JUDGMENT - VAGYANI B.B., J.:---Heard. 2. This criminal appeal filed by original accused No. 1 in Sessions Case No. 316 of 1996 is directed against the order of conviction and sentence dated 6-11-1997 passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon. The appellant accused is found guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 4,000/- in default of payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four months. The appellant accused is also convicted under section 201 of Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for two months. However, the appellant accused is acquitted of the offence punishable under section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 3. In brief, the facts of the prosecution case are as under: Deceased Sharda was married to appellant on 15-5-1995. After marriage, deceased Sharda was residing in the matrimonial house along with her husband, brother-in-law Sanjeev (original accused No. 2), his wife Shobha (original accused No. 3) and father-in-law Kisan D.W. 5. It is prosecution case that the appellant had indecent intimacy with Shobha the wife of his brother Sanjeev. This indecent intimacy shattered the mental equilibrium of Sharda. She used to question her husband and used to pick up quarrels with him. She was stumbling block in the way of appellant and Shobha. Finally she was done to death. 4. The incident occurred on the night between 16-8-1996 and 17-8-1996 roughly between 0.30 to 4 a.m. in the residential house of the appellant, which is situated at village Gahukheda, Taluka Raver, District Jalgaon. On that fateful night, Kisan D.W. 5 (father of appellant) and his grand son Vikas Chaudhari had slept in the varanda of the house. Vikas is the son of Kesarbai, who happens to be the daughter of Kisan D.W. 5. Other inmates occupied inner portion of the house. It is prosecution case that Sharda, wife of the appellant Rajeev alias Balu was done to death by throttling and thereafter the dead body of Sharda was burnt by means of kerosene to make it appear that she committed suicide. 5. Because of commotions, neighbours gathered on the spot. Police Patil Keshav P.W. 5 also arrived on the spot. It is prosecution case that Sharda, wife of the appellant Rajeev alias Balu was done to death by throttling and thereafter the dead body of Sharda was burnt by means of kerosene to make it appear that she committed suicide. 5. Because of commotions, neighbours gathered on the spot. Police Patil Keshav P.W. 5 also arrived on the spot. He allegedly saw the dead body still burning and asked the inmates of the house to sprinkle water on the body. The deceased, however, was found dead. His request to accompany him to the Police Station was turned down by the appellant and his father Kisan D.W. 5. Police Patil Keshav P.W. 5 despatched occurrence report Exhibit 22 to the Police Station. On receipt of report, A.S.I. Chaudhari registered A.D. No. 26 of 1996 and investigation thereof was done by P.S.I. Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 Dr. Vijay Gade P.W. 6, who performed autopsy, noted 86% burn injuries. The burn injuries were post-mortem. Dr. Vijay Gade P.W. 6 also found fracture of hyoid bone and haemorrhage in the subcutaneous tissues of neck, bruising of muscles over the thyroid cartilage and hyoid bone. These injuries noticed by him were ante mortem. According to him, cause of death was asphyxia due to throttling. P.S.I. Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 lodged first information report Exhibit 38 and registered crime under sections 302, 201 and 498-A of Indian Penal Code against the appellant, his brother and brother's wife. 6. Before learned trial Judge, as many as nine witnesses were examined. During the trial, suggestions were given to the witnesses in the cross-examination that original accused No. 2 was not in the house at all. This suggestion was also given to the Investigating Officer who admitted that during investigation, he found that the accused No. 2 was not in the house. Defence of the appellant was not only of denial of his involvement in the crime but he had even denied that his wife Sharda died homicidal death. From inception, the original accused No. 2 tried to impress that he was out of village on that fateful night. Though the appellant took plea of alibi, no suggestions were given to the witnesses about his absence. 7. During the trial, on the basis of material, the learned trial Judge concluded that the deceased died homicidal death and she was set on fire subsequently. Though the appellant took plea of alibi, no suggestions were given to the witnesses about his absence. 7. During the trial, on the basis of material, the learned trial Judge concluded that the deceased died homicidal death and she was set on fire subsequently. She was found killed and set on fire in the kitchen and that her sucking child was found in different room. That the Police Patil arrived on the scene and it was Police Patil who asked the immates of the house to sprinkle water on the deceased and extinguish fire. That the appellant and others did not report the matter. The learned trial Judge rejected belated plea of alibi raised first time in his written statement and convicted the appellant under sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code. 8. The appellant examined his father Kisan as defence witness who was cited as prosecution witness but was given up. Kisan D.W. 5 said in his evidence that his son (appellant) had gone to the field to water banana crop and was not at home. The learned trial Judge rejected his evidence as false. The learned trial Judge accepted the evidence of Investigating Officer Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 who said that clothes of the appellant were seized and that traces of kerosene were found on the spot, dead body, the clothes of deceased and clothes of the appellant. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence, the original accused No. 1 has preferred this criminal appeal. 10. The learned Defence Counsel Shri Godsay vehemently submitted before us that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of appellant in the house at the material time, by positive evidence and, therefore, the order of conviction and sentence is liable to be quashed and set aside. According to him, unless presence of the appellant in the house at the material time is established by positive evidence, the conviction cannot be imposed on the appellant simply on the ground that he happens to be the husband of deceased Sharda. He submits that the circumstantial evidence brought on record is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. According to him, there are missing links in the chain of circumstantial evidence. He submits that the circumstantial evidence brought on record is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. According to him, there are missing links in the chain of circumstantial evidence. He also submits that the defence evidence of Nivratii D.W. 4 and Kisan D.W. 5 is required to receive same treatment as that of prosecution witnesses. The learned Defence Counsel Shri Godsay argued that the evidence of Nivratti D.W. 4 and Kisan D.W. 5 would clearly go to show that the appellant was in the field on that night and was called from the field early in the morning. This being the position, the benefit of doubt is required to be given to the appellant. 11. The learned Defence Counsel Shri Godsay cited large number of authorities. In number of cases, the husband was charged and prosecuted for having committed murder of wife. In some of the cases, Supreme Court recorded order of acquittal. Without there being any match with regard to facts, ultimate result of acquittal is tried to be shown for the purpose of similar kind of result. 12. From perusal of the cases cited by learned Defence Counsel Shri Godsay, we are of the clear view that majority cases on which heavy reliance was placed, were decided taking into consideration the facts of the respective cases. However, these cases are cited before us as a precedent. Therefore, before taking review of the evidence, we would like to discuss the scope of the principle of precedent. 13. A reference with profit can be made to the case of (Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh)1, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 195. The accused Prakash Chandra Pathak was prosecuted for having committed murder of his mother Mst. Reoti Devi, aged 65 years and his infant son Sudhir, aged four and half years. He was sentenced to death under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. He was also convicted under section 380 of Indian Penal Code. After confirmation of conviction by the High Court, Prakash Chandra Pathak filed appeal by Special Leave. The Counsel for Prakash Chandra Pathak cited number of reported decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on appreciation of circumstantial evidence. He was sentenced to death under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. He was also convicted under section 380 of Indian Penal Code. After confirmation of conviction by the High Court, Prakash Chandra Pathak filed appeal by Special Leave. The Counsel for Prakash Chandra Pathak cited number of reported decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on appreciation of circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court, without making reference to those authorities, observed as under: "Decisions even of the highest Court on questions which are essentially questions of fact, cannot be cited as precedents governing the decision of other cases which must rest in the ultimate analysis upon their own particular facts. The general principles governing appreciation of circumstantial evidence are well established and beyond doubt or controversy. The more difficult question is one of applying those principles to the facts and circumstances of a particular case coming before the Court. That question has to be determined by the Court as and when it arises with reference to the particular facts and circumstances of that individual case. It is no use, therefore, appealing to precedents in such matters." 14. The Supreme Court has also held in the case of (B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry)2, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1480, that a decision is binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein. 15. The next is the case of (Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi others)3, 1996(6) S.C.C. 44 . While discussing what constitutes precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and its binding nature, Supreme Court observed: "It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason, it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates- (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or preceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or preceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to built upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reasons or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is along binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi." The Supreme Court further observed: "In order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision, it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and, therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents." (Emphasis is supplied by us). 16. In a recent case of (P.G.I. of M.E. and Research, Chandigarh v. Raj Kumar etc.)4, A.I.R. 2001 S.C.W. 77, the Supreme Court observed that the decision of Supreme Court rendered in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case cannot be a precedent in a subsequent case which is based on its own facts. 17. In a very recent case of (Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa)5, A.I.R. 2002 S.C.W. 4271, dealing with the point of precedent, the Supreme Court observed that there is always peril in treating words of a judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusion in two cases. 18. Keeping in view the law with regard to precedent regard above, we are not inclined to refer all the cases cited by learned Defence Counsel Shri Godsay, except the relevant cases on a specific point raised for consideration. There is no need to reproduce the long list of cases that would only magnify the length of the judgment. 19. It is true that there is no direct evidence against the appellant. The evidence which has been accepted by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge is circumstantial evidence. In the case of (Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay)6, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 500, the Supreme Court while appreciating circumstantial evidence observed that circumstantial evidence means a combination of facts creating a network through which there is no escape for the accused because the facts taken as a whole do not admit any inference but of his guilt. It is also held in this case that the piece of conduct can be held to be incriminatory which has no reasonable explanation except on the hypothesis that the accused is guilty. The Supreme Court further observed that the conduct which destroys the presumption of innocence can alone be considered as material. 20. It is also held in this case that the piece of conduct can be held to be incriminatory which has no reasonable explanation except on the hypothesis that the accused is guilty. The Supreme Court further observed that the conduct which destroys the presumption of innocence can alone be considered as material. 20. In this particular case, Dr. Vijay Gade P.W. 6, who performed autopsy over dead body of Sharda, opined that the cause of death of Sharda was asphyxia due to throttling. From the post-mortem report Exhibit 26, it is seen that the dead body had smell of kerosene oil. There was fracture of hyoid bone. This injury was ante mortem. Burn injuries were to the extent of 86%. Dr. Vijay Gade P.W. 6 testified in her evidence Exhibit 25 that the burn injuries were post-mortem. The post mortem report Exhibit 26 would furnish very strong corroboration to the testimony of Dr. Vijay Gade P.W. 6. From medical evidence, it is proved that Sharda was done to death in the kitchen first and then her dead body was burnt. According to defence version, the appellant had gone to the field to water banana crop. Sanjeev had gone to Udhali. Therefore, deceased Sharda and Shobha shared middle room that night. D.W. 5 and Vijay slept in varanda. 21. From the written statement of accused No. 3, it is revealed that she had closed the door of the middle room before she and deceased went to sleep. If the door of middle room was found closed, Kisan D.W. 5 and his grand son Vikas had no access to the middle room or to the kitchen. Nobody would keep the rear door of kitchen open in the night time. The inmates of the house always take care in closing the rear door of the house in the night time. Under the circumstance, the person who could be in the kitchen on that night had opportunity to commit the murder of Sharda and it is none else than the appellant accused. If the middle room was occupied by Shobha-original accused No. 3, in all probabilities the deceased Sharda and appellant would have shared the bed in the kitchen. This being the position, the presence of the appellant accused in the kitchen on that fateful night can very well be inferred, if defence of alibi is brushed aside. 22. If the middle room was occupied by Shobha-original accused No. 3, in all probabilities the deceased Sharda and appellant would have shared the bed in the kitchen. This being the position, the presence of the appellant accused in the kitchen on that fateful night can very well be inferred, if defence of alibi is brushed aside. 22. The dead body was found in the kitchen. The incident had occurred in the midnight hours. The back door of the kitchen was found open. If it is an act of a thief or stranger, in that case there would have been resistance from Sharda. In that eventuality, stranger may commit murder or leave the place. But thief has no reason to pour kerosene oil on the dead body and set the dead body on fire. Having regard to the special feature of this kind, the possibility of committing heinous crime by outside stranger, is ruled out. On the night of incident, admittedly Shobha original accused No. 3, Kisan D.W. 5 who happens to be the father of appellant accused and his grand son Vikas, were the only persons present in the house besides deceased. 23. Let us examine the defence of alibi. The appellant accused has taken the defence of alibi half heartedly. The original accused No. 2 had also taken defence of alibi. Specific suggestions were given to prosecution witnesses Madhav Taide P.W. 2, Yuvraj P.W. 4 and P.S.I. Vilas Chaudhari P.W. 9 that original accused No. 2 was not present in the house on the fateful night. But so far as the appellant accused is concerned, no suggestions were made to these prosecution witnesses. The appellant accused did not slightly suggest his defence of alibi while answering the questions put to him in his statement recorded under section 313 of Cri.P.C. To every incriminating question, he made a slogan of falsity. He has, however, raised the defence of alibi in the written statement filed by him at the fag end of his statement under section 313 Cri.P.C. Even in the written statement, the appellant accused has not offered any explanation as to how his wife Sharda died. 24. It is material to note that the appellant accused has denied homicidal death of Sharda. The conduct of the appellant accused after commission of offence was also abnormal. 24. It is material to note that the appellant accused has denied homicidal death of Sharda. The conduct of the appellant accused after commission of offence was also abnormal. He, on his own, did not communicate to anybody as to how his wife Sharda died. Kisan D.W. 5 also did not disclose in his oral evidence as to how his daughter-in-law Sharda met homicidal death. It has come in the evidence of Yuvraj P.W. 4 that after hearing commotions at 4 a.m., he woke up from sleep and visited the house of appellant accused and noticed the dead body of Sharda in the kitchen in a burnt condition. Number of persons were also found present that time in the house. It is seen from the evidence of Police Patil Keshav P.W. 5 Exhibit 21 that while he was sleeping in the house, one Subhash Patil and Chintaman Onkar visited his house at 5 to 5.30 a.m. and disclosed the incident to him. Thereafter he visited the house of appellant accused, saw the dead body of Sharda and sent occurrence report Exhibit 22 to Sawda Police Station. It has come in the evidence of defence witness Niwratti Exhibit 62 that he returned from his agricultural field early in the morning. That time, he came to know in the village that Sharda was burnt and thereafter he went to the house of appellant accused. According to him, Kisan D.W. 5 asked him to call accused. From the evidence on record, it is clear that the news of death of Sharda in a suspicious manner had already spread in the village even at 4 to 5 a.m. It is interesting to note that Kisan D.W. 5 did not depute anybody to the appellant immediately after he noticed dead body of Sharda in the kitchen. 25. The incident occurred in rainy season i.e. in the month of August 1996. The appellant claimed that he had been to the field on the night of incident for the purpose of watering banana crop. In rainy season, there was no need to water banana crop. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant accused was actually found present in the field throughout the night. No adjoining field owner was examined by the appellant accused as a defence witness. In rainy season, there was no need to water banana crop. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant accused was actually found present in the field throughout the night. No adjoining field owner was examined by the appellant accused as a defence witness. The evidence of Nivratti D.W. 4 and Kisan D.W. 5 does not at all help the appellant accused for the purpose of establishing the correctness of defence of alibi. From their evidence, at the most, it can be held that early in the morning, the appellant accused was present in the field and was called from the field. If Nivratti D.W. 4 returned from the field on his own accord early in the morning, then what prevented the appellant accused from returning to his house. Why he was lingering in the field waiting for call of somebody. 26. It is not brought on record as to how much is the distance in between the field and house of the appellant accused. From the evidence of Nivratti D.W. 4, one can legitimately infer that the field where accused claimed to have stayed on the fateful night, is not far off from the village. The distance is very much material for the purpose of appreciating the defence of alibi. The Supreme Court in the case of (Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.)7, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 911, has held, while appreciating plea of alibi, that the plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at another place. The plea can, therefore, succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. 27. In the case of (State of Maharashtra v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple)8, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 63, the Supreme Court has observed that it is well settled that a plea of alibi must be proved with absolute certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility of the presence of the person concerned at the place of occurrence. 28. Having kept in mind the well settled legal position with regard to defence of alibi, we find it extremely difficult to digest the plea of alibi, as propounded by the appellant accused. The field is not far off. 28. Having kept in mind the well settled legal position with regard to defence of alibi, we find it extremely difficult to digest the plea of alibi, as propounded by the appellant accused. The field is not far off. The field is in the same village. The accused could very well come to the place of occurrence within short time and disappear from the place within no time. The appellant accused, after committing dastardly crime, might have emerged out from the rear door of kitchen and might have taken shelter in the field in order to create the defence of alibi. In our view, the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, after taking into consideration number of circumstances, has rightly concluded that the original accused No. 1 has failed to establish the plea of alibi. 29. Sharda had gone to her parent's place for the purpose of delivery. It has come in the evidence on record that only couple of days before commission of offence, she had returned to her matrimonial house along with sucking child of 3 to 4 months. Taking into consideration the long separation of his wife and having blessed with a young child, in all probabilities, the appellant would not go to the field for whole night. The work of watering banana crop could have been done in the day time. There was no need for the appellant accused to go to the field for the purpose of watering banana crop in the night time, that too in rainy season. If husband and wife, living under a common roof found closeted in a kitchen and husband emerging out alive and his life partner found dead in a suspicious manner, the husband is not at all permitted to say that the prosecution must prove his presence in the room at midnight hours with a positive evidence. If such a logic is accepted, then this would be a new kind of criminal jurisprudence for erring husbands. After all, this is a matter for inference. 30. The learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay submits that the Muddemal articles which were seized from the spot and the clothes seized from the person of appellant accused, were not sealed at the time of actual seizure and, therefore, in the absence of evidence on the point of sealing, C.A. reports Exhibits 44 and 45 cannot be taken into consideration. 30. The learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay submits that the Muddemal articles which were seized from the spot and the clothes seized from the person of appellant accused, were not sealed at the time of actual seizure and, therefore, in the absence of evidence on the point of sealing, C.A. reports Exhibits 44 and 45 cannot be taken into consideration. He brought to our notice that there is no reference in the arrest panchanama Exhibit 17 dated 18-8-1996 that after seizure of clothes from the person of appellant accused, the cloths were sealed on the spot. Panch witness Raju Patil P.W. 2 and Investigating Officer Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 have not stated in their oral evidence that after seizure of clothes from the person of appellant accused, the clothes were sealed on the spot. No doubt, this is a lacuna in the evidence of prosecution. C.A. report Exhibit 44 would go to show that kerosene residue was found on the shirt and pant of the appellant accused. Having noticed the intrinsic defect in the matter of seizure of clothes of the appellant accused, it is not proper to place any reliance on C.A. report Exhibit 44 to the extent of clothes of appellant. 31. Though Raju Patil P.W. 2 does not speak about sealing of clothes of the appellant accused, he has made a positive statement in his evidence Exhibit 15 that he noticed kerosene stains on the clothes of appellant accused when the clothes were seized from the person of appellant accused. He has testified in para No. 2 of his examination-in-chief that in his presence, shirt and pant were seized from the person of appellant accused and that time, some kerosene stains were noticed on the clothes of appellant. He has further testified in his evidence that one match box was found inside the pocket of pant of the appellant accused. The arrest panchanama Exhibit 17 supports the testimony of panch witness Raju Patil P.W. 2 in this behalf. There is reference in the arrest panchanama Exhibit 17 that there were kerosene stains on the clothes of appellant accused when the clothes were seized from his person. There is also reference in the arrest panchanama Exhibit 17 that a match box having smell of kerosene, was found in the pocket of pant of the appellant accused. 32. There is reference in the arrest panchanama Exhibit 17 that there were kerosene stains on the clothes of appellant accused when the clothes were seized from his person. There is also reference in the arrest panchanama Exhibit 17 that a match box having smell of kerosene, was found in the pocket of pant of the appellant accused. 32. The Investigating Officer Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 has also made a positive statement in his oral evidence Exhibit 37 that there were stains of kerosene oil on the shirt and pant of the appellant accused at the time of seizure of clothes. He also testified that one match box was found in the pocket of pant of the appellant accused and the same has also seized under panchanama Exhibit 17. From the oral evidence of panch witness Raju Patil P.W. 2 and Investigating Officer Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 coupled with arrest panchanama Exhibit 17, it is beyond doubt proved that there were stains of kerosene oil on the clothes of the appellant accused and one match box was found in the pocket of his pant. 33. Madhukar Taide P.W. 1 was present when spot panchanama Exhibit 14 was prepared. It has come in his evidence that articles including burnt match stick and earth stained with kerosene were attached from the spot. The oral evidence of Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 would also go to show that the clothes of deceased were found smeared with kerosene. He noticed kerosene on the floor where dead body was found lying. He also noticed one burnt match stick having smell of kerosene near the dead body of Sharda. He has made a positive statement in his evidence that all those articles were seized and sealed under panchanama in his presence. Spot panchanama Exhibit 14 would clearly go to show that the articles which were seized from the spot were kept in different envelopes and all the envelopes were sealed on the spot itself. Even though Madhukar P.W. 1 has forgotten to disclose in his evidence Exhibit 13 about sealing of the articles, which were seized from the spot, the prosecution can very well rely upon the oral testimony of Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9, which finds support from the spot panchanama Exhibit 14. We find no reason to discard the evidence of Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 in this behalf. We find no reason to discard the evidence of Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 in this behalf. C.A. report Exhibit 44 would go to show that kerosene residues were noticed on the cloths of deceased Sharda. Kerosene residue was also noticed on the sample of earth which was collected from the spot. 34. The presence of kerosene residue on the clothes of deceased, on the scene of offence and also on the clothes of the appellant accused would clearly establish complicity of the appellant accused in the crime in question. The appellant accused has not at all explained presence of stains of kerosene in his clothes and the seizure of match box from the pocket of his pant. He has a simply chanted the Mantra of falsity and nothing else. 35. This takes us to consider the another argument of learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay to the effect that in case of circumstantial evidence, all the links in the chain must be complete in all respects. According to him, the chain of circumstantial evidence is not complete. We do not agree with learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay. The chain of circumstantial evidence is complete in all respects. In the case of (State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Shrivastava)9, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 840, the Supreme Court has given a caution that while appreciating circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a very cautious approach and should record a conviction only if all the links in the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence is capable of being negatived on evidence. It is further observed that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. The circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be considered only with the hypothesis of guilt. But the further observations made by the Supreme Court are very relevant. It is observed that but this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. But the further observations made by the Supreme Court are very relevant. It is observed that but this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise. (Emphasis is supplied by us.) 36. A reference with profit can also be made to the case of (Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana)10, 2001(3) S.C.C. 628 . While dilating on the credibility of circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court observed that success of the prosecution on the basis of circumstantial evidence will depend on the availability of a complete chain of events so as not to leave any doubt for the conclusion that the act must have been done by the accused person. The evidence on record, ascribed to be circumstantial, ought to justify the inferences of the guilt from the incriminating facts and circumstances which are incompatible with the innocence of the accused or guilt of any other person. While, it is true that there should be no missing links in the chain of events so far as the prosecution is concerned, it is not that every one of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts. The circumstances of strong suspicion without, however, any conclusive evidence are not sufficient to justify the conviction and it is on this score that great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence. In any event, on the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. (Emphasis is supplied by us). We will refer the incriminating circumstances little later. Suffice it to say that circumstantial evidence is strong enough to rope the appellant. 37. The learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay very forcefully submitted that there was no reference of seal in the forwarding letter Exhibit 39. We are not inclined to express our concurrence. On careful perusal of forwarding letter Exhibit 39, there is reference of seal. By this forwarding letter, the Investigating Officer sent the seized articles to C.A. for the purpose of examination. We are not inclined to express our concurrence. On careful perusal of forwarding letter Exhibit 39, there is reference of seal. By this forwarding letter, the Investigating Officer sent the seized articles to C.A. for the purpose of examination. In this behalf, we would like to mention that a sealed bottle containing sample of kerosene, four sealed pockets and three sealed parcels were in fact sent to the C.A. All these articles were in respect of MLC 533-MA of 1996. The C.A. report Exhibit 44 would clearly indicate that the sealed parcels were received with the seals in tact. Therefore, it is beyond doubt clear that the articles which were seized from the scene of offence, were properly sealed on the spot itself and were sent to C.A. for the purpose of analysis and the articles were received in the office of C.A. with the seals in tact. It is, therefore, beyond doubt clear that the burnt clothes of deceased, which were attached from the spot and the sample of earth collected from the spot, had smell of kerosene oil. 38. At this juncture, we want to make it clear that we have accepted C.A. report Exhibit 44 to the limited extent. The C.A. report Exhibit 44 can safely be relied upon in respect of burnt clothes of the deceased and the sample of earth collected from the spot. So far as the findings in respect of cloths of the appellant accused are concerned, they are not taken into consideration by us. Because, there is no evidence brought on record by the prosecution to show that the clothes of the appellant accused were sealed immediately after its seizure. Moreover, there is no reference of sealing of the clothes in panchanama Exhibit 17. Therefore, we find it extremely difficult to accept the findings in respect of clothes of the appellant accused. However, there is positive evidence on record to show that there were kerosene stains on the clothes of appellant accused when the clothes were seized from the person of accused and those stains had smell of kerosene. For this purpose, oral evidence of Raju Patil P.W. 2 and P.S.I. Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 is most relevant. 39. However, there is positive evidence on record to show that there were kerosene stains on the clothes of appellant accused when the clothes were seized from the person of accused and those stains had smell of kerosene. For this purpose, oral evidence of Raju Patil P.W. 2 and P.S.I. Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 is most relevant. 39. The learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay has diverted our attention to some of the admissions given by Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 with regard to labels A and B which were found fixed on the kerosene tin. The Investigating Officer Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 has admitted that no signatures were seen on labels A and B on the tin of kerosene. In fact, this is not a circumstance which favour the appellant accused. Because, all the articles were sent to C.A. for the purpose of analysis. After examination, the articles were brought back. After examination, the labels might have been destroyed and, therefore, the argument of learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay in this behalf is liable to be rejected. Moreover, Investigating Officer Vilas Jadhav P.W. 9 has given satisfactory explanation about labels and absence of signatures thereon. 40. The learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay then submits that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove motive and in the absence of direct evidence, the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge should not have convicted the appellant accused for the offence of murder on the basis of circumstantial evidence. We are not impressed by this argument. 41. The Supreme Court in the case of (State of Haryana v. Sher Singh and others)11, 1981 S.C.C.(Cri.) 421, has observed that the prosecution is not bound to prove motive of any offence in a criminal case, inasmuch as motive is known only to the perpetrator of the crime and may not be known to others. If the motive is proved by prosecution, the Court has to consider it and see whether it is adequate. 12. In the case of (Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar others)12, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1175, the Supreme Court has held that the motive always locks up in the mind of the accused and some time it is difficult to unlock. People do not act wholly without motive. The failure to discover the motive of an offence does not signify its non-existence. The failure to prove motive is not fatal as a matter of law. People do not act wholly without motive. The failure to discover the motive of an offence does not signify its non-existence. The failure to prove motive is not fatal as a matter of law. Proof of motive is never an indispensable for conviction. When facts are clear, it is immaterial that no motive has been proved. Therefore, absence of proof of motive does not break the link in the chain of circumstances connecting the accused with the crime nor militates against the prosecution case. 43. Similar view is taken by the Supreme Court in the case of (Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra)13, 1992(3) Bom.C.R. 671 44. No doubt that the prosecution has failed to establish the motive. However, it does not cause any dent on the substratum of prosecution case because the circumstances which are brought on record, are inconsistent with the innocence of the appellant accused. Therefore, failure to prove motive is not at all fatal to the prosecution case. 45. The learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay finally submits that falsity of defence of alibi or failure to give any explanation about cause of death, does not automatically prove the guilt of the accused. According to him, the prosecution has to prove guilt of the accused independently. In support of his argument, he relied upon the cases of (1) (State of Haryana v. Prabhu and others)14, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1019, and (2) (Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat)15, 1997(2) Crimes 109(S.C.). In the case of State of Haryana v. Prabhu (referred supra), the Supreme Court has observed that the prosecution case cannot be said to have been proved against a particular accused, merely because he came out with a plea of alibi, the evidence in support of which is found to be untrustworthy. Similarly, in the case of Tanviben Pankajkumar (cited supra), the Supreme Court has held that falsity of evidence cannot take place of proof of facts which prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. So far as the legal proposition advanced by learned defence Counsel Shri Godsay is concerned, there cannot be two opinions. But in the instant case, the circumstantial evidence is strong enough to establish complicity of the appellant accused in the crime beyond all reasonable doubt. 46. In the case in hand, the appellant accused has taken a false plea of alibi. But in the instant case, the circumstantial evidence is strong enough to establish complicity of the appellant accused in the crime beyond all reasonable doubt. 46. In the case in hand, the appellant accused has taken a false plea of alibi. The defence version of Nivratti D.W. 4 and Kisan D.W. 5 do not help the appellant in any manner. Nivratti D.W. 4 was in his field throughout the night. There is nothing on record to show that his field is adjacent to the field of appellant accused so that he had an opportunity to see the appellant accused in the field on that night. Kisan D.W. 5 is the father of appellant accused. His conduct is also blameworthy. Yuvraj P.W. 4 resides in the close proximity. He heard commotions at 4 a.m. and thereafter immediately he visited the house of appellant accused. That time, the front door of the house and rear door of the kitchen were found open and some persons were found entering into the house from back door and some of them were entering the house from front door. He has also made it clear in his deposition Exh. 20 that before his arrival on the spot, so many persons were found present in the residential house of the appellant accused. 47. Therefore, it is clear that at 4 a.m. Sharda was found dead in a suspicious manner. But there was no attempt on the part of Kisan D.W. 5 to depute somebody to call appellant accused from the field. Niwratti D.W. 4 appears to be a chance witness who arrived on the spot very late. Thereafter Kisan D.W. 5 thought it fit to depute Niwratti D.W. 4 to the field to call the appellant accused. It is true that Yuvraj P.W. 4 and Keshav P.W. 5 have not stated in their evidence that they saw appellant accused present in the house. However, the prosecution case does not at all suffer from that count. Because, presence or absence of the appellant accused in the house after commission of offence is not of much importance. The fact remains on record as to why Kisan D.W. 5 did not send anybody to the field to call appellant, if really appellant was in the field. However, the prosecution case does not at all suffer from that count. Because, presence or absence of the appellant accused in the house after commission of offence is not of much importance. The fact remains on record as to why Kisan D.W. 5 did not send anybody to the field to call appellant, if really appellant was in the field. It is also material to note that Kisan D.W. 5 did not even bother to send somebody to keshav P.W. 5, who is the Police Patil. Therefore, oral evidence of defence witnesses becomes doubtful. Presence of kerosene oil on the clothes of appellant is the connecting link to the crime besides other circumstances brought on record. 48. The falsity of defence of alibi may not be a proof of guilt. However, raising of a false plea can be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances proved and established, point out the guilt of the accused. For this purpose, we would like to make reference to the case of Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat, 1997(2) Crimes 109(S.C.). In para No. 37 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that a false plea may be considered as an additional circumstance if other circumstances proved and established, point out the guilt of the accused. 49. We would also like to refer to the case of (Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab)16, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 350. The accused in the said case, took a false plea of alibi. He also denied the fact of his arrest at the District Court, Amritsar. The Supreme Court has observed that the false plea of alibi and denial of the fact of his arrest, are also incriminating circumstances giving rise to an inference of guilt. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of (Jalalsab Shaikh v. State of Goa)17, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)344 , has held that false explanation given by the appellant provides the missing link in the chain of circumstances. 50. After having examined the entire oral evidence on record, it is clearly seen that no theft was committed in the house of appellant accused on that night. The medical evidence does not at all show that deceased Sharda was subjected to sexual assault. Therefore, the possibility of involvement of outsider or stranger is completely ruled out. The burnt clothes of the deceased were found to have been stained with kerosene oil. The medical evidence does not at all show that deceased Sharda was subjected to sexual assault. Therefore, the possibility of involvement of outsider or stranger is completely ruled out. The burnt clothes of the deceased were found to have been stained with kerosene oil. The kerosene residue was also noticed on the sample earth which was collected from the spot. There is positive evidence on record to show that there were stains on the clothes of the appellant accused and those stains had smell of kerosene. This piece of evidence is very much incriminating against the appellant accused and which rules out the possibility of involvement of any other person other than appellant in the crime in question. 51. We would also like to make reference to the case of Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cri.L.J. 1545 for another purpose. The Supreme Court has observed that it is settled law that the conduct of an accused in an offence previous and subsequent to the crime, are relevant facts. In the said case, false plea of suicide was taken by the accused. The Supreme Court, after taking note of it, has observed that false plea of suicide is a relevant fact. The Supreme Court has further observed that when the death had occurred in the custody of accused, the accused is under an obligation in the statement under section 313 Cri.P.C. at least to give plausible explanation for the cause of death. In the case in hand, the appellant accused has not at all offered any explanation as to how his wife Sharda met homicidal death, that too in the kitchen of the house. 52. After careful review of the entire evidence, following incriminating circumstances are noticed on the basis of which the complicity of the appellant accused in the crime is fully established: 1. Deceased Sharda met with homicidal death by throttling in the house of the appellant accused. 2. Sharda was killed in midnight hours in the kitchen. 3. Deceased Sharda was first throttled to death and thereafter the dead body was burnt by kerosene oil in order to create evidence of suicide. 4. There was fracture of hyoid bone. 5. Kerosene oil stains were found on the clothes of appellant. 6. The burn injuries were post-mortem. 7. 2. Sharda was killed in midnight hours in the kitchen. 3. Deceased Sharda was first throttled to death and thereafter the dead body was burnt by kerosene oil in order to create evidence of suicide. 4. There was fracture of hyoid bone. 5. Kerosene oil stains were found on the clothes of appellant. 6. The burn injuries were post-mortem. 7. Deceased Sharda had a sucking child of three to four months old at the time of commission of offence of murder and the said child was not found in the kitchen where dead body of Sharda was found lying. 8. In rainy season, there was no need to water Banana crop, that too in the night time. 9. The conduct of the appellant accused before and after commission of crime was unnatural. 10. The appellant accused has taken a false defence of alibi. 11. The appellant accused has not offered any explanation as to how deceased Sharda met homicidal death. 12. The appellant accused denied everything, even homicidal death of Sharda. 13. The Mangalsutra was found near the dead body of Sharda which rules out the entry of outside intruder. 52. Having scanned the entire evidence on record and after having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the clear opinion that the complicity of the appellant accused in the crime in question is proved beyond doubt. All the circumstances brought on record are very much consistent with the guilt of the appellant accused. The learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge has elaborately considered all the circumstances and has rightly convicted the appellant accused for the offences punishable under sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code. 53. In the result, we hereby confirm the order of conviction and sentence and dismiss the Criminal Appeal filed by the original accused No. 1. -----