C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) DIVISIONAL Co-operative Officer, Tenali addressed a letter dated 17-10-2003 to the station House Officer, Tsodayapalem Police station stating that on the authorisation given by the Joint Registrar/district Co-operative officer, Guntur, Co-operative Sub Registrar, tenali conducted an enquiry into the affairs of Thummala Primary Agricultural co-operative Credit Society Limited, thummala (the Society) under Section 52 of a. P. Co-operative Societies Act, and submitted a report stating that the funds of the Society were misappropriated by the petitioner and another, the Ex-President and the Secretary respectively of the said Society, to a tune of Rs. 60,025. 00 and so necessary action may be taken against them. On the basis of that letter, the Station House Officer, tsodayapalem Police Station, Guntur District registered a case in Cr. No. 31 of 2003 under sections 406 and 409 I. P. C. against the petitioner and another. This petition is filed to quash the said F. I. R. against the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the offences alleged relate to the year 1998, and since the inspection was conducted and report was submitted in 1999, even assuming that the date of knowledge, but not the date of offence, is the starting point for computing the period of limitation, since the complaint was given in October 2003, i. e. , more than three years after the discovery of the alleged misappropriation, the complaint is hopelessly barred by time, because petitioner is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 I. P. C. as held in D. Venkata Rao v. State following the ratio in State of maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah, and so section 409 I. P. C. does not apply to the petitioner, and in view of Section 469 Cr. P. C. limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 406 I. P. C. is three years. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in state of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh that the object of Section 468 Cr. P. C. limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 406 I. P. C. is three years. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in state of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh that the object of Section 468 Cr. P. C. is in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial, enshrined in article 21 of the Constitution, and so, it is of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complaint, must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation, he contended that since there is no scope for the petitioner being convicted for an offence which is barred by time, no useful purpose would be served in permitting the police to investigate into the alleged offences. He strongly relied on P. V. Subbaiah v. State of A. P. , where a learned Single Judge quashed the F. I. R. in a similar case, and contends that the F. I. R. in this case also is liable to be quashed, more so because the amount allegedly misappropriated was recovered from the petitioner and was remitted to the Society s account long time back, and since the then Joint Registrar of co-operatives did not think it fit to initiate any action against the petitioner, and the new incumbent to the office of Joint Registrar only thought it fit to reopen the issue with a mala fide intention. Heard the learned additional Public Prosecutor. ( 3 ) SUPREME Court in State of Han/ana v. Bhajanlal laid down the principles governing quashing of F. I. Rs. and complaints. Recently a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in state of Karnataka v. Devendrappa6, after reviewing the case law on the subject, held that power under Section 482 Cr. P. C. should be exercised Ex Debitojstitiae to prevent abuse of process of court and should not be exercised to stifle legitimate prosecution, by embarking upon an enquiry as to the sustainability of the accusation or a reasonable appreciation of evidence, and the allegations of mala fides against the informant is of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings. Therefore, mala fides on the part of the complainant are irrelevant for the purpose of deciding this petition. Therefore, mala fides on the part of the complainant are irrelevant for the purpose of deciding this petition. Similarly the fact that the petitioner remitted the amount allegedly misappropriated by him is also of no consequence because offence of misappropriation committed by a person would not get obliterated on his remitting or paying the misappropriated amount to the victim. ( 4 ) THE main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the offence alleged does not fall under section 409 I. P. C. the F. I. R is barred by time. Section 409 I. P. C. reads: "criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker,merchant or agent: Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. " it is clear form the said Section that public servants are not the only persons covered thereby. Persons who are entrusted with, or have dominion over, property in the way of their business as bankers, merchants, factors, brokers, attorneys or agents also are covered by the said Section. In his report dated 31-8-1999, sent by the Co-operative Sub registrar, Tenali to the Joint Registrar, guntur, he referred to the important bylaws of the Society, of which the petitioner was the President. It is well known that a Society registered under the provisions of the A. P. Co-operative Societies Act is a body corporate, and is an artificial person and can sue and be sued in its own name. Since the society cannot act by itself, it has to act through its employees. As per bylaw No. 2, the main objects of the Society, inter alia, are to provide short-term, mid-term and long- term loans to its members; to supply fertilizers, pesticides and seeds, etc. ; to undertake the distribution of consumer and essential commodities; to construct or to take on lease godowns for the benefit of the farmers and the Society to keep their produces or stocks; to purchase, own processing machinery, etc. ; to undertake the distribution of consumer and essential commodities; to construct or to take on lease godowns for the benefit of the farmers and the Society to keep their produces or stocks; to purchase, own processing machinery, etc. , for the benefit of the members of the Society. So, prima facie, it is clear that the Society is formed with a view to carry on business also, for the benefit of its members. As stated earlier, since the Society cannot act by itself it has to act through its employees, who would be doing so as its agents. As per bylaw No. 24 of the Society its management vests in the Managing Committee consisting of President and twelve Directors, elected by the members of the Society. Bylaw No. 26 of the Society vests the President with the power to administer its affairs and makes him the custodian of all its assets, including cash balance, etc. In the above circumstances, question whether the Society is carrying on business, and whether the petitioner came into possession of the funds of the Society, which were allegedly misappropriated, in his capacity as the agent of the Society, has to be investigated into by police. That question has to be decided by the court on the basis of the evidence to be adduced at the time of trial. ( 5 ) IT is no doubt true that in D. Venkata Rao case (1 supra) it was held that President of a co-operative Society registered under the provisions of A. P. Co-operative Societies Act, is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 I. P. C. and so its President cannot be treated as a public servant for the purpose of Section 409 I. P. C. . Merely because the petitioner is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 I. P. C. , it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 409 I. P. C. are not attracted to him, since prima facie it is seen that the Society is carrying on business, and the petitioner, in his capacity of its President and thereby as its agent, came into possession of its funds, and allegedly misappropriated them. If during investigation and trial it is found that petitioner came into possession of the funds of the Society in his capacity as its agent, he can be punished under section 409 I. P. C. . So, at this stage, it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 409 i. P. C. are not attracted to the petitioner. ( 6 ) SINCE punishment for an offence under section 409 I. P. C. is imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years, question of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 409 I. P. C. does not arise, because Section 468 Cr. P. C. does not prescribe any period of limitation in respect of offences for which punishment prescribed is more than three years. ( 7 ) EVEN assuming that Section 409 I. P. C. does not apply, and Section 406 I. P. C. only applies to the facts of this case, in may considered opinion the F. I. R. cannot be quashed in view of Section 473 Cr. P. C. , as per which, a court can, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter XXXVI Cr. P. C. (which contains Sections 467 to 473), take cognizance of an offence even after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, that the delay has been properly explained or when it feels that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. It should be kept in view that the embargo imposed by section 468 Cr. P. C. is on the court taking cognizance of an offence which is barred by limitation. No embargo is imposed by Cr. P. C. on the police or their power to investigate into a cognizable offence and filing a charge sheet, by explaining the reasons for the delay. Offences under Sections 406 and 409 I. P. C. are cognizable offences. If police after investigation explain the delay in presentation of the complaint to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, by virtue of the power in him vested by Section 473 cr. P. C. , he can condone the delay and take cognizance of the complaint. Offences under Sections 406 and 409 I. P. C. are cognizable offences. If police after investigation explain the delay in presentation of the complaint to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, by virtue of the power in him vested by Section 473 cr. P. C. , he can condone the delay and take cognizance of the complaint. Taking into consideration the avernments in the charge sheet filed by the police, after investigation, if he feels that it is expedient in the interests of justice to take the complaint on filealso the magistrate, in spite of the bar of limitation, can take cognizance of the offence in view of section- 473 Cr. P. C. So, merely because the complaint is given to the police three years after the misappropriation came to the notice of the persons concerned, the F. I. R. cannot be quashed when there are allegations, which prima facie show the offence of misappropriation. ( 8 ) IT should be noted that D. Venkata Rao case (1 supra), relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner, arose after two courts convicted the accused therein after trial. Sarwan Singh case (3 supra) also was decided by the supreme Court after trial was taken by the accused, but not at the stage of F. I. R. So, the above two decisions do not come to the rescue of the petitioner. ( 9 ) IT is no doubt true that a learned Single judge of this court in P. V. Subbaiah case (4 supra) quashed the complaint. It is not known if the Co-operative Society, whose funds were misappropriated in that case, was carrying on business, and the members, in charge of the affairs of the said Society, came into possession of its funds as its agents or not. That apart, the power of the Magistrate under Section 473 Cr. P. C. also was not taken into consideration by the learned Single judge. Therefore, the said decision is of no help or assistance to the petitioner. ( 10 ) IN view of the above, I find no grounds to quash the F. I. R. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.