R. B. MISRA, J. Heard Sri Sanjeev Kumar Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri Lalji Sinha, learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. In this writ petition the order dated 27-2-1989 passed by the Commanding Officer, Battalion No. 3 Railway Protection Special Force, Lucknow (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) has been challenged with a prayer to quash the inquiry officer proceedings and charge-sheet and further seeking direction to the respondents to pay the petitioner entire arrears of salary from 27-11-1980 to 27-2-1989. It appears that the petitioner was a Constable in Railway Protection Special Force and was issued a charge-sheet under Rule 153 of RPF Rules, 1987 and was said to raise slogans by virtue of being R. P. S. F. Association being a member of association; rpsf Jindabad in the course of Sainik Sammelan held by Asstt. Commanding No. 2 Bn. /rpsf on 18-11-1980. The petitioner was also charged for leaving sainik sammelan alongwith other participants of sammelan except N. C. O. s and was also charge-sheeted for misconduct and gross indiscipline. The petitioners service was dispensed with by order dated 27-2-1989 by Assistant Commandant under Rule 47 of Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 after dispensing with the Inquiry Officer and procedure 45, 46, 47 of rules 1959. The petitioner preferred appeal and revision against the above order and appeal/revision thereafter, both were dismissed. The writ petitioner preferred against the revisional order dated 3-6-1986 was set aside with the directions to the respondents authority to initiate fresh inquiry accordance with law. After passing of the aforesaid order of the High Court the petitioner by order dated 7-4-1988 of Assistant Commandant II Bn. Railway Protection Special Force, Gorakhpur was placed under suspension under Rule 134 of Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 (in short called rules 1987) a charge-sheet dated 19-4-1988 was issued under Rule 153 of rules 1987 and inquiry officer was appointed who held the inquiry and after taken into consideration the records and statements of Sri Ram Singh, Bachcha Tewari, B. N. Singh, Mukhiyar Singh, Pratap Singh and J. P. Lal Srivastava a fresh charge-sheet dated 11-11-1988 was also issued by the Second Bn. Railway Protection Force, Gorakhpur and after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing the enquiry report was submitted. On the basis of enquiry report the petitioner was dismissed. 3. Railway Protection Force, Gorakhpur and after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing the enquiry report was submitted. On the basis of enquiry report the petitioner was dismissed. 3. It appears that the petitioner was a constable in Railway Protection Special Force and was issued a Major Penalty charge-sheet under Rule 153 of RPF Rules, 1987 vide No. BN/pro-145/hqr/88-3554 dated 11-11-1988 for the following offence : (1) Raising slogans "rpsf Association Zinda-Bad in the course of Sainik Sammelan, induced the staff to by-cott the Sainik Sammelan held by (the then) Asstt. Commandant No. 2 BN/rpsf Sri H. K. Mishra, at Katrashgarh in the morning on 18-11-1980. (2) Finally leaving the Sainik Sammelan and taking away the other participants of Sanik Sammelan alongwith him except the NCOs. (3) Gross misconduct and breach of discipline. 4. It has also been noted in the order dated 27-2-1989 as below : "it has been reported by (the then) Coy. Commander `b Coy 2 BN/rpsf (Shri J. B. Singh) vide his report No. 2 BN/b/7/80 dated 23-11-1980 that in the morning of 18-11-1980, Sri R. K. Mishra (the then) Asstt. Commandant No. 2 BN/rpsf/gkp visited `b Coy of 2 GKP/rpsf Headquartered at Katrashgar, and held Sainik Sammelan of the staff in the varandah of the station building. Besides others, Const. Uttam Chand Prasad also attended the Sammelan. In the course of `sainik Sammelan Constable Uttam Chand Prasad stood up and started raising slogans `rpsf Association `zinda-Bad and induced the staff present in the Sammelan to by-cott the same. Finally, he left the Sainik Sammelan, taking away the other participants of the Sainik Sammelan alongwith his except the NCOs". 5. The Enquiry Officer conduced the enquiry and held the party charged guilty of the charges levelled against him. The disciplinary authority after agreeing with the findings of Enquiry Officer and drawing its own findings has submitted the whole case file to the undersigned for action and punishment which is not in the competency of the disciplinary authority. 6. The whole incident was supported by the PWs during initial stage but later on the PWs retraced the statement and did not support their original statements. From their previous statements and cross- examination done during the enquiry it is abundantly clear that all the PWs had given correct and voluntarily statements without any force being exerted on them by any source. From their previous statements and cross- examination done during the enquiry it is abundantly clear that all the PWs had given correct and voluntarily statements without any force being exerted on them by any source. They seem to be giving different statement than the one which indicates their sympathy for the party charged for the reasons best known to them. From the record it is also not clear as to why and under what circumstances of what events promoted the party charged to raise such slogans to act in such a highly indiscipline way during Sainik Sammelan. In case the party charged had some grievance the same could have been brought to the notice of the proper authority in the police and disciplined way for redressal. 7. Against the order dated 27-2-1989 of commanding officer enclosed as Annexure-12 the impugned order the petitioner has challenged the impugned order without preferring the appeal under Section 212 of the aforesaid rules 1987. The petitioner has challenged this order by saying that he has not been afforded opportunity of hearing and the officer dismissing the service of the petitioner was not competent to do so. 8. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. From the perusal of the record it is clear that the petitioner was placed under suspension and was charge-sheeted and the Enquiry Officer had conducted the enquiry after observing the full procedure and by allowing him to produce the documents and witnesses and sufficient opportunity of hearing was given to him and since the commanding officer who has passed the order was holding additional charge of Battalion No. 2 in addition to his original charge, therefore, impugned order in question cannot be said to be illegal and/cannot be set aside. The petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy of preferring appeal under Rule 212 of Chapter-III of rules 1987 and the writ petition could be rejected on the ground of alternative remedy only. 9. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Honble Court in the case of Chemicals and Allied Products v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, reported in 1988 UPTC page 212, in view of the alternative remedy of reference (which in this case has been availed by the petitioners by filing a reference under Section 35-H (1) of the Central Excise Act), the writ petition of the petitioners was held no longer maintainable. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Madho Saran v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Bareilly, reported in 1986 U. P. T. C. page 959, has dismissed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the petitioner can approach the appellate Tribunal for the purpose of stay during the pendency of the reference proceedings in the High Court, and the writ petition under Article 226 is not an appropriate forum or remedy. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of Chanan Singh and Sons v. Collector Central Excise and others, (1999)9 SCC 17 para 2, has held that instead of challenging the order of the Tribunal by filing the statutory alternative remedy of reference the writ petition was filed and the apex Court has held as follows : "the High Court simply said that the appellant had a statutory alternative remedy and the appellant had to avail that statutory remedy instead of filing writ petition. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. The appellant instead of challenging the order of the Tribunal by availing the statutory alternative remedy has filed this appeal by special leave challenging the order of the High Court. We are of the view that the High Court right in dismissing the writ petition directing the appellant to avail the statutory alternative remedy. " 11. In the case of M/s Titagarh Paper Mills v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC page 603, the Supreme Court has held in para 11 at page 607, as follows : "if the petitioners are dis-satisfied with the decision in appeal they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. . . . . . . . . . Act provides for a complete measure to challenge an order of assessment. . . . . . . . . . . by mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. " 12. . . . . . . . . . Act provides for a complete measure to challenge an order of assessment. . . . . . . . . . . by mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. " 12. The said decision has been followed in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Limited and others, AIR 1985 (SC) page 330 at page 332 para 3, as follows : "in Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 , A. P. Sen, E. S. Venkataramiah and R. B. Misra, JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter, to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were. . . . . . . . . . become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. . . . . . . We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter, prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. " As mentioned earlier, reference under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act is maintainable against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, like a reference against the order of the CEGAT under Section 35-H of the Act. 13. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. " As mentioned earlier, reference under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act is maintainable against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, like a reference against the order of the CEGAT under Section 35-H of the Act. 13. The Supreme Court has depicted the practice of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution instead of filing a reference under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act in the case of Commissioner Income Tax, Lucknow v. U. P. Forest Corporation, (1998)3 Supreme Court Cases page 530 at page 533 para 5, which is reproduced below : " (5) Instead of following the procedure prescribed by the Act by way of a reference under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act, the respondent chose to file three petitions in the Allahabad High Court challenging the orders of the Tribunal in respect to the Assessment years 1977-78 and 1980-81 and order of the Assessing Authority for assessment year 1984-85 which had been made by it. These writ petitions were entertained by the High Court which allowed the same by coming to the conclusion that the respondent was a local authority and therefore, its income was exempt from tax. " Taking note of the aforesaid fact in para 5 quoted above, the Supreme Court has observed as follows in para 14 at page 539 and 540 : "before concluding, we would like to observe that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions when adequate alternative remedy was available to the respondent. . . . . . . . We, however, emphasise that the petitioners should not normally short-circuit the procedure provided by the taxing statute and seek redress by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. " 14. In the case of C. L. Jain Woolen Mills, (1996) 84 Excise Law Times, page 17, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "while we agree with Mr. A. Subba Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that when the appeal before the Tribunal, preferred by the assessee himself, was pending, the High Court ought not to have interfered in the matter by way of a writ petition, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. " 15. A. Subba Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that when the appeal before the Tribunal, preferred by the assessee himself, was pending, the High Court ought not to have interfered in the matter by way of a writ petition, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. " 15. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of P. Vasu Babu v. Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, reported in 2002 Volume 142 Excise Law Times page 316, has dismissed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution only on the question that the petitioner has remedy of Reference under Sections 35-G and 35-H of the Act. 16. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. , AIR 1952 SC 192 , held that as the Motor Vehicles Act is a self contained code and itself provides for appealable/revisable forum, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in matters relating to its provision. 17. Similar view has been reiterated in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. , AIR 1985 SC 330 ; R. Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999)1 SCC 472 and Shivgovinda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999)3 SCC 5 . 18. In C. A. Ibraham v. I. T. O. , AIR 1961 and H. B. Gandhi v. M/s. Gopinath and Sons, 1992 (Suppl) 2 SCC 312, the Supreme Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. 19. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K. S. Venkataraman and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 , considered the Privy Council, AIR 1947 PC 78, and held that the writ Court can entertain the petition provided the order is alleged to be without jurisdiction or has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, or the provisions of the Act/rules is under challenge. 20. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. 20. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa and another, AIR 1983 SC 603 , the Supreme Court refused to extend the ratio of its earlier judgment in State of U. P. v. Mohammed Noor, AIR 1958 SC 86 , wherein the Court had held that prerogative writ can be issued to correct the error of the Court or Tribunal below even if an appeal is provided under the statute under certain circumstances, i. e. the order is without jurisdiction, or principles of natural justice have not been followed, and held that in case of assessment under the Taxing Statute, the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. (supra) would be applicable for the reason that "the use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that us, is the test. " 21. While deciding the said case, the Supreme Court placed reliance on large number of judgments, particularly New Water Works Co. v. Hawkes Ford, (1859)6 CBNS 336; Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. , 1919 AC 368, the Attorney General of Trinidad and Taboco v. Gordon Grant and Co. , 1935 Appeal Cases 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. , AIR 1949 PC 105, wherein it had consistently been emphasised that the remedy provided by the statute must be followed and writ should not generally be entertained unless the statutory remedies are exhausted. 22. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, AIR 1999 SC 22 and Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 74 , the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that writ should not generally be entertained if statute provide for remedy of appeal and even if it has been admitted, parties should be relegated to the appellate forum. 23. In Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999)1 SCC 209, the Honble Supreme Court has held that if the statute itself provides for a remedy of revision, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. 24. In Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and others, AIR 2001 SCW 2993 , the Supreme Court while considering the issue of alternative remedy observed as under : "the Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. 24. In Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and others, AIR 2001 SCW 2993 , the Supreme Court while considering the issue of alternative remedy observed as under : "the Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast tract procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act. " 25. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in K. S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and others, AIR 1954 SC 207 , held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Court a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kota, AIR 1955 SC 425 , holding that the power of issuing writs are purely discretionary and no limit can be placed upon that discretion. However, the power can be exercised alone with recognised line and not arbitrarily and the Court must keep in mind that the power shall not be exercised unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue and in other cases the parties must be relegated to the Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense. 26. 26. Again a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Union of India and others v. T. R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , held that it is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. The Supreme Court held that existence of an another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such remedy is exhausted, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless there are good grounds therefor. 27. Yet another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of U. P. and others v. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , considered the scope of exercise of writ jurisdiction when remedy of appeal was there and held that writ would like provided there is no other equally effective remedy. The Court, in extra-ordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it come to the conclusion that there has been a breach of fundamental principles of justice. Therefore, in a proper case, powers of writ can be exercised, but should not be exercised generally where other adequate legal remedy is available through it may not be, per se, a bar to issue a writ of prerogative. The Supreme Court held that the remedy, being discretionary, cannot be asked as a matter of right, even if the order is a nullity, on the ground that it was passed by disregarding the rules of natural justice. The Court held as under : ". . . . save in exceptional cases, the Courts will not interfere under Article 226 until all normal remedies available to a petitioner have been exhausted. The normal remedies in a case of this kind are appeal or revision. The Court held as under : ". . . . save in exceptional cases, the Courts will not interfere under Article 226 until all normal remedies available to a petitioner have been exhausted. The normal remedies in a case of this kind are appeal or revision. It is true that on a matter of jurisdiction or on a question that goes to the root of the case, the High Courts can entertain a petition at an early stage but they are not bound to do so and a petition would not be thrown out because the petitioner had done that which the Courts usually ask him to do, namely, to exhaust his normal remedies before invoking an extra-ordinary jurisdiction. . . . . . . The petitioner would have been expected to pursue the remedies of appeal or revision and could not have come to the High Court in the ordinary way until he had exhausted them. " 28. In N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and others, AIR 1959 SC 442, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against the orders of the Tribunal is undoubted; but then, it is well-settled that where there is another remedy provided, the Court must properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29. Another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Bhailal Bhai etc. etc. , AIR 1964 SC 1006 , held that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the mods of obtaining relief by an action in a Civil Court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. The power to give relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been reiterated in Municipal Board, Khurai and another v. Kamal Kumar and another, AIR 1965 SC 1321 . 30. In Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das and others, AIR 1984 SC 653 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court must exercise its power under Article 226 with circumspection and while considering the matter of recovery of tax etc. it should not interfere save under very exceptional circumstances. 31. 30. In Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das and others, AIR 1984 SC 653 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court must exercise its power under Article 226 with circumspection and while considering the matter of recovery of tax etc. it should not interfere save under very exceptional circumstances. 31. In S. T. Mathuswami v. K. Natarajan and others, AIR 1988 SC 616 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot be justified to exercise the power in writ jurisdiction if an effective alternative remedy is available to the party. 32. In Kerala State Electricity Board and another v. Kurien E. Kalathil and others, (2000)6 SCC 293 , while dealing with a similar issue, the Supreme Court held that the writ petition should not be entertained unless the party exhausted the alternative/statutory efficacious remedy. 33. In A. Venkateshwaiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and others, (2000)7 SCC 695 , the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of exercising the writ jurisdiction when efficacious alternative remedy is available. The Court observed as under : "though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of Constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well recognised principle which gives judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedy one or other, before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy. " 34. Similar view has been reiterated in UPSRTC and another v. Krishna Kant and others, (1995)5 SCC 75 ; L. L. Sudhakar Reddy and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, (2001)6 SCC 634 ; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, (2001)8 SCC 509 ; G. K. N. Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and others, (2003)1 SCC 72 and Pratap Singh and another v. State of Haryana, (2002)7 SCC 481. 35. In The State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Raja Mahendra Pal and others, AIR 1999 SC 1786 , while dealing with a similar issue the Supreme Court has held as under : "it is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature and can be invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right. . . . . . . The Constitutional Court should insist upon the party (to avail of the efficacious alternative remedy) instead of invoking the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court. This does not however debar the Court from granting the appropriate relief to a citizen in peculiar and special facts notwithstanding the existence of alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of special circumstances are required to be noticed before issuance of the direction by the High Court while invoking the jurisdiction under the said Article. " 36. In Government of A. P. and others v. Sridevi and others, (2002)5 SCC 37 , the Supreme Court held that where a authority is competent to determine the issue "the High Court in a writ jurisdiction should have directed the authority only to take an appropriate decision. When the statutory authority is vested with the power to determine the question as to the applicability of the provisions of the Act, it or ordinarily desirable to leave the question to be decided by such authority. The aggrieved party can file appeal against the decision within the framework provided under the statute and the ultimate decision also could be challenged under judicial review, if permitted in law. 37. In The State of Bihar and others v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. , (2002)1 SCC 216 , the Supreme Court held that existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Writ Court but it could be a good ground for not entertaining the petition. 38. In Harbans Lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. , (2003)2 SCC 107 , the Supreme Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the writ seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; where there is failure of principle of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the virus of an Act is challenged. While deciding the said case, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, AIR 1998 SC 22 . 39. While deciding the said case, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, AIR 1998 SC 22 . 39. This Court in 2002 (1) LBESR 16 (All) ; 2002 (1) UPLBEC 705 in Pradeep Kumar Singh v. U. P. State Sugar Corporation and another, has referred in its judgment the following cases (1991)2 UPLBEC 898, Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U. P. Co-operative Union, AIR 1971 SC 33 ; Hridya Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, 1995 All LJ 454; Dr. Bal Krishna Agrawal v. State of U. P. and others, (1990)1 UPLBEC 699; Ambika Singh v. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and others, (1998)8 Supreme Court Cases; Whilrpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Markets, Mumbai and others, 2000 (1) LBESR 656 (All) ; 2000 (1) ESC 504 (All); Satya Ram Yadav v. Deputy Managing Director, U. P. State Ware Housing Corporation Lucknow, 2001 (2) ESC 619 (All); State of U. P. and others v. Ali Abbas Abdi, AIR 1987 SC 2186 ; Dr. (Smt.) Kamta Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya Sitapur (U. P.) and others, 2000 (89) FLR 1112; Sunil Kumar Pathak v. Chairman, Indian Oil Corporation, New Delhi and others, 1997 (76) FLR 372; J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. , Kanpur v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1972 SC 1031 ; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1900 ; Co-operative Engineering Works Limited v. P. P. Munder, 2000 (7) SCC 529 ; Aligarh Muslim University and others v. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 1995 SC 1715 ; Rajasthan State Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, and has arrived at the conclusion as below : "thus, from the various decisions referred to above the following principles emerge regarding maintainability of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India : (I) While exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court may decline to grant relief until such statutory remedy is exhausted. However, this rule is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and not a rule of law nor it bars the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in granting relief in appropriate case and exceptional circumstances; (II) Alternative remedy is not a bar where a writ petition has been filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights; or where there is violation of principles of natural justice; or where the order of the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 40. In my respectful consideration since in Pradeep Kumar Singh (supra) the question of violation of principle of natural justice was being tested in writ petition and therefore, in reference to the maintainability of the writ petition without resorting to alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, the above view taken cannot have universal application. The present petitioner Union of India cannot take protection of the decision of this Court (D. B.) in Pradeep Kumar Singh (supra) more so in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in reference to the alternative remedy. In view of the foregoing analysis the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. Petition dismissed. .