ORDER 1. This appeal was disposed of earlier by the order dated 5-2-2003. On an application made by Chundru Sridhara Veera Hari Satya Prasad, claiming to be the beneflciary (legatee) under the Will, he has been brought on record and the said order of 5-2-2003 was recalled. The appeal is heard again. 2. The original holder, Chundru Veerraju, filed a declaration under Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (for short "the Act") showing that a total area of 89.86 acres of land was sold to different persons under ten registered sale deeds executed between September and December 1971 - nine sale transactions took place in the months of September and October 1971 and one in December 1971. These lands were sought to be excluded from the holding of Chundru Veerraju, the original respondent. The Primary Tribunal, constituted under the Act, rejected the contention for reasons more than one, recorded in its order. Aggrieved by the said order, the Primary Tribunal, the original respondent filed an appeal before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal (for short "the Appellate Tribunal"). The Appellate Tribunal found fault with the order of the Primary Tribunal in relation to the ten sale transactions, aforementioned, and concluded that the area of land covered by these sale deeds should be excluded in reckoning the total holding of the original respondent. We make it clear here itself that, in this appeal, we are only concerned with the area covered by the ten sale deeds and not with other lands dealt with by the Primary Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. The State challenged the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal before the High Court in a revision petition. The High Court disposed of the revision petition by a short order, affirming the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, relevant portion whereof reads: "On a consideration of the entire evidence on record the Appellate Tribunal has held that the registered sale deeds are true, valid, supported by consideration and have been acted upon that the vendees were put in possession of the lands on the very date of the deeds. These lands have been shown in their holdings by the vendees and they have been accepted by the learned Tribunals. These lands have been shown in their holdings by the vendees and they have been accepted by the learned Tribunals. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the finding arrived at by the Tribunal is vitiated by any error of jurisdiction justifying my interference." 3.Hence, this appeal by the State of Andhra Pradesh. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant strongly contended that the Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court committed serious error in upsetting the order passed by the Primary Tribunal; the approach of the Appellate Tribunal was erroneous, consequently it arrived at a wrong conclusion; the Appellate Tribunal misdirected itself in dealing with the controversy that arose for consideration; unfortunately, the High Court simply affirmed the order of the Appellate Tribunal without a detailed discussion, except saying as stated above. The learned counsel added that the burden was placed on the original respondent to prove that the transfer of lands by way of sale had not been effected in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding or defeating the objects of any law relating to reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings in terms of Section 7(1) of the Act. According to him, the Primary Tribunal, keeping in view Section 7(1) of the Act and the facts on the basis of evidence, recorded a categorical finding that the ten sale transactions were intended to defeat the provisions of the Act in order to get reduction in the ceiling area. 5. Per contra the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, who has been brought on record on the basis of the Will, said to have been executed by the original respondent in his favour, contended that the respondent discharged the burden of proof in regard to the sale transactions; the respondent and his wife had to sell the lands as both of them were suffering from serious disease and on account of the lands being at a distant place, they were not able to personally cultivate; the decision of this Court in the case of Yedida Chakradhararao v. State of A.P.1 is distinguishable on the facts of the case. The said decision dealt with a case of agreement of sale and delivery of possession of property pursuant to such an agreement of sale. The said decision dealt with a case of agreement of sale and delivery of possession of property pursuant to such an agreement of sale. That is not the situation in the present case as in this case properties were sold, sale deeds were executed and pursuant thereto, the possession was also delivered to the vendees. According to the learned counsel, the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal should be accepted and the High Court did not commit any error having regard to the scope of revision and particularly when no jurisdictional error was committed by the Appellate Tribunal or it failed to exercise its jurisdiction. That being the position, the High Court was right in affirming the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. He alternatively submitted that in case the Appellate Tribunal has not appreciated the evidence in a proper perspective, the impugned order should be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Appellate Tribunal for consideration afresh. 6. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side. It is not in dispute that nine sale deeds were executed in the months of September and October 1971 and one sale deed was executed in December 1971. The Act came into force with effect from 1-11973 but as far as the ceiling law is concerned, the notified date is 1-1-1975. Admittedly, all the sale transactions were between 24-1-1971 to 1-1-1975. The controversy that was to be resolved was, whether the area of land covered by these ten sale deeds could be excluded on the ground that these transactions were effected bona fidely and not to defeat the provisions of the Act in regard to the ceiling area. The Primary Tribunal, on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, held that these sale deeds were brought into existence to defeat the provisions of the Act in relation to the ceiling area. In other words, they were not bona fide transactions and the respondent did not discharge the burden of proof placed on him in this regard in terms of Section 7 of the Act. In other words, they were not bona fide transactions and the respondent did not discharge the burden of proof placed on him in this regard in terms of Section 7 of the Act. In so doing, the Primary Tribunal has recorded the following reasons: in the sale deeds, the declarant, that is, the original respondent, and his wife did not state that they had sold the lands on the ground that they had become old and they were suffering from blood pressure and weakness and were to invest the sale consideration amount in money lending business; in all the sale deeds, the declarants have taken lesser amounts at the time of sale and delivered possession of the lands and permitted the vendees to pay the remaining sale consideration amount later. No vendor will deliver the possession of lands by taking lesser amounts and allow the vendees to pay the remaining sale consideration amount later; the sale of lands made between September and December 1971 of an area of 89.86 acres covered by ten sale deeds within a period of two months or little more gave rise to the impression that the lands were disposed of in anticipation of and with a view to defeat the provisions of the Act in relation to the ceiling area; the land revenue receipts do not contain the survey numbers of the lands purchased by the vendees. Further, neither the declarants nor the vendees have produced the land revenue receipts of earlier years. The stamped receipts are only brought up to suit the evidence and the contentions of the declarants. The Primary Tribunal has also looked into the other evidence and on a detailed consideration, concluded, as already indicated above, that these transactions covered by ten sale deeds were not bona fide and they were executed with a view to circumvent the provisions of the Act and as such the area covered by the ten sale deeds should not be excluded from the holding of the declarant, that is the original respondent. The Appellate Tribunal, it appears to us, did not keep in mind the provisions of the Act in dealing with the controversy_ It gives an impression that even it did not look into Section 7 of the Act itself, which has a material bearing on the question to be decided. The Appellate Tribunal, it appears to us, did not keep in mind the provisions of the Act in dealing with the controversy_ It gives an impression that even it did not look into Section 7 of the Act itself, which has a material bearing on the question to be decided. As can be seen from the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the following points for determination were raised: "1. Whether the classification of Oduru village lands as double crop wet is not correct? 2. Whether the alienations covered by Exts. A-5 to A-12, A-14 and A-15 registered sale deed and Ext. A-13 registered gift deed dated l-4~ 1972 are true and real transactions and whether the extents covered by Exts. A-5 to A-15 should be excluded from computation?" 7. Point 2 shows that the Appellate Tribunal went on to consider, whether the sale transactions were true and real? In paragraph (7), the Appellate Tribunal has observed: "[S]imply because the alienations came to be affected during the crucial period they cannot be automatically disregarded without going into the further question whether the said transactions are true or not." In paragraph (8) again, the Appellate Tribunal has stated: "[L]et us now consider each alienation independently and find out whether it is a true transaction or not." Further, the Appellate Tribunal has observed thus: "In spite of all these inherent, improbabilities existing suspicion there is no solid legal evidence contrary on record to show that the transaction covered by Ext. A-8 is a nominal one." Similar has been the approach in regard to the other sale deeds also. The Appellate Tribunal concluded that the sale deeds were not sham or nominal but unfortunately it did not consider whether the transactions were bona fide or not and whether they were intended to defeat the provisions of the Act in relation to ceiling area. We may also add that the Appellate Tribunal did not dispel the reasons recorded by the Primary Tribunal in arriving at the a conclusion that the transactions covered by the ten sale deeds were not bona fide and they were intended to defeat the provisions of the Act. It is unfortunate that the High Court also did not look into the position of law that was required to be applied to the controversy that came up for decision before it. It is unfortunate that the High Court also did not look into the position of law that was required to be applied to the controversy that came up for decision before it. We are not in a position to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent when he contended that the High Court rightly did not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal. When the approach of the Appellate Tribunal itself was basically wrong and it did not address itself to the controversy, as required to be examined in terms of the Act and particularly keeping in view Section 7 of the Act, it was a case where the High Court should have interfered in revisional jurisdiction and an error was, therefore, committed in the application of law which itself is a jurisdictional error. It is not a case where either want of opportunity of hearing or want of evidence is pleaded and even otherwise there are not justifiable grounds to accept the alternative submission made on behalf of the respondent that the case is to be remanded to the Appellate Tribunal. 8. In view of what is stated above, the impugned order passed by the High Court affirming the order of the Appellate Tribunal, in our view, cannot be sustained. Hence, the civil appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the order passed by the Primary Tribunal is restored. 9. No costs.