M. KATJU, J. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the proceedings under Section 37 of the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad as also the summoning order. 2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 3. The petitioner is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. It has an industrial unit for manufacture of Ayurvedic medicines at Naini, Allahabad. For this purpose the petitioner obtained a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. For the purpose of manufacture of these Ayurvedic drugs the petitioner purchases commodities including certain products which are agricultural produce e. g. Gur, Ghee, Amala etc. It is alleged that the petitioner consumed these agricultural products in its factory for manufacturing ayurvedic drugs. 4. In paragraph 9 of the writ petition it is alleged that the petitioner is not a producer under Section 2 (p) of the Act nor is it a broker under Section 2 (b), or a trader under Section 2 (y) of the Act. It is alleged that the petitioner is not a buyer or seller of agricultural produce nor is it engaged in processing of agricultural produce. Hence it is alleged that the Act is not applicable to the petitioner company. The petitioner purchases agricultural produce only as raw material for its production in its factory. Hence it is alleged that the petitioner is under no obligation to take a licence under Section 9 (2) and the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules made under the Act have no application. 5. It is alleged in paragraph 13 of the writ petition that to the utter surprise of the petitioner it was served with the notice dated 17-3-1999 Annexure-1 to the writ petition from the office of the Secretary, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Mundera, Allahabad stating that the petitioner should obtain a licence under the Act failing which proceedings will be taken against him. On receiving this notice the petitioner sent a reply dated 31-3-1999 stating that the petitioner is not a trader and hence is not liable to taken any licence under the Act. True copy of the petitioners reply is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. On receiving this notice the petitioner sent a reply dated 31-3-1999 stating that the petitioner is not a trader and hence is not liable to taken any licence under the Act. True copy of the petitioners reply is Annexure 2 to the writ petition. However, vide letter dated 2-12-2000 the respondent Secretary, Mandi Samiti issued an order stating that the petitioners explanation has been considered but it is not acceptable and hence the petitioner should taken a licence under Section 9 (2) read with Rule 70 of the Rules otherwise legal action will be taken against him. True copy of the said letter dated 2-12-2000 is Annexure 3 to the writ petition. The petitioner sent reply dated 3-12-2000 vide Annexure 4 to the writ petition. However, thereafter vide letter dated 16-12-2000 and 15-2-2001 the petitioner was directed again to take licence vide Annexure 5 and 6 to the writ petition. The respondents have initiated proceedings for penalty under Section 37 of the Act against the petitioner for which summons have been issued. Hence this petition. 6. A counter-affidavit has been filed and we have perused the same. In paragraph 8 it is stated that Gur, Ghee, Amla are specified agricultural produce as notified in the Schedule to the Act. Hence the transactions in those commodities entails market fee, and after declaration of the market area all the traders or consumers who effect sales and purchase or even store agricultural produce are liable to take a licence under Section 9 of the Act. 7. In paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit it is denied that the petitioner does not sell or purchase specified agricultural produce. It is alleged that even storage of agricultural produce requires licence under Section 9. It is alleged in paragraph 10 that the petitioner is storing agricultural produce, and hence he has to obtain a licence. 8. A perusal of the Schedule to the Act shows that Gur, Ghee and Amla are mentioned therein. Hence in view of Section 2 (a) they are definitely agricultural produce under the Act. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, is that the petitioner is not engaged in the business of buying or selling agricultural produce nor is engaged in processing of agricultural produce. Hence in view of Section 2 (a) they are definitely agricultural produce under the Act. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, is that the petitioner is not engaged in the business of buying or selling agricultural produce nor is engaged in processing of agricultural produce. Hence it is alleged that the petitioner is neither broker, as defined in Section 2 (b), nor a commission agent as defined in Section 2 (e), nor a producer as defined in Section 2 (p), nor a trader as defined in Section 2 (y) of the Act. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is exempt from Section 9 (1) to the Act in view of the proviso to that provision which states: "provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply to a producer in respect of agricultural produce produced, reared, caught or processed by him or to any person who purchases or stores any agricultural produce for his domestic consumption. " 10. Learned Counsel submitted that the words "domestic consumption" in the proviso to Section 9 (1) means consumption for the use of that person and is not limited to consumption in homes. Hence he has submitted that Section 9 (1) has no application to the petitioner. 11. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned Counsel for the respondents,however, urged that the petitioner is bound to take a licence under Section 9 because it stores agricultural produce. 12. In our opinion this petition deserves to be allowed on the ground that the expression "domestic consumption" in the proviso to Section 9 (1) means consumption by the person himself who is doing the storing. Hence in our opinion the petitioner does not require to take a licence under Section 9 of the Act. 13. There is no dispute that the petitioner purchases the agricultural produce for use as raw material in its factory at Naini, Allahabad. In our opinion, when the petitioner purchases these agricultural produce and stores it for use in its manufacturing activities such purchases and storage is for domestic consumption. In this case the whole issue turns on the meaning of the word "domestic. " 14. One word may have several meanings, and one meaning may have several words (synonyms ). Hence the correct interpretation given to a word must take colour from the context, otherwise it may lead to strange results. In this case the whole issue turns on the meaning of the word "domestic. " 14. One word may have several meanings, and one meaning may have several words (synonyms ). Hence the correct interpretation given to a word must take colour from the context, otherwise it may lead to strange results. No doubt the word "domestic" can have a meaning associated with the home or house. For example a domestic servant means a servant employed in the house rendering personal service to the employer. 15. However, the word domestic can have other meanings too e. g. the expression "domestic trade" means trade pertaining to the home country as opposed to foreign trade, vide Law Lexican by P. Ramanatha Aiyar page 587. 16. In this sense the word "domestic" means `internal and not `external. From this point of view, the expression "domestic" would mean consumption by the party purchasing the goods himself and not by someone else to whom the said party sells the goods. From this point of view the storage of agricultural produce by the petitioner is clearly for domestic consumption as it is use by him for manufacturing activity. 17. No doubt the words any person who purchases or stores any agricultural produce for his domestic consumption in the proviso to Section 3 (1) can also mean a person who grows agricultural produce and eats it or consumes it himself. However, in our opinion, the expression domestic consumption in the proviso to Section 9 (1) includes both the agricultural producer who consumes his own production and also the manufacturer who uses the agricultural produce in his manufacturing activity. 18. In Catto v. Plant 137-A. 764, 106 Conn. 236 it was observed: "the term "domestic" has widely varying meanings, and, while its primary significance relates to the house or home, it is often used in a vastly broader sense, and its significance is determinable with reference to the subject matter or relation in which it appears. " 19. In United States v. United Verde Copper, Co. 25 S. Ct. 222 196 U. S. 207, it was observed that the word domestic may relate to a broader entity than household. Thus a domestic manufacturer means not only those of the household but may also mean those of a country, State or nation, according to the context. 20. In Louisville & N. R. Co. 25 S. Ct. 222 196 U. S. 207, it was observed that the word domestic may relate to a broader entity than household. Thus a domestic manufacturer means not only those of the household but may also mean those of a country, State or nation, according to the context. 20. In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Tennessee, 19 F. 679, it was observed that domestic commerce is commerce which is entirely within one State. 21. In the New Shorter Oxford dictionary the word domestic has been shown to have several meanings e. g. of or pertaining to ones own country or nation; not foreign or international; indigenous; made in ones own country, not imported, etc. 22. In Websters New International Dictionary among the various definitions of the word domestic given there one definition is "internal". This is also mentioned in this Oxford Thesaurus p. 108. 23. In our opinion, the meaning of domestic consumption in the proviso to Section 9 (1) is internal and is not limited to home. The petitioner uses the agricultural produce which he is buying for internal purpose, that is, for the purpose of consumption in its factory, and not for external consumption by some one else to whom he may transfer the agricultural produce. 24. In view of the above this petition is allowed. We hold that the petitioner is not liable to take licence under Section 9 of the Act. The impugned proceedings are accordingly quashed. No order as to costs. .