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2003 DIGILAW 1534 (AP)

Adikari Rangarao v. Byreddi Tulasamma

2003-12-11

P.S.NARAYANA

body2003
( 1 ) ADIKARI Ranga Rao, the tenant - 1st respondent in R. C. C. No. 39/86 on the file of rent Controller, Vijayawada, the Revision petitioner, died pending this Civil Revision petition and petitioners 2 to 4 are brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased tenant in C. M. P. No. 16291/2001 dated 31-7-2003. Likewise, Byreddi Tulasamma, the original landlady also died pending r. C. C. M. A. No. 68/92 on the file of Principal senior Civil Judge/appellate Authority under A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) control Act, 1960, in short hereinafter referred to as "act", and respondents 6 to 11 were brought on record as her legal representatives in I. A. No. 8693/96. ( 2 ) BYREDDI Tulasamma, the landlady filed r. C. C. No. 39/86 on the file of the Rent controller, Vijayawada, praying for the relief of eviction from the petition schedule property on the ground that an extent of 1500 sq. yards of site and building thereon had been let out to Adikari Ranga Rao/tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- and the said tenant committed willful default in payment of rents from 26-7-1985 upto the date of the eviction petition and that the tenant, without consent of the landlady constructed sheds in the vacant site and sub-let the same for residence to respondents 2 to 5 and that the tenant put the petition schedule property for a purpose different from the purpose for which the property was let out; that by making constructions in the vacant site, the tenant is guilty of acts of waste; and the landlady required the petition schedule property for her bona fide occupation and also on the ground that denial of title of the landlady by the tenant is not bona fide. The tenant had taken a stand that the extent let out is only 500 sq. The tenant had taken a stand that the extent let out is only 500 sq. yards of site with building thereon and the site on which the tenant made constructions in fact was not let out to him and it is only a poramboke site and the same was let out by him to respondents 2 to 5 and he had not committed any default in payment of rents and had not sub-let the premises and not guilty of acts of waste and the requirement made by the landlady for personal occupation is not at all bona fide, and in such circumstances there is no question of denying the title of the landlady at all in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances. The learned Rent Controller had ordered eviction on the grounds of denial of title not being bona fide, sub-letting the premises, use of the petition schedule property for the purpose other than the purpose for which the same was let out, by an order dated 15-6-1992. No doubt the learned Rent controller had rejected the groups of willful default, acts of waste and requirement for personal occupation. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant filed R. C. C. M. A. No. 68/92 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge/appellate authority, Vijayawada, and as aforesaid, during the pendency of the appeal, the landlady died and the legal representatives were brought on record. The learned principal Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada/ appellate Authority also had confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller and dismissed the Appeal on 13-10-2000. The learned Senior civil Judge, Vijayawada/appellate authority also had arrived at a conclusion that inasmuch as there were no independent cross Objections in relation to the grounds which had been rejected by the learned Rent controller, Vijayawada, there was no need to disturb the said findings also. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant preferred the present civil Revision Petition and as referred to supra, pending the Civil Revision Petition, the tenant too died and his legal representatives are at present prosecuting the present litigation. ( 3 ) SRI Srinivas Murthy, counsel representing the legal representatives of the deceased tenant/revision Petitioners had submitted that the tenant had taken a clear and a specific stand that the property let out was only an extent of 500 sq. yards and not 1500 sq. ( 3 ) SRI Srinivas Murthy, counsel representing the legal representatives of the deceased tenant/revision Petitioners had submitted that the tenant had taken a clear and a specific stand that the property let out was only an extent of 500 sq. yards and not 1500 sq. yards, no doubt with a building thereon, and in the light of the specific stand and the oral and documentary evidence available, the Tribunals below should have arrived at a conclusion that there is no denial of title and there is no question of sub-letting and using the property for a purpose other than for which it was. let out. The learned counsel also contended that as far as the rest of the property on which constructions were made by the tenant, the same cannot be the subject matter of this litigation since there was never landlady and tenant relationship between the parties in relation to the said property. The learned Counsel also commented, that these houses were constructed by the tenant in 1967 and his name also was mutated and he had been paying taxes inducting the tenants to the knowledge of the landlady and this conduct of the landlady would clearly point out that the stand taken by the landlady cannot be accepted. The Counsel also would maintain that the tenant himself by asserting his title in relation to the houses constructed by him filed the suit O. S. No. 1009/80 against one of the tenants and obtained a decree, and in the light of the facts and circumstances, the landlady is estopped from contending otherwise as far as the rest of the property is concerned. The Counsel would maintain that since the Tribunals below had recorded a finding that the property let out was 1500 sq. yards with a building, the consequential findings were recorded relating to denial of title, sub-letting and user for the purpose other than the purpose for which the petition schedule property was let out, and when the very fact of leasing out 1500 sq. yards site and the building cannot be believed, in the light of these facts, the necessary consequence should be that the tenant is not liable to be evicted on these grounds also. yards site and the building cannot be believed, in the light of these facts, the necessary consequence should be that the tenant is not liable to be evicted on these grounds also. The learned counsel also had taken me through the oral evidence in general and the evidence of p. W. 1 in particular and had pointed out that certain clear admissions were made and though these aspects were elaborately argued the Tribunals below had not attached much importance. The learned Counsel also pointed out that P. W. 1 stated in his evidence: ". . . . . . . It is true that the entire extent is poramboke. . . . . . . " ( 4 ) PER contra, Sri Vijaya, the Counsel representing Sri P. R. Prasad, had maintained that concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Tribunals below and the said findings need not be disturbed in the present civil Revision Petition under Section 22 of the Act. The Counsel also would maintain that in fact, the learned Principal Senior Civil judge, Vijayawada/appellate Authority had taken pains to record findings in detail relating to the boundaries and the extent which had been let out, especially in the light of the registered partition deed, dated 1-8-1954-Ex. A-9, between the husband of the landlady and the brothers. The Counsel also submitted that this is a document of more than 30 years old from proper custody and hence the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is available and hence in the light of these clear findings, no interference is warranted in the present revision. The learned Counsel also had taken me through the evidence of P. W. 1 and had explained that a stray sentence cannot be read in isolation and cannot be styled as an admission since while appreciating such a fact, the whole of the evidence of P. W. 1 may have to be taken into consideration and it is clear that P. W. 1 had taken a specific stand relating to the letting out of 1500 sq. yards with a building and even the prior signatures to the alleged admission clarify the same. ( 5 ) HEARD both the Counsel and perused the findings recorded by the learned Rent controller and also the Appellate Authority. yards with a building and even the prior signatures to the alleged admission clarify the same. ( 5 ) HEARD both the Counsel and perused the findings recorded by the learned Rent controller and also the Appellate Authority. ( 6 ) THE findings recorded by both the learned Rent Controller, Vijayawada and the Appellate Authority are very elaborate and the oral and documentary evidence in toto had been well appreciated and the appellate Authority had gone a step further and meticulously compared the boundaries and all other attendant circumstances and had recorded a finding that the property let out by the landlady to the tenant is of an extent of 1500 sq. yards and not only 500 sq. yards as contended by the tenant. ( 7 ) THE petitioner/landlady had pleaded in R. C. C. NO. 39/86 on the file of the learned rent Controller, Vijayawada, as hereunder: the 1st respondenthad taken the petition schedule building with appurtenant area from the petitioner for conducting his sawmill business about ten years ago. The 1st respondent had installed his saw-mill business in the schedule premises. The monthly rent was Rs. 500/- payable at the end of every tenancy month which commences on 26th of every English calender month. The 1st respondent was not regular in payment of monthly rents. Whenever the 1st respondent defaulted to pay the rent, the petitioner used to send somebody to collect the rents. The petitioner could not go to the petition schedule premises to find out what the 1st respondent was doing in the schedule premises. She used to go rarely to the schedule premises when the 1st respondent failed to pay the rent inspite of several demands. Taking advantage of the weakness of the petitioner, the 1st respondent had started to use the schedule premises for the purpose other than the purpose for which it was taken on lease. The schedule premises was originally in tended and arranged for the sawmill business only and not for residential purpose. The 1st respondent had began to reside therein for the last 3 or 4 years stopping his saw-mill business. The 1st respondent had sublet the said building to the 2nd respondent and the 2nd respondent is now running the saw-mill while the 1st respondent is residing therein. The schedule premises consists of some vacant site appurtenant to the said building to stock wood etc. The 1st respondent had sublet the said building to the 2nd respondent and the 2nd respondent is now running the saw-mill while the 1st respondent is residing therein. The schedule premises consists of some vacant site appurtenant to the said building to stock wood etc. , required for the saw-mill business, but the 1st respondent constructed small sheds in the appurtenant area and sublet them to the respondents 3, 4 and 5 for their residential purpose. All the alterations made by the 1st respondent are without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. The 1st respondent has no right to use the petition schedule premises for the purposes other than the purpose for which it was leased out. The 1st respondent has no right to sublet and the respondents 2 to 5 have no right to take on sublease any part of the petition schedule premises. Due to erection of the sheds in the appurtenant area of the said building in the petition schedule premises, the value and utility of the schedule premises got impaired materially, changing completely the whole structure. The alterations were carried on by the respondents surruptiously. ( 8 ) IT was further pleaded that except the first daughter, the other five daughters of the petitioner are residents of Vijayawada and they have no separate houses for their residential purpose. They are also joint owners of the petition schedule premises. Majji Anasuyamma and Thalia Ramakumari, though married, are residents of Vijayawada and they have no separate houses of their own. The husband of Majji Anasuyamma, by name Kondandaramayya is now working in the Postal Department at Vijayawada and both of them are residing in a rented house. The husband of Thalia Ramakumari by name t. Varahalu is a Doctor and they have no separate house of their own to reside but they are residing with the petitioner. The petitioner and her daughters are joint owners of the portion of the house situated in Byreddi ramanna lane, Governorpet, Vijayawada. The said portion is too small to accommodate the petitioner and her daughters including the married daughters with their husbands. The said portion consists of three small rooms and one Varandah only. Anasuyamma and ramakumari are anxious to reside in the schedule premises. Dr. The said portion is too small to accommodate the petitioner and her daughters including the married daughters with their husbands. The said portion consists of three small rooms and one Varandah only. Anasuyamma and ramakumari are anxious to reside in the schedule premises. Dr. T. Varahalu being a medical Practitioner desires to set up his private practice with nursing home in the schedule premises and so the daughters of the petitioner want to reside in the schedule premises establishing a hospital therein. The petitioner desires to occupy the same for her other unmarried daughters as there would be protection and assistance. The petitioner requires the schedule premises bona fide and reasonable. The petitioner informed the same to the 1st respondent by the end of 1984 that she wants the schedule premises for her personal occupation. The 1st respondent promised to vacate and handover the vacant possession of the schedule premises by the end of June 1985. But the 1st respondent did not keep up his promise. When the petitioner went to the schedule premises to ask the 1st respondent to vacate, she came to know On enquiry about the sublease and the alterations made by the 1st respondent. When questioned, the 1st respondent told that he would vacate as such. It was further pleaded that the 1st respondent has got three buildings of his own in Vijayawada itself and has given all these buildings for rent. The petition schedule premises is required for the personal occupation of the petitioner and her daughters and there is no alternative accommodation for her personal occupation. ( 9 ) IT was further pleaded that the 1st respondent began to evade payment of rents personally to the petitioner as she demanded the 1st respondent to handover the vacant possession of the schedule premises and defaulted to pay rent from 26-7-1985 and issued registered notice dated 6-11-1985 mischievously with false allegations. A reply dated 25-11-1985 was sent by the petitioner with true facts directing him to handover vacant possession of the schedule premises. The 1st respondent also sent another rejoinder dated 5-12-1985 along with a cheque dated 4-12-1985 for Rs. 2000/- in the name of the petitioner s Advocate stating that the said building does not belong to the petitioner and that the petitioner is only owner of the site. The said cheque is not a valid tender. The 1st respondent had committed default. 2000/- in the name of the petitioner s Advocate stating that the said building does not belong to the petitioner and that the petitioner is only owner of the site. The said cheque is not a valid tender. The 1st respondent had committed default. Further, the 1st respondent had denied even the right of the petitioner in the said building situated in the schedule premises. The 1st respondent has to pay rents from 26-7-1985 upto date. The 1st respondent violated section 10 (1) by way of denying title to the building in the schedule premises, committed willful default in payment of rents from 26-7-1985 to 25-1-1986 for a period of five months. The 1st respondent sublet the schedule premises to respondents 2 to 5 without the consent and knowledge of the petitioner and used the petition schedule premises for a purpose other than for which it had been leased out and that the petitioner bona fide requires the schedule premises for the personal occupation. The respondents 2 to 5 have no manner of right to continue in the schedule premises and all the respondents are liable to be evicted. Therefore, the petitioner was constrained to file the petition for eviction on the grounds of wilful default, different user, sub-lease, personal occupation and denial of title which is not bona fide. ( 10 ) RESPONDENTS 1, 2 and 5 in the R. C. C. resisted the same by filing counters. The 1st respondent filed a counter taking a stand that the tenancy with regard to the dispute concerned does not cover the site and is not governed by the Rent Control Act. The tenancy under the Rent Control Act is only with regard to the mill and the site therein. The petitioner has got extensive site of about 400 sq. yards. At the first instance, the monthly rent was Rs. 140/- and the tenancy commenced from 26-11-1964. The extent of site and appurtenant site under the saw-mill is only 500 sq. yards. It was pleaded that the 1st respondent was not at all irregular in payment of rents and paid the rents regularly every month till the end of July 1985. At the first instance, the monthly rent was Rs. 140/- and the tenancy commenced from 26-11-1964. The extent of site and appurtenant site under the saw-mill is only 500 sq. yards. It was pleaded that the 1st respondent was not at all irregular in payment of rents and paid the rents regularly every month till the end of July 1985. Either the petitioner or one of her daughters used to call on him regularly and collect rents for august 1985 and suspecting that something was wrong he tendered the rent for august 1985 during September 1985 at the house of the petitioner and repeatedly requested to take rent in the usual manner, but the petitioner evaded to receive. Therefore, he was compelled to remit the rent of August 1985 on 17-9-1985 by way of money order and the petitioner refused to receive the same. Again, it was pleaded, the 1st respondent tendered the rent for september 1985 during October 1985 and the petitioner again evaded to receive the rent. Again, the 1st respondent remitted the rent for September 1985 during October which was also refused. Then he gave a notice dated 6-11-1985 and he remitted the rent for the period commencing from 26-9-1985 to 25-10-1985 by way of money order on 22-11-1985. He further gave notice to the petitioner on 6-11-1985 requesting her to accept the rents or in the alternative to name the Bank. The petitioner issued reply notice dated 25-11-1985 with false contents. ( 11 ) THE 1st respondent further pleaded that he remitted Rs. 2000/- being the rent for the period from 26-7-1985 to 25-11-1985 by way of demand draft on 6-12-1985 and thus he had not committed any default. The 1st respondent filed R. C. C. No. 6/86 under section 8 (5) of the Act. The 1st respondent had not constructed any structures or buildings without knowledge of the petitioner. The building was raised as early as in 1967and they were not governed by the rent Control Act since the site occupied by them is distinct and independent and has nothing to do with the saw-mill and appurtenant site. The said structures are being assessed to tax in his name from the inception of their constructions. The petitioner has no right in the said structures. The petitioner never protested against the same. The said structures are being assessed to tax in his name from the inception of their constructions. The petitioner has no right in the said structures. The petitioner never protested against the same. The petitioner, as such, is estopped from contending that the said structures are illegal structures. This Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, if any, with regard to the said structures. On account of the construction of the said building, the petitioner had not sustained any loss and their value and utility had not been impaired in any manner. It was further pleaded that the plea with regard to the personal occupation is not true and correct. The 1st respondent learnt that Byreddi suryanarayana died prior to 1956. It was pleaded that all the married daughters cannot be considered to be the members of the same family and their alleged necessity is not at all relevant. The eldest son-in-law of the petitioner was an employee in Hyderabad in his own building. Besides, the daughters are not the co-owners. The second daughter of the petitioner was married to an Engineer and that he is staying with his wife in his own quarters. The husband of the third daughter has got his own building at Phirangipuram of Guntur District and he is staying with his family at Guntur. The husband of the third daughter of the petitioner is not a Doctor. The building in occupation of the petitioner as owner in Byreddi Ramanna street is very expansive and it is more than sufficient for the petitioner and his family. It was also pleaded that the petitioner has got another site wherein there used to be a machine for preparing lime. The petitioner removed the machinery recently about four years ago and the shed was partitioned and let out by the petitioner. The petitioner has also got other site in the very same area which she let out to a timber depot belonging to P. Subbaiah the petitioner also let out the sheds to b. Narayana, N. Venkateswara Rao, Subba reddy, B. Sreeramulu and Kancherla poomachandra Rao. The petitioner, having extensive building and sites, is now intending to evict the respondents. The 1st respondent had not been in a position to enhance the rents as demanded by the petitioner. He had not sublet the tenanted premises to anybody and he himself had been in occupation of the tenanted premises. The petitioner, having extensive building and sites, is now intending to evict the respondents. The 1st respondent had not been in a position to enhance the rents as demanded by the petitioner. He had not sublet the tenanted premises to anybody and he himself had been in occupation of the tenanted premises. The petitioner being tempted by the escalation and hike of the rents had filed the petition with absolutely false contentions. There were no acts of waste. The extent of site given in the petition is not true and correct. The schedule annexed to the counter is the only tenanted premises. The 1st respondent himself had been carrying on the saw-mil and timber depot business. The 1st respondent is not guilty of any acts rendering himself liable for eviction and he is not guilty of conversion of the non-residential premises into residential premises. The petitioner never requested him to vacate the premises on the ground of personal occupation. ( 12 ) THE 2nd respondent, no doubt, filed a memo stating that he had vacated the premises. The 5th respondent had taken a stand that he is not the sub-tenant, but in fact he is residing in a portion which belong to the 1 st respondent/ tenant. The learned Rent controller framed the following Points for determination. (1) Whether the 1st respondent (tenant) committed default in the matter of payment of monthly rents from 26-7-1985 till the date of institution of the petition in respect of the demised premises? If so, whether the default committed by him is not willful and deliberate? (2) Whether there is existing jural relationship of landlady and tenant between the petitioner and the 1st respondent in respect of the property in dispute? (3) Whether the 1st respondent (tenant) is guilty of sub-lease? (4) Whether the 1st respondent (tenant) used the tenanted premises for a purpose other than for which it was leased out? (5) Whether the 1st respondent (tenant) is guilty of acts of waste? (6) Whether the requirement of the petitioner for his personal occupation is bona fide? on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence - the evidence of p. W. 1 to P. W. 3, R. W. 1 to R. W. 4 and also exs. A-1 to A-9 and Exs. (5) Whether the 1st respondent (tenant) is guilty of acts of waste? (6) Whether the requirement of the petitioner for his personal occupation is bona fide? on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence - the evidence of p. W. 1 to P. W. 3, R. W. 1 to R. W. 4 and also exs. A-1 to A-9 and Exs. B-1 to B-30, the learned Rent Controller arrived at a conclusion that the respondents in the R. C. C. are liable to be evicted on the grounds of denial of title which is not bona fide, sublease and on the ground of different user and no doubt had negatived the other grounds. Aggrieved by the same, as aforesaid, r. C. C. M. A. was filed on the file of Principal senior Civil Judge/appellate Authority, vijayawada, who had framed the following points for consideration: (1) Whether there is existing jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the landlady and the tenant - appellant in respect of the property in dispute? (2) Whether the respondent/tenant is guilty of sub-lease? (3) Whether the first respondent (tenant) used the tenanted premises for the purpose other than the purpose for which it was leased out? the Appellate Authority had discussed all the aspects in detail and had confirmed the said findings of the learned Rent Controller. ( 13 ) I had given my anxious consideration to the respective contentions of the parties and also the findings recorded by both the courts. I had also gone through the oral and documentary evidence. The specific case of the landlady who is no more was that she had let out 1500 sq. yards with a building to the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- and the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rents from 26-7-1985 till the date of filing of the eviction petition and also without her consent the tenant constructed sheds in the vacant site and sub-let the same to respondents 2 to 5 in the R. C. C. and the tenant also had put the petition schedule property for a different use i. e. , for the purpose of residence though it was let out for saw-mill business and by making constructions on the vacant site the tenant committed acts of waste also. The landlady also had sought eviction stating that there was bona fide personal requirement and on the ground that the title of the landlady was denied by the tenant which is not a bona fide denial. Specific stand was taken by the tenant that the extent let out was only 500 sq. yards with the building and the rest of the site which is poramboke never belonged to the landlady and no doubt the tenant had denied all the other allegations also. Thus, the whole controversy revolves round the fact whether 500 sq, yards alone was let out as contended by the tenant or 1500 sq. yards had been let out as contended by the landlady. ( 14 ) IN the schedule of the eviction petition, 1500 sq. yards of the building had been shown. It is pertinent to note that even in the schedule annexed to the counter, the tenant also has specified the tenanted premises as 1500 sq. yards. The boundaries in the petition schedule and the counter, except the northern boundary are similar. Apart from the fact that the tenant himself mentioned 1500 sq. yards in the schedule annexed to the counter, there is also an admission of R. W. 1 in this regard. The Report and Plan of the authorised Officer show the constructions of the super structures raised by the tenant. Ex. A-9 is the registered partition deed, a document of more than 30 years old. Findings in detail had been recorded in relation to ex. A-9 and the petition schedule property. The payment of taxes by tenant also had been well explained. The evidence of P. W. 1 to P. W. 3, R. W. 1 to R. W. 4 and Exs. A-1 to a-9 and also Exs. B-1 to B-30 had been discussed elaborately by both the learned rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. There is absolutely no controversy that ex. A-9 satisfies the conditions specified in section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. A-1 to a-9 and also Exs. B-1 to B-30 had been discussed elaborately by both the learned rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. There is absolutely no controversy that ex. A-9 satisfies the conditions specified in section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act reads: presumption as to documents thirty years old where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person s handwriting and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. In Lakhi Baruah v, Padma Kanta Kalita the apex Court held:"section 90 of the Evidence Act is founded on necessity and convenience because it is extremely difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature of execution of old documents after lapse of thirty years. In order to obviate such difficulties or improbabilities to prove execution of an old document. Section 90 has been incorporated in the evidence Act, which does away with the strict proof of private documents. Presumption of genuineness may be raised if the documents in question is produced from proper custody. It is, however, the discretion of the Court to accept the presumption flowing from section 90. There is, however, no manner of Court that judicial discretion under Section 90 should not be exercised arbitrarily and not being informed by reason. "the learned Rent Controller in. relation to ex. A-9 had stated as hereunder:"the petitioner (landlady) produced ex. A-9 registered partition deed between her husband and his brother. Ex. A-9 registered partition deed dated 1-8-1954 would go to show that the petition schedule property is shown as a schedule property. It is not in dispute that Suryanarayana Reddi on whom the A schedule property in the said partition deed fell towards his share is no other than the husband of the petitioner. The Northern boundary is shown as Road abutting Bandar canal. The Northern boundary of the petitioner schedule property is also the bank of Bandar canal. Ex. It is not in dispute that Suryanarayana Reddi on whom the A schedule property in the said partition deed fell towards his share is no other than the husband of the petitioner. The Northern boundary is shown as Road abutting Bandar canal. The Northern boundary of the petitioner schedule property is also the bank of Bandar canal. Ex. A-9 is a document of more than 30 years old and it is a registered one. In view of the presumption, there is no need or necessity to prove the contents thereof. The boundaries for the A schedule property in Ex. A-9 and the boundaries given in the schedule property tallies. If really there is any poramboke site on north, Definitely it should have been mentioned in Ex. A-9 about its existence. Ex. A-9 belies the case of the 1st respondent that there is poramboke site in between Bandar canal bank and the site of the petitioner (landlady) which devolved upon her by way of succession. "apart from this aspect, the learned Rent controller had discussed all the other details and had arrived at a conclusion that what was let out to the tenant was an extent of 1500 sq. yards with the building and not 500 sq. yards with the building as specified by the tenant and also arrived at a conclusion that there is jural relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties in relation to the petition schedule property. The Appellate authority not only had confirmed these findings, but in fact, the Schedules had been compared and a clear finding had been recorded as hereunder: "now it is necessary to go through the schedule annexed to the petition for eviction. The building with appurtenant area bearing Municipal door No. 41-27-9, Revenue Ward no. 10, Block No. 8, N. T. S. NO. 304/a, municipal Ward No. 30 is situated in gurureddy Road, Driverpeta, krishnalanka, Vijayawada-13 is bounded by ( 15 ) ELABORATE submissions were made pointing out certain portions of the evidence of P. W. 1. Strong reliance was placed on a statement made by P. W. 1 in the course of cross-examination on the ground that it would amount to an admission. In the evidence of P. W. 1, in cross-examination she deposed:". . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strong reliance was placed on a statement made by P. W. 1 in the course of cross-examination on the ground that it would amount to an admission. In the evidence of P. W. 1, in cross-examination she deposed:". . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is not true to say that the respondent is in occupation of the poramboke site. It is true that the entire extent is poramboke. . . . . "p. W. 1 also deposed:". . . . . . . . . . I let out the premises to respondent and its extent is 1500 sq. yards and a shed at monthly rent of Rs. 164/- at the beginning and at present rent is at Rs. 500/ -. . . . . . . "p. W. 1 also deposed:". . . . . . . . . The respondent made constructions in the vacant site without my consent and knowledge. . . . . . . "it is also pertinent to note that P. W. 1 specifically stated:". . . . . . . . . . . . . It is not true to suggest that I did not construct those structures and the same is situated in the poramboke land and that respondent is paying the taxes in his name. . . . . . "in the light of the several statements made by p. W. 1 in his evidence, his evidence in toto may have to be appreciated so as to arrive at a conclusion whether it would amount to an admission. Unless a statement is clear, categorical and unequivocal, a stray sentence cannot be taken as admission. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines admission. Section 31 of the said Act dealing with Admission not conclusive proof, but may estop, reads:"admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereafter contained. "in Bharat Singh v. Bhagirithi the Apex Court held at para-19 as hereunder:"admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of sections 17 and 21 of the Indian evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. "in Bharat Singh v. Bhagirithi the Apex Court held at para-19 as hereunder:"admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of sections 17 and 21 of the Indian evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence. "in MM. Chetti v. C. Coomaraswmy Naidu and sons the Madras High Court held at para 10 as hereunder:"the law by no means regards admissions as conclusive proof of the matters admitted. This is because to a court of law admissions are but statements which do no more than suggest an inference as to some fact or facts in issue (See Ss. 31 and 17 of the indian Evidence Act 1872 ). It is, therefore, important that the Court should examine any given admission inside out to see if it suggests any clear inference on the fact in issue against the adverse inference against a party on the basis of what he is stated to have admitted, the admission must be unequivocal. It must also be comprehensive. It must go the whole-hog, as it were, on the point at issue. If a party s admission falls short of the totality of the requisite evidence needed for legal proof of a fact in issue, such an admission would be only a truncated admission. It follows that in such a case, it cannot support a valid judicial determination, unless it be that the court is in a position to find other evidence before it to make up for the deficiencies in the admission. It follows that in such a case, it cannot support a valid judicial determination, unless it be that the court is in a position to find other evidence before it to make up for the deficiencies in the admission. "if the evidence of P. W. 1 as a whole is carefully scrutinized, definitely it cannot be said that the said stray sentence will amount to an admission. Hence, I am not inclined to accept with the contention raised by the Counsel representing the Revision petitioners in this regard. Thus, the findings recorded relating to jural relationship of landlady and tenant are hereby confirmed. ( 16 ) THE landlady had examined herself as p. W. 1 and the daughter as P. W. 2 and the son-in-law as P. W. 3. The tenant had examined himself as R. W. 1, and his tenants - R. W. 2 and R. W. 3, and R. W. 4 - an independent witness. Exs. A-1 to A-9 and b-1 to B-30 were marked. No doubt there is some controversy relating to payment of taxes and certain portions of the deposition of P. W. 1 had been pointed out to show that p. W. 1 had taken a false stand in this regard. When once the finding that this property is covered by Ex. A-9, the registered partition deed, is affirmed, the other aspects may virtually fall into insignificance. On the aspect of denial of title not being bona fide, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever since in view of the clear findings recorded especially in the light of Ex. A-9 and also the evidence of P. W. 1 to P. W. 3, it is clear that the petition schedule property of an extent of 1500 sq. yards with the building had been let out, but the tenant had taken a specific stand that what was let out was only an extent of 500 sq. yards with building, thus denying the title of the landlady to the rest of the extent. Definitely it cannot be said to be a bona fide denial of title and hence in the light of the findings recorded above and the findings in detail recorded by both the Tribunals below on appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, I do not see any reason to differ with those findings and accordingly the said findings are hereby confirmed. ( 17 ) AS far as the ground of sub-lease is concerned, when once the finding relating to the denial of title for the rest of the extent of 1000 sq. yards is affirmed, then the consequence would be that the tenant had sub-let the premises and it is the specific stand of the tenant himself that he had let out these structures to the tenants and he had raised these constructions in a poramboke site. In the light of the same, I have no hesitation in holding that the ground of sub-letting had been well established and the findings recorded by both the Tribunals below in this regard do not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting any interference whatsoever. ( 18 ) THE next ground on which the eviction was order is the ground of different user. There is clear evidence and also several admissions on the part of R. W. 1 in this regard and though the purpose for which the petition schedule property was let out was for running the saw-mill, the same was converted into residential portions and had been let outby raising certain super structures and not being satisfied with the same, the tenant yet had taken a mala fide stand denying the very title of the landlady to a portion of the property - an extent of 1000 sq. yards - contending that what had been let out was only 500 sq. yards with the building. Hence, i do not see any reason to differ with the said findings recorded by both the Tribunals below and accordingly the said findings are hereby confirmed. ( 19 ) IT is needless to say that as far as other grounds are concerned, even before the appellate Authority no Cross Objections were filed and the findings recorded by the learned Rent controller had been affirmed by the Appellate Authority and hence this court as a Revisional Court is not inclined to disturb those findings. ( 20 ) AS far as Ex. A-30 is concerned, it is a certified copy of the decree in O. S. No. 1009/80 on the file of Principal District munsif, Vijayawada wherein the tenant filed the suit as against third party for ejectment. It is needless to say that the landlady is not a party to the said litigation and hence the said document is of no consequence. It is needless to say that the landlady is not a party to the said litigation and hence the said document is of no consequence. ( 21 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, I do not see any merit in the Civil Revision petition and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed, with costs. A month s time is granted to vacate the premises.