L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is the chairman of the Hyderabad Co-operative bank Limited, Yakutpura, Hyderabad, the 3rd respondent, (for short the bank ). He challenges the notice dated 28-8-2003 issued by the 1st respondent-Joint Registrar/ district Co-operative Officer, Hyderabad. Through the impugned notice, the 1st respondent directed the petitioner and other members of the Board of Directors of the bank to show-cause as to why an order shall not be passed superseding the Board of Directors, under Section 34 of the A. P. Co-operative Societies Act (for short the Act ). The other members of the board of Directors are said to have authorised the petitioner to file this writ petition. ( 2 ) THE case as presented by the petitioner is as under : ( 3 ) THE bank was established with due registration under the Act and obtaining necessary permission from the 4th respondent- reserve Bank of India (for short the rbi ) and that it was operating within the banking norms. In the months of September and October 2002, the RBI caused an inspection of the bank and was satisfied with its functioning. The aspects, such as cash Reserve Ratio, etc, were found to be in better position than the stipulated norms and limits. The petitioner was elected as chairman in April 2003 and he is functioning as such. ( 4 ) THE 1st respondent issued the impugned notice referring to the letter dated 18-8-2003 addressed to it by the rbi. There was hardly anything for the petitioner or the Directors to respond to it, since nothing was indicated in the show-cause notice nor the letter addressed by the RBI was made available to them. ( 5 ) THE petitioner contends that though Section 115-B of the Act enables the rbi to issue necessary directions, even for supersession, such a course of action can be resorted to, only after giving an opportunity to the affected parties. Since the RBI did not issue show-cause notice to the petitioners and the other members of the Board of Directors, requiring them to show-cause as to why the Board of directors shall not be superseded, the decision, if any, that emanated from the RBI cannot be sustained, and that equally unsustainable are the consequential steps taken by the 1 st respondent. ( 6 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed by the RBI, serious objection is taken as to the maintainability of the writ petition. According to them, the writ petition challenging a show-cause notice is not maintainable. It is their case that the impugned show-cause notice itself was unwarranted in view of the fact that once a direction is issued by them under section 115-B of the Act, the 1st respondent has no other alternative except to implement it straightaway. Copious reference is made to the inspection conducted by them into the functioning of the bank and noticing of several irregularities during the course of inspection. It is also stated that ample opportunity was given to the bank to rectify the defects and ultimately when it emerged that the lapses and deficiencies were persistent, direction was issued under section 115-B to supersede the Board of directors of the bank. ( 7 ) THE 1st respondent filed a counter- affidavit stating that the impugned notice was issued in the context of the direction received by him from the RBI. He tries to sustain the same by referring to the provisions of Section 115-B of the Act. ( 8 ) SRI Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned notice directs the petitioner to show-cause as to why the board of Directors shall not be superseded without indicating the reasons for the supersession. He submits that the very basis of issuance of show-cause notice viz. , the letter addressed by the RBI to supersede the Board of Directors, is contrary to law, inasmuch as the petitioner was not put on notice before such a decision was taken. He contends that the show-cause notice is, in fact, a futile exercise, inasmuch as the 1 st respondent has not even chosen to furnish a copy of the letter received by it from the RBI. ( 9 ) DURING the course of hearing of the matter, a copy of letter dated 16-8-2003, which incidentally was referred to, as the one dated 18-8-2003 in the show-cause notice, was made available to the petitioner. On receiving the same, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that except repeating the gist of Section 115-B (iii) of the Act, the RBI did not indicate any reasons, in support of its decision to supersede the board of Directors of the bank. On receiving the same, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that except repeating the gist of Section 115-B (iii) of the Act, the RBI did not indicate any reasons, in support of its decision to supersede the board of Directors of the bank. He strenuously contends that such a decision ought not have been taken without issuing notice to the affected parties. ( 10 ) SRI K. Srinivasa Murthy, learned senior Counsel for the RBI, submits that during the course of inspection of the functioning of the bank, several irregularities as to banking norms, maintenance of accounts, etc. , were noticed. He submits that the RBI addressed a letter dated 5-3-2003 to the bank pointing out the defects and deficiencies and advising it to place before the Board of Directors and directing them to call on the officials of the RBI for discussions. It is stated that the bank had addressed letter dated 23-5-2003 informing the RBI about the discussion of the inspection report and the remedial steps taken by them. Learned senior counsel contends that it is only when repeated efforts of the RBI to ensure that the bank functions in accordance with the relevant norms failed, that the RBI had to take a decision to direct supersession of the board of Directors. ( 11 ) LEARNED senior Counsel submits that issuance of the impugned show-cause notice by the 1st respondent was totally uncalled for. According to him, the letter dated 16-8-2003 addressed by the RBI in exercise of its power under Section 115-B brought about supersession and the 1st respondent was expected nothing more than to communicate the decision to the Board of Directors. So far as the observance of principles of natural justice is concerned, learned Senior Counsel submits that having regard to the Scheme of chapter XIII-A of the Act, principles of natural justice can be said to have been excluded. Placing reliance upon certain judgments rendered by the Bombay High court, the learned Counsel submits that it is not necessary for the RBI to issue any show- cause notice when it takes a decision to supersede the Board of Directors of the bank. It is also his contention that since no challenge is made to the order of supersession passed by the RBI, the petitioner cannot advance any contentions in relation to the same. It is also his contention that since no challenge is made to the order of supersession passed by the RBI, the petitioner cannot advance any contentions in relation to the same. ( 12 ) SIMILAR submissions are on behalf of the 1st respondent by the learned government Pleader for Co-operation. ( 13 ) THE challenge in this writ petition is to a show-cause notice dated 28-8-2003. A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the 1st respondent as to maintainability of the writ petition against such a show- cause notice. It is true that interference with show-cause notice in writ petition is rather rare and Courts would be slow to exercise jurisdiction in such cases. The reason is that no prejudice as such is caused to a citizen, when he is simply required to show-cause as to why a particular action should not be taken against him. It is only when a decision, adverse to the interest of a citizen, results on such an exercise, that he can be said to have suffered prejudice. ( 14 ) THERE are, however, certain exceptions to this general rule. If a show- cause notice is issued by an authority not vested with the power or where it is in contravention of specific provisions of law, the affected persons need not be required to undergo the ordeal of submitting an explanation to an otherwise unsustainable action. A further category of cases is where the contents of show-cause notice patently disclose that there is hardly anything, which a notice can state in his defence. In other words, if the notice discloses that a decision, adverse to the interest of an individual has already been taken; and the individual is required to show-cause without indicating any particular aspect, such an exercise cannot be permitted to be undertaken. There is no absolute bar as such to entertain writ petitions against show-cause notices. If at all anything, it is reluctance of the Courts to entertain writs against such show-cause notices, for the reasons indicated above. If the examination of the matter discloses that the show-cause notice itself is patently illegal, the reluctance fades away. It is from this angle that the matter needs to be examined. ( 15 ) THE bank was registered under the act. If the examination of the matter discloses that the show-cause notice itself is patently illegal, the reluctance fades away. It is from this angle that the matter needs to be examined. ( 15 ) THE bank was registered under the act. All its affairs, such as, membership, method of election, terms of the Board of directors, power of the Registrar of the co-operative Societies to supersede the management for any violations, causing inspection, audit initiation of surcharge proceedings against the members of the board of Directors or employees, etc. , are governed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules made there under. Section 34 of the Act specifically deals with the power of the Registrar to supersede the management of the society. The circumstances under, and the manner in which, the Registrar can supersede the management of a society, are incorporated therein. ( 16 ) THROUGH A. P. Act 10 of 1970, chapter XIIIA, comprising of Sections 115-A and 115-B, has been inserted dealing with "eligible Co-operative Banks". It is not in dispute that the bank falls within the definition of "eligible Co-operative Banks" and thereby Chapter XIIIA applies to it. ( 17 ) SECTION 115-B of the Act contains special provisions applicable to the eligible co-operative Banks. It is not in dispute that the bank falls within the definition of "eligible Co-operative Banks" and thereby Chapter XIIIA applies to it. ( 17 ) SECTION 115-B of the Act contains special provisions applicable to the eligible co-operative Banks. It is beneficial to extract the same: "115-B. Special provisions applicable to eligible Co-operative Banks : notwithstanding a. anything in this Act, the following provisions shall apply to an eligible co-operative bank, namely: (I) an order for the winding up, or an order sanctioning a scheme of compromise or arrangement or of amalgamation or reconstruction, of the bank may be made under the provisions of this Act only with the previous sanction in writing of the reserve Bank; (II) an order of the winding up of the bank shall be made under the provisions of this Act, if so required by the Reserve bank in the circumstance referred to in section 13-D of the said Act; (III) if so required by the Reserve Bank in the public interest or for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or for securing the proper management of the bank, an order shall be made under the provisions of this Act for the supersession of the committee of management or other managing body (by whatever name called) of the bank and the appointment of a special officer therefor for such periods not exceeding five years in the aggregate as may, from time to time, be specified by the Reserve bank;" a reading of clause (iii) of this Section discloses that the RBI is entitled, in public interest, or for preventing the affairs of a bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors, to require the supersession of the committee of the management "under the provisions of this Act" and the appointment of a Special officer therefor. As and when such a requisition is given, the authority under the act is required to make an order under the provisions of the Act. The language employed in the provision reveals that the decision as such, for supersession of the management of a bank, is to be taken by the rbi, whereas the corresponding order under the Act is to be made by the authority under the Act, viz. , the Registrar. The language employed in the provision reveals that the decision as such, for supersession of the management of a bank, is to be taken by the rbi, whereas the corresponding order under the Act is to be made by the authority under the Act, viz. , the Registrar. This view gains support from the circumstances that factors, such as, public interest or affairs of the bank are needed to be taken into account by the RBI and that hardly any scope is left for the authority under the Act, except to make the order as required by the RBI. ( 18 ) FOR a better understanding of the power of the authorities to supersede the management of a society, it is necessary read to Section 34 of the Act, which applies to all kinds of societies. The relevant provision reads as under:"34. Supersession of the Committee: (1) If in the opinion of the Registrar, the committee is not functioning properly or wilfully disobeys or fails to comply wilfully with any lawful order or direction issued by the registrar under this Act or the rules, he may, after giving the committee an opportunity of making its representation, by order supersede the committee from a specified date; and appoint either a person (hereinafter referred to as the special officer) or a committee of two or more persons (hereinafter referred to as the managing committee) to manage the affair of the society for a period, not exceeding two years, specified in the order which period may, at the discretion of the Registrar, be extended from time to time, so however, that the aggregate period shall not exceed three years. "this provision discloses that the Registrar is under obligation to give the managing committee an opportunity of making a representation before he takes a decision to supersede it. A combined reading of section 34 (1) and Section 115-B (iii) discloses that the former is not rendered inapplicable for the eligible Co-operative Banks in its entirety. ( 19 ) IT is true that Section 115-B commences with a non-obstante clause. This, however, does not mean that the application of Section 34 is totally excluded. The reason is that even under clause (iii) of section 115-B, the order of supersession is required to be made "under the provisions of this Act". Except Section 34, there is no other provision under the Act for this purpose. This, however, does not mean that the application of Section 34 is totally excluded. The reason is that even under clause (iii) of section 115-B, the order of supersession is required to be made "under the provisions of this Act". Except Section 34, there is no other provision under the Act for this purpose. The result is that while an order of supersession is required to be made under section 34, the decision for such supersession in respect of eligible Co-operative Banks is to emanate from the RBI. The decision making process in the matter of supersession, insofar as it relates to such banks, stands made over from the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies to the RBI. Such an interpretation would be in harmony with section 34 as well as Section 115b. This court does not find that any other approach is possible or permissible. ( 20 ) ONCE it has emerged that Section 34 is not excluded, the requirement to give an opportunity of making a representation before the decision to supersede the Board of Directors remains intact. In view of the fact that the role of the Registrar in such matters is confined only to the one of passing an order in contradistinction to taking a decision, the decision taking authority, viz. , the RBI, has to comply with the requirement of giving the Board of directors, an opportunity of making a representation. ( 21 ) IF the contention of the learned senior Counsel for the RBI that it is not obligatory on the part of the RBI to issue any notice before taking any decision to require the supersession of the Board of directors is to be accepted, it would result in a situation where the decision to supersede a validly elected committee comes to be taken unilaterally by the RBI and the Registrar will have no other alternative except to make an order of supersession. This course of action would neither conform to the letter and spirit of the act nor that of the principles of natural justice. ( 22 ) LEARNED senior standing Counsel for the RBI placed reliance upon three unreported judgments of the Bombay High court - one rendered by a learned Single judge and two by Division Benches. This course of action would neither conform to the letter and spirit of the act nor that of the principles of natural justice. ( 22 ) LEARNED senior standing Counsel for the RBI placed reliance upon three unreported judgments of the Bombay High court - one rendered by a learned Single judge and two by Division Benches. In ishwardas Premkumar Choradiya v. State of Maharashtra (Unreported judgment in wp No. 890/2002 dated 28-3-2002), a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court considered the question as to whether the registrar of Co-operative Societies is bound to give a show-cause notice while passing an order under Section 110a of the maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act; which is said to be in pari materia with section 115b of the Act. It was held therein that since the direction to supersede emanates from RBI, the Registrar has no discretion in the matter, but to supersede and appoint an Administrator. There is absolutely no quarrel with this proposition. If at all anything the decision discloses that the impugned show-cause notice is superfluous. If that is ignored, nothing operates against the petitioner. ( 23 ) THE learned senior Counsel for the rbi insists that the decision taken by the rbi to supersede the Board of Directors becomes operative on its being communicated to the petitioner. It is in this context that the validity of the decision taken by the RBI needs to be considered. It is not disputed that the RBI did not issue any show-cause notice to the petitioner before it has taken a decision to supersede the Board of Directors of the bank. The two unreported decisions rendered by the division Benches of the Bombay High Court are in Mahendra v. State of Maharashtra (WP No. 2746/1990 dated 29-4-1992) and prakash Ganesh Aaphale v. State of maharashtra (WP No. 3658/2002 dated 18-9-2002 ). In the judgment in Ishwardas premkumar Choradiya s case, referred to above, the learned Single Judge relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench in mahendra s case in WP No. 2746/90. In that case, the question whether it is obligatory on the part of the Registrar to issue a show-cause notice, once he receives a requisition from the RBI was considered. The question as to whether it was obligatory on the part of the RBI to issue notice to the affected parties was not considered. In that case, the question whether it is obligatory on the part of the Registrar to issue a show-cause notice, once he receives a requisition from the RBI was considered. The question as to whether it was obligatory on the part of the RBI to issue notice to the affected parties was not considered. Similar is the situation in the judgment in Prakash Ganesh Aaphale s case in WP No. 3658/02. Hence, the 3 judgments referred to above do not support the contentions advanced on behalf of the RBI. ( 24 ) THE judgment in Janata Sahakari bank Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra, air 1983 Bom. 252, relied upon by the learned senior standing Counsel for the rbi, dealt with the power of the RBI to issue direction under Sections 35a and 56 of the Banking Regulations Act. None of the instructions issued by the RBI in exercise of its power in the said provisions is challenged in this writ petition. ( 25 ) THE judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in b. Suryanarayana v. The Kolluru Parvathi co-operative Bank Limited, AIR 1986 ap 244 , relied upon by the learned senior standing Counsel for the RBI, dealt with the question as to whether the provisions of the A. P. Co-operative Societies Act or those of the Banking Regulations Act are applicable in the matter of winding up of the co-operative banks. It was contended that the provisions of the Co-operative societies Act are not applicable in the matter of winding up of such banks. Referring to the expression "under the provisions of this Act" occurring in section 115b, this Court repelled the contention. The said decision, in fact, supports the view expressed in this case in the preceding paragraphs. ( 26 ) LEARNED senior standing Counsel for the RBI strenuously contended that since there does not exist any specific provision in the Act in cases governed by Section 115-B warranting issuance of a show-cause notice, the principles of natural justice stand excluded. He contends that it is in the interest of depositors that an immediate decision needs to be taken and observance of principles of natural justice would delay the decision and thereby may cause detriment to the depositors. He contends that it is in the interest of depositors that an immediate decision needs to be taken and observance of principles of natural justice would delay the decision and thereby may cause detriment to the depositors. ( 27 ) SO far as the contention as regards protection of public interest and taking immediate decision is concerned, it needs to be observed that the RBI is vested with ample powers to pass such orders as it deems fit, in exercise of its powers under section 35a of the Banking Regulations act. In fact, it did pass an order in relation to the bank on 16-8-2003, the same day on which it had directed supersession of the board of Directors of the bank. In these directions issued under Section 35a, the rbi indicated several measures as to the extent of withdrawal of amounts by depositors, renewal of existing terms on maturity, payment of bills received for collections, payment of drafts or pay orders, incurring expenditure for the purpose of salaries, rents, electricity bills, legal expenses, payment of premium to the deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee corporation, incurring expenditure on any other items, etc. Neither such directions were challenged nor it is complained that the same were not followed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the interests of depositors cannot be protected except by directing the supersession of the Board of directors of the bank, without giving an opportunity of being heard. ( 28 ) NOTWITHSTANDING the fact that the application and observance of the principles of natural justice is universal, there are instances where their application is excluded. Such exclusion can be either through a special provision in the respective statute as in the case of 2nd proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India or by necessary implication (See UOI v. Tulsi Ram Patel, air 1985 SC 1416 ). For this purpose, regard needs to had to the totality of the circumstances, such as, where the action covers large number of persons involved (See Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U. P. , AIR 1981 SC 875 and involvement of National security (See Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. UOI, air 1981 SC 818 ). For this purpose, regard needs to had to the totality of the circumstances, such as, where the action covers large number of persons involved (See Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U. P. , AIR 1981 SC 875 and involvement of National security (See Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. UOI, air 1981 SC 818 ). In Tulsi Ram Patel s case (supra), the Supreme Court had in fact fitted the concept of principles of natural justice into Article 14 of the Constitution of india, through a syllogism, with the following major and minor premises: (A) Violation of rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness, which is same as discrimination; (B) Where the discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of article 14; (C) Violation of principles of natural justice by a State action is violative of Article 14. Dealing with the context in which the principles of natural justice can be excluded by statute, in his judgment in Swadeshi cotton Mill s case (supra), Justice Chinnappa reddy, observed: "where the statute is silent about the observance of principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. The implication of natural justice being presumptive, it may be excluded by express words of statute or by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between public interest and the private interest, the presumption must necessarily be weak and may therefore, be readily displaced. " this passage was cited with approval in tulsi Ram Patel s case. ( 29 ) IT has already been observed in the preceding paragraphs that a combined reading of Section 34 and Section 115b discloses that the requirement under section 34 as to giving an opportunity of making a representation is left intact. If at all there is any change in this regard, it is only as to the agency that is empowered to take decision, and correspondingly, required to give an opportunity to the affected party. Instead of Registrar, it becomes the rbi in case of Banking Companies. ( 30 ) THE decision to supersede the Board of Directors to be taken by the RBI is not absolute and without any fetters. Clause (iii) of Section 115b discloses that such a decision is to be taken in public interest or to protect the interests of the depositors. ( 30 ) THE decision to supersede the Board of Directors to be taken by the RBI is not absolute and without any fetters. Clause (iii) of Section 115b discloses that such a decision is to be taken in public interest or to protect the interests of the depositors. The Board of Directors are answerable to its general body and it is readily available to be questioned by the members, when compared to the officialdom of the co-operative Department or the RBI. There cannot be any presumption that the members of the Board of Directors of a Co-operative bank Act detrimental to the interests of its depositors. As the members of the board of Directors are elected by the entire membership, its supersession would set at naught, such mandate. ( 31 ) IF there exists any persistent violation on the part of the management, it is always open to the RBI to direct it to show-cause as to why it should not be superseded. A mighty organisation like the RBI cannot dispense with the services of its Class IV employees without issuing notice to them. An elected body of a co-operative Bank cannot be relegated to a lower status than that of Class IV employees of the RBI. ( 32 ) EVEN in cases where the principles of natural justice are excluded, the context in which such exclusion took place should be evident from the content of the order. While undertaking judicial review, the Court has to satisfy itself as to the existence of such causes and circumstances warranting the exclusion of principles of natural justice. The power of judicial review to undertake scrutiny into these aspects, even in cases where the principles of natural justice stood excluded was dealt with in Chief Security officer v. Singasan Rabi Das, AIR 1991 sc 1043 . Starting with the premise that it is competent for the employer not to follow the principles of natural justice if the circumstances warrant, the Supreme court, on scrutiny of the facts, took the view that the facts of the case did not warrant such exclusion. Starting with the premise that it is competent for the employer not to follow the principles of natural justice if the circumstances warrant, the Supreme court, on scrutiny of the facts, took the view that the facts of the case did not warrant such exclusion. ( 33 ) THE directive issued by the RBI, which constituted the basis for the impugned notice, reads as under:"the Reserve Bank of India, being satisfied that in the public interest and for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors and for securing the proper management of the bank, it is necessary to supersede the Board of Directors of the Hyderabad Co-operative Urban Bank ltd. ; Hyderabad, (Andhra Pradesh) and to have an Administrator appointed therefor, hereby requires the Registrar of Co-operative societies, Andhra Pradesh to make an order for supersession of the Board of directors of the Hyderabad Co-operative urban Bank Ltd; Hyderabad, (Andhra pradesh) and the appointment of an administrator therefor, initially for a period of one year from the date on which the official takes charge as Administrator, in terms of the provisions of clause (iii) of section 115-B of the Andhra Pradesh co-operative Societies Act, 1964. "except for a broad reference to the requirements under the Act, there is hardly any reference to any specific acts, omissions or circumstances warranting a decision that cannot await a response from the aggrieved party. This letter does not attribute anything to the Chairman or directors of the Board of Directors of the Bank. It is settled principle of law that every violation by itself cannot result in extreme action and that existence of power by itself is not a justification for the exercise of it. Before resorting to such an extreme step, the RBI was under obligation to point out the deficiencies on the part of the members of the Board of Directors and to call upon them to explain as to why such a step should not be taken. This not having been done, the entire exercise cannot be sustained. Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any basis for the contention that the RBI can supersede the Board of directors of a Co-operative Bank, without issuing any notice. ( 34 ) THE writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned notice is set aside. This not having been done, the entire exercise cannot be sustained. Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any basis for the contention that the RBI can supersede the Board of directors of a Co-operative Bank, without issuing any notice. ( 34 ) THE writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned notice is set aside. Since it is found that the letter dated 16-8-2003, which constituted the basis for the show-cause notice, does not conform to the requirements of law, it is declared that no action pursuant thereto can be taken against the petitioner. It is, however, made clear that it is open to the respondents to take such action as they intend to, duly following the procedure prescnbed by law, as indicated above. No costs.