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2003 DIGILAW 1550 (MAD)

C. B. M. College v. State Human Rights Commission & Others

2003-09-30

P.K.MISRA

body2003
Judgment :- The present writ petition has been filed by C.B.M. College, a private college coming within the meaning of Section 2(8) of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, receiving grant from the Government of Tamil Nadu for quashing the order dated 15.6.2001 passed by the first respondent, the State Human Rights Commission. 2. Third respondent was employed under the petitioner college. He had filed an application before the State Human Rights Commission, respondent No.1, alleging harassment by the management. The gravamen of his allegation was to the effect that even though he had withdrawn his resignation dated 31.8.1979 on the very same day, he was subsequently relieved on 31.3.1981 by the management on the basis of the so called resignation. Subsequently, he successfully challenged the action of the management in the High Court. However, even though the management had reinstated him in April, 1993, the management did not pay arrear of salary from 1.4.1981 to 15.4.1993. It was further alleged that the third respondent has been again placed under suspension on 4.4.2000, but such suspension was not revoked even though expiry of 4 months as prescribed under the Act was over and was kept out of employment inspite of the order passed by the Joint Director. 3. The State Human Rights Commission in its report observed that salary should have been paid by the college for the period from 1.4.1981 to 15.4.1993 and as such the human rights of the third respondent had been violated. It also directed that in addition to the above salary, compensation of Rs.50,000/- should be paid and the entire amount should be paid by the Government and thereafter recovered from the Grants payable to the petitioner’s college. 4. The petitioner has raised the following contentions :- (1) The petitioner college being a private college coming within the scope of Act 19 of 1976, which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court and gives over-riding effect to the Act, the Human Rights Commission did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the third respondent. (2) The question relating to suspension had been raised before the appellate authority under Section 37 of the Act 19 of 1976 and a connected matter is also pending in the High Court in W.P.No.11842 of 2000 and as such, such matters could not have come within the purview of the Human Rights Commission. (2) The question relating to suspension had been raised before the appellate authority under Section 37 of the Act 19 of 1976 and a connected matter is also pending in the High Court in W.P.No.11842 of 2000 and as such, such matters could not have come within the purview of the Human Rights Commission. (3) Since the question relating to acceptance of the resignation had been agitated before the appropriate authorities and had been decided by the High Court, the decision operated as constructive res judicata and such question should not be re-agitated before the Human Rights Commission. (4) Even assuming that Human Rights Commission has no jurisdiction, the complaint was barred by limitation in view of the provisions contained in Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. 5. Since the last two points raised by the petitioner are worthy of acceptance, it is unnecessary to deal with other questions raised by the petitioner. 6. Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 is to the following effect :- “ 36(2) The Commission or the State Commission shall not inquire into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed.” 7. In the present case, the Human Rights Commission has not purported to consider the question relating to suspension in 2000, but has concentrated on the question of non-payment of the amount after the petitioner was reinstated pursuant to the order of the High Court in 1993. Though there was a direction for reinstatement, there was no specific direction for payment of arrear salary from the date of acceptance of resignation till the date of reinstatement. It was open to the petitioner to claim such benefits at that stage. If the petitioner had claimed such benefits and the prayer was not granted, it would be deemed that prayer was rejected. On the other hand, if the petitioner has not made any specific claim at that stage and it was claimed only in 2000, it must be taken that the claim was barred by limitation keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. On the other hand, if the petitioner has not made any specific claim at that stage and it was claimed only in 2000, it must be taken that the claim was barred by limitation keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. In either event it must be taken that recommendation by the State Human Rights Commission regarding payment of arrear salary for which cause of action had arisen atleast in 1993, if not earlier, must be taken to be illegal and such direction must be quashed. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by the State Human Rights Commission dated 25.6.2001 is quashed. No costs.