ORDER 1. Application for intervention is allowed. 2. Both these appeals can be disposed of by a common judgment. Both of them are against the judgment of the High Court dated 14-7-2000. 3. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: On 17-11-1987 there was a notification under Section 4 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The award came to be passed on 8-6-1988. The question is whether the claimants are entitled to compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This has been allowed by the High Court by the impugned judgment. The High Court has based this decision on another judgment in respect of other lands acquired under the same notification. We are fairly informed that the other party has been paid this additional amount as the special leave petition was dismissed by this Court on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Thus, on the basis ofparity, the High Court was right in granting even in this case. We do not see any reason to interfere with the award. However, the High Court has also decided and held on merits that the amount is payable. This is a question of law which affects many cases and the law is thus required to be settled. We, thus entertain Civil Appeal No. 2549 of 2002 only to settle the question of law. 4. On the basis of the other judgment the High Court has also made a deduction of 20% for development charges. Aggrieved by that portion, Civil Appeal No. 2550 of 2002 has been filed by the claimants. As the acquisition was of a large piece of land, the High Court was right in making the deduction of 20%. It cannot be said that the deduction of 20% is unreasonable. Even otherwise, on the basis of parity, the High Court was right in making the same deduction. To this extent, we see no infirmity in the impugned judgment. Civil Appeal No. 2550 of 2002 is dismissed with no order as to costs. 5. As stated above, the acquisition is under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. Even otherwise, on the basis of parity, the High Court was right in making the same deduction. To this extent, we see no infirmity in the impugned judgment. Civil Appeal No. 2550 of 2002 is dismissed with no order as to costs. 5. As stated above, the acquisition is under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The relevant provision is Section f 7(1) which reads as under: "7: (I) Wherever any land is acquired under Section 4 there shall be paid to every person interested compensation the amount of which shall be determined by the Collector in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in sub-section (I) of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as they may be applicable Provided that the market value referred to in clause first of sub-section (I) of Section 23 of the said Act shall, in respect of any land acquired under this Act, be deemed to be the market value of such land on the date of publication of the notice referred to in sub-section (I -a) of Section 4: Provided further that in respect of any land in Calcutta which, immediately before the 1st day of January, 1964, constituted a bustee as defined in clause (10) of Section 5 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, the amount of compensation to be paid on account of acquisition to the persons interested shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in sub-section (I) of Section 7 of the Calcutta Slum Clearance and Rehabilitation of Slum-Dwellers Act, 1958, so far as they may be applicable." Thus compensation is to be worked out in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in sub-section (I-A) [sic (I)] of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The High Court has proceeded on the footing that the case is governed by a decision of this Court in the case of u.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. lainul Isiaml. In this case, the acquisition was under the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965. Section 55 of which read b as under: "55. The High Court has proceeded on the footing that the case is governed by a decision of this Court in the case of u.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. lainul Isiaml. In this case, the acquisition was under the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965. Section 55 of which read b as under: "55. Power to acquire land.-(l) Any land or any interest therein required by the Board for any of the purposes of this Act, may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act I of 1894), as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, which for this purpose shall be subject to the modifications specified in the Schedule to this Act. (2) If any land in respect of which betterment fee has been levied under this Act is subsequently required for any of the purposes of this Act, such levy shall not be deemed to prevent the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act I of 1894)." The question was whether after the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act by incorporation of Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28, a person whose land was acquired was entitled to compensation under these amended provisions. In that case it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 480-81, para 17) "17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to the earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by the later legislation. Such a legislation may either be (i) a referential legislation which merely contains a e reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or (ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. If it is a referential legislation the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made in the subsequent legislation would be applicable as it stands on the date of application of such earlier legislation to matters referred to in the subsequent legislation. In other words, any amendment made in the earlier legislation after the date of enactment of the subsequent legislation would also be applicable. But if it is a legislation by incorporation the rule of construction is that repeal of the earlier statute which is incorporated does not affect operation of the subsequent statute in which it has been incorporated. In other words, any amendment made in the earlier legislation after the date of enactment of the subsequent legislation would also be applicable. But if it is a legislation by incorporation the rule of construction is that repeal of the earlier statute which is incorporated does not affect operation of the subsequent statute in which it has been incorporated. So also any amendment in the statute which has been so incorporated that is made after the date of incorporation of such statute does not affect the subsequent statute in which it is incorporated and the provisions of the statute which have been incorporated would remain the same as they were at the time of incorporation and the subsequent amendments are not to be read in the subsequent legislation. In the wordsof Lord Esher, M.R., the legal effect of such incorporation by reference is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the pen or printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all. (See Woods Estate, Re2, Ch D at p. 615.) As to whether a particular legislation falls in the category of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation depends upon the language used in the statute in which reference is made to the earlier legislation and other relevant circumstances. The legal position has been thus summed up by this Court in State of M.P. v. M. V. Narasimhan3: (SCC p. 385, para 15 : SCR p. 14) Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act. " It was held that Section 55 of the Adhiniyam made a reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, the amended provisions were also applicable. It was further held that in any event, the acquisition was by the same body for a public purpose and, therefore, there could not be discrimination between two owners of properties and by implication also the amended provisions should be deemed applicable. 6. As seen earlier in Section 7 the calculation of compensation is to be made in the manner and in accordance with principles set out in Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thus, this is not a referential legislation which contained a reference to or the citation of Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 7 merely incorporates the manner in which compensation is to be worked out. As per the principles set out in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad easel any subsequent amendment would therefore not be applicable, particularly so when the amendment is not even in Section 23(1). Thus, any subsequent amendments in Section 23 would not be applicable and cannot be read in Section 7. 7. It must also be mentioned that by an amendment of 1996. Section 7 has been amended and Section 23(I-A) has been incorporated with effect from 1-4-1994. This also shows that earlier to this date, the provisions of a Section 23(l-A) were not applicable to an acquisition under the West Bengal (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. 8. A question then arises whether such an interpretation leads to discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This question has been squarely answered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer v. H. Narayanaiah4• Here also the b acquisition was under a Requisition and Acquisition Act. The question was whether compensation was payable under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. An argument based on Article 14 was repelled by holding that cases of mere acquisition are different from cases where first there is a requisition and thereafter there is an acquisition. This decision has subsequently been confirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the c case of Union of India v. Chajju Rams. An argument based on Article 14 was repelled by holding that cases of mere acquisition are different from cases where first there is a requisition and thereafter there is an acquisition. This decision has subsequently been confirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the c case of Union of India v. Chajju Rams. In view of these authorities, it cannot be said that there is any violation of Article 14 inasmuch as even in this case the acquisition is under a Requisition and Acquisition Act. 9. In this view of the matter, we are unable to uphold the reasoning of the High Court. However, as stated above, we maintain the compensation payable on the basis of parity. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.There will be no order as to costs.