Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. An order dated 18-12-2002, passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, directing the detention of Tr. M. Sarfudeen, under Sec.3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (in short COFEPOSA) is challenged in this petition. 2. The said Sarfudeen (hereinafter called the detenu) was intercepted on 9-11-2002 while he was proceeding to board the Air India Flight No.AI480, bound for Singapore. He was found with a handbag. When the search was taken, it was found that on his person, he was carrying US$1000 and when the chappals worn by him were cut open, it was found that in each chappal there were three paper packets kept concealed, totalling 6-Nos. paper packets, containing US$26,550/-. This amount as well as the amount of US$1000 which were being carried by him was being tried to be smuggled out of the country. There was no declaration made by him for this amount. 2.1. The investigation commenced and it turned out that when the detenu was staying with his friend in Chennai, he was visited by one unknown person on 8-11-2002, who requested him to wear a particular pair of chappals, which were illicitly stuffed with six paper packets of US$26550/-, while he was going to Singapore and hand over the foreign currency to one Krishnamoorthy outside the Singapore Airport. After the detailed investigation, the contraband currency was seized. The detenu was arrested and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. 2.2. From the materials collected against him, the State Government came to the conclusion that he was likely to come out on bail and in that case, his activities would be prejudicial. An order, therefore, came to be passed by the State Government as stated above. 3. Mr. Jabbar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-detenu, in all raised three points. 3.1. He firstly pointed out that the detenu was not given the adequate opportunity to represent his case before the Advisory Board. For this learned counsel pointed out that though the sitting of the Advisory Board was to be held in the chambers of the Chairman of the Advisory Board in the High Court buildings on 18-2-2003 and the notice to that effect was already given to him, he had made the preparation by asking his friend to remain present there at the time mentioned in the notice. However, the hearing did not take place and he was taken to the residence of the Hon'ble Chairman of the Advisory Board and, therefore, he was not in a position to effectively represent his case as he was deprived of the help that he could have had from his friend who remained in the High Court premises. 3.1.1. The thrust of the learned counsel is on the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. ROY v. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1982 SC 710 ) where the Apex Court has categorically reiterated the need to give a proper opportunity to the detenu for making a proper representation. In that case, the Supreme Court had found fault with the failure on the part of the authorities to give a notice sufficient in advance of the sitting of the Advisory Board. Relying on this decision, the learned counsel drives home his contention. 3.1.2. Learned counsel also points out that in RAJENDRAKUMAR VERMA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (1993 Crl.2590), which is a Division Bench judgment, also the same law is reiterated. 3.1.3. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, countered this argument by suggesting that the argument is factually erroneous inasmuch as the petitioner on the same day was brought to the High Court premises and thus had the full opportunity to meet whomsoever he had requested to be present to him him in his representation. A specific counter has been filed by the Joint Secretary to the Government, Public (Law and Order) Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, wherein, it is reiterated that on the day when the Advisory Board meeting was fixed, the detenu was brought to the chambers of the Chairman of the Advisory Board and since one of the Members of the Board was unwell, the hearing was held in the residence of the Member. It is specifically reiterated in this counter that the detenu was given all the chances to inform anybody who was present at that time on his request to help him in his representation. If that is so, there is nothing wrong in changing the venue. 3.1.4. The factual situation obtained from A.K. Roy case as also Rajendrakumar Verma case, cited supra, was entirely different. There a factual finding was given that the detenu did not have a proper opportunity to even prepare his representation. Such is not the case here. If that is so, there is nothing wrong in changing the venue. 3.1.4. The factual situation obtained from A.K. Roy case as also Rajendrakumar Verma case, cited supra, was entirely different. There a factual finding was given that the detenu did not have a proper opportunity to even prepare his representation. Such is not the case here. We are fully convinced that the detenu had the full opportunity to take the help of any relative whom he had instructed to be present. It is further obvious that the detenu did not even make the request to the Advisory Board to postpone the meeting nor did he complain that because of the change in the venue, he was in any manner affected. The contention of the learned counsel is, therefore, rejected. 3.2. Mr. Jabbar secondly contended that in the grounds, it has been specifically stated in paragraph (xii) that the detenu was subjected to the Offence Proceedings under OS.678/2002 for Rs.2,01,000/- and OS.447/2002 for Rs.20,000/- and that he was a habitual offender. Learned counsel says that in his representation, he had specifically demanded the papers i.e. notices, statements of witnesses, etc. regarding these proceedings but, they were not supplied to him and, therefore, his right to make an effective representation suffered and thus the further detention has become illegal. 3.2.1. We do not agree at all. It is obvious that the documents which the detenu had sought were not 'relied on' documents. When we see in this behalf the documents supplied to the detenu, it is clear that the documents which supported the infliction of these penalties have already been furnished to him. The fact relied upon by the detaining authority was only the past instances where the detenu had suffered the penalties in the similar kind of transactions. It was not therefore necessary for the detaining authority to supply all the papers in relation to those proceedings which were merely referred to. We do not think that any prejudice is caused by the non-supply of these documents. The second contention is, therefore, rejected. 3.3. Lastly, the learned counsel pointed out that firstly in the detention order, the detenu is specifically described as 'remand prisoner' in Central Prison, Chennai. We do not think that any prejudice is caused by the non-supply of these documents. The second contention is, therefore, rejected. 3.3. Lastly, the learned counsel pointed out that firstly in the detention order, the detenu is specifically described as 'remand prisoner' in Central Prison, Chennai. Learned counsel then points out that even in the grounds in paragraph 5 it is stated as under: "The State Government are also aware of the fact that you are in the Central Prison, Chennai as remand prisoner and there is likelihood of you being released on bail. The State Government are satisfied that there is likelihood of your indulging in the above said prejudicial activities again while on bail and there is a compelling necessity to prevent you from indulging in such activities. ..." The learned counsel thereafter invites our attention to subpara (ix) of paragraph 1, which reads as follows: "On the request made by the Customs Department on 22-11-2002, your remand period was extended upto 5-12-2002. On the request made by the Customs department dated 5-12-2002 for your remand extension, the ACMM EO.II has observed that you were not produced due to non-availability of escort and ordered that the next date of hearing is 19-12-2002." From this, learned counsel points out that this is nothing but a complete non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority as though the detenu was not a remand prisoner on the date when the detention order was passed and though there was no valid remand against him, he was so described as a 'remand prisoner' and seemingly contradictory statements came to be made as shown above. It is pointed out that after observing that the detenu was not produced due to non-availability of police escort, if the detaining authority still described him as the 'remand prisoner' in paragraph 5 as also on the order, it was a typical case of non-application of mind and passing the order with mechanical mind. 3.3.1. Learned counsel very heavily relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court, to which one of us (V.S.S., J.) was a party, in HIDAYA BANU AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS (2002 MLJ Crl. 608). 3.3.1. Learned counsel very heavily relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court, to which one of us (V.S.S., J.) was a party, in HIDAYA BANU AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS (2002 MLJ Crl. 608). Learned counsel also pointed out that, relying on this Full Bench decision, a Division Bench of this Court again in H.C.P. No.2451 of 2002 (S. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Tamil Nadu), in the identical circumstances, allowed the petition, quashing the order. 3.3.2. On going through the above decisions, there can be no doubt that the decisions apply on all fours to the matter. In the Full Bench decision cited above as well as in the present situation, the detenu was undoubtedly not under the remand order. In fact, there was no extension of remand in this case and though the police had sought his remand, the Magistrate had merely ordered the case to be called on the next day, noting the ground that he was not produced on account of non-availability of police escort. Not only was the detenu described as a remand prisoner in the detention order but even in the ground he was described as a person on remand. That could not have been done. This suggests that the authorities concerned had acted mechanically and had failed to apply their mind to the facts. There was a factually incorrect statement, on the basis of which the detention was ordered. It could be that had the detaining authority come to know that there was no remand order against the detenu, the detaining authority might not have passed the detention order. However, the order has been passed that too prominently describing him as the 'remand prisoner' in Central Prison, Chennai would certainly be an example of the non-application of mind. On this count alone, the petition should succeed. 4. We, accordingly, allow the petition and quash the detention order and direct the detenu to be released forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with any other matter.