P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful defendant in o. S. No. 1223/78 on the file of V Additional munsif Magistrate, Guntur, aggrieved by the reversing Judgment and decree made in a. S. No. 28/82 on the file of III Additional district and Sessions Judge, Guntur, had preferred this Second Appeal. ( 2 ) ). The plaintiff who had instituted the suit being unsuccessful in the original court had obtained a decree by virtue of the reversing judgment made by the appellate Court. The said plaintiff, it is represented, died during the pendency of the Appeal and inasmuch as though the legal representatives were brought on record, the same was not shown, in the present Second Appeal, the said legal representatives-respondents 2 to 5, are brought on record. The dispute is in relation to the statement (sic. settlement) of accounts of an unregistered partnership firm. There is some controversy even in relation to the dissolution of the firm - the plaintiff asserting that the firm continues and the defendant taking a stand that the firm was dissolved, and Ex. B-1 came into existence in token of the final settlement. The court of first instance after recording evidence of P. W. 1/ plaintiff, D. W. 1/defendant and D. W. 2 and d. W. 3 - attestors of Ex. B-1, and on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence - Exs. A-1 and A-2, the office copy of the registered notice and the reply and ex. B-1, dated 22-11 -1976 - agreement executed by the P. W. 1 in favour of D. W. 1, ultimately had arrived at a conclusion that the deceased plaintiff Mallela Subba Rao received Rs. 5000/- in full settlement of the accounts and walked out of the joint business as recited in Ex. B-1 and he is not interested in the said business from the said date and hence he was not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for. Aggrieved by the same, the said Mallela Subba Rao, the plaintiff preferred appeal A. S. No. 28/82 on the file of III Additional District and Sessions judge, Guntur and the appellate court had reversed the judgment of the trial court principally on appreciation of evidence and the contradictory nature of the evidence of D. W. 1 and D. W. 2 and certain inconsistencies and improbabilities. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant had preferred the present Second Appeal. ( 3 ) BOTH the Counsel had advanced elaborate arguments pointing out to the findings recorded by the court of first instance and also the appellate court. ( 4 ) SRI D. V. Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the appellant had pointed out to grounds 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Grounds in second Appeal and had contended that these are substantial questions of law. The learned Counsel also maintained that ex. B-1 was well proved by examining the attestors D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 and except the evidence of P. W. 1, the plaintiff, no other evidence is forthcoming and when Ex. B-1 was proved in accordance with law and in accordance with the provisions of the Indian evidence Act, in the absence of any rebuttal, the appellate court should have confirmed the said finding of fact relating to Ex. B-1 in stead of arriving at a different finding pointingout some minor discrepancies or inconsistencies which would not in any way affect the proof of Ex. B-1 in accordance with section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The learned Counsel also had taken this court through the findings recorded by the court of first instance and also the appellate court and the findings recorded and the discrepancies on which the finding recorded by the court of first instance had been reversed by the appellate court. The learned counsel also had pointed out that such minor discrepancies definitely would not be material at all for deciding the question in controversy. Reliance was placed on bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of gujarat, Appabhai v. State of Gujarat and mohanlal v. Kurkut Utpadak Sahakari samiti. The learned Counsel also had explained what "attestation" means and how an attestation in relation to a document should be proved. The learned counsel had referred to Section 3 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 and had placed reliance on M. L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib v. M. V. Venkata sastri and Sons in this regard. The learned counsel also pointed out that though in fact it is a letter in relation to sale of movable property, the appellate court had construed the said document Ex. B-1 as just an agreement in relation to a shop. The learned counsel also pointed out that though in fact it is a letter in relation to sale of movable property, the appellate court had construed the said document Ex. B-1 as just an agreement in relation to a shop. The learned counsel would maintain that this is a wrong approach adopted by the appellate court. The Counsel would maintain that when a document or interpretation thereof had not been done in proper perspective, that itself would constitute a substantial question of law. The Counsel also had placed reliance on Becharbhai v. Khushalbhai and v. K. Gohil v. R. Rambhadran. The learned counsel also with all emphasis had submitted that in a case of reversing judgment, when a well considered finding of fact recorded by the court of first instance had been reversed by the appellate court, it would amount to two contrary findings, one recorded by the court of first instance and another recorded by the appellate court, and in the light of the same the High Court while deciding a Second Appeal in such a matter can definitely interfere and decide which is the correct finding of fact and this would not amount to mere appreciation of evidence, but something more. No doubt, the learned counsel made an attempt to draw a distinction in the arena of appreciation of evidence between the concurrent findings and the reversing findings. The learned counsel also made elaborate submissions that inasmuch as the findings are totally erroneous and contrary to the known principles of law, such findings cannot be sustained and hence the appellant is bound to succeed. ( 5 ) SRI Suresh Reddy, the learned counsel representing the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff mallela Subba Rao, made the following submissions. The learned Counsel would maintain that after issuance of notice, ex. B-1 was brought into existence with a view to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. The learned Counsel in all fairness had submitted that in the present suit, the relief of dissolution of partnership had not been prayed for, but it is a suit for settlement of accounts simpliciter. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the terms of partnership had not been reduced into writing and no document is forthcoming. The learned Counsel in all fairness had submitted that in the present suit, the relief of dissolution of partnership had not been prayed for, but it is a suit for settlement of accounts simpliciter. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the terms of partnership had not been reduced into writing and no document is forthcoming. But however, the learned counsel had taken this court through the evidence of P. W. 1 and made an attempt to convince the court that the evidence of P. W. 1 is convincing whereas the evidence of D. W. 1 and the inconsistent evidence of D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 definitely cannot be believed and hence the appellate court had arrived at the correct conclusion by taking into consideration the discrepancies and disbelieving the said evidence and consequently disbelieving Ex. B-1 itself and reversing the finding recorded by the court of first instance. The learned Counsel also contended that the stand taken relating to payment also is highly improbable and the conduct of the parties also may have to be taken into consideration. ( 6 ) HEARD both to the Counsel and perused the findings recorded by the court of first instance and also the appellate court and the oral and documentary evidence available on record. ( 7 ) THE deceased plaintiff Mallela Subba rao instituted the suit O. S. No. 1223/78 on the file of V Additional Munsif Magistrate, guntur for settlement of accounts, rendition of accounts, ascertainment of mesne profits and for interest @ 18% p. a. from the respective dates till date of realization and for costs of the suit. It was pleaded by the plaintiff in the said suit that he is the owner of killi shop at Liberty Talkies, Guntur and the defendant owns a killi shop at Hotel Lido. The plaintiff and the defendant joined in partnership business each having 50 ps. share and both of them entered into an agreement of partnership. For the purpose of their joint business, they purchased a shop in which Sri Andhe Koteswara Rao was previously carrying on his business as shown in the plaint schedule which is opposite to Leela Mahal, Guntur on Kothapet main road. As per the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff and defendant invested Rs. 3,000/- each for their respective shares. After their purchase, they improved the shop. As per the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff and defendant invested Rs. 3,000/- each for their respective shares. After their purchase, they improved the shop. In that connection the plaintiff purchased timber on 16-12-1975 from sri Durga Timber Depot and purchased A. C. sheets and necessary hardware from padarthi Enterprises, Guntur. Later, the plaintiff and defendant jointly carried on business and increased the capital by purchasing necessary things and increased the value of the assets of the suit schedule shop to Rs. 20,000/ -. Thus, the plaintiff s half share therein is Rs. 10,000/ -. In 1977, the plaintiff got typhoid fever and could not attend to the business. During the said period, taking advantage of his business, the defendant committed breach of trust and had unlawfully gained for himself and caused wrongful loss to the plaintiff. Taking advantage of the written agreement being in his hands, the defendant sent away the plaintiff out of his shop and he did not permit the plaintiff to step into the suit schedule premises. The plaintiff got issued a registered notice through his Advocate on 31-1-1978 to the defendant and the defendant gave a reply with false allegations but admitting that the plaintiff and the defendant started joint business in the plaint schedule shop each investing Rs. 3,000/ -. The allegations in the reply notice to the effect that a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was paid to the plaintiff in the presence of Sri Varahala naidu and Innaiah Chowdary of Guntur is false. It was further pleaded that the business in question was joint even by the date of filing of the suit and that the plaintiff has got 50 ps. share in the said business. ( 8 ) THE appellant herein as defendant filed a written statement and pleaded that they had started a joint business having taken shop No. 15 opposite to Leela Mohal on 14-11-1975 in the name and style of Karuna cool Drinks. Initially, the plaintiff and the defendant invested Rs. 3000/- each in the joint business. Stage by t,:age the plaintiff and the defendant each invested rs. 5,000/- and had been carrying on business since 14-11-1975 only in cool drinks. After the business was carried on for some time, the plaintiff intended to start his own business in 1976 and wanted to separate. 3000/- each in the joint business. Stage by t,:age the plaintiff and the defendant each invested rs. 5,000/- and had been carrying on business since 14-11-1975 only in cool drinks. After the business was carried on for some time, the plaintiff intended to start his own business in 1976 and wanted to separate. By settlement in the presence of mediators, the plaintiff agreed to receive a sum of Rs. 5,000/- in total to go out of the joint business and in accordance with the same he received on 20-4-1976 Rs. 3,000/- as advance out of Rs. 5,000/- agreed to be received by him in full quittance of all claims in the presence of mediators Maddineni varala Naidu and Poodota Innaiah chowdary and later on 22-11-1976 the plaintiff received the balance amoun; of rs. 2,000/- and also executed an agreemem dated 22-11-1976 in favour of the plaintiff evidencing the two payments and also relinquishing his rights. Thus, from 20-4-1976 onwards, the plaintiff had nothing to do with the business and it has been an exclusive business of the defendant. It was further pleaded that having received a sum of Rs. 3,000/- on 20-4-1976, the plaintiff also started another business which he sold to ande Koteswara Rao who is in his camp. It was specifically pleaded that it is the defendant who developed business annexing a tea shop and also a killi shop at great expenses and had also to incur loss for the business. Thus, the plaintiff in consideration of Rs. 5,000/- in full satisfaction of his share capital, good will and other benefits had gone out from the partnership and it is only the exclusive business of the defendant. The plaintiff has no share therein. The partnership came to an end by 20-4-1976 and at any rate by 22-11-1976 and there is no relationship of partners between the plaintiff and the defendant with effect from that date. It was further pleaded that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff had no cause of action or justifiable right. The plaintiff filed the suit at the instance of ande Koteswara Rao who is in his camp and other enemies of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to the settlement of accounts nor for joint possession and mesne profits. The plaintiff had no cause of action or justifiable right. The plaintiff filed the suit at the instance of ande Koteswara Rao who is in his camp and other enemies of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to the settlement of accounts nor for joint possession and mesne profits. The suit is bad as there is no relief for dissolution as per the plaintiff s case and the plaintiff is not entitled to seek for settlement of accounts without seeking for dissolution. It was further pleaded that as the plaintiff filed the suit suppressing the agreement dated 22-11-1976, he is guilty of suppressio veri suggestion falsi. ( 9 ) ON the respective pleadings of the parties, Issues 1 to 5 as hereunder were settled by the court of first instance: (1) Whether the partnership as alleged by the plaintiff with the terms referred to in the plaint is true? (2) Whether the plaintiff has invested rs. 10,000/- as alleged? (3) Whether there is subsisting partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant? (4) Whether the defendant is liable to render any account? (5) To what relief? the evidence of P. W. 1, the plaintiff was recorded and Ex. A-1 - office copy of registered notice dated 31-1-1978 and ex. A-2 - reply to Ex. A-1 dated 7-2-1978 were marked. Likewise, D. W. 1 - the defendant, and D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 - attestors of Ex. B-1 were examined and Ex. B-1 dated 22-11 -1976 - agreement executed by P. W. 1 in favour of D. W. 1, was marked. The court of first instance relied upon the evidence of d. W. 1 well supported by D. W. 2 and D. W. 3 and believed Ex. B-1 and ultimately had dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff had preferred a. S. No. 28/82 on the file of III Additional district and Sessions Judge, Guntur. The appellate court at para-9 of its Judgment had framed the point for consideration as hereunder: "whether the plaintiff is entitled for the settlement of accounts. B-1 and ultimately had dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff had preferred a. S. No. 28/82 on the file of III Additional district and Sessions Judge, Guntur. The appellate court at para-9 of its Judgment had framed the point for consideration as hereunder: "whether the plaintiff is entitled for the settlement of accounts. " it is no doubt true that both the Counsel representing the parties had elaborately argued about several of the evidentiary details and it is pertinent to note that the court of first instance had appreciated the evidence of D. W. 1, supported by D. W. 2 and d. W. 3 in a particular fashion which had been reversed by the appellate court. The prime stand taken by the learned Counsel representing the respondents in the Second appeal is that this would fall in the arena of appreciation of evidence which is impermissible at the stage of Second appeal. The learned Counsel also strenuously pointed out that no substantial question of law is involved and in view of the limitations placed on this court under sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this is not a fit matter warranting any interference. ( 10 ) IN the light of the respective pleadings of the parties it is clear that the dispute relates to an unregistered partnership firm. No doubt, the terms and the other details are not so clear in view of the fact that it relates to a very small business. It is unfortunate that though the business is small, the parties have been litigating the matter for sufficiently a long time. ( 11 ) SECTION 69 of the Indian Partnership act deals with Effect of non-registration. Sub-section (1) of Section 69 specifies as hereunder:"no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm. "no doubt sub-section (3) of Section 69 specifies: the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract-, but shall not affect- (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or (b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or court under the presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (2 of 1909), or the Provincial insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), to realise the property of an insolvent partner. "clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 69 specifies that the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. The specific stand taken by the plaintiff is that the firm continues and there was no dissolution at all at any point of time. But, for the reasons best known, the said relief was not prayed for and the relief of settlement of accounts alone was prayed for. It is not their case that the suit can be maintained in the light of the exceptions. In Seth Loonkaran sethiya v. Ivan E john the Apex Court held that Section 69 is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void, and that in other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the partnership Act. It is also pertinent to note that the firm as such had not instituted any suit and it appears from the respective pleadings that the partners of a firm whether an existing firm or an erstwhile firm - have been fighting this litigation. It is also pertinent to note that the firm as such had not instituted any suit and it appears from the respective pleadings that the partners of a firm whether an existing firm or an erstwhile firm - have been fighting this litigation. It is needless to say that the parties would be governed by the provisions of the Indian partnership Act, 1932. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the appellate court had framed a very cryptic point for consideration, but however dealt with all evidentiary details and had pointed out the discrepancies in the oral evidence. No doubt, elaborate submissions were made relating to the nature of the document Ex. B-1. However, the said question need not be gone into in the light of the different provisions of the Indian partnership Act, 1932. ( 12 ) ELABORATE submissions were made relating to the reversal of the finding by the appellate court. Where one fact finding court, the trial court, recorded a particular finding on appreciation of evidence and the appellate court as a final court of fact again on appreciation of evidence reversed such findings, this court may carefully scrutinize the same not on the mere ground of reversal of the finding, but on the ground of conflicting views expressed by the first court and the appellate court. Even in case of concurrent findings, though appreciation of evidence in relation to findings may stand slightly on a different footing, this court may have to examine if serious perversity, irregularity or illegality or reasons of such nature are pointed out in such appreciation of evidence. Often than not, substantial question of law do arise in this arena also and the second appellate court normally need not go into the appreciation of evidence again and may decide on the basis of the findings recorded by the courts below. However, when the very basic approach is erroneous, that by itself may constitute a substantial question of law. It is difficult to lay down the illustrations or specify the guidelines which would be too numerous and it is suffice to state that total closure of doors at the second appellate stage, whatever may be the gravity of illegality or irregularity in this arena, would be definitely not in the interest of justice. It is difficult to lay down the illustrations or specify the guidelines which would be too numerous and it is suffice to state that total closure of doors at the second appellate stage, whatever may be the gravity of illegality or irregularity in this arena, would be definitely not in the interest of justice. Conflicting findings by the first court and the appellate court, and concurrent findings by both the courts below in relation to appreciation of facts definitely stand on different footings. Suffice for me to state that in the light of the fact that a suit for settlement of accounts was filed without praying for the appropriate reliefs, taking the over all facts and circumstances into consideration and also the fact that the original plaintiff died and the legal representatives are prosecuting this litigation and also in the light of the unsatisfactory disposal by the appellate court, I am inclined to set aside the Judgment and decree of the appellate court made in A. S. No. 28/82 on the file of III Additional District Judge, Guntur, and accordingly set aside and remand the matter to the court of first instance for affording opportunity to both the parities and also permit the parties to amend the pleadings, if they are so advised and further proceed with the matter in accordance with law. This court is inclined to make this order of remand in the interest of justice after taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration especially in the light of the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and also the factual controversy between the parties. In view of the findings recorded above, this court need not further dwell upon the other evidentiary details in detail. ( 13 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Second Appeal is hereby allowed to the extent indicated above. Each party to bear their own costs.