Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. All the above-mentioned five writ petitions shall be disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Petitioner herein seeks to quash the orders passed by the respondents dated 25-4-2003 and 15-2-2001 whereby the pre-detention representations of the petitioner were rejected. By the first order, the petitioner’s representation dated 17-6-2002 was dealt with while, by the second mentioned order, the subsequent four representations dated 7-7-2002, 9-8-2002, 25-9-2002 and 22-10-2002 were disposed of. These representations were made by the petitioner praying therein that a detention order dated 15-2-2001 passed under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (in short ‘COFEPOSA’) should not be executed and should be cancelled. Following facts will highlight the controversy involved in these unusual writ petitions. 3. Petitioner, who claims to be a lawyer, holds a licence as an accredited overseas recruiting agent, which licence is granted by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. Petitioner has been holding this licence right from 1984. He was intercepted at Anna International Airport, Chennai on 10-12-2000, when he was on his way to Malaysia. He claimed that he was going there in pursuance of his business and that on 11th and 12th December, he had sent sixty workers to Malaysia for the purpose of employment. He claimed that he was carrying the amount of those sixty persons and thus he was carrying with him US$11700 in the denominations of US$100s, US$50s and US$20s. This amount was obviously not declared by him and he was therefore arrested by the officials of the Enforcement Wing. He was also charged with an offence under Sec.135-1A of the Customs Act and was put behind the bars. He claims that on this basis, an order for his detention came to be passed under COFEPOSA. 3.1. He did not wait for being served with the order of detention, which was tried to be served upon him and approached this Court vide W.P. No.3212 of 2001 on 16-2-2001. An interim order of status quo came to be passed in the said writ petition on 20th April 2001. Needless to mention that in the meantime, the respondents could not nab him. Ultimately, the writ petition came to be decided on 5-6-2002, whereby the writ petition was dismissed relying on the reported decision of the Supreme Court in Government of India v. Alka Subash Gadia (1992 Supp. (1) 496). Needless to mention that in the meantime, the respondents could not nab him. Ultimately, the writ petition came to be decided on 5-6-2002, whereby the writ petition was dismissed relying on the reported decision of the Supreme Court in Government of India v. Alka Subash Gadia (1992 Supp. (1) 496). The Division Bench (Jagadeesan and Murugesan, JJ.) gave a categorical finding therein that the petitioner’s case did not fall under any of the eventualities contemplated under the decision of Alka Subash Gadia, cited supra, so as to enable him to move a writ petition even before the order of detention was served against him. The Division Bench also took notice of the latter decisions of the Supreme Court in SAYED TAHER BAWAMIYA v. JOINT SECRETARY (2000 [8] SCC 630) and UNION OF INDIA v. MUNEESH SUNEJA (2001 [3] SCC 92) and came to the conclusion that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed. It was also observed by the Bench, relying on UNION OF INDIA v. PARASMAL RAMPURIA (1998 [8] SCC 402) that the petitioner was bound to surrender before the petition could be entertained. 3.2. However, in the last paragraph of the judgment, the Division Bench observed that it was open to the petitioner to make a representation after the receipt of the order of the High Court to the concerned authority and that such representation was bound to be considered as to whether the order of detention had to be implemented in view of the lapse of time by taking into consideration the subsequent conduct of the petitioner coupled with his explanation offered for possession of foreign and Indian currency while he was bound to leave India. This judgment was delivered on 5-6-2002. However, the petitioner was not arrested. The petitioner, accordingly, made the first representation on 17-6-2002. He also made four other representations on 7-7-2002, 9-8-2002, 25-9-2002 and 22-10-2002. 3.3. These five representations were considered and rejected by the order dated 27-11-1002. However, the said order of rejection was challenged in W.P. No.44378 of 2002 on the ground that the order of rejection was not a speaking order. The Division Bench of this Court again passed an order on 30-1-2003, directing the respondents to consider the first representation alone on the ground that they had directed the petitioner to file only one representation. Accordingly, on 25-4-2003, the first representation dated 17-6-2002 was rejected. 3.4. The Division Bench of this Court again passed an order on 30-1-2003, directing the respondents to consider the first representation alone on the ground that they had directed the petitioner to file only one representation. Accordingly, on 25-4-2003, the first representation dated 17-6-2002 was rejected. 3.4. Before this, the Government had challenged the first order of the Division Bench by way of a Special Leave Petition but, that was dismissed in limine. After the rejection of the representation, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Art.32 of the Constitution, which was registered as W.P.(Crl.) No.90 of 2003. This was disposed of by order dated 23-6-2003. The petitioner also filed S.L.P. No.2219 of 2003 against the decision of this Court dated 30-1-2003 wherein, this Court had directed to decide only the first representation of the petitioner, ignoring the subsequent four representations made by him. This Special Leave Petition and W.P. No.90 of 2003 came to be disposed of on 23-6-2003. The Supreme Court therein observed that the part of the High Court’s order directing the respondents not to consider the petitioner’s subsequent four representations could not be sustained. The Court directed the first respondent to dispose of the said four representations also and further directed that the order of detention should not be executed till the disposal of the four representations. As regards the writ petition filed by the petitioner, i.e. W.P. (Crl.) No.90 of 2003, the Supreme Court directed the petitioner to withdraw the said writ petition with liberty to move the High Court in the event of an occasion arising for that purpose. 3.5. On 17-7-2003, the respondents passed separate orders and rejected the petitioner’s four subsequent representations. Now the petitioner has come up by way of the present writ petitions challenging those orders by which, the respondents have rejected the representations. In the present writ petitions, the petitioner has claimed a Writ of “Certiorarified Mandamus” for quashing the orders of rejection and for forbearing the respondents from executing the order of detention dated 15-2-2001 passed by the respondents. 4. Learned senior counsel, Shri K. Subramaniam, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended before us that all these orders were liable to be quashed and the respondents were bound to cancel the detention order passed owing to the towering delay in execution of the detention order. 4. Learned senior counsel, Shri K. Subramaniam, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended before us that all these orders were liable to be quashed and the respondents were bound to cancel the detention order passed owing to the towering delay in execution of the detention order. Learned counsel contended that the live-link between the incident, on which the detention was based, and the necessity to detain the petitioner was already snapped because of this towering delay and that the respondents were in error in not realising this. 5. Learned counsel also fell back on the first order of this Court wherein, the writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed and canvassed that this Court had specifically directed to taken into consideration the subsequent conduct of the petitioner before considering the representations made by him and that the orders were silent about the said subsequent conduct. Learned counsel pointed out that there was nothing done by the petitioner contrary to law so as to attract the provisions of the COFEPOSA. It was also tried to be urged that there was total apathy on the part of the authorities to nab the petitioner though the petitioner was not protected by the stay order either from this Court or from the Apex Court and, there was absolutely no explanation regarding the same. This itself suggested that there was, in reality, no necessity by the Department to clamp the detention order against the petitioner. It was also tried to be suggested that there was no material furnished for the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority regarding the necessity of executing the order. Learned counsel also urged that the detention was based on solitary incident and as such could not be justified in law and that the authorities had failed to consider this aspect while disposing of the representations. 6. As against this, leanred Additional Public Prosecutor again reiterated the decisions of Alka Subash Gadia, Sayed Taher Bawamiya, Muneesh Sunerja and Parasmal Rampuria, cited supra. It was pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor that the writ petitions now could not be entertained questioning the correctness or otherwise of the reasons given by the respondents to reject the representations. 6. As against this, leanred Additional Public Prosecutor again reiterated the decisions of Alka Subash Gadia, Sayed Taher Bawamiya, Muneesh Sunerja and Parasmal Rampuria, cited supra. It was pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor that the writ petitions now could not be entertained questioning the correctness or otherwise of the reasons given by the respondents to reject the representations. It was pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor that what was actually being done by the petitioner was to challenge the detention order itself as if the detention order was not only passed but served also. Learned Public Prosecutor based his arguments mainly on the theory that what was contemplated under Art.22(5) of the Constitution was a ‘representation’, which was of ‘post-detention’ nature, and that there was no scope to make the representation even before the order of detention was passed or as the case may be served upon the detenu. Learned Public Prosecutor urges that the representations made by the detenu could not be treated on par with the representation contemplated under Art.22(5) of the Constitution complaining against the detention. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, a writ petition was permissible only to the extent as stated in the above-mentioned four Supreme Court judgments and more particularly Alka Subash Gadia case, which law was fossilised by the Supreme Court in Muneesh Suneja case, cited supra. Learned counsel pointed out that thereafter there was no change in the law at all. 7. On this backdrop, it has to be seen as to whether the petitioner can successfully challenge the impugned orders dated 25-4-2003 and 17-7-2003. All these orders were separately passed, considering the petitioner’s representations individually. A cursory glance at the individual orders passed by the respondents, rejecting the representations, suggests that not only have the authorities considered these representations in detail but, have given equally detailed reasons for arriving at the conclusions that they did. The orders are in the nature of parawise remarks and it is pointed out in all the orders that it was the petitioner who was to be blamed for not being nabbed in time. When we take into consideration the first order dated 17-7-2003 in respect of the second representation dated 7-7-2002, the authorities have explained as to why the order could not be executed against the petitioner. They have also categorically denied the claim of the petitioner to revoke the detention. When we take into consideration the first order dated 17-7-2003 in respect of the second representation dated 7-7-2002, the authorities have explained as to why the order could not be executed against the petitioner. They have also categorically denied the claim of the petitioner to revoke the detention. There can be no doubt that the petitioner had a right under Sec.11 of COFEPOSA. However, in view of the language of Sec.11 that a detention order could at any time be revoked or modified, there does not appear to be any scope to hold that the pre-detention representations were not possible to be made at all. Perhaps, bearing this in mind, this Court in its first judgment had held that if it was felt, the detenu could make the representations and that those representations were bound to be considered by the detaining authority. 8. During the whole debate, learned counsel for the petitioner did not assail the orders on their merits questioning the reasons given to reject the representations. The main thrust of the argument was that firstly the order, if made, was illegal and that the fact that the order was passed in 2001 and was not served for more than three years was sufficient for the authorities to revoke the said order or rather to put it straight, the authorities were bound to revoke the said order, considering the towering delay. We have to, therefore, consider mainly as to whether it is now possible to question those reasons by way of a writ petition and what would be the scope of the writ petition and whether it would be permissible to examine the reasons and to hold on that basis that the detention order was not justified or that the said detention order should be revoked. 9. There is a common thread in all the orders that the detention order against the petitioner could not be executed for two reasons, viz. firstly, due to petitioner’s concealment and secondly, the orders passed by this Court and the Supreme Court wherein there was a clear-cut injunction against the respondents to execute the detention order. We are of the clear opinion that the scope to consider such a petition would be extremely limited and that this Court would not and could not go into the correctness or otherwise of the reasons. We are of the clear opinion that the scope to consider such a petition would be extremely limited and that this Court would not and could not go into the correctness or otherwise of the reasons. In our considered opinion, this Court will desist from going into the “merits” of the reasons, atleast at this stage, when the detention order is not even served on the detenu and when the detenu has not surrendered and when the liberty of the detenu has not been jeopardised. 10. In K.M. ABDULLA KUNHI AND ABDUL KHADER v. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1991 SC 574 ), the Apex Court considered the necessity of the reasons rejecting the representation. In paragraph 19 of the said judgment, the Apex Court observed as follows: “This has been explained in Hardhan Saha case, AIR 1974 SC 2154 , where Ray, C.J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed that the consideration of the representation by the Government is only to ascertain whether the detention order is in conformity with the power under the law. There need not be a speaking order in disposing such representation. There is also no failure of justice by the order not being a speaking order. All that is necessary is that there should be real and proper consideration by the Government.” Going strictly by these observations, when we see the impugned orders, it is obvious that the impugned orders are not only reasoned but, a meticulous care has been taken to meet each and every point raised in the representations. There has thus been an ‘active’ consideration of the representations sent by the petitioner in all the cases. It will not be for this Court to judge as to whether the authorities could still serve the order of detention which is already passed earlier. A glance at the impugned order suggests that the concerned authority has blamed the petitioner for evading the order and has reiterated the need to serve the order and thereby reiterating the need to detain the petitioner. Once there is an ‘active’ consideration of the representations, that should be the end of the matter because, it will not be for this court then to go and find out whether those reasons are sufficient for the detaining authority to hold that the detention is still necessary. In our opinion, that stage has not arrived yet at all. 11. Once there is an ‘active’ consideration of the representations, that should be the end of the matter because, it will not be for this court then to go and find out whether those reasons are sufficient for the detaining authority to hold that the detention is still necessary. In our opinion, that stage has not arrived yet at all. 11. In the reported decision in UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. PARASMAL RAMPURIA ( 1998 8 SCC 402 ), the situation was somewhat alike. There also even before the detention order could be served, a writ petition came to be filed before the High Court. Initially, an injunction restraining the service of the order came to be passed by the learned single Judge and thereafter by the Division Bench. Aggrieved by the interim order passed by the Division Bench, the detaining authority challenged the same before the Apex Court. The Apex Court observed as follows: “When the writ petition was filed, the respondent had not surrendered. Under these circumstances, the proper order which was required to be passed was to call upon the respondent first to surrender pursuant to the detention order and then to have all his grievances examined on merits after he had an opportunity to study the grounds of detention and to make his representation against the said grounds as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.” The Apex Court ultimately vacated the interim orders passed by the Division Bench which were continued throughout for the period of two years and directed the prospective detenu to surrender and observed that after surrendering, it would be open to him to amend the writ petition and to take all permissible legal grounds to challenge the detention order. The Apex Court went on to set aside all the extension orders by which the interim relief was extended. 12. This only goes on to suggest the approach of the Apex Court in these matters, which approach had already been settled in Muneesh Sunerja case, cited supra where the Apex Court had the occasion to examine the law laid down in Alka Subash Gadia case as also Sayed Taher Bawamiya case. This was also a case where a writ petition was filed even when the detention order was not served. This was also a case where a writ petition was filed even when the detention order was not served. The Apex Court reiterated the five principles laid down in Alka Subash Gadia case, cited supra and held that the writ petition was not to be treated as a writ for Habeas Corpus but like any other ordinary writ petition. The Apex Court further observed: “This Court has been categorical that in the matters of pre-detention cases interference of court is not called for except in the circumstances setforth by us earlier. If this aspect is borne in mind, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana could not have quashed the order of detention either on the ground of delay in passing the impugned order delay in executing the said order. That mere delay either in passing the order of detention or executing thereof is not fatal except where the same stands unexplained.” 13. The situation is absolutely identical here. For whatever reasons, there has undoubtedly been a delay in serving the detention order. The impugned orders do suggest that those reasons have not only been reiterated but justified by the authorities also. Explanations have been given in those orders themselves as to why the detention order was not or could not be served against the detenu. As observed in the law laid down by the Apex Court, it would not be for this Court to quash the detention order, which is already passed but could not be served on the petitioner on the ground that there has been delay in serving that order on the detenu. We have already pointed out that that has been practically the mainstay of the argument of Mr. K. Subramaniam, who very forcibly suggested that the delay in executing the orders became fatal. He relied on the reported decision of the Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (V.S. Sirpurkar, J.) was a party, in RAJESWARI v. JOINT SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, NEW DELHI AND ANOTHER ( 2000 (III) CTC 97 ). That was a case where the detention order was passed after five and a half months and it was based on a single incident of seizure of gold bars. That was a case where the detention order was passed after five and a half months and it was based on a single incident of seizure of gold bars. It was found by the Division Bench that since no effort was taken by the investigating agency in the meantime, the detention order suffered from illegality and that the life-line between the incident and the detention order was snapped. Learned counsel tried to urge before us that in this case also, since the detention order has been passed three years back but has not been served on the detenu, there would be no point in now allowing the said order to be served. We do not agree. We have already given our reasons as to why such a plea could not be raised at this stage in the light of the observations made in Parasmal Rampuria case and Muneesh Suneja case, cited supra. 14. Heavy reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the unreported decision of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No.5737 of 1990, which was delivered on 17-2-1992, where the learned Judges considered the question of delay in executing the order of detention. We have already pointed out that much water under the bridge has flown after this decision and we find ourselves unable to agree with this decision on account of the law settled down in Muneesh Suneja case, cited supra. The Division Bench of this Court had quashed the detention order by a Writ of Mandamus. We have already discussed as to how on the mere question of delay, it would be possible for the High Court to quash the detention order. We are also unable to follow as to how for quashing an order of detention, which was yet not served, a Writ of Mandamus could be issued. But, there will be no question of considering all that in view of the subsequent decisions of the Apex Court. 15. We are also unable to follow as to how for quashing an order of detention, which was yet not served, a Writ of Mandamus could be issued. But, there will be no question of considering all that in view of the subsequent decisions of the Apex Court. 15. Learned counsel also relied on the reported decision in SUNIL FULCHAND SHAH v. UNION OF INDIA (JT 2000 [2] SC 230) and relied on the following observations in paragraph 18: “The question whether or not the detenu should be made to surrender to undergo the remaining period of detention would depend upon a variety of factors and in particular on the question of lapse of time between the date of detention, the order of the High Court and the order of this Court, setting aside the order of the High Court. A detenu need not be sent back to undergo the remaining period of detention after a long lapse of time when even the maximum prescribed period intended in the order of detention has expired, unless there still exists a proximate temporal nexus between the period of detention prescribed when the detenu was required to be detained and the date when the detenu is required to be detained pursuant to the appellate order and the State is able to satisfy the court about the desirability of ‘further’ or ‘continued’ detention.” In our opinion, these observations have been made by the Apex Court in entirely different situation. There the High Court had allowed the writ petition filed by the detenu and quashed the detention order. The Apex Court had, however, set aside the order of the High Court and was, therefore, considering as to whether the detenu was liable to be put behind the bars for the remainder of the detention period as ordered in the detention order. Such is not the situation here. We have already pointed out that the jurisdictional constraints, which are spelt out by the earlier decisions, are rather compulsive for us not to consider any such plea. 16. Another decision relied upon by the learned counsel is RAJESH GULATI v. GOVERNMENT OF N.C.T. OF DELHI AND ANOTHER (JT 2002 [6] 331). This was a case where the detention was directed though the detenu’s passport was retained by the Customs authorities. 16. Another decision relied upon by the learned counsel is RAJESH GULATI v. GOVERNMENT OF N.C.T. OF DELHI AND ANOTHER (JT 2002 [6] 331). This was a case where the detention was directed though the detenu’s passport was retained by the Customs authorities. A plea was, therefore, raised that under the circumstances, there was no possibility of the detenu engaging himself in any prejudicial activity and as such, the conclusion drawn by the detaining authority was baseless. The Apex Court in paragraph 15 came to the conclusion that since none of the instances of the smuggling by the appellant, as stated in the impugned detention order, describe the appellant as having travelled without a passport for the purpose of smuggling, the conclusion drawn by the detaining authority was based on no material. Learned counsel tried to heavily rely on this judgment and suggest that in the present case also, there was no question of the petitioner’s engaging in any smuggling activity. In our opinion, this judgment has no relevance with the controversy involved in the present case. We, therefore, reject the contention. 17. It was then tried to be suggested that this was a solitary incident in which the petitioner was involved and, therefore, the petitioner should not be allowed to be detained now. For this purpose, the reported decision in CHOWDARAPU RAGHUNANDAN v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS (2002 SCC (Cri.) 714) was relied upon. In our opinion, for the reasons that we have given, it is futile for us to go into the merits of the detention order at this stage. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel is also rejected. 18. It was tried to be argued that a detention order is not ‘punitive’ in nature and should not be used as a ‘warrant’. For this purpose, a few decisions were cited before us. We have absolutely no difficulty in accepting this. However, suffice it to say that it is not established in this case that this detention order has been treated as a ‘punitive’ order or as a ‘warrant’. The authorities have insisted in their orders that the detention order needs to be served even now. In their orders rejecting the representations, the authorities have again and again reiterated the need to execute the detention order. The authorities have insisted in their orders that the detention order needs to be served even now. In their orders rejecting the representations, the authorities have again and again reiterated the need to execute the detention order. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order dated 17-7-2003, in reply to the representation dated 25-9-2002, are sufficient to suggest the application of mind on the part of the authorities. 19. In short, this is a case where the petitioner, who claims to be a lawyer and who also claims to be holding a permit for doing business of arranging manpower to work in Malaysia (we do not know how is it permissible for a lawyer to do such business) has successfully thwarted the orders, so much so, that the authorities have not been able to nab him even when there were no stay orders either by this Court or by the Apex Court. Taking the advantage of the last paragraph of the first Division Bench judgment, the petitioner fired representations after representations and thereby skirted his arrest. We are not at all happy with the way the Department has treated the whole affair. We fail to follow as to why the petitioner who has a permanent address and who claims to be a lawyer could not be served with the detention order. In fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner had reiterated before us that the licence of the petitioner has again been renewed which suggests the good behaviour on the part of the petitioner after the detention order was passed. In our opinion, the renewal of the licence is completely irrelevant in so far as the controversy in this case is concerned. We, however, record our utter dissatisfaction for the way the matter of arrest of the petitioner has been treated by the department. However, we do not find any merit in the writ petitions. The writ petitions are dismissed.