first category only can be entertained by civil Courts. Explanation I clarifies as to what a suit of a civil nature is. Explanation I to Sec.9 reads as follows: “A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies”. Thus, neither the right of the plaintiff to the property nor its right to any office arise in this suit. Prima facie there is no enforceable right to institute this suit and no infringement of right of civil nature is involved in the present case. 14. Thus, neither the right of the plaintiff to the property nor its right to any office arise in this suit. Prima facie there is no enforceable right to institute this suit and no infringement of right of civil nature is involved in the present case. 14. The learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff has relied upon Saina v. Konderi, A.I.R. 1984 Ker. 170,in support of his contention that a citizen’s right to move a Court of law is to be liberalised even in implementation of Municipal regulations, etc. That case arose out of peculiar conditions of enforcement of well conceived municipal measures and a learned single Judge of Kerala High Court adopted a liberal view upholding a right of a citizen to enforce the legislative mandates. In my view, that principles cannot be adopted to the case in hand for we are not dealing with any enforcement legislative mandate; but only concerned with the functioning of self-governed autonomous body. 15. There is no provision to extend the concept of PIL to Sec.9, C.P.C. If the concept PIL is to be extended to the civil suits, flood-gates of litigation would be opened. What is sought to be termed as a Golden Master Key in S.P.Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 149 is sought to be used/misused by the applicant/plaintiff under the garb of saying that the plaintiff Club is interested in promoting the Cricket. As no enforceable right is involved, this Court is constrained to observe that the applicant/plaintiff is nothing but an intruder/intermeddler to whom no discretionary relief is available. 16. When the applicant/plaintiff applies for an injunction in respect of violation of right, the plaintiff must establish his enforceable right and the violation thereof. Now, what is the right of the plaintiff in BCA; how the right of the plaintiff is violated by the Proposed Amendment in retaining BCA, Jamshedpur and introducing the Amendment suggesting the procedure for affiliation of the other newly bifurcated State Members. Absolute none. 17. Absolutely plaintiff has no enforceable right. Equally, there is no violation of any right much less of a substantial character. Mere interference with a legal right does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to an injunction, nor does mere inconvenience. There must be violation of an enforceable right and the violation must be of a substantial character. Absolute none. 17. Absolutely plaintiff has no enforceable right. Equally, there is no violation of any right much less of a substantial character. Mere interference with a legal right does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to an injunction, nor does mere inconvenience. There must be violation of an enforceable right and the violation must be of a substantial character. Under O.39, Rule 1, C.P.C., the Court may grant an injunction to restrain such acts, or may make any other order staying or preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of plaintiff, or causing of injury. The Court may also grant in a suit for restraining the defendant from committing breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. This Court is unable to see under which the above provisions the plaintiff’s alleged complaint of violation of right falls and how the plaintiff could claim to seek an injunction. 18. Proposed Amendment relating to 3(a)(ii), 5 Rules and Regulations reads thus: Existing Proposed 3. (a)(ii) There shall be no direct affiliation to the Board as a Full Member. Delete The above proposed Amendment under Clause 3(a)(ii) of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Control for Cricket (BCCI) was withdrawn by the letter dated 2.8.2002 (Letter of the Secretary). The rest of the proposed Amendment would remain unchanged. Thus, the combined effect of the letter is that BCA, Jamshedpur would continue to be the Full Member, for which Chennai based plaintiff could have no exception. 19.Proposed amendment - Procedure for Affiliation as Member to Rule 6(i) is thus: The Central Controlling Body for Cricket in any State within the territory of India and being a body duly registered under the Societies Registration Act or a body corporate desirous of being admitted as an Associate Member shall be required to submit an application to the Secretary of the Board for affiliation along with the true copies of its Rules and Regulations, its List of Members mentioning the areas or regions over which it exercises jurisdiction. The application shall be considered by the Board at a Annual/Special General Meeting and the applicant may be admitted as an Associate member if a two-third majority of the Board present at the Annual/Special General Meeting and entitled to vote, so decide. The Board may reject any application for membership without assigning any reason therefor. 20. The above procedure for affiliation as Member by way of Proposed Amendment is after much deliberation and consultation of D1 Board. What could be the valid objection for such proposed Amendment to Rule 6(i) and New Addition Rule 6(ii). The proposed Amendment retaining the BCA, Jamshedpur as Original Member; suggesting procedure for affiliation as Member by way of proposed Amendment is the inter-subject and activity of D1 Board. The procedure for affiliation of any new Member after evaluating its performance arose out of the Bifurcation of the States. The proposed Amendment to Rule 6(i) and New Addition Rule 6(ii) was thus necessary in the larger interest of the functioning of the Board to promote its objects. How could the right of the plaintiff, who is placed IV or V division, be affected by the same. Hardly can the plaintiff have any say in the functioning of D1 Board. 21. From the averments in para (3) of the Affidavit filed by the petitioner Club, it is seen that for BCA, Patna, elections were held on 26.5.2001 and Mr.Laloo Prasad Yadav was elected as the President of the said Association. BCA, Patna thus formed in 2001 is not the State Governing Body, which can never be the Full Member as per the present Rules and Regulations. When BCA, Jamshedpur is the Full Member of D1 Board, BCA, Patna, cannot claim to be the Full Member. Thus even apart from the locus standi, on facts also, plaintiff Club has not proved prima facie case. 22. In Gujarat Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995)5 S.C.C. 545 : A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2372, the tests for exercise of discretion in granting temporary injunctions have been stated: While exercising the discretion the Court applies the following tests: (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; or (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an inrreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. To sustain validity a claim for temporary injunction, it is not only that plaintiff has to establish his prima facie case as to his right, but he has to also establish further the balance of convenience lay in his favour and that he would suffer irreparable injury if the temporary injunction prayed for was not granted. Thus even on facts, plaintiff Club has neither established prima facie case nor established the balance of convenience. That apart, what could be the irreparable injury to a Club like the petitioner which is IV - V Rank player in Tamil Nadu. How the petitioner Club would suffer by the proposed Amendment entitling it to the order of temporary injunction. 23. On the contrary, when we weigh the case of D1 on the probabilities, we find that earlier interim injunction was obtained, which continued to remain on force for nearly one year. Either due to congestion of work or other reason the applicationcould not be taken up immediately. The order of interim injunction remaining in force has had serious repercussions on the activities of the Board. Atleast the affiliation of the names of six States and promoting Cricket in those States are stalled because of the interim order of this Court. The hardship caused to D1 Board is comparatively heavier when considered in the light of probabilities. That apart, the time and energy spent by the Board in this litigation cannot also be lost sight of. 24. In Multi Channel (India) Limited v. Kavitalya Productions Private Limited, Chennai, A.I.R. 1999 Mad. 59, Division Bench of this Court has gone in elaborate on the ground of interim injunction. As the Division Bench has emphatically laid down that there must have been violation of enforceable right and the violation must be of substantial character, we would do no better than referred to those principles laid down in the Division Bench, which reads thus: "It is not in every case of breach of contract or covenant that the Court will interfere by way of injunction. In exercising its jurisdiction by way of an interlocutory injunction, the Court acts upon the principle of preventing irreparable injury. In exercising its jurisdiction by way of an interlocutory injunction, the Court acts upon the principle of preventing irreparable injury. If a covenant is clear and the breach clear and serious injury is like to arise from the breach, the Court will interfere before the hearing to restrain the breach; but if the covenant is obscure or the breach doubtful, and no irreparable damage can arise to the plaintiff/appellant, then the question resolves itself into a question of comparative injury, whether the defendant will be more damnified by the injunction being granted or the plaintiff by its being withheld. Mere interference with a legal right does not, however, ipso facto entitle a plaintiff to an injunction and mere inconvenience is not enough to entitle a party to an injunction. There must be violation of an enforceable right and the violation must be of a substantial character. An injunction will not be granted where the plaintiff has a remedy by way of damages. The injury must be irreparable and it must be continuous. By the term irreparable injury is meant injury which is substantial and could never be adequately remedied or atoned for by damages, nor injury which cannot possibly be repaired". 25. In the above decision, the Division Bench of this Court in extenso considered other decisions: (1) Gujarat Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995)5 S.C.C. 545 : A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2372; (2) Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993)3 S.C.C. 161 . which the learned counsel for D1 has referred to. As laid down consistently in the above decisions, in the instant case, plaintiff Club has not proved any enforceable right nor any violation of the same much less of substantial character. 26.Cause of action: The first defendant is an independent Non-Profit Making Autonomous Body having its Head Office at Mumbai. The Board has to be sued in the name of the Secretary who has its Office at Rajkot. The decision to hold General Body Meeting was held in Calcutta. The Bihar Cricket Association, Patna, whose cause the plaintiff is espousing, is having its Office at Patna. The Special General Body Meeting on 8.8.2002 was held in Mumbai. While so, it is submitted, when none of part of cause of action has arisen in Chennai, the suit itself is not maintainable in the Court at Chennai. The Bihar Cricket Association, Patna, whose cause the plaintiff is espousing, is having its Office at Patna. The Special General Body Meeting on 8.8.2002 was held in Mumbai. While so, it is submitted, when none of part of cause of action has arisen in Chennai, the suit itself is not maintainable in the Court at Chennai. The Annual General Body Meeting held in Chennai on 29.9.2001 cannot give rise to cause of action at Chennai. plaintiff Club claims circulation of the Proposed Amendment along with the Notice dated 16.7.2002 about the Special Meeting to be held on 8.8.2002 and that the plaintiff Club happened to receive the same in Chennai and that earlier Annual General Body Meeting held on 29.9.2001 in Chennai, in which the President has given a ruling and hence, part of cause of action has arise at Chennai. Learned senior counsel for D1 Board assailed this contention of the plaintiff contending that receipt of circulation of Proposed Amendment along with the Notice dated 16.7.2002 cannot give rise to the cause of action. It is further submitted that the cause of action being a bundle of facts must form integral part of the plaintiff claim. 27. The plaintiff Club has filed rejoinder. In the rejoinder, it is averred that Annual General Meeting was held in Chennai on 29.9.2001 and part of cause of action has arise in Chennai. Though holding of Annual General Meeting on 29.9.2001 is referred in para (22) of the plaint, in my view that by itself cannot give rise to cause of action. Since any ruling by the then President on 29.9.2001 was set aside by the D1 Board introducing the Proposed Amendments, cause of action being a bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove, if traversed would entitle him to a judgment. A stray incident of Meeting held in Chennai on 29.9.2001 would not give rise to cause of action in Chennai. That apart, it is relevant to note that the present suit was not filed at that point of time. The main cause of action for the suit is the circulation of the Proposed Amendment along with the Notice dated 16.7.2002 over which the Chennai Court cannot be said to be having jurisdiction. 28. That apart, it is relevant to note that the present suit was not filed at that point of time. The main cause of action for the suit is the circulation of the Proposed Amendment along with the Notice dated 16.7.2002 over which the Chennai Court cannot be said to be having jurisdiction. 28. In a case of identical facts in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994)4 S.C.C. 711 , “the plaintiff company NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen with its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently”. In that case, the Supreme Court was of the view that, “Therefore, merely because NICCO read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action”. 29. The Supreme Court referring to an earlier decision State of Rajasthan v. M/s.Swaika Properties, (1985)3 S.C.C. 217 , deprecated the practice of the Calcutta High Court in assuming the jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction and observed thus: “Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency”. [Italics added] The Supreme Court also disapproved the conduct of the litigants who seek to abuse the process giving rise to avoidable suspicion. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency”. [Italics added] The Supreme Court also disapproved the conduct of the litigants who seek to abuse the process giving rise to avoidable suspicion. In my view, the case in hand is also one such illustrious example where this Court is called upon to assume jurisdiction without any basis or cause of action. 30. The indications are that plaintiff Club seems to have been actuated by motive and oblique purpose. Petitioner Club seems to have moved this Court after BCA, Patna had failed before various other Forums. From the averments in the counter affidavit of the first defendant, it is seen from that earlier Ajay Narain Singh claiming to be the Honorary Secretary of BCA, Patna moved an application in a pending suit before the IX Court of Subordinate Judge, Patna questioning the legality of the Amendment as proposed by D1. The matter is said to be pending there. That apart, invoking Writ Jurisdiction of the Patna High Court, the Amendment was challenged before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in CWJC No.8975 of 2002. That applicationwas disposed of by the judgment rendered by the Chief Justice of Patna High Court finding that D1 Club is a Society and an incorporate Body not discharging a State function and not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the petition was dismissed as misconceived (judgment dated 6.8.2002). In the judgment, the Division Bench refers two other sets of litigation before the District Court, Patna. Thus, there seems to have been several rounds of litigation in various Courts in Patna. When that being so, the petitioner/applicant Club seems to have moved this Court with oblique purpose to obtain the order of interim injunction. 31. D1 Club is an Autonomous Body having its own Rules and Regulations for its management. The Civil Courts do not sit as a Court of Appeal over the internal management of the Club. In Madras Gymkhana’s Club case, (1997)1 C.T.C. 77 , a single Judge of this Court reiterated the principles on the maintainability of the civil suit; but the jurisdiction of the civil courts is limited only to the extent of considering the compliance of the principles of natural justice or whether relevant rules have been violated. In Madras Gymkhana’s Club case, (1997)1 C.T.C. 77 , a single Judge of this Court reiterated the principles on the maintainability of the civil suit; but the jurisdiction of the civil courts is limited only to the extent of considering the compliance of the principles of natural justice or whether relevant rules have been violated. D1 Club being a self-governed - an Autonomous Body, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is very much limited to go into the merits of the Proposed Amendment. The application is not maintainable on this score also. 32. In granting an interim injunction, the Court acts upon the principle of preventing irreparable injury. The plaintiff Club has not established any such irreparable injury. The plaintiff has neither proved any enforceable right nor proved any prima facie case. 33. For the reasons stated above, since the applicant has not made out any prima facie case, it is not entitled to the temporary injunction restraining the defendants from carrying into effect the proposed amendment. This application has not merit and it is bound to fail. 34. For the reasons stated above, O.A.No.509 of 2002 is dismissed and the ex parte interim injunction (dated 7.8.2002) already granted stands vacated.