DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is filed under section 22 of A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short the act ) against the judgment dated 9-7-2001 in rca. No. 25 of 1997 on the file of Principal senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, confirming the order of eviction dated 28-7-1997 in RCC. No. 47 of 1986 on the file of the Rent Controller-cum-Principal District munsif, Rajahmundry. The tenants-respondents 3 and 4 in the eviction petition are the appellants. ( 2 ) NECESSARY averments for the disposal of this revision petition briefly are as follows: golla Subbayya, who is the father of the eviction petitioners, in or about 1964 leased out the petition schedule premises to the first respondent - Batchu China Koteswara rao on a monthly rent of Rs. l25=-00. From the year 1980 the monthly rent is Rs. 400=00. The petitioners sought the eviction of the tenant first respondent on three grounds. The first ground is that after taking the petition schedule premises for rent, the tenant installed an oil extractor in the schedule premises and its use caused damage to the building. The second ground is that petitioners 1 and 2 bona fide require the petition schedule premises for their personal occupation to carry on kirana business by petitioners 1 and 2 in the petition schedule premises. The third ground is that in the adjoining lane, the first respondent - tenant was constructing his own building, petitioners demanded him to vacate petition schedule premises for their personal occupation, the tenant agreed to vacate and shift his business to his own building after the construction was over, but he did not shift his business to his own premises after the construction was over and the tenant leased out some portions to third parties. The tenant - first respondent filed a counter opposing the eviction petition. He denied that the oil extractor machinery caused any damage to the petition schedule premises. He denied that petitioners 1 and 2 bona fide require to occupy the petition schedule premises to do their own business. According to him the landlords demanded enhancement of the monthly rent to rs. 800=00 per month and he did not agree for the same and therefore the eviction petition is filed with a mala fide intention. He denied that petitioners 1 and 2 bona fide require to occupy the petition schedule premises to do their own business. According to him the landlords demanded enhancement of the monthly rent to rs. 800=00 per month and he did not agree for the same and therefore the eviction petition is filed with a mala fide intention. He pleaded that the building in the adjoining lane is a joint property of himself, his wife and sons, it is useful for godown purposes only, after reconstruction the old tenants again reoentered and it is not fit for carrying on his business. After the tenant - first respondent filed his counter, he died pending disposal of the eviction petition. Thereupon his wife and children, namely, respondents 2 to 11 were brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased first respondent - tenant. They adopted the counter filed by the first respondent - tenant. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the Rent Controller. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the rent Controller opined that the tenants are not liable to be evicted on the ground of causing damage to the petition schedule premises. He accepted the case of the landlords that they bona fide require the petition schedule premises for the occupation by petitioners 1 and 2 to carry on their own business and ordered eviction of the tenants. Aggrieved by the said order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the tenants preferred an appeal in RCA. No. 25 of 1997 before the Appellate Authority, namely, the Principal Senior Civil Judge, rajahmundry. The learned Senior Civil judge considered all the contentions urged before him and the material available on record. He concurred with the findings recorded by the Rent Controller. He dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority, respondents 3 and 4 in the eviction petition alone preferred the present revision petition. ( 3 ) AT this juncture it is necessary to point out another aspect. During the pendency of the appeal before the Principal Senior Civil judge at Rajahmundry, the tenants filed a petition requesting the Appellate Authority to permit the tenants to file an additional counter in the eviction petition. The landlords filed a counter in the said petition and opposed the said petition. During the pendency of the appeal before the Principal Senior Civil judge at Rajahmundry, the tenants filed a petition requesting the Appellate Authority to permit the tenants to file an additional counter in the eviction petition. The landlords filed a counter in the said petition and opposed the said petition. The tenants filed another petition along with some documents and requested the Appellate court to receive those documents as additional evidence on their behalf. The appellate Court allowed both the applications. It received the additional counter filed by the tenants. It also received all the documents produced by the tenants as additional evidence in the appeal and marked them as Exs. B-24 to B-34 on behalf of the tenants - respondents. According to the averments in the additional counter, the father of the tenants (sic. landlords) entered into an agreement with the first respondent - tenant to sell the petition schedule premises to the first respondent -tenant. It is also further pleaded that after the appeal was filed, the tenants were paying the house tax payable to the petition schedule premises. It is further pleaded that during the pendency of the appeal, in pursuance of a Civil Court decree affirmed by the High court, the landlords took possession of an adjoining shop room and as the landlords are in possession of the said shop room, which is a non-residential building, the landlords are not entitled to evict the respondents and seek possession of petition schedule non-residential premises on the ground of carrying on business by the petitioners 1 and 2. The Appellate Authority considered the additional evidence and the contentions raised in the additional counter and found that the alternative accommodation mentioned in the additional counter is not suitable for carrying on business in kirana by the landlords. Regarding the agreement to sell the petition schedule premises, the Appellate Court disbelieved and rejected the version of the tenants. ( 4 ) AT the time of hearing of this revision petition, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners advanced only one contention. According to him as alternative accommodation is available, the landlords are not entitled to seek eviction of the tenants. In this regard, it is contended that the requirement of the landlords is not bona fide. ( 4 ) AT the time of hearing of this revision petition, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners advanced only one contention. According to him as alternative accommodation is available, the landlords are not entitled to seek eviction of the tenants. In this regard, it is contended that the requirement of the landlords is not bona fide. He did not press into service the other ground, namely, that there is an agreement by the original owner to sell petition schedule premises to the first respondent -tenant. ( 5 ) FOR the purpose of disposal of this revision petition, it is necessary to extract the provision in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. It reads as follows:"10 (3) (a): A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building----- 0 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise (A) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on the date of the application, or (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence". The said provision was interpreted by a Full bench of this court reported in Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal1. The said provision was interpreted by a Full bench of this court reported in Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal1. It held as follows:"under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, a landlord in occupation of a non- residential building is not entitled for carrying on his business or for commencing a business to get back possession of another non-residential building in the occupation of a tenant; the bar under the Section against securing eviction of the tenant of such non residential building is absolute; suitability, convenience and sufficiency of the non-residential building already in the occupation of the landlord for carrying on the business of the landlord or to meet the bonafide need of any other member of the family of the landlord, independent of and over and above the need of the landlord, are all irrelevant considerations in the context of constructing the provisions in section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act which, in clear terms, interdicts the landlord, in absolute terms, from seeking recovery of the non-residential building belonging to him in the occupation of the tenant. " ( 6 ) THERE is a judgment of the Apex Court reported in D. Devaji v. K. Sudarshana Rao2. A similar interpretation to the provision in section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act was given by the Apex Court in the said decision. Two hon ble Judges of the Apex Court rendered the above judgment. Subsequently the said decision, namely, Devaji s case2 fell for consideration before three Member Bench of the Apex Court reported in b. Jagadeshwaraiah and Sons v. Pushpa Trading co. 3. The Apex Court held as follows:"the aspects of quality, size and suitability of the building have been totally put out of consideration. We think this would frustrate the purposes of the Act. Here was a claim set up by the landlord that the non-residential premises he owned did not serve the purpose of his need of setting up a textile and cloth business and that the need could only be met in seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises sought. As we view it there is no difficulty in D. Devaji s case2 standing in the way of the landlord -appellant to have the issue examined from the point of view which would carry out the purposes of the Act". As we view it there is no difficulty in D. Devaji s case2 standing in the way of the landlord -appellant to have the issue examined from the point of view which would carry out the purposes of the Act". Therefore, as per this judgment of the Apex court, the aspects of quality, size and suitability of the alternative building are also to be taken into consideration. ( 7 ) THERE is yet another judgment of the apex Court reported in V. Radhakrishnan v. S. N. Loganatha Mudaliar4. A three member bench of the Apex Court interpreted the provision in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of Tamil nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) act, 1960. The said provision is in pari materia with the provision in Sec. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of A. P. Act. The Apex Court held in para 12 of its judgment as follows:"on a plain reading of Sec. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, it appears to us that the legislature intended that a landlord seeking eviction of the tenant could be disentitled from claiming possession of the non-residential premises where he requires those premises for his own use, if he is occupying a non-residential building of his own. Similarly, the landlord would also be disentitled from claiming possession of non-residential premises for the benefit of a member of his family, if that member of the family was in occupation of a non-residential building of his own. Any other interpretation of this Section would not only be doing violence to the plain language of the Section but would result in absurdity inasmuch as the benefit of the provision would stand denied to the family members of the landlord, who do not occupy any premises of their own and for whose benefit eviction is sought, if the landlord himself is in occupation of a non-residential premises of his own". ( 8 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, following the said judgment of the Apex Court in a decision reported in Pallicherla Suseelamma v. Kondapalli Sarojanamma5, I have held that the principle of law laid down by the Supreme court in the above decision undoubtedly, impliedly overrules the decision of the Full bench of this court in Vidya Bai v. Shankerlal ( 1987 (2) ALT 550 ). ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents brought to the notice of this court a recent decision of the Supreme court reported in G. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas6. This decision interprets the provision in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of A. P. Act. The headline reads as follows:"section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act provides when the landlord requires the building whether residential or non-residential for his own occupation he may apply for eviction of tenant in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is no occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this act or otherwise. The expression "to the possession of which he is entitled" would not mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that capacity or having a superior right or under any of the grounds under the Act. Provisions of Section 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the Mysore Act are quite in pari materia with the provisions of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the act. Therefore, merely because the landlord is already having his business in a leased premises of which he is in possession, it cannot be said that he cannot seek eviction of the tenant. It is not disputed that other conditions of section 10 (3) (a) (iii) are satisfied in favour of the landlord. The Act did not prohibit eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of landlord possessed other non-residential premises. Even though the landlord and his brothers were conducting business on partnership in leased premises yet it was no ground to contend that the requirements of landlord is not bonafide". ( 10 ) THIS latest decision interprets the expression "to the possession of which he is entitled" in the provision in Sec. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act and lays down that the said expression would not mean possession otherwise than as a owner or in that capacity or having a superior right or under any other ground under the Act. If the landlord is in possession of a leased premises, he cannot be considered to be in possession of other non-residential building in the same town or village. If the landlord is in possession of a leased premises, he cannot be considered to be in possession of other non-residential building in the same town or village. ( 11 ) 1 have come across another recent judgment of Apex Court reported in Lingala kondala Rao v. Vootukuri Narayana Rao7. The facts of this case are that the landlord sought the eviction of the tenant from a shop for his bonafide non-residential need. The said shop is exclusively owned by the landlord. The landlord is entitled to a share in Joint Hindu family shops which are in occupation of joint Hindu Family. The question that fell for consideration is as the landlord is entitled to a share in the Joint Hindu Family shops, his right of seeking eviction under section 10 (3) (a) (iii) from an accommodation (shop) exclusively owned by him is to be denied. The Apex Court held that a non- residential building owned by Joint Hindu family and in its occupation would not be included within the meaning of the expression "which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled". It further held that a Joint Hindu Family premises in which joint family business is being run and wherein the landlord too had a share and interest and juridical possession on account of being a member of the family would not disentitle the landlord from seeking recovery of possession from tenant of a non-residential building exclusively owned by him subject to his satisfying other requirements of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the act. ( 12 ) THE scope and ambit of the provision in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act that emerges from the decisions of the Apex court noticed supra in a nutshell can conveniently be described as hereunder: section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act bars a landlord from securing eviction of a tenant in occupation of a non-residential building if the landlord is in occupation of another non-residential building of his own in the same city, town or village. However such a bar is not an absolute bar. The factors such as size, quality, suitability and convenience of the landlord have to be taken into consideration. However such a bar is not an absolute bar. The factors such as size, quality, suitability and convenience of the landlord have to be taken into consideration. Even if a landlord is in occupation of his own non-residential building in the same city, town or village, the eviction of the tenant cannot be denied if the eviction is sought for the benefit of any of the family members of the landlord if such family member does not occupy his own non-residential building in the same city, town or village. The occupation of another non-residential building by the landlord or his family member must be as an owneabove principles of law, I propose to dispose of the revision petition. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioners relied upon two decisions of the supreme Court reported in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram8, and M/s. Variety Emporium v. R. M. Mohd. Ibrahim9. In both these decisions the Apex Court laid down that wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. Reliance was placed on these decisions in view of the contention that during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Authority, the landlords secured possession of a building and in view of the subsequent event, the landlords cannot evict the tenants from possession of the suit premises. This principle of law is not in dispute. ( 14 ) REGARDING the alternative accommodation, it is to be stated that the additional documentary evidence adduced by the tenants before the Appellate authority was considered by the Appellate authority. It also considered the other evidence already on record. The width of petition schedule premises is 10 feet. The width of the alternative accommodation suggested by the revision petitioners is only 6 feet. Taking into consideration the respective width of the two premises, both the courts below came to the conclusion that the other shop room is not sufficient and suitable accommodation to enable the petitioners 1 and 2 to carry on kirana business. These are findings of fact recorded by the two courts below on the basis of legal evidence available on record. These are findings of fact recorded by the two courts below on the basis of legal evidence available on record. It is not shown to me that those findings suffer from any legal infirmity. In view of the decision of the supreme Court reported in Mudigonda chandra Mouli Sastry v. Bhimanepalli bikshalu10 reassessment of evidence by the high Court and arriving at a contrary finding, is not proper when concurrent findings of fact that need of landlords was bona fide and in view of size of the alternative shop, it is not suitable and sufficient for the purpose of the landlords are not suffering from any legal infirmity. The learned advocate for the revision petitioners contended that P. W. I in his cross-examination admitted that he was carrying on business in grinding in another shop room. It was in a leased premises. In view of the decision of Apex Court in Kaushalya devi s case (supra), the said premises is not non-residential building in occupation of the landlords. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that after additional counter was received by the Appellate authority, the landlords did not file any rejoinder. There is no need for a rejoinder in the circumstances of the present case. To the petition filed before the Appellate Authority seeking permission to receive additional counter, the landlords filed a detailed counter. In that counter they had denied all the material averments made in the additional counter. It is also contended that after the additional counter is received by the Appellate Authority, no opportunity was given to prove the pleas taken by the tenants in the additional counter and therefore the rent control proceedings have to be remanded to the Rent Controller to record evidence on the pleas relating to subsequent developments and for giving findings. It is already noticed that a separate application was filed by the tenants before the Appellate Authority to receive additional evidence. All the documents produced as additional evidence were received and considered by the Appellate authority. In the additional evidence application the tenants did not request the appellate Authority to permit them to adduce oral evidence in addition to the documentary evidence produced by them as additional evidence before the Appellate authority. In these circumstances, there is no force in the contention that the matter requires remand to the Rent Controller. In the additional evidence application the tenants did not request the appellate Authority to permit them to adduce oral evidence in addition to the documentary evidence produced by them as additional evidence before the Appellate authority. In these circumstances, there is no force in the contention that the matter requires remand to the Rent Controller. The question of remand to the Rent Controller was considered and rejected by the appellate Authority. Therefore, I do not find any ground to interfere with the orders of eviction passed by the two courts below against the revision petitioners and others. There are no merits in the revision petition. ( 16 ) IN the result, the revision petition is dismissed. The tenants are granted four months time to vacate and deliver vacant possession to the respondents - landlords. No costs.