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2003 DIGILAW 1497 (PNJ)

Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab

2003-10-29

VIRENDER SINGH

body2003
JUDGMENT Virender Singh, J. - Darshan Singh, the appellant herein, was convicted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ropar vide judgment dated 16.4.1990 under Sections 325/324/323/34 Indian Penal Code for having caused injuries to Bhupinder Kaur. The maximum sentence awarded to the appellant was two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. An appeal was then preferred and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ropar, vide impugned judgment dated 15.7.1991 released the appellant under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on his entering into a probation bond for a period of two years with one surety in the like amount. He was also ordered to pay Rs. 5,000/- as compensation to injured Bhupinder Kaur. The fine already paid has been converted into litigation/cost of the proceedings. It was then directed by the lower Appellate Court that the appeal shall be dismissed in toto in case the compensation was not deposited within one week. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 2. I have heard Mr. A.S. Jattana, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant as proxy counsel for Mr. S.K. Singla and Ms. B.K. Mann, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State. With their assistance I have also gone through the records. 3. A perusal of the record shows that at the time of admission of the present appeal, the appellant was allowed two months time to pay the compensation of Rs. 5,000/- to injured Bhupinder Kaur and the operation of the impugned judgment of the lower Appellate Court was stayed for two months only. Thereafter, an application was moved for stay of payment of compensation of Rs. 5,000/- till final disposal of the appeal. However, vide order dated 26.9.1991, the appellant was granted another two months for making the payment of compensation and the operation of the impugned judgment was also stayed till then. Thereafter, there is no order in this regard. Mr. Jattana submits that the appellant by now must have deposited the amount of compensation before the Court and would have also furnished his bail bonds as directed by the lower Appellate Court. 4. The only argument advanced by Mr. Thereafter, there is no order in this regard. Mr. Jattana submits that the appellant by now must have deposited the amount of compensation before the Court and would have also furnished his bail bonds as directed by the lower Appellate Court. 4. The only argument advanced by Mr. Jattana is that while releasing the accused on probation, no condition can be imposed in default of payment of fine, as it amounts to punishing him with some sentence which directly defeats the purpose of releasing on probation and renders the provisions of the Act redundant. According to Mr. Jattana the observation made by the learned lower Appellate Court in this regard is thus unsustainable. 5. Learned State counsel has refuted the submissions made by Mr. Jattana and submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned judgment whereby the specific condition has been imposed while releasing the appellant on probation. 6. As stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that the compensation amount must have been deposited by the appellant by now as there was no stay of the operation of the impugned judgment after November, 1991, the present appeal is to be decided only on academic side. 7. Admittedly, there is no legal flaw in the approach adopted by the lower Appellate Court while directing the appellant to pay compensation as under Section 5 of the Act, the Court while releasing an offender under Sections 3 or 4 of the Act, if thinks fit can also direct the offender to pay compensation to the injured for loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of the offence and at the same time the cost of the proceedings as the Court thinks reasonable can also be imposed for that purposes. The victim can otherwise be compensated under Section 357 Criminal Procedure Code (Hari Krishan and State of Haryana v. Sukhbir Singh and others, 1988(2) RCR (Criminal) 394 S.C. refers). 8. Now the premier question which needs consideration is as to whether the Court while awarding the compensation can fix any period for making the payment and in default thereof the offender can be asked to undergo the sentence. In my view, the Court can impose such condition. 9. 8. Now the premier question which needs consideration is as to whether the Court while awarding the compensation can fix any period for making the payment and in default thereof the offender can be asked to undergo the sentence. In my view, the Court can impose such condition. 9. The Probation of Offenders Act has been enacted keeping in view certain specified offences according to their nature and gravity so that the offender can be reformed and become useful member of the society. But at the same time the interest of the injured and the State has also been protected and for this reason, Section 5 has been inserted in the statute. The very purpose of the Act is to keep the offender under surveillance for a particular period may be without supervision of the probation officer or under the supervision. The plain reading of section 4(1) of the Act shows that the Court may instead of sentencing the offender at once to any punishment direct the offender to be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and to receive sentence when called upon during the stipulated period and in the meantime, the offender is supposed to keep peace and be of good behaviour. This virtually amounts to a condition. 10. Section 4 of the Act has to be read in consonance with Section 9 of the Act which provides that whenever the offender fails to observe conditions of bond, the Court which was already passed an order under Section 4 of the Act for releasing the offender on probation, can issue a warrant for has arrest and in that eventually, the Court after hearing the case if feels satisfied that the offender has failed to observe the conditions, sentence him for the original offence. For ready reference, Section 9 of the Act is reproduced as under ;- "9. Procedure in case of offender failing to observe conditions of bond. - (1) If the Court which passes an order under section 4 in respect of an offender or any court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence has reason to believe, on the report of a probation officer or otherwise, that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of the bond or bonds entered into by him. It may issue a warrant for his arrest or may, if it thinks fit, issue a summons to him and his sureties, if any, requiring him or them to attend before it at such time as may be specified in the summons. (2) The Court before which an offender is so brought or appears may either remand him to custody until the case is concluded or it may grant him bail, with or without surety, to appear on the date which it may fix for hearing. (3) If the Court, after hearing the case, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of the bond or bonds entered into by him, it may forthwith - (a) sentence him for the original office; or (b) where the failure is for the first time, then, without prejudice to the continuance in force of the bond, impose upon him a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees. (4) xx xx xx" 11. The bare reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act makes it amply clear that the Court can impose any condition while releasing the offender on probation. 12. The order thus passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ropar directing the appellant to pay the compensation within a stipulated period failing which his appeal is to be dismissed in toto does not suffer from any illegality or firmly on any count. 13. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit. 14. As the amount of compensation has already been deposited by the appellant, the concerned Court is directed to re-assure that the same has been disbursed to injured Bhupinder Kaur and if not shall now be disbursed without any delay. Appeal dismissed.