ORDER : Shivaraj V. Patil, J. These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 14-9-2001 passed by the High Court at Madras. 2. The respondent herein joined the appellant Institute on 4-12-1967 as a lower division clerk and was subsequently promoted to the post of Upper Division Clerk with effect from 1-4-1972. He was associated with the work of Cashier with effect from 5-5-1976. While discharging his duties as Cashier, there were some lapses on his part inasmuch as he did not write cashbooks properly relating to normal, quality improvement programme and curriculum development accounts. In the internal audit, several serious discrepancies committed by him in the maintenance of cashbooks were found. He was asked to explain about the discrepancies pointed out and he offered his explanation on 22-4-1980. On finding the explanation unsatisfactory, disciplinary proceedings were initiated by serving a charge memo on 8-7-1980. 3. The respondent filed civil suit, OS No. 5293 of 1980 in the Court of the City Civil Judge, Madras for declaration that the order reverting him from the post of Cashier to Upper Division Clerk was illegal and for other reliefs. Since no injunction was granted, disciplinary proceedings initiated against him were continued. The civil court, after trial, dismissed the suit on 22-12-1981. After considering the report of the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority removed the respondent from service on 25-2-1982. He filed an appeal before the appellate authority against the order of the disciplinary authority removing him from service, which was dismissed by a speaking order. 4. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982 before the High Court questioning the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the ultimate order of his removal from service. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, by a well-considered order, dismissed the writ petition on 15-12-1986. The matter did not rest at that. The respondent filed Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987, which too was dismissed on 16-2-1987. No further challenge was made by the respondent to the order passed in the writ appeal dismissing it. It may be also mentioned that the respondent did not challenge the decree passed by the trial court in OS No. 5293 of 1980. 5. Almost seven years after the dismissal of the writ appeal aforementioned, the respondent raised conciliation proceedings before the Labour Officer. It may be also mentioned that the respondent did not challenge the decree passed by the trial court in OS No. 5293 of 1980. 5. Almost seven years after the dismissal of the writ appeal aforementioned, the respondent raised conciliation proceedings before the Labour Officer. The Labour Officer submitted a failure report and thereafter the respondent herein raised an industrial dispute in ID No. 653 of 1994 before the Labour Court. The appellant contended that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent. When the proceedings were pending before the Labour Court, the appellant preferred Writ Petition No. 9152 of 1995 seeking a writ of prohibition of the proceedings before the Labour Court in ID No. 653 of 1994. 6. The learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition only on the ground that the appellant was not an "industry". In doing so, the learned Judge placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees' Assn. v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 723 . The learned Judge did not go into the merits of the other contentions raised. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the respondent filed Writ Appeal No. 106 of 1998. The Division Bench of the High Court, by the impugned judgment, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and allowed the parties to raise all the contentions available to them before the Labour Court in the industrial dispute pending before it. The Labour Court could also examine the effect of the earlier orders passed in OS No. 5293 of 1980, Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982 and Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant, before us, contended that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained for reasons more than one. The Labour Court could also examine the effect of the earlier orders passed in OS No. 5293 of 1980, Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982 and Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant, before us, contended that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained for reasons more than one. He urged that the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute on the ground that the order of removal of the respondent from service was passed in the year 1982 and the amendment to Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act"), as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 5 of 1988 came into force on 1-11-1988 by which individual workman also could raise the dispute directly; it was not open to the respondent to raise an industrial dispute having suffered already in the earlier round of litigation challenging the very order of his removal from service. 8. The learned counsel drew our attention to the decree passed in OS No. 5293 of 1980 and also orders passed in Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982 and Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987 in support of his submission that the validity of the very disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent and the order of his removal from service were the subject-matter and that the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987 affirming the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982 upholding the removal of the respondent from service has become final. 9. The learned counsel also added that the respondent could not raise dispute after almost twelve years from the date of his removal from service, at any rate seven years after the Division Bench of the High Court passed the order in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987 upholding the order of his removal from service. In the light of the admitted facts, the Division Bench of the High Court should not have relegated the parties to go before the Labour Court again and a writ of prohibition, as sought for, ought to have been issued. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent made submissions supporting the impugned judgment. According to him, the subject-matter of the civil suit, aforementioned, was different. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent made submissions supporting the impugned judgment. According to him, the subject-matter of the civil suit, aforementioned, was different. The order of removal of the respondent from service was not directly in question in that suit; the effect of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982 and of the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987, affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge, could also be examined by the Labour Court, as observed in the impugned judgment. The learned counsel further submitted that all that the Division Bench of the High Court has done is to give opportunity to the appellant to raise all the contentions available to it before the Labour Court. Under the circumstances, he submitted, this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment. 11. The facts that are not in dispute are that the respondent was removed from service on 25-2-1982. The civil suit filed by him was dismissed. The respondent challenged the order of his removal from service in Writ Petition No. 7287 of 1982, which was also dismissed on 15-12-1986. Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1987 filed against the said order of the learned Single Judge was also dismissed on 16-2-1987. The order passed in the writ appeal, aforementioned, was not challenged further. 12. The respondent raised industrial dispute almost after a period of twelve years from the date of his removal from service and seven years after the Division Bench of the High Court passed the order dismissing the writ appeal in which challenge to his removal from service was involved. The said order passed by the Division Bench has attained finality, that having not been challenged any further. 13. The amendment to Section 2-A of the Act by Tamil Nadu Act 5 of 1988 came into force on 1-11-1988. The removal from service of the respondent was in the year 1982. In the light of these admitted facts, we are of the view that the High Court was not right and justified in saying that the Labour Court should proceed with the adjudication of the dispute and the appellant should urge all the contentions, that were sought to be urged before the Division Bench of the High Court, before the Labour Court. The respondent chose to approach the High Court challenging the order of his removal from service and he also took up the matter further in writ appeal unsuccessfully. It is not a case where the respondent withdrew the writ appeal with a view to approach the Labour Court. He, having allowed the order passed by the Division Bench in writ appeal to become final, cannot be allowed to reagitate the matter and question the very validity of his removal from service. 14. It is well settled that the decision inter partes which has become final binds the parties. Apart from all other questions, the respondent having suffered the order, which has become final, cannot be permitted to reopen the case again questioning the very validity of his removal from service or for that matter question the quantum of punishment. 15. One more factor to be kept in view is that although limitation may not be pleaded as a bar but his conduct of approaching the Labour Court after twelve years after his removal from service and seven years after the Division Bench passed the order cannot be ignored. Merely because the Tamil Nadu amendment to Section 2-A of the Act came into force on 1-11-1988, it was not open to the respondent to approach the Labour Court for raising an industrial dispute. If the plea of the respondent is allowed, it may give rise to a situation where the Labour Court even may have to examine the validity of the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court which has become final. We are of the view that it cannot be permitted to happen. 16. Thus, viewed from any angle, these appeals are entitled to succeed. Hence, the impugned judgment is set aside and Writ Petition No. 9152 of 1995 filed by the appellant is allowed and the writ of prohibition, as sought for, is granted. No costs. Appeals allowed.