JUDGMENT L. MOHAPATRA, J. — The petitioner in this writ applica¬tion calls in question the legality of the order passed by Opposite party No.3 in Annexure-18 imposing the punishment of reduc¬tion in basis pay one (1) stage lower in the scale of payment in Middle Management Grade Scale-II pursuant to a disciplinary proceeding. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he entered into service under the opposite parties in the year 1972 and while working as Branch Manager in Nayabazar Branch a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him and article of charges dated 11.12.89 was served on him. In the article of charges it is alleged that while working as Branch Manager, Naya Bazar Branch from 25.5.1984 to 18.6.1986 the petitioner unauthorisedly sanc¬tioned and disbursed two bank guarantees on 7.2.85 in the account of M/s. Suresh Chandra Sahoo in favour of Orissa State Civil Sup¬plies Corporation Limited and also disbursed a cash credit of Rs.7 lakhs and term loan of Rs.76,500/- to M/s. Sahoo commer¬cials. After receipt of copy of the charges, petitioner submitted his show cause reply denying the allegations made therein and not being satisfied with the show cause reply filed by the petitioner the bank initiated a departmental proceeding against him on the said charges and the petitioner was intimated about the same on 31.12.1990. The Opposite party No.6 was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and D.K. Sen was appointed as the Presiding Officer. the disciplinary proceeding continued on several dates and on comple¬tion of inquiry, a report was filed. The conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer is as follows :- “(1) From the above as per analysis of charge No.1 (a) I am of opinion that since Sri Jena C.S.O. was not present in the Office on 7.2.85 he has not sanctioned and disbursed the above two bank guarantees viz. 2/85 and 3/85 dt. 7.2.85. (2) The other charges of 1(b), (c) and (d) stand proved against Sri Jena. (3) So the charges as analysed under item No.2 on Cash Credit and Term Loan (Transport) A/c. of M/s. Sahoo Commercial and Partnership firm have been proved save and except that the securities which were obtained at the time of sanction of Cash Credit and T.L. (Transport) was not adequate. (3) So the charges as analysed under item No.2 on Cash Credit and Term Loan (Transport) A/c. of M/s. Sahoo Commercial and Partnership firm have been proved save and except that the securities which were obtained at the time of sanction of Cash Credit and T.L. (Transport) was not adequate. The amount of loss, if any, suffered by bank after proper follow-up on the A/c. and exhausting all the securities cannot be stated categorically at this stage. the constitution of the borrowing unit (stated in the charge sheet as partnership) has not been placed or provided at the enquiry by any evidence.” 3. After a copy of the enquiry report was given to the petitioner, he submitted his reply to the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. On consideration of the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer as well as the reply of the petitioner with regard to the findings of Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority in Annexure-14 exonerated him of the charges and warned him to be more careful in his duties in future. The Disciplinary Authority only imposed a caution. The operating part of the order passed by Disciplinary Authority in Annexure-14 is quoted below:- “On an overall consideration of the nature of charges and the extent to which they have been presented and argued during the enquiry, you have not been proved guilty of the charges and therefore I caution you and warn you to be more careful in your duties in future. I impose a caution on you. “ 4. Though the order of the Disciplinary Authority exoner¬ating the petitioner and imposing a caution was passed on 14th December, 1993 the Reviewing Authority on perusal of the records issued a letter to the petitioner on 31st March, 1994 asking him to show cause as to why he shall not be awarded with punishment of reduction in Basic Pay one (1) stage lower in the scale of pay in Middle Management Grade Scale-II. After receipt of the notice from the Reviewing Authority, the petitioner has submitted his reply in Annexure-17 and after consideration of the same the im¬pugned order in Annexure-18 was passed. 5. After receipt of the notice from the Reviewing Authority, the petitioner has submitted his reply in Annexure-17 and after consideration of the same the im¬pugned order in Annexure-18 was passed. 5. Shri J.M. Mohanty, the learned Council appearing for the peti¬tioner challenged the impugned order in Annexure-18 on the ground that the power of review under Regulation 18 of United Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (thereinafter called the ‘Regulations’) can only be exercised where a punishment is imposed and where there is no punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the review power cannot be exercised. Shri mohanty also submitted that in absence of an appeal, the Reviewing Authority has no power to exercise power of review under Regulation 18. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties wherein it is stated that the Reviewing Authority in exercise of its power under Regulation 18 can call for the re¬cords of any case and examine the same and may also take a dif¬ferent view than that of the disciplinary authority and impose punishment even if the delinquent officer is exonerated of all the charges. Shri S.C. Lal, the learned counsel appearing for the Bank referring to Regulation 18 submitted that the power con¬ferred on the Reviewing Authority under Regulation 18 is general in nature and not confined to a case where punishment is imposed. 7. Shri J.M. Mohanty the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner having confined his case to interpretation of Regulation on 18 of the Regulations, this Court is called upon to decide as to whether the review power can be exercised even when the delin¬quent officer is exonerated of all the charges and in absence of an appeal. In this connection, certain provisions of the Regula¬tion are required to be looked into. Regulation 4 prescribes the minor and major penalties. The minor and major penalties as enumerated in Regulation 4 are quoted below :- “4. In this connection, certain provisions of the Regula¬tion are required to be looked into. Regulation 4 prescribes the minor and major penalties. The minor and major penalties as enumerated in Regulation 4 are quoted below :- “4. Penalties : The following are the penalties which may be imposed on an officer employee, for acts of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient Minor Penalties (a) censure (b) withholding of increment of pay with or without cumula¬tive effect ; (c) withholding or promotion ; (d) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank by negligence or breach of orders. Major penalties (e) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale ; (f) compulsory retirement ; (g) removal from service which shall not be disqualification for future employment. (h) dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment. “ 8. From the above, it is clear that caution is not a penalty at all and therefore, it has to be accepted that the petitioner had been exonerated from the charges. Regulation 17 provides for appeal against an order imposing punishment. The said regulation provides that an officer employee may appeal against an order imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 and the appeal shall lie to the Appellate Author¬ity specified in the first and second Schedules of Regulations. It is therefore clear from this regulation than an appeal shall be maintainable only when a penalty as provided in Regulation 4 is imposed on an officer employee in a departmental proceeding. When there is no punishment imposed in terms of Regulation 4 an appeal is not maintainable. Since we have held that imposition of punishment of caution does not come with the definition of either minor or major penalty, no appeal can be maintained at the in¬stance of the petitioner. 9. Coming to Regulation 18, it appears that the said regulation starts with a non obstante clause and the Reviewing Authority is empowered to call for the records of a case within six months from the date of final order and after reviewing the case pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit. The Regulation 18 is quoted below :- “18. The Regulation 18 is quoted below :- “18. Review : Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Reviewing Authority as specified in the first and second Schedules to these Regulations may call for the record of the case within six months of the date of the final order and after reviewing the case pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit ; Provided that - (i) if any enhanced penalty, which the Reviewing Authority proposed to impose is a major penalty specified in clauses (e), (f), (g) or (h) of Regulation 4 and an enquiry as provided under Regulation 6 has not already been held in the case, the Reviewing Authority shall direct that such an enquiry be held in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 6 and thereafter consider the record of the enquiry and pass such orders as it may deem proper; (ii) if the Reviewing Authority decides to enhance the punishment but an enquiry has already been held in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 6, the Reviewing Authority shall give show cause notice to the officer employee as to why the enhanced penalty should not be imposed upon him and shall pass an order after taking into account the representation, if any, submitted by the officer employee.” 10. Shri Mohanty, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner referring to the said regulation submitted that the power of review can only be exercised for the purpose of enhanc¬ing the penalty and does not apply to cases where the officer-employee has been exonerated of the charges. In support of his contention, the learned counsel submitted that the proviso to Regulation 18 cannot be read in issolation and the entire provi¬sion if read together, it will be clear that the power of review can only be exercised for the purpose of enhancing the penalty. Shri Lal, the learned counsel appearing for the bank, on the other hand, submitted that first part of the regulation is a general power conferred on the Reviewing Authority whereas the proviso to the regulation is to be followed only when there is a penalty and the said penalty is sought to be enhanced. Shri Lal, the learned counsel appearing for the bank, on the other hand, submitted that first part of the regulation is a general power conferred on the Reviewing Authority whereas the proviso to the regulation is to be followed only when there is a penalty and the said penalty is sought to be enhanced. A plain reading of the regulation shows that notwithstanding anything contained in the regulation, the Reviewing Authority may call for the records of any case within six months from the date of the final order and after reviewing the records pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit. In our considered view, this power of the Reviewing Authority is a general power to call for the re¬cords and review the case and pass such orders as the Reviewing Authority may deem fit. The proviso only speaks of enhancement of penalty already imposed by the Disciplinary Authority depending on whether any enquiry was conducted or not, Proviso (i) is applicable where no enquiry has been conducted and the Reviewing Authority proposes to impose a major penalty as specified in Regulation 4 and Proviso (ii) applies to a case where the Review¬ing Authority decides to enhance the punishment but an enquiry has already been conducted in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 6. We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties that both the Proviso to Regulation 18 are applicable in different circumstances and the general power of review lies with the Reviewing Authority under which it can call for the records, review the same and pass such orders as it may deem fit. undisputedly in this case the final order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority exonerating the petitioner from the charges and imposing a punishment of caution on 14th December, 1993. The Reviewing Authority within six months i.e. on 31st March, 1994 called for the records and directed the petitioner to show cause as to why he shall not be punished and after receipt of the reply from the petitioner the punishment was imposed on 9th June, 1994. We, therefore, do not find any illegality in the impugned order in Annexure-18. 11. We, therefore, do not find any illegality in the impugned order in Annexure-18. 11. The other contention raised by Shri Mohanty is that in absence of an appeal, the review power cannot be exercised and in support of his contention, Shri Mohanty referred to a decision in the case of Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others reported in A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1503. The Apex Court in the aforesaid decision observed as fol¬lows :- “ It is true that when an authority higher than the disci¬plinary authority itself imposes the punishment, the order of punishment suffers from no illegality when no appeal is provided to such authority. However, when an appeal is provided to the higher authority concerned against the order of the disciplinary authority or of a lower authority and the higher authority passes an order of punishment, the employee concerned is deprived of the remedy of appeal which is a substantive right given to him by the Rules/Regulation. An employee cannot be deprived of his substantive right. What is further, when there is a provision of appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority and when the appellate or the higher authority against whose order there is no appeal, exercises the powers of the disciplinary authority in a given case, it results in discrimination against the employ concerned. This is particularly so when there are no guidelines in the Rules/Regulations as to when the higher authority or the appellate authority should exercise the powers of the discipli¬nary authority. The higher or appellate authority may choose to exercise the power of the disciplinary authority in some cases while not doing so in other cases. In such cases, the right of the employee depends upon the choice of the higher/appellate authority which patently results in discrimination between an employee and employee. Surely, such a situation cannot savour of legality. It cannot be contended that when an appellate authority chooses to exercise the power of disciplinary authority, it should be held that there is not right of appeal provided under the Regulations.” 12. In the aforesaid decision it appears that a departmen¬tal proceeding was initiated against the petitioner therein where the Manager of the Branch of the Bank was appointed as the In¬quiry Officer to conduct the inquiry and he found the petitioner guilty of the charges in his report dated 28th May, 1985. In the aforesaid decision it appears that a departmen¬tal proceeding was initiated against the petitioner therein where the Manager of the Branch of the Bank was appointed as the In¬quiry Officer to conduct the inquiry and he found the petitioner guilty of the charges in his report dated 28th May, 1985. On the basis of the said report the Deputy General Manger, Zonal Office, West Bengal Zone of the Bank by his order dated 14th November, 1985 dismissed the petitioner from service. It was contended before the Apex Court that the Regulations as it stood at the time of imposition of punishment the disciplinary authority for officers in Grades E. D. C. and B excepting Divisional Managers in Grade B was the Divisional Manager/AGM (Personnel) and an appeal against the order of the Disciplinary Authority was to be preferred before the Deputy General Manager or any other officer of the same rank. Accepting such a contention, the Apex Court observed that when there is a provision of appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority and when the appellate or the higher authority against whose order there is no appeal, exer¬cises the powers of the disciplinary authority in a given case, it results in discrimination against the employee concerned as such action deprives the employee of an opportu¬nity of having filed an appeal. This decision has no application to the present case in view of the fact that the petitioner was exonerated by the Disciplinary Authority and was only imposed a caution. He did not prefer any appeal against the said order as appeal shall lie only when a punishment is imposed as indicated in Regulation 4. Therefore, there could not have any appeal at the instance of the petitioner. We, therefore, in the second point also disagree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in absence of an appeal, the review power cannot be exercised. 13. In view of the discussions made above, we do not find any merit in the writ application and the same stands dismissed. P. K. MOHANTY, J. I agree. Application dismissed.