JUDGMENT 1. - This contempt petition has been filed by one Shri Ghanshyam Singh, who is practicing as an advocate. The contempt petition is against one Judicial Officer Shri Samar Pal Singh, the then Judicial Magistrate, Jetaran and against two more persons, who were the clients of the petitioner in a criminal case and have not paid remuneration for conducting the case to the 5 petitioner and non-payment of remuneration by the clients to petitioner advocate ultimately resulted into this contempt proceeding against the judgment of the trial Court and petitioner's own clients. 2. Since the petitioner is advocate and seeking initiation of the proceedings for the contempt committed by none else than a Judicial 5 Magistrate and also initiated contempt proceedings against his own clients and petitioner has filed the contempt petition by engaging an advocate who is practicing in the High Court, as the Advocate is supposed to be an officer of the Court and pious duties are cast upon the advocate to assist the Court in the cases conducted by them or in case any assistance is sought by the to Court from the advocates and advocates are part and parcel in process of imparting justice in addition to a fact that legal profession is not a Business and it has its own high ethics. In legal profession, an act may not be unlawful and may not be forbidden by law but still it may be unethical. Therefore, this matter. requires serious consideration because contempt proceeding has 15 been initiated by a responsible advocate with the legal assistance of another advocate and if proceedings culminate in favour of the petitioner it will have far reaching serious consequences because now it is not a mere money matter as it was initially. In these proceedings a judicial officer and petitioners own clients may be punished by the High Court. 3. Brief facts of the case, relevant for the purpose of deciding this contempt petition, are that according to the petitioner he was engaged as the counsel in Criminal Case No. 249/96 State of Rajasthan v. Ramjani , by non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 which was pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 'Jetaran on 13.2 1996. 3. Brief facts of the case, relevant for the purpose of deciding this contempt petition, are that according to the petitioner he was engaged as the counsel in Criminal Case No. 249/96 State of Rajasthan v. Ramjani , by non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 which was pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 'Jetaran on 13.2 1996. It is alleged that though the petitioner was engaged by the accused persons (non-petitioners No 2 and 3 in this petition) to conduct their case and was conducting the case but another advocate Shri Rajendra Kumar Gujar filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the accused non-petitioners without obtaining consent of the petitioner. The petitioner submitted an application before the trial Court raising objection about filing of the Vakalatnama by advocate Rajendra Kumar Gujar and it was prayed that advocate Rajendra Kumar Gujar be restrained from conducting the case on behalf of the non-petitioners accused-persons or, in the alternative, the clients of the petitioner should pay his fees. The said application was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 2.11.1996. Copy of this order has not been placed on record by the petitioner. 4. The petitioner preferred criminal revision against the said order dated 2.11 1996, which was partly allowed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat, Camp Jetaran, on 7.8.1998 and the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, directed the non-petitioners No 2 and 3 to pay Rs. 2000/- each to the petitioner advocate before the final arguments in the criminal case. The revisional Court further directed the trial Court to secure payment of fees of the petitioner-advocate before the final arguments in the criminal case. 5. The petitioner, when was not paid the fees, submitted an application before the trial Court on 8.2.2002 and sought compliance of the order dated 45 7.8.1998 passed in revision by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat wherein direction was given not only to the non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 to pay remuneration of the petitioner but direction was also to the trial Court to secure the payment of the fees of the petitioner-advocate from the accused-persons. On the same day, i.e. on 8.2.2002, the accused persons produced in Court from Judicial Custody, as it was the date fixed for attendance of the accused persons. On the same day, i.e. on 8.2.2002, the accused persons produced in Court from Judicial Custody, as it was the date fixed for attendance of the accused persons. Accused persons were told by the Court to pay the petitioner-advocate's fees but the accused persons had shown their inability to pay the fees as they had no money. Therefore, the Court ordered that the matter can be considered at the time of final arguments. On 27.5.2002, the petitioner submitted another application and sought payment of remuneration from the accused persons in compliance of the order dated 7.6.1998. On 28.5.2002 petitioner submitted two more applications for the same relief upon which the Court instructed accused persons to pay the petitioner's remuneration and fixed the case for final arguments on 10.6 2002. On 10.6.2002 also, the petitioner submitted yet one more application seeking the same relief of payment of remuneration, again pointing out that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat has passed the order against to non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 and for the Court for securing the payment of the remuneration of the petitioner before the final arguments. On this day also the learned judge of the trial Court asked the non-petitioners accused to pay the petitioner's remuneration but again the accused persons stated that they are poor persons and not in a position to pay the fees of the petitioner-advocate. The Court also observed that accused appears to be poor persons which is apparent by mere looking at them only and this old criminal case (old-more than 20 years old) cannot be adjourned again and again and rejected the application of the petitioner. The trial Court thereafter, decided the criminal case finally by judgment dated 11.6.2002 though the non-petitioners did not pay the petitioner's remuneration as ordered by the Addl. Sessions Judge. According to petitioner, the non-petitioner No. 1, the Judge of the trial Court, did not obey the directions of the higher Court and committed contempt of the higher Court, therefore, he may be punished for that. Since the non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 did not pay the petitioner's remuneration despite the Court's order, therefore, they also committed the contempt of the Court, hence they may also be punished. 6. Since the non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 did not pay the petitioner's remuneration despite the Court's order, therefore, they also committed the contempt of the Court, hence they may also be punished. 6. In the back drop of the these facts of the petitioner advocate of the non-petitioner No. 2 and submitted this contempt petition under sections 10 and 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and u/Art. 215 of the Constitution of 30 India. 7. It is submitted by the petitioner that non-petitioner No. 1 Shri Samar Pal Singh, while acting as Judicial Magistrate, Jetaran malafidely and in arbitrary manner rejected petitioner's application for payment of petitioner's legal fees from non-petitioners No. 2 and (accused before him in criminal case) vide order dated 10.6.2002. According to the petitioner, there was no material available on record on the basis of which non-petitioner No. 1 could have reached to the conclusion that the accused persons had no money with them to pay the remuneration of the petitioner-advocate. This is according to petitioner amounts to refusal of the non-petitioner No. 1 (Judge of the trial Court) to comply with the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat. According to the petitioner by not obeying the order of the higher Court, the non-petitioner No. 1 has refused to guide by "precedent" laid down by the higher Court under which he functions and, therefore, the value of precedence and respect for the pronouncement of the higher Courts is jeopardised which is detrimental to the dignity and efficiency of the administration of justice and the non-petitioner has shown his total dis-respect and dis-regard for higher Court's directions. It is also alleged that non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 have also acted intentionally to disobey the order of the Court. The petitioner empathetically submitted that "It is well so established principle of law that any judge of inferior Court and the magistrate may be punished for contempt of Court for acting unjustly, oppressively and irregularity in execution of their duties under colour of judicial proceedings wholly unwarranted by law and for disobeying any direction and orders issued by superior Court to proceed or not to proceed in a matter before them". The petitioner prayed that the contemnors may be punished and exemplary cost may be awarded against the non-petitioners by this Court. 8. The petitioner prayed that the contemnors may be punished and exemplary cost may be awarded against the non-petitioners by this Court. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner advanced arguments in support of petitioner's pleas. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the parties to the suit are liable to be punished for obstructing the execution of the order. It is also submitted that the direction of the Addl. Sessions Court to the non-petitioners and to the trial Court was clear and unambiguous which should have been complied in its true spirit but the contemnors did not obey the directions deliberately and malafidely. The validity and irregularity of the order cannot be an excuse for not obeying the 15 order of the Court. Till the said order is set aside by the Court or vacated, it is required to be obeyed and cannot be flouted by the party against whom order is passed. For this, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in the case of Kruthiventi Kutumba Rao v. Muthi Venakata Subba Rao & Ors., AIR 1969 AP 47 . It is also submitted that even if an order is ultimately found to be passed without jurisdiction even then the defendants can be punished for violation of the said interim order The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. Etc., AIR 1997 SC 1240 . It is further contended that in contempt proceedings the Court does not possess the power to examine the legality and validity of the order of which violation is alleged by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner retied upon the judgment delivered in the case of J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar & ors., AIR 1997 SC 113 and in support of his argument 30 that the Judicial Officer and Magistrate can also be punished in case they committed contempt of Courts, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Judgment delivered in the case of Mahabir Prasad v. The State, AIR 1953 Madhya Bharat 60 . 9. 9. I considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the documents placed on record by the petitioner as well as certified copies of the order-sheets and applications placed on record by the learned counsel for the petitioner while arguing the contempt petition and also considered the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. At the outset, it may be stated that so far as issuance of order by the Court is concerned, it is required to be obeyed by the persons against whom the order has been passed and it is also the duty of the subordinate Court to comply with the directions issued by the higher Court. It is not in dispute that the order till it is vacated or set aside; it is required to be obeyed. Presently, I need not to examine whether any contempt proceeding can be as initiated against the Judge of the subordinate Court or not. In this case, the facts are glaring inasmuch as that the petitioner who is advocate, appeared for non-petitioner Nos. 2 and in trial Court and represented them in the Court proceedings and was agent of non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 has filed the application against his own clients. that too for monetary relief in his own so favour in criminal case founded upon contract of advocate with his clients. The criminal case was launched by the State against non-petitioners No. 2 and 3. Independently, the petitioner was nobody in the criminal case as it was by the State against non-petitioners No. 2 and 3. The petitioner could lot have even appeared in the criminal case except as an agent and Representative of non-petitioners No. 2 and 3. How the litigation, which was between the State and non-petitioners No. 2 and 3, has been converted into Agnation for recovery of remuneration of the agent advocate against his 5 a persons (accused-persons-clients of petitioner) is a serious matter. How a Criminal Court can pass any order for payment of fees of an advocate and The question is whether the non-petitioner No. 1 while acting as judicial magistrate could have complied with the directions contained in the order dated 8.1998 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge Sojat Camp Jetaran. How a Criminal Court can pass any order for payment of fees of an advocate and The question is whether the non-petitioner No. 1 while acting as judicial magistrate could have complied with the directions contained in the order dated 8.1998 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge Sojat Camp Jetaran. 10 further question is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, can it be said that the non-petitioners wilfully disobeyed the directions issued on 7.8.1998 by the Addl. Sessions Judge in revision No. 25197 First of all, it is to be examined what is the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge in order dated 7.8.1998. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge ordered, which is 15 translated in English, which reads as under "Consequently, the revision is partly allowed and accused Ramjani and Safi Mohd. both are directed to pay Rs. 2,000/- each to advocate Sh. Ghanshyam Singh before final arguments and the trial Court is also directed to secure the payment of remuneration before final 20 arguments." 11. When learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to explain how the trial Court could have secured payment of the remuneration of the petitioner-advocate. learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the rules framed under the Advocates Act, 1961 which provides that no advocate shall 25 be permitted to file Vakalatnama for the same party without the consent of former advocate. When asked whether the trial Court could have stayed the proceedings of the criminal case for securing the payment of the remuneration of the petitioner, there was no answer rather it was admitted that the trial Court could not have stayed it. Without examining the legality 30 and validity of the order and even without examining jurisdiction of the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge in entertaining the revision petition and jurisdiction to pass the order as passed in criminal revision petition on 7.8.1998, paramount question requires consideration is how it could have been complied with by the non-petitioner No. 1 while discharging judicial function sand who was bound to act within the powers which he could have exercised by law and under the law and then whether the judge of the trial court will fully flouted or disobeyed the direction issued by the higher Court? 12. 12. It is clear from the order of the trial Court dated 8.2.2002 that the trial Court told non-petitioner No. 2 to pay the remuneration of the petitioner when the accused persons were brought before the Court from the Judicial custody. The accused-persons submitted that they are not having money. he trial Court still passed the order that the request of the petitioner can be considered at the time of final argument. It appears from the order-sheet dated 27.5.2002 and as stated by the petitioner in his contempt petition, the 45 petitioner submitted an application again before the trial Court and requested that he may be paid his remuneration and on 28.5.2002 two more applications were submitted by the petitioner, upon which the trial Court issued directions to the non-petitioner-accused to pay the remuneration of the petitioner and fixed date for final arguments, 10.6.2001. Again on so 10,6.2002, the petitioner submitted the application for the same relief of Payment of remuneration. The trial Court again told the accused-persons to pay the remuneration of the petitioner-advocate but they again did not pay the amount and again submitted that they are not in a position to pay the remuneration because of their poverty. Not only had this but the Court observed that even by looking to the accused-persons, they appear to be very poor persons. The trial Court was constrained to observe that the case is old one and cannot be adjourned again and again and in these circumstances, the application of the petitioner was rejected by the trial Court by separate order. Not only had this but the Court observed that even by looking to the accused-persons, they appear to be very poor persons. The trial Court was constrained to observe that the case is old one and cannot be adjourned again and again and in these circumstances, the application of the petitioner was rejected by the trial Court by separate order. The order dated 10.6.2002 is as under : 10-6-2002 % izkFkhZ vf/koDrk }kjk viuk esgurkuk fnykus ckcr izkFkZuk&i= izLrqr fd;k x;kA izkFkZuk i= ij vfHk;qDrx.k ,oa izkFkhZ vf/koDrk dks lquk x;kA vfHk;qDr }kjk esgurkus ds lEcU/k esa ;g dgk fd fiNys yxHkx nks ekg ls ts@lh esa py jgk gSA rFkk mlds ikl tekur djkus ds Hkh iSlk ugha gS rFkk og vR;Ur fu/kZu ,oa chekj O;fDr gSA ,oa yxHkx fiNys 21 o"kZ ls fopkj.k dk lkeuk dj jgk gSA vfHk;qDr jetkuh ls Hkh izkFkhZ vf/koDrk dk esgurkuk vnk djus ds fy, dgk x;kA ijUrq vfHk;qDr }kjk Hkh viuh fu/kZurk dk dFku fd;k x;kA rFkk ;g dgk x;k fd mlds ikl iSlk fcYdqy ugha gS rFkk o`) ,oa detksj gks x;k gSA okLro esa vfHk;qDrx.k fu/kZu ,oa xjhc gSa fu/kZu gksuk dksbZ iki vFkok vijk/k ugha gks ldrk gSA esgurkuk olqyh ds fy;s U;k;ky; }kjk vfHk;qdrx.k dks ckj&ckj dgk x;k gSA ijUrq izkFkhZ vf/koDrk ds esgurkus dks tqekZus ds :i esa olwys tkus dk dksbZ izko/kku lh-vkj-ih-lh- esa ugha gSA izkFkhZ vf/koDrk ds ek= esgurkus ds vk/kkj ij bl vfHk;ksx ds Hkfo"; ds fy;s vfuf'prdky rd Vkyk tkuk U;k;fgr esa ugha gSA mijksDr rF;ksa ,oa ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq;s izkFkhZ vf/koDrk dk izkFkZuk i= fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA g0 U;kf;d eftLV~sV&izFke oxZ tSrkj.k ( jkt0 ) 13. What else could have been done by the trial Court in the facts of this case Not a single word is in the petition about how the trial judge should have proceeded to secure payment of remuneration of the petitioner Advocate from his clients in criminal trial in a criminal case. The trial Court did not question the legality or validity of the order passed by the higher Court, which was by Shri Baldevpuri Goswami, Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat,Camp Jetaran. The trial Court made its efforts and directed the non-petitioners to pay the remuneration which shows that the trial Court earnestly obeyed the order of the Addl. The trial Court did not question the legality or validity of the order passed by the higher Court, which was by Shri Baldevpuri Goswami, Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat,Camp Jetaran. The trial Court made its efforts and directed the non-petitioners to pay the remuneration which shows that the trial Court earnestly obeyed the order of the Addl. Sessions Judge, dated 7.8.1998 still it is said by the petitioner, who is an advocate, that the trial Court will fully and malafidely disobeyed the order. The petitioner who himself is advocate could 40 not point out in his contempt petition how the trial Court could have executed the order otherwise than the manner in which the trial Court made efforts, has filed the contempt petition against the judge of the trial Court. Not only this but even after obtaining consent and assistance of an advocate practicing in High Court for filling this petition, neither the petitioner nor the learned counsel for the petitioner had any answer. Allegations of malafide and arbitrariness are levelled recklessly and without any foundation and reason. The allegations against the non-petitioner No. 1 Shri Samar Pal Singh, the then Judicial Magistrate. Jetaran are factually wrong, baseless and also frivolous. The contempt petition deserves to be dismissed merely on this I ground alone. 14. The facts referred above and the documents placed on record by the petitioner himself clearly show that the petitioner grossly abused the process of the Court by filling contempt petition before this Court. This is not 5 only a mere false and frivolous civil litigation, this is not a list between two private parties. It is a matter wherein serious consequences are provided. It is a matter between an advocate and a Judicial Magistrate. There are allegations, not by a layman but by a responsible Court officer and who is supposed to assist the Court. The gravity of the matter not comes to an end 10 here but it is clear from the judgment of the trial Court dated 11.6.2002 by which the trial Court finally decided the criminal case which was pending against non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 since 1981, that criminal case under the provision of Section 4/9 of the Opium Act, 1878 was decided by the trial Court by consuming about 21 years. The efforts of the petitioner-advocate for securing his disputed amount of remuneration in this criminal case of 1981 started from the year 1996 and the petitioner was very sincere in attending the proceeding before the trial Court for preventing the other advocate from conducting the criminal case and more, for securing his fees from his clients without knowing whether he could have adopted such a course or not. 15. Apart from above, it is relevant to mention here that the trial Court by specific order that 10.6.2002 (quoted above) rejected the application of the petitioner-advocate on the ground that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for recovery of petitioner's remuneration as fine. The trial Court further observed that the accused-persons are poor persons and 25 are not in a position to pay the remuneration and the Court further observed (in order sheet dated 10.6.2002) that even by mere looking to the accused-persons, they appeared to be poor persons. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that even High Court cannot examine the legality of the order which is the foundation of the claim of the 30 petitioner, i.e., the order dated 7.8.1998 passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, in criminal revision in which the trial Court was directed to secure payment of petitioner's remuneration and at the same time wants to condemn (without challenging) the order dated 10.6.2002 passed by the trial Court rejecting petitioner's application by a reasoned order in this very contempt petition.The petitioner, if was aggrieved against the order dated 10.6.2002, then the petitioner should have challenged the order of the trial Court dated 10.6.2002 which gave him fresh cause of action in view of the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of J.S. Parihar (supra). The judgment cited by learned counsel himself gives complete answer to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the contempt petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed in view of the said judgment of J.S. Parihar's case of the Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court in above case of served that once an order is passed on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in appropriate forum. The Hon'ble Apex Court in above case of served that once an order is passed on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in appropriate forum. It is observed that the order (in that case preparation of the seniority list) may be wrong or may be right or may not be in conformity with the directions but that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail the opportunity of judicial review but that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. Therefore, the contempt so petition filed by the petitioner on the face of it is not maintainable not only against the non-petitioner No. 1 but is not maintainable against the non-petition No. 2 and 3 also as the trial Court accepted the contention of the non-petitioner No. 2 and 3 by its order dated 10.6.2002 which is binding upon the petitioner equally. 16. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of the rule framed under the Advocates Act, 1961 is absolutely misplaced and irrelevant. The rule has no application in the facts of this case. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Rule 11 of the Rules under the Advocates Act, 1961, which reads as under "No advocate shall be permitted to file an appointment or memorandum or appearance in any proceeding in which another advocate is already on record for the same party save with the consent of the former advocate on record or the leave of the Court, unless the former advocate has ceased to practise or has by reason of infirmity of mind or body or otherwise become unable to continue to act " 17. A bare perusal of this rule clearly reveals that this is a rule creating bar against advocate. against his appearance in any proceeding in which another advocate is already on record for the same party and no consent has been obtained by the advocate from the former advocate already on record. A bare perusal of this rule clearly reveals that this is a rule creating bar against advocate. against his appearance in any proceeding in which another advocate is already on record for the same party and no consent has been obtained by the advocate from the former advocate already on record. In this contempt petition, wisely the petitioner has not impleaded the advocate who filed the power after filing of power by the petitioner and there is no explanation for not impleading him party but it can be presumed that the petitioner was sure that neither the subsequent advocate has committed any contempt of the Court nor the petitioner can proceed against that advocate for contempt of any order of the Court. Despite the fact rule puts bar against the advocate, the petitioner wants to justify his action by taking help of this rule against his own clients which has no relevance. How this rule give the jurisdiction to Court seized with criminal case to entertain application/petition of an advocate for recovery of disputed amount of advocate's fees from his clients who are accused in the case, remained unanswered. 18. Before parting with, this Court is constrained to observe that the petitioner has abused the process of the Court by submitting one after another frivolous application before the trial Court for seeking relief of payment of remuneration from his clients and wasted Court's precious time,particularly, the time which could have been given more effectively for hearing the case pending since the year 1981, that too. involving a heinous offence under the Opium Act. Though this Court cannot set aside the order dated 7.8.1998 passed by Shri Baldevpuri Goswami, Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat, Camp Jetaran but at he same time, this Court is not deprived of its right to say that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge did not even examine whether in criminal case launched by State against the accused-persons, if any application is filed by the accused person's advocate, whether the trial Court can entertain such application? Whether an order passed by the trial Court rejecting such application could have been challenged by the advocate impleading his own clients as rival parties and could have been converted as a litigation (of others, State and accused persons only), into petitioner-advocate's case. The learned Addl. Whether an order passed by the trial Court rejecting such application could have been challenged by the advocate impleading his own clients as rival parties and could have been converted as a litigation (of others, State and accused persons only), into petitioner-advocate's case. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge even not only entertained the revision petition but determined the disputed question of fact in criminal revision; about the engagement of petitioner as an advocate for non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 and what was the fees settled between the petitioner and the accused persons and allowed the revision petition. Surprisingly, Addl. Sessions Judge allowed the revision petition after holding that accused persons were free to engage their counsel and rejected the 1 argument of the petitioner that any consent of petitioner was condition precedent for engaging another advocate by the accused persons (this Court need not examine this finding also). Not only this but even the learned Addl. Sessions Judge determined the Civil liability in Criminal Revision on the basis 5 of the affidavit and even reduced the remuneration claimed by the petitioner also assessed value of consideration for rendering assistance given by the advocate to his client in conducting the case for rendering assistance given by the advocate to his client in conducting the case for accused persons that without say anything about the terms of contract between the petitioner and 10 his clients reduced the fees of the petitioner (strangely the petitioner is not aggrieved against said reduction of the fees). What else can be said other than, it is unfortunate. 19. In view of the reasons mentioned above it is clear that the petitioner has abused the process of the three Courts; Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jetaran, Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Sojat and of this Court, despite the fart that he is a responsible advocate, therefore, the contempt petition is dismissed with a special cost of Rs. 10,0001- against the petitioner. The petitioner is directed to deposit cost with State Legal Services authority.Writ Petition Dismissed As Above. *******