Research › Search › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 149 (DEL)

R. S. BAKSHI v. H. K. MALHARI

2003-02-10

M.A.KHAN

body2003
Mahmood All Khan, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition the petitioner landlord has challenged an order of Additional rent Controller dated 17th March 2001 whereby an application for leave to defend filed under sub-section (4) of Section 25b of Delhi Rent Control Act (for short the Act) was allowed and the tenant (respondent No. 1) was permitted to contest the petition filed by the petitioner for his eviction under clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act. ( 2 ) AT the outset, an objection was; raised by Shri R. K. Gupta, counsel for the respondent that this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable. He argued that an order allowing application for leave to defend filed by a tenant under sub-section (5) of Section 25b of the Act may be challenged only in a revision petition. Conversely, petitioner No. 1 in person who argued for himself and petitioner No. 2 controverted this argument and stated that the petition filed by him was maintainable. In the alternative, he requested that the instant petition may be converted into a civil revision petition. It is interesting to note that this controversy survived (though for no valid reasons) even after a reference was made by a learned single Judge in this case for a decision by a Larger bench the question of maintainability of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by a landlord assailing an order whereby leave to contest is granted to the tenant in a petition under clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act. The reference order is dated 7th December 2001 and was a consequence of the learned Single Judge finding difference in the view of the Supreme Court in two judgments titled Vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt. Narain Devi Taneja, 1980 (2) scc 120 and Major D. N. Sood and Another Versus Shanti Devi, (1997) 10 scc 428 . The Division Bench by its order dated 21. 12. The Division Bench by its order dated 21. 12. 2001 in CM (M) 221 of 2001 answered the reference as follows : "we, therefore, are of the opinion that the judgment of the Apex Court in vinod Kumar Chaudhary v. Smt Narain Devi (supra) having not been brought to the notice of the Apex Court in the later judgment in D. N. Sood v. Shanti Devi (supra) that the former judgment shall prevail on d. N. Sood s case wherein the legal question was neither noticed nor considered. No arguments on merit were advanced. The binding precedent in Vinod Chaudhary s case was not brought to its notice. The said decision was, therefore, rendered per incuriam. " ( 3 ) ACCORDING to petitioner No. 1, the precise question before the Division bench was whether the landlord can file a petition challenging the order of the Additional rent Controller by which the leave is granted to a tenant to contest an eviction petition under clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act and that the question before the court was not as to whether a civil revision or a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was the remedy available to the landlord. Conversely, the argument of the counsel for the respondent is that in Vinod Kumar chaudhary s case (supra) the Supreme Court had rejected the contention of the tenant that the revision petition was not envisaged against the Border granting tenant leave to defend an eviction petition under clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the act. In other words, he urged that the revision petition and not a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was the remedy available to the landlord against such an order. ( 4 ) HOW this controversy survived after the answer of the reference by the division Bench, I am unable to understand. The Division Bench observed that decision in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary (supra) shall prevail over the decision in major D. N. Sood and another (supra ). In Vinod Kumar Chaudhary s case the supreme Court laid down that the High Court has power to entertain revision against the order refusing eviction to the landlord under Section 14a or 14 (1) (e) of the Act and not only against directing eviction. In para 16 of the judgment supreme Court held : "16. In Vinod Kumar Chaudhary s case the supreme Court laid down that the High Court has power to entertain revision against the order refusing eviction to the landlord under Section 14a or 14 (1) (e) of the Act and not only against directing eviction. In para 16 of the judgment supreme Court held : "16. As a result of the above discussion, we hold that the remedy of the landlady against the order of the Controller in the present case was by way of revision (and revision only) of that order by the High Court as laid down in the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B, even though it was an order not directing, but refusing, recovery of possession of the premises in dispute. " ( 5 ) THE contention of the petitioner NO. 1 that the Division Bench after answering the reference had remitted the matter to the single Bench "for disposal of the matter on merits" which meant that this Bench was to decide the case on merit other than maintainability. The argument is untenable. The question of maintainability of the petition is part of the questions which requires to be decided on merit. ( 6 ) SUB-SECTION (8) of Section 25b of the Act has provided as under: " (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section : provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. " ( 7 ) THIS provision spelt out the power of the High Court to call for the record of the Controller for the purpose of. satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 25-B is "in accordance with law". Analysing sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act the Supreme Court in Shiv sarup Gupta v. Dr. satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 25-B is "in accordance with law". Analysing sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act the Supreme Court in Shiv sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507 has observed in para 11 as follows : "section 25-B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 finding its place in Chapter iii-A of the Act was inserted into the body of the main Act by Act No. 18 of 1976 with effect from 1. 12. 1975. It provides for a special procedure to be followed for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide need. Obviously, this ground for eviction of the tenant has been treated on a fotting different from the one on which other grounds for eviclion of the tenant stand. Seclion 25-B is a self-contained provision in the sense that remedy against an order passed by the Rent controller thereunder is also provided by that provision itself. Sub-section (8) provides that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in Section 25-B provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself than an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law (or not), call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. The phraseology of the provision as reproduced hereinbefore provides an interesting reading placed in juxtaposition with the phraseology employed by the Legislature in drafting section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the latter provision the exercise of revisipnal jurisdiction of the High Court is circumscribed by the subordinate Court having committed one of the three errors, namely (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or material irregularity. Under the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B, the expression governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is for the purpose of satisfying if an order may by the Controller is according to law". Under the proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B, the expression governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is for the purpose of satisfying if an order may by the Controller is according to law". The revisional jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 25-B (8) is not so limited as is under Section 115, CPC nor so wide as that of an Appellate court. The High Court cannot enter intoappreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether it is according to law . For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached that conclusion on the material available. Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established facts as betray the lack of reason and/or objectivity would under the finding of the Controller not according to law calling for an interference under proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act. A judgment leading to miscarriage of justice is not a judgment according to law. [see : Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance co. Ltd. , (1998) 8 SCC 119 : (1998 0 AIR (SCW) 3451) and ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani (1999) 1 SCC 141 . ] ( 8 ) THE above observation of the Supreme Court made it explicity clear that the power given by sub-section (8) are wider than the power which this Court enjoyed under Section 115 of the CPC but they are narrower that the poor of an appellate court. The question which the High Court is obliged to decide in a petition filed under sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act are whether the order of the rent Controller was according to law . The petitions which are filed under subsection (8) of Section 25-B of the Act as such are class apart. The question which the High Court is obliged to decide in a petition filed under sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act are whether the order of the rent Controller was according to law . The petitions which are filed under subsection (8) of Section 25-B of the Act as such are class apart. The High Court does not exactly exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC while examining the order of the trial court but as observed by the Supreme Court in the above cited judgment the High Court for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Controller was wholly unreasonable or was one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached that conclusion on the material available may enter into reappraisal of evidence. The petitions which are filed before the High Court invoking its jurisdiction under sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act are classified as civil revision when a tenant challenges the order of the Rent Controller refusing him to grant leave to contest the eviction petition under clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act. In fact sub-section (9) of Section 25b of the Act itself described such petition as revision. It stated as under: "where no application has been made to the High Court on revision, the controller may, exercise the power of review in accordance with the provision of Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)". ( 9 ) THERE is no reason why the petition filed by a landlord under sub-section (8) of Section 25b questioning the order of the Rent Controller whereby he had granted leave to defend the eviction case to a tenant should also not fall into this class of cases. Whether the petition is filed by the tenant or the landlord, both are under sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act. Therefore, branding them to be a writ petition invoking discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the constitution of India will not be correct. They have to be classified as civil revision. The Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary s case has already held so. ( 10 ) BUT the power of the High Court is circumscribed to the four corners of sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act. They have to be classified as civil revision. The Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary s case has already held so. ( 10 ) BUT the power of the High Court is circumscribed to the four corners of sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act. It would be neither enlarged nor abridged by labelling such cases to be under Section 115 CPC or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As observed by the Supreme Court in the above cited case of Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) the powers of the court under Section 115 CPC are different. They are circumscribed by the subordinate court having committed one of the three erros, namely (i) having exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) having failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) having exercised its jurisdiction with illegality or" material irregularity. On the other hand, the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and limited to seeing that inferior court or tribunal function within the limit of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of record much less error of law. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Article 227. The High court does not act as an appellate court. The High Court will also not review or reweigh the evidence upon which determination of the inferior court or tribunal propose to be based or to correct error of law in the decision, (see Mohammad yunus v. Mohammad Mustaquin and Others, AIR 1984 SC 38 ). In short, the scope and ambit of both the provisions under Section 115, CPC and Article 227 of the Constitution of India differ. Same is with the power which sub-section (8) of section 25b of the Act has vested in the High Court. This is materially different from its power under Section 115, CPC and the power under Article 227 of the constitution of India. ( 11 ) THE present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of india and has been registered as Civil Miscellaneous (Main ). It ought to have been registered as a civil revision. This is materially different from its power under Section 115, CPC and the power under Article 227 of the constitution of India. ( 11 ) THE present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of india and has been registered as Civil Miscellaneous (Main ). It ought to have been registered as a civil revision. Petitioner No. 1 has requested for converting this petition into a civil revision petition and hear the arguments for deciding the petition on its own merit. Strongly opposing it, counsel for the respondent referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, (1980) 2 scc 378 . He relied upon the observation of the Supreme Court in para 17 of the judgment which are as follows : "it has been urged by the appellant in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad (Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 1979) that in case this Court is of the opinion that a revision petition under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, is not maintainable, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition under Section 115 is a separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the constitution, and one cannot be identified with the other. " ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court in the cited judgment has held that revision will not lie to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a district court under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as applicable to the State of U. P. It was in this context that the Supreme Court declined to convert the revision petition into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution holding that both the proceedings were distinct and cannot be identified with each other. The question before this court is totally different. The petitioner might have branded the petition to be a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India but it has to be registered as a civil revision petition since it purports to challenge ah order of the rent Controller passed on the leave application filed by the tenant under Section 25b of the Act. It has to be considered by the court only within the parameters of sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act. It has to be considered by the court only within the parameters of sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act. For this reason since the petitioner has requested that this petition may be treated to be a civil revision petition, it is treated as such. ( 13 ) ARGUMENTS have also been heard on the merit of this petition. The powers of this Court under sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act have already been analysed by the Supreme Court in the judgment of Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra ). If the order of the Rent Controller allowing or disallowing the application for leave preferred by a tenant is based on no evidence or misreading an evidence or a wrong decision on question of law or reasons are not given for arriving at the conclusion such an order would be not according to law and may call for interference by this Court under proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act since it resulted in miscarriage of justice. The Rent Controller s decision has to be appraised on the touchstone of the proposition of law enunciated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra ). ( 14 ) NOW I advert to the merit of the case. Additional Rent Controller has found that the contentions of the tenant on the question whether the premises are required by the landlord bona fide and they are not in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation has raised triable issues. Finding on other ingredients of requirement of clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act seems to be in favour of the petitioner landlord. Petitioner No. 1 referred to paras 7 and 8 of the order of the additional Rent Controller. He has contended that the leave has been granted to the tenant to contest the petition solely on the ground that two pages of the two sale deeds filed by the petitioners in respect of property No. A-283 Defence colony were missing. He contended that the Additional Rent Controller could have called those missing pages from the petitioner. ( 15 ) CONVERSELY, counsel for the respondent has pointed out to the averment of the petitioner-landlord made in clause 18(a) of the eviction petition where he had pleaded the ground of bona fide requirement. It is a very long recital. He contended that the Additional Rent Controller could have called those missing pages from the petitioner. ( 15 ) CONVERSELY, counsel for the respondent has pointed out to the averment of the petitioner-landlord made in clause 18(a) of the eviction petition where he had pleaded the ground of bona fide requirement. It is a very long recital. Counsel for the respondent has, in particular, referred to pages 35, 36 and 38 of the paper book where in respect of this ground the petitioners have alleged that they are in possession of first floor and the second floor of premises in question and that they were in possession of two bed rooms and one drawing room, one kitchen, one small bath room with verandah on the first floor and three rooms and a tin room and verandah, small kitchen, small bath room and a small store on second floor. The residential area on both the floors, according to the petitioners, is 900 sq. ft. The eviction of the tenant-respondent was sought from the ground floor. Counsel for the respondent further pointed out to the allegations which showed that the present house was purchased by the petitioner in 1995 and they were conscious that they would not get enough office accommodation in the new house, so they retained ground floor of property No. A-283 Defence Colony for their office for one year. They also made office in two rooms on the second floor of the disputed property. It is further alleged by them that the petitioners after vacating the accommodation in House No. A-283 Defence Colony had rented an accommodation for their office at Jantar Mantar and thereafter they had taken first floor premises in house No. A-422 Defence Colony in 1999 for a period of two years for use of their office. The total covered area of the said accommodation was 1300 sq. ft. They have to vacate it after the expiry of the lease period. They need more accommodation and they are still using two rooms on the second floor in the disputed property for their small office. They require at least five rooms of one hall and three rooms for the office of petitioner No. 1 who is an advocate and his son who is also a practising lawyer. They need more accommodation and they are still using two rooms on the second floor in the disputed property for their small office. They require at least five rooms of one hall and three rooms for the office of petitioner No. 1 who is an advocate and his son who is also a practising lawyer. The petitioners have admitted that they were owners of property No. A-283 Defence Colony which was a three storied building with 10 bed rooms attached bath rooms, two small rooms, huge drawing cum dining room, besides covered verandah etc. Which they had disposed of in 1995 after they had purchased the disputed property. Mr. Gupta, counsel for the respondent has also referred to the allegations of the petitioners that they propose to reconstruct the disputed building by adding basement, increasing the covered area on the ground floor, first floor and second floor by at least six rooms. It is argued that the real purpose of the petitioners in filing the eviction petition under clause (e) is not for the bona fide requirement for residence of the landlord and their family but for using the additional accommodation for office purposes i. e. for non-residential use. He has also challenged the exact size of the family of the landlord and has contended that the so called uncle and aunt are not dependent upon the petitioners for their residence and one. of them has already died etc. , moreover, it is contended that the petitioners sold house No. A-283 Defence colony soon after purchasing the disputed property. It is contended that the object of the petitioners is mala fide and the real purpose is to evict the tenant and convert the premises for commercial use. Mr. Gupta argued that the reading of the petitioners allegation in para 18 of the eviction petition make it explicitly clear that the requirement of the petitioners for additional accommodation is not real, natural, bona fide and an honest desire. For all these reasons, he justified the order of the learned Additional Rent Controller. Mr. Gupta argued that the reading of the petitioners allegation in para 18 of the eviction petition make it explicitly clear that the requirement of the petitioners for additional accommodation is not real, natural, bona fide and an honest desire. For all these reasons, he justified the order of the learned Additional Rent Controller. ( 16 ) CONVERSELY, the argument of petitioner No. 1 is that petitioner No. 1 is a co-landlord and he is a practising lawyer and his son is also a practising lawyer and, therefore, maintaining an office by a lawyer in his residential premises is not a non-residential or commercial use of the accommodation, so the bona fide of the landlord in constructing the basement or some more accommodation in the building to enable him to have a comfortable office as per his and his son s requirement cannot be viewed with suspicion and is mala fide. He submitted that House no. A-283 Defence Colony was sold in 1995 by different sale deeds and these sale deeds showed that undivided share of 40% and undivided share of 60% in each floor was sold by two sale deeds, therefore, the learned Additional Rent Controller erred in holding that it was not clear from the two sale deeds as to which portion has been sold out. In the sale deed indeed it has been mentioned that the undivided share of 40% or 60% has been sold on the ground floor or the first floor or the second floor. This by itself will not dispel the contention of the respondent that the need of the landlord is not bona fide and a triable issue arise for consideration. ( 17 ) MR. Gupta, counsel for the respondent has cited unreported jurjgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1990 (arising out of SLP No. 236 of 1990) titled Dr. S. N. Misra v. D. D. Malik decided on January 11, 1990 where the tenant was occupying the first floor and the landlord was occupying the ground floor and the second floor, the question was whether the landlord required the first floor also. The Supreme Court observed "this question in our opinion could be properly determined only by granting leave to the tenant to contest. There is no need to take summary procedure since it is a case of additional accommodation. The Supreme Court observed "this question in our opinion could be properly determined only by granting leave to the tenant to contest. There is no need to take summary procedure since it is a case of additional accommodation. " in Santosh Devi Soni v. Chand Kiran, 2000 (3) CCC 178 (SC) the Supreme court observed "this Court in the case of Dr. S. N. Misra, v. D. D. Malik, Civil Appeal no. 120 of 1990 decided on January, 11, 1990 has ruled that in the cases where additional accommodation is asked for in proceedings under Delhi Rent control Act, normally leave to defend should not be refused". The Supreme Court in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706 : 2001 (57) DRJ 182 in para 14 of the judgment has observed as under: "this Court in Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand, (1983) 1 SCC 301 while dealing with the question in the matter of granting leave to defend to contest the eviction petition filed on the ground of personal requirement, in para 5 has stated thus : (SCC pp 302-03) "5. What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought? There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action (see Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh, AIR 1958 SC 321 ). At the stage of granting leave parties rely in support of their rival contentions on affidavits and assertion and counter-assertions on affidavits may not afford such incontrovertible evidence to lead to an affirmative conclusion one way to the other. Conceding that when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. Conceding that when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. If as it appears in this case, the landlord is staying at Pathankot, that a house is purchased, may be in the name of his sons and daughters, but there may not be an apparent need to return to Delhi in his old age, a triable issue would come into existence and that was sufficient in our opinion to grant leave to defend in this case. " ( 18 ) IN the same judgment, in para. 7 it is further observed : "7. The genesis of our procedural laws is to be traced to principles of natural justice, the principal amongst them being that no one shall suffer civil or evil or pecuniary consequence at his back without giving him an adequate and effective opportunity to participate to disprove the case against him and provide his own case. Summary procedure does not clothe an authority with power to enjoy summary dismissal. Undoubtedly wholly frivolous defence may not entitle a person leave to defend. But equally a triable issue raised, enjoins a duly to grant leave. May be in the end the defence may fail. It is necessary to bear inmind that when leave to defend is refused the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test "the truth of the averments of the opposite party by cross-examination and rival affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for concluding the point one way or the other. It is not for a moment suggested that leave to defend must be granted on mere asking but it is equally improper to refuse to grant leave though triable issues are raised and the controversy can be properly adjudicated after ascertainment of truth through cross-examination of witnesses who have filed their affidavits. Burden is on the landlord to prove his requirements and his assertion is required to be tested more so when it is shown that for long he is staying outside Delhi, that he has a building albeit standing in the names of his sons and daughters where he is staying and at which place he receives his normal correspondence. Burden is on the landlord to prove his requirements and his assertion is required to be tested more so when it is shown that for long he is staying outside Delhi, that he has a building albeit standing in the names of his sons and daughters where he is staying and at which place he receives his normal correspondence. If in such a situation one can say that a triable issue is not raised, one is at a loss to find out where, when and in what circumstances such an issue would arise. We are, therefore, satisfied that this is a case in which triable issues were raised and both the learned Rent Controller and the High Court were in error in refusing to grant the leave. " ( 19 ) MR. Gupta, counsel for the respondent has also referred to some unreported judgment of this Court also where leave to defend was granted since the landlord sought eviction of the tenant for his requirement for additional accommodation. ( 20 ) NEEDLESS to state here that in the application for leave to defend the tenant has disputed the bona fide of the requirement of the landlord and that the landlord was not in occupation of reasonably suitable accommodation. In a very lengthy application he disputed the size of the family of the landlord and the number of members who are. dependent upon them for their residence, the mala fide of the landlord in disposing of property No. A-283 Defence Colony with the sole object of getting rid of the tenant on a false ground. He specifically denied that the petitioners are not in possession of any reasonable suitable accommodation. From the averments made in para 18 of the eviction petition read with the application for leave to defend submitted by the respondent tenant I find that the order of the Additional Rent Controller cannot be said to have been passed ignoring material facts or is erroneous in law or is without reason. It cannot be said to be not in accordance with law. It does not call for an interference by this Court in exercise of the power given by sub-section (8) of Section 25b of the Act. ( 21 ) THE result of the above discussion is that the petition has no merit. It is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.