Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 152 (HP)

RATTO v. STATE OF H. P.

2003-06-13

A.K.GOEL, K.C.SOOD, M.R.VERMA

body2003
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This matter has been referred on the following questions:— "Whether 1 Kg. Cannabis (Charas) will be commercial quantity in the face of Section 2 (vii-a) of the Act, 1985, as has been held in the aforesaid two decisions of this Court." 2. For ready reference, both these decisions are extracted hereinbelow:— "Cr. M.P. (M) No. 1492 of 2001 : 4.1.2002 The quantity of the charas recovered in the present case is one kilogram, that is, the commercial quantity, therefore, the provisions of Section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act would apply. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be admitted to bail and his application is accordingly rejected. “Cr. M.P.(M) No. 1088 of 2002: 29.9.2002 Notice. Learned Additional Advocate General waives service of notice on behalf of the state. Heard. The petitioner has been arrested for an offence under Section 20 of the NDPS Act for having been found in possession of one kilogram of Charas. Vide Notification issued by the Central Government dated 19.10.2001 published in the Gazette of India, Extra-ordinary on 19.10.2001, in a case of Charas, one kilogram has been specified as commercial quantity. Since the petitioner was found in possession of one kilogram of charas which is a commercial quantity within the meaning of said Notification, the rigorous of Section 37 of NDPS Act would be applicable as it has been held by this Court in Mathew Andrews British National v. State ofH.R, Cr.M.P. (M) No. 1492 of 2001, decided on 4.1.2002. Therefore, no ground is made out for exercising the discretion of bail in favour of the petitioner. The application is accordingly rejected." 3. We may also notice that besides these, there is another decision of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 140 of 2000, State v. Munshi Ram, dated 7.11.2002, wherein bail had been allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge (2), Kangra at Dharamsala to Munshi Ram-respondent. He was found to be in possession of one kilogram of Charas. While cancelling his bail and dealing whether one kilogram of the contraband was commercial or not, it was held as under:— "So far the notification dated 19.10.2001 is concerned, it specifies the quantity mentioned in column Nos. 5 and 6 of the table as small and commercial quantity respectively in relation to the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance mentioned in the corresponding entry in columns 2 to 4 of the said table. 5 and 6 of the table as small and commercial quantity respectively in relation to the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance mentioned in the corresponding entry in columns 2 to 4 of the said table. Cannabis and cannabis resin (charas, hashish) are given at Sr. No. 23 and the small quantity thereof is 100 grams whereas commercial quantity is 1 kg. It is correct that under the definition of the commercial quantity it is prescribed that any quantity greater than the quantity specified in the notification is a commercial quantity and any quantity lesser than the quantity specified in the notification is smaller quantity, but it does not mean that commercial quantity should be more than 1 kg. and small quantity less than 100 grams. In other words, the commercial quantity is 1 kg. and above and small quantity is 100 grams and less than 100 grams. The words greater or smaller than the quantity specified in the notification cannot be construed in such a manner as to make the commercial and small quantity as specified in the notification as non-commercial. Though there is no definition of non-commercial quantity, yet the quantity less than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity as referred to in Sections 20, 22 and 23 may be termed as non-commercial. In view of these provisions, non-commercial quantity will be from 101 grams to 999, 999 grams. Therefore, the quantity 1 kg. involved in the present case is commercial quantity and the limitations as prescribed under Section 37 (l)(b) are applicable which have not been kept in view while granting bail by the Additional Sessions Judge and on this ground alone, bail deserves to be cancelled." 4. This reference, we may add, assumes significance looking to the addition of definitions particularly of sub-section (vii-a) of Section 2 added in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and other amendments to this law (hereinafter referred to as the Act), by amendments made by Central Act No. 9 of 2001, (hereinafter referred to as 2001 Act). 5. By this Act 2001, some existing provisions of the Act were amended, some were added like sub-section (viia) and some substituted for the existing sections of the Act. However, for the present, we are concerned with Section 2(vii-a) and Sections 20 and 37. 5. By this Act 2001, some existing provisions of the Act were amended, some were added like sub-section (viia) and some substituted for the existing sections of the Act. However, for the present, we are concerned with Section 2(vii-a) and Sections 20 and 37. For ready reference these sections are extracted hereinbelow, both as they stood prior to their amendment by 2001 Act or earlier : "2(vii-a) "Commercial quantity" means any substance which the Central Government may, having regard to the available information as to its possible use in the production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances or to the provisions of any International Convention, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a controlled substance. This provision is newly added in 2001) "20. Punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis.—Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,— (a) cultivates any cannabis plant; or (b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable,— (i) Where such contravention relates to ganja or the cultivation of cannabis plant, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees; (ii) Where such contravention relates to cannabis other than ganja, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less -than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees and which may extend to two lakh rupees : Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees." This section was amended vide Act of 2001. This amended Section is as under:— 20. This amended Section is as under:— 20. "Punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis.—Whoever, in contravention of any provisions of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,— (a) cultivates any cannabis, plant; or (b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable— (i) where such contravention relates to clause (a) with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees; and (ii) where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b),— (A) and involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both; (B) and involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees; (C) and involves commercial quantity with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees." "37. Offences to be cognizable.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable." This section was substituted with the following vide Central Act No. 2 of 1989. "37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable ; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless— (1) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of subsection (1) are in addition to the limitation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail." Again this section is amended by Act of 2001. For ready reference, this amended provision is extracted hereinbelow:— 37. "Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for [offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A and also for offences involving commercial quantity) shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless— (1) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of subsection (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.]" 6. Reason for making amendments in the Act can be traced from its objects and reasons noted at the time of introduction of the amending bill. These are:— "7. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 provides deterrent punishment for various offences relating to illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Most of the offences invite uniform punishment of a minimum ten years rigorous imprisonment which may extent up to twenty years. While the Act envisages severe punishments for drugs traffickers, it envisages reformative approach towards addicts. In view of the general delay in trial it has been found that the addicts prefer not to invoke the provisions of the Act. The strict bail provisions under the Act add to their misery. Therefore, it is proposed to rationalise the sentence structure so as to ensure that while drug traffickers who traffic in significant quantities of drugs are punished with deterrent sentences, the addicts and those who commit less serious offences are sentenced to less severe punishment. The strict bail provisions under the Act add to their misery. Therefore, it is proposed to rationalise the sentence structure so as to ensure that while drug traffickers who traffic in significant quantities of drugs are punished with deterrent sentences, the addicts and those who commit less serious offences are sentenced to less severe punishment. This requires rationalisation of the sentence structure provided under the Act. It is also proposed to restrict the application of strict bail provisions to those offenders who indulge in serious offences.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. In the aforesaid background, Act No. 9 of 2001 came to be passed. This was with a view to separate the drug trafficking in significant qualities. And such traffickers were required to be punished with deterrent sentences. At the same time the addicts and those who committed less serious offences were intended to be punished with less severe punishment. With a view to rationalise the sentence structure as originally provided in the Act before its amendment in 2001, the amendments were proposed to be carried out and had in fact been carried out. 8. In this behalf, it may be noted that before the amendment by Act of 2001, there was no discretion with the court irrespective of the quantity of the contraband recovered from an accused so far sentencing process was concerned. Once he was found guilty, law was to take its course. 9. Similarly, the provisions for the grant of bail was also very stringent under Section 37 of the Act as it was before its amendment by 2001 Act. 10. Though there is hardly any ambiguity in the definition of commercial quantity, as noted hereinabove, however, looking to the aforesaid decisions of this court, it has become necessary to decide as to how a provision in a statute, like the present one, is to be interpreted. 11. In this behalf it may be appropriate to observe that useful rule in the construction of a statute is to adhere to the original meaning of the words used and to adhere to its grammatical construction, unless of course, that is at variance with the legislative intent which is to be gathered from the provision itself. 12. In addition to this, question of interpretation of a statute would only arise when it is capable of two interpretations. 12. In addition to this, question of interpretation of a statute would only arise when it is capable of two interpretations. However, in the face of the clear language as also its plain meaning, effect needs to be given to the letter of law. Legislative purpose and intent has always to be found in the words used in the legislation itself. And in case words used therein are capable of one construction only, then it is not the courts job to go in for hypothical construction on the plea that it is more consistent with the object and policy of the Act. Words used in a particular provision of the statute have to be interpreted on their plain grammatical meaning. 13. In this behalf it may also be noted that when meaning is plain, it is also not duty of the court to busy itself with supposed intentions. Construction which makes the provision superfluous has to be avoided at all cost. 14. One can safely assume that legislature was very well aware of the rules of grammer. Such rules should be considered by the courts in their effort to ascertain meaning of a statutory enactment like sub-section (viia) supra of the theory that they will reveal or tend to reveal the correct sense or meaning thereof. Language of a provision of law has to be interpreted on the assumption that legislature was aware of the existing statute and it was aware what it intended by amending the law. 15. Another rule of interpretation is to ascertain as to what was the law prior to its amendment, as in the present case. What remedy the legislation resolved and carried out by way of amendment and true reason therefor. 16. While interpreting a provision, the courts have to give effect to the provision law as enacted by the legislation. Reason being that power to legislate is not conferred upon the courts. As such courts can neither re-write nor re-cast or re-frame the legislation for the simple reason that it has no such power. As in the present case, while considering the changes carried out by 2001 Act, it may be of some assistance while examining the amended provisions to look to the legislative history thereof. In the context of Section 2(vii-a) supra, it may also be noted that Central Government has issued notification in the official Gazette notifying "commercial quantity". As in the present case, while considering the changes carried out by 2001 Act, it may be of some assistance while examining the amended provisions to look to the legislative history thereof. In the context of Section 2(vii-a) supra, it may also be noted that Central Government has issued notification in the official Gazette notifying "commercial quantity". For ready reference relevant extract of this notification is also reproduced hereinbelow:— NOTIFICATION SPECIFYING SMALL QUANTITY AND COMMERCIAL QUANTITY "In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (viia) and (xxiiia) of Section 2 of Narcotic Drugs and Psycho tropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985) and in supersession of Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue Notification S.O. 527(E) dated 16th July, 1996, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central Government hereby specifies the quantity mentioned in columns 5 and 6 of the Table below, in relation to the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance mentioned in the corresponding entry in columns 2 to 4 of the said Table, as the small quantity and commercial quantity respectively for the purposes of the said clauses of that section. TABLE [See sub-clause vii(a) and xxiii(a) of Section 2 of the Act] SI. No. Name of Narcotic Drug and Psycho-tropic Substance (International non-proprietary name (INN) Other non-proprietary name Chemical Name Small Quantity (in gm.) Commercial Quantity (in gm./kg.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 23. Cannabis and Cannabis resin Charas Hashish Extracts and Tinctures of Cannabis 100 1 Kg. 17. It is also a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act. As such in our view the title and preamble, whatever their value may be, as aids to the construction of a statute, undoubtedly throw some light on the intent and design of the legislature as also is indicative of the scope as well as of the legislative intent. 18. On the basis of decisions supra, it was urged on behalf of the respondent-State, that since commercial quantity has been notified as per notification, therefore, no exception can be taken to those decisions by holding that one kilogram of Charas will be commercial quantity, and reference be answered accordingly. 19. 18. On the basis of decisions supra, it was urged on behalf of the respondent-State, that since commercial quantity has been notified as per notification, therefore, no exception can be taken to those decisions by holding that one kilogram of Charas will be commercial quantity, and reference be answered accordingly. 19. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the provisions of Section (vii-a) supra, have been completely mis-read and mis-construed while holding that one kilogram cannabis (Charas) is commercial quantity in all these decisions supra. This according to him will not only be ignoring the purpose to bring 2001 Act, but will also be destroying this sub-section and particularly keeping in view the background and circumstances whereunder amendments were carried out. He further submitted that no doubt, commercial quantity has been notified as per notification issued by the Central Government extracted hereinabove in case of cannabis (Charas). It speaks of commercial quantity being one kg. Up to this extent, there is no difference, muchless dispute either in the notification supra and the schedule thereunder. However, the words "any quantity greater then the quantity specified by the Central Government..." assume significance. Thus, he prayed that for interpreting this provision in a purposive manner for which it had been enacted, as also keeping in view the legislative intent as extracted herein-in-above. 20. In our considered view "quantity greater then" has to be given its simple and grammatical meaning. Reason is that there is no ambiguity in these words. Nor they can be given any other meaning than the one as are understood in the common parlance. We further feel that these words are not capable of being interpreted in any other manner except that commercial quantity as notified by the Central Government has to be greater than or to say more than/bigger than/larger than one kg. 21. For holding so, we are of the view that legislature was well aware when the words "greater than" were incorporated in the sub-section as also about its meaning. There can hardly be any other purpose, import or meaning that can be attributed to the words quantity greater than used in the aforesaid sub-section. Thus, there is no ambiguity while examining this provision of law. 22. There can hardly be any other purpose, import or meaning that can be attributed to the words quantity greater than used in the aforesaid sub-section. Thus, there is no ambiguity while examining this provision of law. 22. As already noted, process of sentencing as well as provisions of bail have been whittled down by the amendments carried out to Sections 20 and 37 by 2001 Act. Both these sections, as existed prior and after their amendments have extracted hereinabove. A bare perusal of these sections before and after, (alongwith other provisions of the Act), amendment vide 2001 Act clearly support the view being taken by us in this judgment. 23. After amendments vide 2001 Act, it is clear that law has gone under sea change. While admitting a person to bail earlier there was no discretion with the Court on the basis of the quantity of the recovered contraband. Unless of course there were grounds to believe that the person concerned was not guilty of such offence and that he was not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Similarly, sentence has been reduced in case of persons found to be in possession different quantities as detailed in Section 20 after it by 2001, Act. 24. This shows that strict rigors of punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis were amended to the extent and with a view to achieve the object with which amendments were carried out in the year, 2001. This is one aspect of the case. 25. Another aspect that is to be kept in view in this case is that where there is a stringent provision of the penal law, stricter has to be its compliance. Since consequences of grant/refusal of bail relates to the liberty of a citizen, (like the petitioner) being put in to jeopardy, thus we have to interpret the same in a manner which favours the subject. 26. In this behalf submission urged on behalf of the State needs to be noted here. As per learned Counsel one Kg. needs be held to be commercial quantity, otherwise the purpose of enacting the main Act will be defeated. Purpose was to curb menace of drug trafficking etc. which was spreading its tenterhooks rapidly. 26. In this behalf submission urged on behalf of the State needs to be noted here. As per learned Counsel one Kg. needs be held to be commercial quantity, otherwise the purpose of enacting the main Act will be defeated. Purpose was to curb menace of drug trafficking etc. which was spreading its tenterhooks rapidly. This argument prima facie appears to be attractive and may have at some relevance in the context of provisions of the Act, as those stood before its amendment vide Act of 2001 but not thereafter. 27. Reason being the legislature carried out the amendments after having gone through and examining the working of the Act and probably thereafter having felt necessity to carry out the amendments. It was only thereafter on examination of the whole matter that amendments have been carried out. 28. Provisions of law in their interpretation has been attending the attention of Supreme Court as well as other Courts. We will briefly make a reference to some of such decisions. In Firm L. Hazari Mai Kuthiala v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Cantt. and another, AIR 1957 Punjab 5, while dealing with the Interpretation of Statute, it was held as under:— "....The following are well-known rules for the construction of statutes: (1) The first and foremost rule, to which all others are subordinate, is that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation. If a statute speaks for itself clearly any attempt by the Court to make it clearer by imposing another meaning would not be constructing the statute but enacting one. (2) The second rule is that the words appearing in a statute must be presumed to have been used in their popular sense and should be given their ordinary natural and familiar meaning. (3) The third rule is that the Courts are not at liberty to create an imaginary ambiguity in the terms of a statute and later to clear it up by a long and tedious process of subtle analysis. The Courts proceed on the assumption that the legislature knew its own mind, that it understood the meaning of the terms employed by it and that those terms do not contain a hidden meaning which only the study of a powerful intellect can discover. The Courts proceed on the assumption that the legislature knew its own mind, that it understood the meaning of the terms employed by it and that those terms do not contain a hidden meaning which only the study of a powerful intellect can discover. (1910) AC 220 and 1953 SC 58 (60, 61) (AIR V 40), Relied on (Para 14 a) 29. In M/s. New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207, a three Judge Bench observed as under:— (b) Interpretation of Statutes—Interpretation harmonizing with the object of the statute to be given. "It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning the Court would be justified in assuming that the legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its powers invalid. In interpreting a statute the Court cannot ignore its aim and object." 30. In Polester and Co. Ltd. etc. v. Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax, New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 897, while dealing with the Bengal Finance Sale Tax Act, it was observed as under:— "Now, if there is one principle of interpretation more well settled than any other, it is that a statutory enactment, must ordinarily be construed according to the plain natural meaning of its language and that no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly, necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. This rule of literal construction is firmly established and it has received judicial recognition in numerous cases. Crawford in his book on "Construction of Statutes" (1940 Ed.) at page 269 explains the rule in the following terms: "Where the statutes meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case they are not needed. Crawford in his book on "Construction of Statutes" (1940 Ed.) at page 269 explains the rule in the following terms: "Where the statutes meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case they are not needed. If they should be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute." 31. In Rib Tapes (India) Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 2014, in the context of Interpretation of Statute, it was held as under:— "6. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that in fact in the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Shree Ram Durga Prasad (P) Ltd., (1969) 2 SCR 727 : AIR 1970 SC 1597, this Court considered the question of description and came to the conclusion that a penal provision has to be construed strictly and in absence of specific words requiring Value to be mentioned, it could not be inferred that any difference in value could be made the basis of penalty. Whereas learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that although the term value was not in Section l11(m) of the Act before the amendment but that will make no difference as according to him even without the term value a misdescription could be interpreted to be a misdescription on the basis of value stated and ultimately the goods found to be of a higher value. By the amendment the legislature had only tried to explain or clarify the position and he contended that this was the view taken by the High Court while considering this question." 32. By the amendment the legislature had only tried to explain or clarify the position and he contended that this was the view taken by the High Court while considering this question." 32. In Union of Indias case, AIR 1970 SC 1597, the Court held:— "If we are to hold that every declaration which does not state accurately the full export value of the goods exported is a contravention of the restrictions imposed by Section 12(1) then all exports on consignment basis must be held to contravene the restrictions imposed by Section 12(1). Admittedly Section 12(1) governs every type of export. Again it is hard to believe that the legislature intended that any minor mistake in giving the full export value should be penalised in the manner provided in Section 23-A. The wording of Section 12(1) does not support such a conclusion. Such a conclusion does not accord with the purpose of Section 12(1). It is true that the regulations contained in the Act are enacted in the economic and financial interest of this country. The contravention of those regulations which we were told are widespread are affecting vital economic interest of this country. Therefore the rigor and sanctity of those regulations should be maintained but at the same time it should not be forgotten that Section 12(1) is a penal section. The true rule of construction of a section like Section 12 (1) is, if we may say so with respect, as mentioned by Plowman, J. in Re H.P.C. Productions Ltd., (1962) Ch. D. 466 at p. 473...." It is therefore, clear that their Lordships relied on the rule of construction holding that penal provision has to be strictly construed and held that where the provision itself did not require the value to be stated for any error in respect of that, no penalty could be imposed. Learned Counsel contended that it was because of this decision that the Amendment Act 1973 was passed by the Parliament and the term value was inserted in Section 111(m) of the Act. Learned Counsel referred to Objects and Reasons for the amendment mentioned in the Bill, which resulted in Act No. 36 of 1973. Learned Counsel contended that it was because of this decision that the Amendment Act 1973 was passed by the Parliament and the term value was inserted in Section 111(m) of the Act. Learned Counsel referred to Objects and Reasons for the amendment mentioned in the Bill, which resulted in Act No. 36 of 1973. The material words mentioned in the Objects and Reasons for the amendment as stated in the Bill reads as under : "The amendments to these Acts proposed in the Bill mainly seek to make the punishments prescribed thereunder more severe and to make certain other provisions therein with regard to the rules of evidence and procedure with a view to removing the loopholes noticed in the working of these Acts and making their enforcement more effective. 2. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions of the Bill. Clause (2). This clause seeks to amend Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962, with a view to providing for the confiscation of goods in cases of mis-declaration of value or imported goods irrespective of whether or not such goods are dutiable or prohibited, in order to cover cases of over-invoiced imports." It is not in dispute that in order to interpret a particular provision and to infer the intention of the legislature, the Objects and Reasons stated in the bill, when it is presented to the legislature, could be used. In this view of the matter it appears that before the amendment in 1973, Section 111(m) did not contemplate any difference in material particulars in respect of value but it referred matters other than the value." 33. To similar effect is a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Vatan Mal v. Kailash Nath, AIR 1989 SC 1534 : "The object of enacting Section 13-A by the Legislature was to confer benefit on all tenants against whom suits for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent were pending. To achieve the object, Section 13-A has been given overriding effect. In this case provision of Section 13 (a) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act was being examined. What is relevant for the purpose of the present case it was held as under:— In construing the terms of Section 13-A, the Court has to bear in mind the object underlying the introduction of the section by the Legislature. In this case provision of Section 13 (a) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act was being examined. What is relevant for the purpose of the present case it was held as under:— In construing the terms of Section 13-A, the Court has to bear in mind the object underlying the introduction of the section by the Legislature. It is a settled principle that the interpretation of the legislative intent as far as possible and the courts should not take a narrow or restricted view which will defeat the purpose of the Act." 34. In Shashikant Laxman Kale and another v. Union of India and another, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 2114, it was held as under:— "14. It is first necessary to discern the true purpose or object of the impugned enactment because it is only with reference to the true object of the enactment that the existence of a rational nexus of the differentia on which the classification is based, with the object sought to be achieved by the enactment, can be examined to test the validity of the classification. In Franchise Bennions Statutory Interpretation, 1984 edition, the distinction between the legislative intention and the purpose or object of the legislation has been succinctly summarised at p. 237 as under:— "The distinction between the purpose or object of an enactment and the legislative intention governing it is that the former relates to the mischief to which the enactment is directed and its remedy, while the latter relates to the legal meaning of the enactment." 15. There is thus a clear distinction between the two. While the purpose or object of the legislation is to provide a remedy for the malady, the legislative intention relates to the meaning or exposition of the remedy as enacted. While dealing with the validity of a classification, the rational nexus of the differentia on which the classification is based has to exist with the purpose or object of the legislation so determined. The question next is of the manner in which the purpose or object of the enactment has to be determined and the material which can be used for this exercise. 16. For determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the passing of that law. 16. For determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the passing of that law. For the limited purpose of appreciating the back ground and the antecedent factual matrix leading to the legislation, it is permissible to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the bill which actuated the steps to provide a remedy for the then existing malady. In A. Thangal Kunju Masaliar v. M. Menkitachalam Potti, (1955) 2 SCR 1196 : AIR 1956 SC 246, the Statement of Objects and Reasons was used for judging the reasonableness of a classification made in an enactment to see if it infringed or was contrary to the constitution. In that decision for determining the question, even affidavit on behalf of the State of "the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law thereunder consideration had been passed and which necessitated the passing of that law" was relied on. It was reiterated in State of West Bengal v. Union of India, (1964) 1 SCR 371 : AIR 1963 SC 1241—that the Statement and Objects and Reasons accompanying a bill, when introduced in Parliament can be used for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation/ Similarly in Pannalal Binjaraj v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 233 : AIR 1957 SC 397—a challenge to the validity of classification was repelled placing reliance on an affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Board of Revenue disclosing the true object or enacting the impugned provision in the Income-tax Act. 35. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India and another, (1992) 4 Supreme Court Cases 711, it was held as under :— "8. The language of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 is absolutely clear and does not permit any artificial rule of interpretation to be applied. It is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are, therefore, reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences. The language of the sub- rule here is precise and unambiguous and, therefore, has to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. The language of the sub- rule here is precise and unambiguous and, therefore, has to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. As was observed in enemurable cases in India and in England, the expression used in the statute alone declares the intent of the legislature. In the words used by this Court in State of H.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the act speaks for itself. Reference was also made in the reported judgment to Maxwell stating: "The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words." The comparison of the language with that of sub-rule (3) reinforces the conclusion that sub-rule (4) has to be understood in the natural sense. It will be observed that in sub-rule (3) the reference is to "a Government servant under suspension" while the words "under suspension", are omitted in sub-rule (4). Also, the sub-rule (3) directs that on the order of punishment being set aside, "the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force" but in sub-rule (4) it has been said that "the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension". The departure made by the author in the language of sub-rule (4) from that of sub-rule (3) is conscious and there is no scope for attributing the artificial and strained meaning thereto. In the circumstances it is not permissible to read down the provisions as suggested. We, therefore, hold that as a result of sub-rule (4) a Government servant, though not earlier under suspension, shall also be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, provided of course, that the other conditions mentioned therein are satisfied." 36. In State of T.N. v. Sivarasan alias Raghu alias Sivarasan and others, (1997) 1 Supreme Court Cases 682, while dealing with the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, it was held that this Act contains stringent provisions and provides heavier punishment, therefore, its provisions have to be construed strictly. 37. In State of T.N. v. Sivarasan alias Raghu alias Sivarasan and others, (1997) 1 Supreme Court Cases 682, while dealing with the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, it was held that this Act contains stringent provisions and provides heavier punishment, therefore, its provisions have to be construed strictly. 37. In State of West Bengal and others v. Scene Screen (Pvt.) Ltd. and another, AIR 2000 Supreme Court 3089, what was held and is relevant so for interpreting a statute, is as under:— "21. However, that is not the end of the problem. The question that remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was right in setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge holding inter alia that the petitioner respondent No. 2 herein was not entitled to retain the land in dispute because he was not in Khas possession of the same. In our considered view the Division Bench was right in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 22. Section 6(1) (b) does not lay down that intermediary should be in Khas possession of the land comprised in or appertaining to buildings or structures, whether erected by him or not. On a close look at the Section 6 it is manifest that wherever the legislature intended to lay down the requirement of "Khas possession" as a condition precedent for the claim of right of retention it expressly stated so. In this connection the provisions of Section 6(1)(c) and (d) may be seen. Section 6(l)(b) clearly and unambiguously lays down that the intermediary shall be entitled to retain the land comprised in or appertaining to the building or structure whether erected by the intermediary or not. It is a well accepted principle of interpretation of statutory provisions that if the plain language of the section is clear or unambiguous it is not open to a Court to interpret it giving a meaning different from plain grammatical meaning of the provisions. The learned Single Judge, in view of the plain and unambiguous language of the provisions of the Act, was in error in introducing the condition of Khas possession in Section 6(1)(b) even though the section made no such provision. The learned Single Judge, in view of the plain and unambiguous language of the provisions of the Act, was in error in introducing the condition of Khas possession in Section 6(1)(b) even though the section made no such provision. Equally incorrect was the reasons by the learned Single Judge that if the requirement of Khas possession by the intermediary is not read into that section it will result in the crimination between different categories of lands which the intermediary may be entitled to retain. Each clause of Section 6(1) refers to a separate category of land. The reason for and the wisdom of the legislature in insisting on Khas possession in respect of certain categories of land while not insisting upon the same in others, cannot be questioned. We are, therefore, of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge." 38. In Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and others, (2002) 3 Supreme Court Cases 722, while dealing with the provisions of the Press Council Act, 1978, it was held that basic rule of interpretation should be, where right to be appointed is conferred by the statute, any ineligibility entailing a bar on being appointed should be clearly provided and in the absence, such bar cannot be read into the provisions on the basis of assumed intention. For ready reference, what was held is extracted here-in-below : anguage of sub-section (7) of Section 6 abovesaid, is plain and simple. There are two manners of reading the provision. Read positively, it confers a right on a retiring member to seek renomination. Read in a negative manner, the provision speaks of a retiring member not being eligible for renomination for more than one term. The spelt of ineligibility is cast on "renomination" of a member who is "retiring." The event determinative of eligibility or ineligibility is "renomination, and the person, by reference to whom it is to be read, is "a retiring member", "Retiring member" is to be read in contradistinction with a member/person retired sometime in the past, and so, would be called a retired or former member. "Re" means again, and is freely used as a prefix. It gives colour of "again" to the verb with which it is placed. "Renomination" is an act or process of being nominated again. "Re" means again, and is freely used as a prefix. It gives colour of "again" to the verb with which it is placed. "Renomination" is an act or process of being nominated again. Any person who had held office of member sometime in the past, if being nominated now, cannot be described as being "again nominated". It is only a member just retiring who can be called "being again nominated" or "re-nominated". No other meaning can be assigned except by doing violence to the language employed. The legislature does not waste its words. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule the legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless material-intrinsic or external-is available to permit a departure from the rule. 8. The provision is cast in the present tense. A retiring member is ineligible for renomination. "Not more than one term" qualifies "renomination". The words "retiring", used in the present tense, and "renomination" speak aloud of the intention of the legislature. If the word "retiring" was capable of being read as "retired" (sometime in the past) then there would have been no occasion to use "renomination" in the construction of the sentence. If the intention of law-framers would have been not to permit a person to be a member of the council for more than two terms in his lifetime then a different, better and stronger framing of the provision was expected. It could have been said: "no member shall be eligible for nomination for more than two terms", or it could have been said: "a retired member shall not be eligible for nomination for more than two terms." 9. It could have been said: "no member shall be eligible for nomination for more than two terms", or it could have been said: "a retired member shall not be eligible for nomination for more than two terms." 9. Cross in Statutory Interpretation (3rd Edn., 1995) states : "The governing idea here is that if a statutory provision is intelligible in the context of ordinary languages, it ought, without more, to be interpreted in accordance with the meaning an ordinary speaker of the language would ascribe to it as its obvious meaning, unless there is sufficient reason for a different interpretation.....Thus, an ordinary meaning or grammatical meaning does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used. By enabling citizens (and their advisers) to rely on ordinary meanings, unless notice is given to the contrary, the legislature contributes to legal certainty and predictability for citizens and to greater transparency in its own decisions, both of which are important values in a democratic society." (P. 32 ibid) The learned author cites three quotations from speeches of Lord Reid in the House of Lords Cases, the gist whereof is : (i) in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, ask for the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute and follow the same unless that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the legislative intent; (ii) rules of construction are our servants and not masters; and (iii) a statutory provision cannot be assigned a meaning which it cannot reasonably bear if more than one meanings are capable you can choose one but beyond that you must not go. (P. 40, ibid) Justice G. P. Singh in his celebrated work Principles of Statutory Interpretation (8th Edn., 2001) states (at p. 54): The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (P. 40, ibid) Justice G. P. Singh in his celebrated work Principles of Statutory Interpretation (8th Edn., 2001) states (at p. 54): The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.” The learned author states at another place (at p. 74, ibid) that the rule of literal construction whereby the words have to be assigned their natural and grammatical meaning can be departed from but subject to caution. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. A departure is permissible if it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used or the object of the statute in which they occur requires a different meaning. To quote: "Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the Judges in the light of their own views as to policy although they can adopt a purposive in interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliaments purpose or policy. A modern statement of the rule is to be found in the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal All ER at. p. 616, to the effect Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply "the golden rule" of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further." 39. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further." 39. These are some decisions noted for considering as to how a provision of law is to be interpreted in case there is any difficulty in the background, whereunder the amendment was carried out in 2001 in the Act, some of which have been extracted hereinabove. 40. We feel that there is no ambiguity in the language of Section 2(viia), supra. As such, simple and literal meaning has to be given to the words "quantity greater than", so as to hold what would be the commercial quality. 41. As already noted there is hardly any ambiguity, muchless conflict between Section 2(viia) and the notification as extracted here-in-above for determination of what would be the commercial quantity. By virtue of powers conferred under sub-section (viia) of Section 2, Central Government is authorised to notify as to what would be the commercial quantity. Because the "commercial quantity" on a plain reading of its definition amongst other things has to be "....greater than the quantity specified by the Central Government by notification....". Under 2001 Act notification supra was issued specifying the quantity for the purpose of Section 2(viia) of the Act. A perusal of this notification indicates that quantity specified is one kilogram. Various columns of the notification extracted hereinabove have to be read in conjunction with the substantive provision of Section 2(viia) of the Act. This also puts a harmoneous construction on both, notification as well as Section 2(viia). While determining the quantity under this subsection, it has to be greater than One kg. There is hardly any doubt regarding either the words one kg.", or the "commercial quantity" which has to be "greater than", which in our considered view would always mean any quantity more than/bigger than/larger than one kg. We are further of the view that this provision, and for that matter, notification admits of no other interpretation on its reading. Thus, it cannot be said that one Kg. would be the commercial quantity for the purpose of Section 2(viia); as added by 2001 Act. 42. We are further of the view that this provision, and for that matter, notification admits of no other interpretation on its reading. Thus, it cannot be said that one Kg. would be the commercial quantity for the purpose of Section 2(viia); as added by 2001 Act. 42. Another reason to take this view is that substantive and main provision of the Act is Section 2(viia) which is subject matter of the discussion in this judgment. It is also well known and accepted rule of interpretation of statutes that rules, regulations as well as notifications issued thereunder are meant to sub-serve the purpose of main provision of law and not other way round. Notification in the instant case, as extracted hereinabove, is a delegated legislation. Therefore, it can in no case bye-pass or over-ride the substantive provision of law and in case of conflict, delegated legislation has to give way to the main provision of law. 43. In this behalf, we may also observe that legislature in its wisdom has used the words in this sub-section knowing their significance, as well as import and at the cost of repetition, it needs to be noted that when language is clear, then ordinary meaning to the words needs to be given. As such, no aids either internal or external need to be pressed into service as was urged on behalf of the respondent to given another meaning. No other point is urged. 44. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, decisions of this Court in Mathew Andrews British National v. State of H.P., Cr.M.P. (M) No. 1492 of 2001, decided on 4.1.2002; State v. Munshi Ram, Criminal Revision No. 140 or2000, decided on 7.11.2002 and Sarvjeet Singh v. State, Cr.M.P. (M) No. 1088 of 2002, decided on 29.8.2002 (so far dealing with "commercial quantity" while cancelling the bail), do not lay the correct law, therefore, these are over-ruled. At the same time, while answering this reference, it is held that in order to be the "commercial quantity" as defined in Section 2(viia) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psycho tropic Substances Act, 1985 as amended by Central Act of 2001, it has always to be more than/greater than/bigger than one kg. Order accordingly. -