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Andhra High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 1417 (AP)

M. A. Raoof v. Mohd. Ghouse

2003-11-18

P.S.NARAYANA

body2003
P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful tenant in both the Tribunals below had preferred the present civil Revision Petition under Section 22 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960, in short hereinafter referred to as "act" for the purpose of convenience. ( 2 ) THE respondent herein/landlord filed R. C. No. 701/92 on the file of II Additional rent Controller at Hyderabad for eviction of the tenant on the grounds of landlord requiring the suit mulgi for personal occupation, tenant obtaining alternative accommodation and also on yet another ground - the tenant making alterations and additions impairing the value and utility of the said building. ( 3 ) THE learned Rent Controller after recording evidence of PW-1, RW-1 and RW-2 and marking Exs. P-1 to P-24 and Exs. R-1 to R-9 ultimately allowed the R. C. and aggrieved by the same, the tenant preferred R. A. No. 125/96 on the file of additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad and the appellate authority had confirmed the order of eviction on the ground of bonafide personal requirement and the tenant securing alternative accommodation, but had reversed the same as far as the ground of acts of waste is concerned. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant had preferred the present Civil Revision Petition. Sri Vilas Afzulpurkar, the learned Counsel representing the Revision petitioner/tenant submitted that the landlord had not approached the Court with clean hands and the same is evident by virtue of several admissions made by pw-1, the landlord in cross-examination. The learned Counsel also would contend that since the landlord is having several shops, the requirement is only a fancy requirement and not bonafide personal requirement. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the evidence on record clearly discloses that the landlord had suppressed the fact that he is owning several other shops. The learned counsel also commented that no acceptable legal evidence was let in relating to the tenant having alternative accommodation and hence ordering eviction on that ground cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel while elaborating his submissions had taken me through the respective pleadings of the parties and the subsequent amendment to the pleadings and also the conduct of the parties. The learned Counsel while elaborating his submissions had taken me through the respective pleadings of the parties and the subsequent amendment to the pleadings and also the conduct of the parties. The learned Counsel also had made submissions about the burden of proof and the wrong casting of the burden of proof and also had touched the aspect that fundamental principles of pleading and proof had been totally ignored while appreciating the evidence available on record. The learned Counsel also had placed reliance on HASMATH RAI Vs. RAGHUNATH PRASAD 1, GANTUSA H. BADDI Vs. MEERABAI G. PAI 2. VENKAYALA VEERARAGHAVULU Vs. M/s. GODAVARI METAL ROLLING MILLS contractor s FIRM 3. Per contra, Sri Suryanarayana, the learned Senior Counsel had drawn my attention to the concurrent findings recorded by both the Tribunals below relating to the grounds of bonafide personal requirement and the tenant securing alternative accommodation. The learned Counsel also would maintain that though there is clear evidence relating to acts of waste, the appellate authority definitely had erred in not ordering eviction on the said ground also. The learned Counsel had taken me through the portions of the order of the appellate authority touching this aspect and had commented that the appellate authority is not justified in setting aside the said finding and inasmuch as the landlord was successful on other two grounds, in a Revision filed by the tenant, the landlord is definitely entitled to canvass the correctness of such adverse finding relating to one of the grounds. The learned Counsel also had drawn my attention to Ex. P-1 and also the other oral and documentary evidence and had concluded that in view of the limitations in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, since there is no serious legal infirmity pointed out, the said concurrent findings cannot be disturbed at the Revisional stage and the same is liable to be dismissed. The learned Counsel also had placed strong reliance on MUDIGONDA chandra MOULI SASTRY Vs. BHIMANEPALLI BIKSHALU AND OTHERS 4, GOPINATH Vs. MANMOHAN SHAH 5, K. V. S. S. PRASADA RAO Vs. GODAVARI BAI AND OTHERS 6, CHALLARAM and co. Vs. PRAGALLAPATI ADI KUMAR 7 and KODANGI SETHU MADHAVA RAO Vs. CHAKKA prabhakar RAO 8. The learned Counsel also had placed strong reliance on MUDIGONDA chandra MOULI SASTRY Vs. BHIMANEPALLI BIKSHALU AND OTHERS 4, GOPINATH Vs. MANMOHAN SHAH 5, K. V. S. S. PRASADA RAO Vs. GODAVARI BAI AND OTHERS 6, CHALLARAM and co. Vs. PRAGALLAPATI ADI KUMAR 7 and KODANGI SETHU MADHAVA RAO Vs. CHAKKA prabhakar RAO 8. ( 4 ) HEARD the counsel and also perused the pleadings of the respective parties, the oral and documentary evidence, the findings recorded by the learned Rent controller and also the appellate authority. The respondent herein as landlord filed R. C. No. 701/92 on the file of II additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad with the following averments made in the eviction petition: the petitioner is the absolute owner of the double storeyed premises bearing m. No. 21-2-266, situated at Lad Bazaar, Hyderabad. The respondent is the tenant in the ground floor mulgi and the first floor premises, part of premises bearing m. No. 21-2-266 situated at Lad Bazaar, Hyderabad. The respondent had obtained the suit premises for carrying bangles business under the name and style of m. A. Jabbar. The monthly rent of the suit premises is Rs. 400/- excluding electricity consumption charges and municipal property tax. The tenancy is in writing as per rental deed dated 2-4-1987. It was pleaded that as per the terms and conditions of the tenancy, rent was payable on or before 5th of every succeeding English calendar month. The petitioner had brought to the notice of the respondent that the suit premises is required for the personal occupation of his son by name Mohd. Ismail who is unemployed and intends to commence business in ready made garments in the suit premises. The respondent had agreed to vacate the premises, but failed to vacate the same. It was stated that the petitioner is carrying on cycle taxi business in a rented premises bearing h. No. 20-6-563 situated at Syed Ali Chabutra, Hyderabad. The premises wherein the petitioner is carrying on the business belongs to one Mosin Bin Saleh. The suit premises is required for the personal requirement of the petitioner s son as he is unemployed and the petitioner wants to establish his son in the proposed business in garments. The premises wherein the petitioner is carrying on the business belongs to one Mosin Bin Saleh. The suit premises is required for the personal requirement of the petitioner s son as he is unemployed and the petitioner wants to establish his son in the proposed business in garments. The petitioner s son has got sufficient experience in the business and also got sufficient funds to commence the business and as such the requirement of the petitioner s son of the suit premises is bonafide. It was further pleaded that the petitioner is not having any other non-residential premises of his own in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and as such the respondent be evicted from the suit premises. It was further pleaded by the petitioner/landlord that the respondent had recently constructed a complex comprising of ten mulgies bearing part of premises No. 20-2-1224, situated at Lad Bazaar, Hyderabad, which is opposite to the suit premises. The said mulgies are vacant. The respondent is not expected to continue in the suit premises as he secured alternative accommodation by constructing his own mulgies which are opposite to the suit premises. Further, the respondent had recently constructed mulgies bearing M. No. 20-4-1223, situated at Lad Bazaar, Hyderabad. The said mulgies which are constructed by the respondent comprise of cellar, ground floor, first floor and second floor. In view of the respondent having constructed the mulgies and having secured alternative accommodation, the respondent is entitled to be evicted. The respondent had promised to vacate the premises in view of his securing alternative accommodation, but had failed to do so. As such the respondent is liable to be evicted from the suit premises. ( 5 ) IT was further pleaded that the suit premises is of Madras terrace and the roof was supported by wooden rafters. The respondent had caused damage to the suit premises. The respondent removed the Madras terrace roof of the ground and first floor premises and laid R. C. C. roof without any written consent and permission to petitioner. Apart from it, the respondent had made additions and alterations in the suit premises by fixing shutters after removing the wooden doors. The respondent had impaired the value and utility of the premises by making additions and alterations in the suit premises without the written consent and permission of the petitioner. Apart from it, the respondent had made additions and alterations in the suit premises by fixing shutters after removing the wooden doors. The respondent had impaired the value and utility of the premises by making additions and alterations in the suit premises without the written consent and permission of the petitioner. Moreover, as per the privity of tenancy, the respondent was not expected to make additions and alterations in the suit premises unless and until he obtains written consent from the petitioner. But, in the present case, the respondent had caused substantial damage to the suit premises by impairing the value and utility of the suit premises. The respondent had also made additions and alterations over the first floor by laying tin sheet shed and due to the acts of waste the respondent had materially impaired the value and utility of the premises and as such the respondent is liable to be evicted from the suit premises. ( 6 ) SUBSEQUENT to the filing of the plaint, by amendment, para 2 (a) was introduced, which reads as hereunder : the petitioner was carrying on business in mulgi bearing M. No. 20-6-663 belonging to Mohsin Bin Saleh. The petitioner was carrying on cycle taxi business in the said mulgi for the last 20 years. The petitioner s landlord Mohsin Bin Saleh had instituted an eviction petition bearing R. C. No. 643/1992 on the file of IV additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad. The said eviction petition was allowed on 30-8-1994 and vacant possession of the mulgi was delivered to Mohsin Bin saleh by the bailiff of the Court. Subsequently, the petitioner had temporarily obtained a rented mulgi bearing M. No. 19-3-742/1, situated at Ghazibanda, hyderabad belonging to Fatima Begum on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- and is carrying on meat business. Apart from it, the petitioner s youngest son by name mohd. Ibrahim was also assisting the petitioner and he was aged about 19 years. Apart from it, the landlady of the mulgi at Ghazibanda, Hyderabad had been requesting the petitioner to vacate the mulgi. The petitioner s younger son also requires the suit premises for the purpose of carrying on ready made garments along with his eldest son. The youngest son has got experience in garments business. The requirement of the petitioner s youngest son is bonafide. The petitioner s younger son also requires the suit premises for the purpose of carrying on ready made garments along with his eldest son. The youngest son has got experience in garments business. The requirement of the petitioner s youngest son is bonafide. The petitioner and his son are not in occupation of any other non-residential premises of their own in the twin cities of Hyderabad and secunderabad. ( 7 ) THE Revision petitioner herein/tenant filed a counter in detail virtually denying all the allegations. It was pleaded that the petitioner is the landlord and the respondent is his tenant relating to the mulgi bearing Municipal n. 21-2-266, Lad Bazar, Hyderabad city which is referred to hereinafter as the petition premises. Initially the respondent obtained the petition premises about 35 years back from the then owner on a monthly rent of Rs. 22/ -. Later on, the petitioner purchased the petition premises and the previous landlord attorned the tenancy of the respondent relating to the petition premises in favour of the petitioner and the petitioner increased the monthly rent to rs. 40/ -. Thereafter at every short interval, the petitioner gradually increased the rent of the petition premises and ultimately in the year 1987 the rent was increased to Rs. 400/ -. The petition premises consists of three portions i. e. , ground floor, first floor and second floor and the relevant facts are stated below, but the petitioner had deliberately suppressed the aforesaid facts. It was stated that from the beginning the respondent was running his bangles business in the petition premises. The petitioner had not filed the alleged original rental deed deliberately and the xerox copy is not admissible. Therefore, the respondent reserves his right to file additional counter after production of the original rental deed. The respondent is an illiterate person and he does not known reading and writing any language except to sign in Urdu and hence the petitioner is put to strict proof of the execution of the rental deed and its truth and genuineness. ( 8 ) IT was also pleaded that it is incorrect that any specific plea was fixed for payment of monthly rent as alleged. In fact, no specific date was fixed for payment of rent. The petitioner does not require the petition premises as stated. The petitioner never represented that he requires the petition premises as stated. ( 8 ) IT was also pleaded that it is incorrect that any specific plea was fixed for payment of monthly rent as alleged. In fact, no specific date was fixed for payment of rent. The petitioner does not require the petition premises as stated. The petitioner never represented that he requires the petition premises as stated. The petitioner s son Mohd. Ismail is not unemployed as stated. In fact the petitioner and his son Md. Ismail used to run meat business and cycle taxi business and got their shops. The allegation that the petitioner s son mohd. Ismail is unemployed and he intends to commence business in readymade garments in the petition premises is false and hence the same is denied. The allegations in the plaint are flimsy and they are made for the purpose of instant bogus eviction petition. In fact, the petitioner s son by name mohd. Ismail is now in Saudi Arabia and he is doing job there. There was no occasion for the respondent to agree to vacate the petition premises and the allegations in this regard are false and baseless and hence they are denied. The petitioner s alleged requirement of the petition premises is not real, genuine, pressing and bonafide. In fact, it is a pretext for the purpose of the instant bogus eviction petition. It was further pleaded that the allegation that the petitioner is not having any other non-residential premises of his own is incorrect. As a matter of fact, the petitioner owns and possesses different residential and non-residential buildings of his own in Hyderabad city and he had suppressed the same which reveals his malafides and on this ground alone, the instant eviction petition is liable to be dismissed. It is submitted that the petitioner owns and possesses different houses and mulgies (non-residential premises) at Syed Ali Chabutra, Shakkargunj, Shah Ali Banda and other localities of Hyderabad city and he is in possession of two mulgies (non-residential premises) at Syed Ali Chabutra, Hyderabad city and hence the petitioner is not entitled to evict the respondent from the petition premises on the ground of his alleged requirement and the instant eviction petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 9 ) IT was further pleaded that allegations made by way of amendment of the eviction petition are false and baseless and hence the same are denied. ( 9 ) IT was further pleaded that allegations made by way of amendment of the eviction petition are false and baseless and hence the same are denied. It was pleaded that the petitioner is put to strict proof of the allegation that he was carrying business in the mulgi bearing Municipal No. 20-6-663 and that he was evicted therefrom. It is also incorrect and denied that the petitioner had temporarily obtained rented mulgi bearing M. No. 19-3-742/1, situated at ghazibanda, Hyderabad on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- and he was carrying on business as stated. The petitioner is in possession of the mulgi No. 19-3-742/1 at Ghazibanda, Hyderabad in his own right. Neither the mulgi No. 19-3-742/1 at ghazibanda, Hyderabad is a rented one nor the petitioner is required to vacate the same. The allegation that the petitioner requires the petition premises is false. The petitioner and his younger son do not require the petition premises for the purpose of carrying on readymade garments business along with his eldest son. It was also denied that the petitioner and his son are not in occupation of any other non-residential premises of their own in the twin cities of hyderabad and Secunderabad. It was pleaded that the petitioner owns and possesses different non-residential buildings of his own in Hyderabad city and he is not entitled to evict the respondent from the petition premises. The petitioner s conduct reveals the falsity of his case. It was also pleaded that the amendment made eviction petition is inconsistent with the allegations in the original eviction petition. It was submitted that the petitioner is the owner of the premises at Shah Ali Banda market bearing M. No. 23-6-1018 and 1021 by virtue of a registered sale deed in his favour and he is in physical possession of a major portion of it. It was also submitted that the petitioner is the owner of four mulgies bearing M. Nos. 20-6-160 to 164, situated at Syed Ali chabutra, Hyderabad city by virtue of a registered sale deed in his favour and he is in possession of two mulgies. The petitioner had suppressed these material facts which also reveal his malafides and on account of suppression of these material facts also the eviction petition is fit to be dismissed. 20-6-160 to 164, situated at Syed Ali chabutra, Hyderabad city by virtue of a registered sale deed in his favour and he is in possession of two mulgies. The petitioner had suppressed these material facts which also reveal his malafides and on account of suppression of these material facts also the eviction petition is fit to be dismissed. It was further pleaded that the respondent had not constructed any complex comprising of ten mulgies bearing part of premises No. 20-2-1224, situated at Lad Bazar, Hyderabad city and the said allegation is baseless and there is no truth in it. The respondent had not carried out any construction whatsoever and the petitioner is put to strict proof of the same. The respondent had not secured any alternative accommodation as alleged. It is also false and denied that the respondent had recently constructed mulgies bearing municipal No. 20-4-1223, Lad Bazar, Hyderabad city. The respondent does not own or possess any non-residential premises of his own in Hyderabad or secunderabad. The petition premises is the only accommodation in possession of the respondent wherein he is running his business. It was stated that the ground of securing alternative accommodation is false and baseless and the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 10 ) IT was also further pleaded that the petition premises is a very old building of more than 100 years and the petitioner proposed to carry out necessary construction and additions etc. , in order to protect it and he carried out the necessary construction and additions in the petition premises in the year 1984 and the work went on for a long time. The respondent also made necessary renovation in the demised premises and spent huge and substantial amount and again he commenced his business in the demised premises after renovation. At that time, different political leaders, social workers etc. , were invited. Different photos were taken at that occasion and in some of them the petitioner also will be seen. It is stated that false allegations were made in the petition for the purpose of instant frivolous petition and the lapse of time will also prove the falsity of the petitioner s allegations. , were invited. Different photos were taken at that occasion and in some of them the petitioner also will be seen. It is stated that false allegations were made in the petition for the purpose of instant frivolous petition and the lapse of time will also prove the falsity of the petitioner s allegations. It was specifically pleaded that the respondent had not caused any damage to the petition premises and he had not removed the Madras terrace roof of the ground floor and first floor and he had not laid the R. C. C. roof thereon. The respondent had not made any additions or alterations in the petition premises by fixing shutters after removing the wooden doors and he had not impaired the value and utility of the petition premises. The respondent had not made any additions and alterations over the first floor by laying tin sheet roof shed as alleged. It was further stated that the allegations of the petitioner on this ground are false and baseless. ( 11 ) THE pleadings relating to jurisdiction and the Court fee are not disputed by the respondent. It is stated that the petitioner offered to sell the petition premises to the respondent and after necessary negotiation the matter was finalized and the petitioner agreed to sell the petition premises to the respondent at Rs. 1,80,000/ -. Thereupon the respondent paid a sum of Rs. 45,000/- as advance sale consideration for the petition premises to the petitioner on 25-11-1991 and the petitioner agreed to receive the balance sale consideration at the time of registration of sale deed. The relations between the petitioner and the respondent were very cordial and the respondent had full trust and confidence in the petitioner and hence the execution of the agreement of sale and the receipt for payment of Rs. 45,000/- was regarded unnecessary and the petitioner assured the respondent to execute the sale deed and the respondent also did not insist for the execution of the agreement of sale and receipt to keep good relations in with the petitioner. The respondent was ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation and pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed executed, but the petitioner delayed the matter giving assurances to the respondent. The respondent was ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation and pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale deed executed, but the petitioner delayed the matter giving assurances to the respondent. Ultimately, the petitioner changed his mind and demanded more money towards the sale consideration on the ground that the prices of the properties have gone up and thus the matter is pending. Further, the petitioner, pending execution of the sale deed, demanded the respondent in June 1992 to enhance the rent of the petition premises from rs. 400/- to Rs. 3000/- per month. As the aforesaid demand of the petitioner is most unjust and improper, the respondent did not agree. It was stated that thereafter the petitioner avoided to receive the rent of the petition premises as per his usual practice and hence the respondent started remitting the rent of the petition premises by money order and thus the petitioner failed to dub the respondent as defaulter. ( 12 ) ON the respective pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller recorded the evidence of PW-1, RW-1 and RW-2 and had marked Exs. P-1 to P-24 and Exs. R-1 to R-9 and had ordered eviction on all the three grounds raised by the landlord and aggrieved by the same, the tenant preferred R. A. No. 125/96 on the file of additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad - the appellate authority, who had confirmed the order of eviction on the ground of bonafide personal requirement and the tenant securing alternative accommodation, but had reversed the order of eviction sofaras it relates to the ground of acts of waste is concerned. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant had preferred the present Civil revision Petition. Elaborate submissions were made by both the Counsel pointing out to several of the evidentiary details. As far as the ground of bonafide personal requirement and the tenant securing alternative accommodation are concerned, concurrent findings had been recorded. In the decision referred (4) supra, the Apex Court held that in the case of recording of concurrent findings relating to facts by both the Tribunals below, when no legal infirmity had been pointed out, it is not open to this Court in exercise of Revisional jurisdiction to reassess the evidence and interfere with such findings. In the decision referred (4) supra, the Apex Court held that in the case of recording of concurrent findings relating to facts by both the Tribunals below, when no legal infirmity had been pointed out, it is not open to this Court in exercise of Revisional jurisdiction to reassess the evidence and interfere with such findings. It is no doubt true that PW-1 had deposed in detail about certain alterations and had stated that they would definitely impair utility of the building. In the decision referred (8) supra, it was held :"in the case on hand, the petitioner categorically admitted that the existing wooden staircase was removed and a pucca staircase was constructed to effectively enjoy the first floor of the petition schedule building as the wooden steps had become completely dilapidated. It is true that the first floor is also under the occupation of the petitioners. If really the wooden staircase had become unuseful, nothing prevented the petitioners from giving a notice to the first respondent to construct a pucca staircase or a new staircase. Further, as the petition schedule building is within the Municipal limits, any alteration to the petition schedule building can be done only after obtaining prior permission to the Municipality. In the instant case, the petitioners neither obtained consent from the first respondent nor obtained permission from the Municipality for constructing pucca staircase. With the result, the municipality gave a notice for demolition of that pucca staircase. The learned Counsel for the first respondent has produced before me the photographs of the petition schedule building showing the existence of the building at present. From the photographs it is also seen that at the time of removal of wooden staircase, the roof of the first floor of the petition schedule building which was Madras tiled roof, was completely damaged and that the parapet drop wall intended to protect the petition schedule building from rain water was completely demolished. Hence it cannot be said that construction of a pucca staircase without prior permission under the bye-laws of the Municipality cannot be treated as an improvement to the petition schedule building more so after the municipality gave notice for removal of the staircase. Hence the action of the petitioners in removing wooden staircase and constructing a pucca staircase as discussed above amount to acts of waste. Hence the action of the petitioners in removing wooden staircase and constructing a pucca staircase as discussed above amount to acts of waste. "it is no doubt true that the learned Rent Controller had discussed in detail all the evidentiary details spoken to by PW-1 relating to acts of waste. But however, the appellate authority also had recorded reasons in detail and had pointed out that specific plea relating to these details had not been taken and in view of the same had arrived at a conclusion that the ground of acts of waste is not available to the landlord. The appellate authority being the final Court of fact expected to deal with all the factual aspects, I am not inclined to disturb the said findings recorded by the appellate authority since reasons had been recorded in detail why the learned appellate authority was not inclined to accept with the learned Rent Controller as far as this ground is concerned. Hence the said finding of the appellate authority reversing the finding of the learned Rent Controller is hereby confirmed. ( 13 ) THE next question which may have to be considered is whether the Revision petitioner/tenant can succeed in the present Revision in the light of the background of the elaborate contentions advanced by the respective Counsel representing the parties. As far as the ground of bonafide personal requirement is concerned, the landlord amended the eviction petition by virtue of the orders in I. A. No. 16/95 dated 7-2-1995. There is no dispute relating to the relationship of landlord and tenant. It is no doubt true that the mere desire of the landlord to have the premises may not be sufficient to satisfy the test of bonafide personal requirement and the requirement of the landlord must be genuine. In MANOJ KUMAR JAIN Vs. LALCHAND AHUJA 9 at para 5 it was held : "taking into consideration the rival submissions, I shall address myself firstly to the question whether the petitioner-landlord requires the premises for his bona fide requirement ? The burden of proving that the premises is required for the bona fide requirement is heavily on the petitioner-landlord. For the purpose of discharging this burden the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Court has to be examined. The burden of proving that the premises is required for the bona fide requirement is heavily on the petitioner-landlord. For the purpose of discharging this burden the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Court has to be examined. The petitioner-landlord examined himself as PW-1 and deposed before the trial Court that he is the elder son in the family and that he is working in his father s shop on a monthly salary and that he is residing in House bearing No. 7-2-312/313 situate in Mission School Street, secunderabad and that he is the landlord of the premises bearing No. 7-2-747 situate at General Market, Secunderabad. He further stated that in the residential premises of 7-2-312/313 his father stays in the first floor and the ground floor is commonly used by all the members of the family. He also spoke to the fact that he is living separately in the same premises after his marriage. Exs. P-3 and P-9 Income tax returns for the years 1989-90 and 1990-91 disclose that the petitioner got married on 26-1-1989 and that there was partition among the family members and that he is working on monthly salary in the jewellery shop of his father. It is also in evidence that the petitioner-landlord does not have any other non-residential premises of his own in the twin cities. From the oral and documentary evidence the petitioner-landlord is able to establish that there is a bona fide requirement for starting his own business and that he has separated from his father and is living separately after his marriage. The bonafide requirement of the landlord has to be viewed from the objective point of the landlord but not on the subjective satisfaction of the tenant. The Apex Court in a judgment reported in v. Radhakrishnan Vs. S. N. Loganatha Mudaliar (1998) 6 SCC 431 ) while construing the concept of bonafide requirement of landlord has held that the fact that landlord is in occupation of a non-residential building in the same city would not bar eviction of a tenant from non-residential building for business of landlord s family members if such family member is not in occupation of any other non-residential building in the city. A learned Single Judge of this court in a Judgment reported in N. Chenchuramaiah Vs. A learned Single Judge of this court in a Judgment reported in N. Chenchuramaiah Vs. Syed Nawabjan ( 1991 (1) ALT 416 ) held as follows :-"where the landlord who is a joint owner cannot have the exclusive enjoyment of the joint house especially when he was living with other joint owner or joint owners, the landlord cannot be asked to suffer by living with joint owners when he is having his own house which exclusively belongs to him and which is in occupation of the tenant and if he gets possession of the same, he can occupy it exclusively for himself. " ( 14 ) IN another judgment of the Apex Court reported in Smt. Pravita Devi Vs. T. V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 ) it was held that the bonafide requirement of the landlord has to be viewed from his convenience and that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement. In view of the afore-mentioned judgments, it is clear that the requirement of the landlord takes priority than the necessity of the tenant to stay in the tenanted premises. The Apex Court had also an occasion to deal with the concept where the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building as his own and held that the bonafide requirement of the landlord is to be seen where he is actually in possession and is occupying the premises as his own. Hence it is not for the tenant to take the stand that the landlord can very well stay in the joint family premises along with others without claiming eviction. Once the landlord establishes that he intends to start his own business and that the premises is required for his own bonafide requirement, it is not for the tenant to contend that a person having no practical experience in that particular field is incapable of starting the business. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in Dattatrayalaxman Kamble Vs. Abdul Rasul Moulali kotkunde (1999) 4 S. C. C. 1) held as follows:-"if a person wants to start a business of his own it may be to his own advantage if he acauires experience in that line. But to say that any venture of a person in the business field without acquiring past experience reflects lack of his bona fides is a fallacious and unpragmatic approach. But to say that any venture of a person in the business field without acquiring past experience reflects lack of his bona fides is a fallacious and unpragmatic approach. Many a business has flourished in this country by leaps and bounds which was started by a novice in the field; and many other business ventures have gone haywire despite vast experience to the credit of the propounders. The opinion of the learned single judge that acquisition of sufficient know-how is a precondition for even proposing to start any business, if gains approval as a proposition of law, is likely to shatter the initiative of young talents and deter new entrepreneurs from entering any field of business or commercial activity. Experience can be earned even while the business is in progress. It is too pedantic a norm to be formulated that "no experience no venture". As against the above discussed oral and documentary evidence and the legal position, the respondent-tenant resisted the eviction petition contending that the landlord has failed to prove that he has separated from the joint family. The learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant has addressed himself to the concept of hindu undivided family and contended that the income tax assessment order by itself does not establish that he has separated from the family. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bharat Singh Vs. Bhagirathi (AIR 1966 S. C. 405) for the proposition that there is a strong presumption in favour of the Hindu brothers constituting joint family and it is for the person alleging severance of the joint family to prove it. I am afraid the learned Counsel has not understood the scope of the bona fide requirement as enunciated in the statute. In the present case, the landlord was able to prima facie establish that he has separated himself from his father through the registered documents and income-tax assessment orders and it is not for the joint family to dispute those facts. This Court would only confine itself to the legal concept set out in the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1960. The appellate Court while dealing with the concept of bonafide requirement has misdirected the enquiry and started scrutinizing the income tax assessment orders and came to the conclusion that there is no justification for the landlord to claim that he intends to start his own business separately. The appellate Court while dealing with the concept of bonafide requirement has misdirected the enquiry and started scrutinizing the income tax assessment orders and came to the conclusion that there is no justification for the landlord to claim that he intends to start his own business separately. The appellate Court, having found that the landlord was paying the income tax separately in his individual capacity, has, at the same time, held that there is no bonafide requirement. The appellate Court also found that they are all living in one portion and expects them to live as a joint family for ever. As discussed supra, the landlord is the best Judge in deciding or choosing his own accommodation. For the aforementioned discussion I hold that the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant on the ground of his bonafide requirement. " in the decision referred (5) supra, it was held :"it is no doubt true that the Act is a beneficiary legislation but that does not mean that the Act is meant only for the tenants and not for the landlords. The courts are expected to maintain a balance while appreciating the rent control matters. If the landlord is able to establish any one of the grounds of which he can seek the eviction of the tenants, the Courts are expected to give the necessary relief to such landlords also in accordance with law. The very fact that the landlord has been agitating the dispute for such a long time clearly goes to show his necessity to occupy the premises for the purpose of running his own business and definitely such need, necessity of a landlord can be termed to be a bonafide personal requirement within the meaning of the Act. Further, the tenant also appears to be an old man of 75 years and his sons are well settled either in employment or doing business and in the light of the said fact also, the well considered order of the appellate authority does not warrant interference while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. In the light of the clear oral and documentary evidence of PW-1 and pw-2 and also Ex. P-1 to P-46 and RW-1 and Ex. In the light of the clear oral and documentary evidence of PW-1 and pw-2 and also Ex. P-1 to P-46 and RW-1 and Ex. R-1 to R-24, I am of the clear opinion that the clear findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority in detail on appreciation of evidence do not warrant any interference by this revisional Court and hence those findings are hereby confirmed. " ( 15 ) IN K. C. ANTHAPPAI Vs. C. AHAMMED 10 while dealing with the aspect of bonafide need under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the Apex Court held :"the question whether the building is required bona fide by the app for his own residence is primarily one of fact and the finding recorded by the Appellate authority after considering the evidence on record could not be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act because it could not be said that the said finding recorded by the appellate Authority was not supported by the evidence on record. The said finding as reversed by the High Court on the basis of a reassessment of the said evidence. We find it difficult to agree with the reasons given by the High court for embarking on this reassessment of evidence. Although the Appellate authority has observed that there is no specific pleading by the respondent in the counter that the bonafide requirement set up by the appellant is false but in spite of the said observation the Appellate Authority has examined whether the said claim of the appellant is false and after considering the evidence adduced by both the parties, the Appellate Authority has found that the claim of the appellant is not false. Similarly, the High Court is not right in holding that in its approach to the question of bonafides of the claim made in the petition the Appellate Authority has not considered the cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances established in the case. On a consideration of the various circumstances the Appellate Authority chose to accept the testimony of the appellant, as PW-1 as against that of the respondent, as RW-1 and on that basis found that the appellant had succeeded in establishing the bona fide need set up by him. On a consideration of the various circumstances the Appellate Authority chose to accept the testimony of the appellant, as PW-1 as against that of the respondent, as RW-1 and on that basis found that the appellant had succeeded in establishing the bona fide need set up by him. "reliance also was placed on the decisions referred (2) and (3) supra and also on the decision referred (1) supra. I had given my anxious consideration to the findings recorded by the appellate authority while confirming the findings recorded by the primary Tribunal in this regard. The appellate authority had discussed this aspect in detail in paras 17, 18 and 19. The evidence of PW-1 is that he needs the premises for his unemployed son to run business. Clear finding had been recorded that the other mulgies are not in a condition to use and they are in a dilapidated condition. Ex. P-23 and P-24 had been relied upon in this regard. No doubt, the stand taken by the tenant is that the said son is elsewhere and hence there is no bonafide personal requirement. This stand of the tenant also was taken into consideration and reasons in detail had been recorded. Hence, the same being a question of fact and especially in the light of the reasons recorded in detail by the Primary Tribunal and as well as the Appellate Tribunal, as a Revisional court, this Court is not inclined to disturb such concurrent findings and hence the said findings relating to bonafide personal requirement are hereby confirmed. ( 16 ) THE next ground is the tenant securing alternative accommodation. The same was discussed at length at para 20 by the appellate authority. It is the case of the landlord that the tenant constructed commercial complex having several mulgies. The stand taken by the tenant is that the said complex does not belong to him at all and his sons had constructed the said complex. The plan and the sale deed were marked as Exs. P-15 and P-16. These documents establish that four sons of the tenant are minors represented by him and a finding had been recorded by both the Tribunals below that the said complex was of the tenant and hence he secured alternative accommodation and on this ground also the tenant is liable to be evicted. P-15 and P-16. These documents establish that four sons of the tenant are minors represented by him and a finding had been recorded by both the Tribunals below that the said complex was of the tenant and hence he secured alternative accommodation and on this ground also the tenant is liable to be evicted. In the decision referred (6) supra, it was held that the tenant need not secure alternative accommodation in his own name to be evicted from the premises under Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act and it is sufficient if he has legal right to stay in the building though purchased in the name of his wife. The finding recorded by both the Tribunals below relating to the tenant securing alternative accommodation are not only concurrent findings, but they are findings recorded with clear and convincing reasons. It is no doubt true that when perversity is pointed out in appreciation of evidence, the revisional Court under Section 22 of the Act may go into the evidentiary details also. But, in the present case, all the aspects which had been raised were in fact taken into consideration and reasons in detail had been recorded why the stand taken by the tenant cannot be accepted in this regard. These are all factual details and findings had been recorded on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence by the appellate authority. In the light of the elaborate reasoning given by the appellate authority, I do not find any reason to take a different view as far as appreciation of evidence is concerned. No doubt, the Counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant pointed out certain improbabilities drawing the attention of this Court to certain portions of the evidence of PW-1 and RW-1 as well. These aspects, in fact, had been discussed by the Tribunals below and hence I am not inclined to express a different opinion relating to these aspects. In view of the findings recorded above, the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed, with costs. The tenant is given three months time to vacate the premises.