Judgment :- By consent of the parties, the revision petition itself has been taken up for disposal. 2. The order passed by the XV Small Cause Judge, Madras in M.P.No.463/2001 in R.C.O.P.1730/2000 is challenged in this revision. 3. The respondents in this C.R.P. as landlords, have filed R.C.O.P.No.1730/2000 for eviction of this petitioner, who is occupying the demised premises, as tenant, on the ground that the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of rent, which comes to Rs.1,20,641/- from 26.8.1999 to 31.8.2000. 4. In the said R.C.O.P., the landlords have filed a petition under Section 11(4) of the Act 18/1960, as amended by Act 23/1973, (hereinafter called Act), to issue direction to the respondent viz., the revision petitioner herein, to pay the entire arrears of rent of Rs.2,29,860/- commencing from 26.8.1999 to 31.7.2001 at Rs.10,929/- per month, together the future rents also at the same rate till the date of the order, failing which to stop all further proceedings and to pass an order of eviction in the main R.C.O.P. That petition was contested, questioning the fair rent fixed, taking the defence under Section 10(4)(ii) of the Act also, since they are running the society with a non profit motive, distributing essential goods to the public, through the Public Distribution System. 5. The learned trial Judge after considering the case of the parties, directed the revision petitioner/tenant to pay a sum of Rs.2,29,860/-, being the rental arrears from August 1999 to July 2001 with a further direction to pay the arrears up to date at the rate of Rs.10929/- per month, failing which further proceedings in R.C.O.P. will be stopped and eviction will be ordered. 6. The revision petitioner/tenant not complying with the condition as per the order of the Rent Controller, has filed this revision. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.Sathish Parasaran and the learned counsel for the respondents Mr.K.P. Ashok. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the landlord Trust and therefore, the fixation of fair rent by the Rent Controller itself is incompetent and in that view, for the non deposit of such rent, eviction could not be ordered. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the landlord Trust and therefore, the fixation of fair rent by the Rent Controller itself is incompetent and in that view, for the non deposit of such rent, eviction could not be ordered. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order made in R.C.O.P.No.1736/99 will not operate as res judicata in the present proceedings since the Rent Controller had passed the order fixing the fair rent, without jurisdiction. He argues further, that the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and the maintainability of the R.C.O.P. could be questioned in this revision, since the fixation of fair rent was made without jurisdiction and therefore, that order will not bind the tenant or it will not operate as res judicata. In this view, he has submitted that for the non payment of the alleged arrears of rent, as directed by the Rent Controller, eviction could not be ordered and in fact, the order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 11(4) of the Act is liable to be set aside. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents/landlords would contend, that the land lord Trust is only a private Trust, not exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act and therefore, as such the petition filed for the fixation of fair rent before the Rent Controller is well maintainable. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, that the fixation of the fair rent made by the Court in the previous proceedings has not been challenged by the tenant, and therefore, it has reached the finality and on that basis, the tenant is liable to pay the rent. The learned counsel argues further, that by the non payment of the rent fixed by the Rent Controller, despite demand, the tenant had committed wilful default and therefore, on this ground, the tenant is liable to be evicted and for that purpose alone, a petition was filed for eviction, in which, an application was filed under Section 11(4) of the Act, wherein an order was passed directing the tenant to pay the arrears of rent in accordance with the provisions, which is not liable to be challenged or interfered with by this Court in the revision, the further fact being, the revision itself is not maintainable. 10. The revision petitioner by name Vidya Bharathi Women Co-operative Women's Co-operative Stores Limited is in occupation of two shops, which belong to the respondents. The contractual rent for the said premises, was Rs.468/-. The landlord considering the location of the property and the probable rent that would fetch, if let to third parties, felt that the contractual rent fixed at Rs.468/- was very low. Therefore, they have filed a petition in R.C.O.P.No.1736/1999 for the fixation of the fair rent under Section 4 of the Act. It seems after notice to the respondent, in that petition, who is the revision petitioner herein, the Rent Controller, namely XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, had fixed the rent at the rate of 10929/- per month, payable with effect from 26.8.1999. It seems the said petition was not contested by the tenant, though notices were served. It is also an admitted position, that the order made in R.C.O.P.No.1736/1999 fixing the fair rent at Rs.10929/- per month is not questioned so far, by preferring any appeal or by filing a petition to set aside the ex parte order. In the counter filed by the tenant in M.P.No.463/2001 also, it is stated that the tenant is taking steps to file an appeal against the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.1736/1999. But, as on this date, as submitted before me, no appeal is preferred and the order made in R.C.O.P.No.1736/1999 is not set aside or modified. Therefore, it could be said safely, as on this date, that order is final, binding upon the parties, if it is otherwise valid. 11. According to the respondents/landlords, the tenant has not paid the fair rent fixed by the Court at Rs.10929/- per month from 26.8.1999, despite demand and request. Therefore, the non payment of the rent by the tenant, in the eyes of the landlords, amounted to wilful default. In this view, they have filed a petition for eviction on the ground of wilful default, in R.C.O.P.No.1730/2000. In that petition alone, Section 11(4) petition was filed as aforementioned, where a direction was given. The tenant not paying the rent or complying the order, has impugned the said order, in this revision. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the revision petition itself is not maintainable, which appears to be correct in my considered opinion. In that petition alone, Section 11(4) petition was filed as aforementioned, where a direction was given. The tenant not paying the rent or complying the order, has impugned the said order, in this revision. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the revision petition itself is not maintainable, which appears to be correct in my considered opinion. It is not the case of the tenant, that they have paid the rent or there is no arrears of rent. If the tenant has been aggrieved about the fixation of fair rent, they ought to have preferred an appeal or revision, as the case may be, but failed to do so, thereby allowing the order passed in R.C.O.P.No.1736/99, to reach the finality. That cannot be questioned in the petition filed for eviction, on the ground of wilful default. If the petitioner/tenant aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller, he ought to have preferred an appeal before the appellate authority as contemplated under law. That is also not done. Instead of preferring an appeal, to the appellate authority, in my considered opinion, the revision is not maintainable and on this ground the same is liable to be dismissed. 13. It is the specific case of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the provisions of the Rent Control Act are not applicable to the demised premises and therefore, the orders passed by the Rent Controller in fixing the rent in R.C.O.P.No.1736/99 as well as the order passed in M.P.No.463/2001 in R.C.O.P.No.1730/2000 directing the petitioner to deposit the rent, are all not valid and therefore, questioning the said orders alone, this petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution, which is well maintainable. In this context, we have to see the nature of the property and the character of the Trust and the stand taken by the parties, before the courts concerned when they had the opportunity to project their case at the earliest point of time. 14. The landlords have filed R.C.O.P.No.1736/1999 for fixing the fair rent, contending that the petitioner Trust is a 'private trust'. If it is not so, the tenant ought to have questioned the same, at the earliest opportunity. 14. The landlords have filed R.C.O.P.No.1736/1999 for fixing the fair rent, contending that the petitioner Trust is a 'private trust'. If it is not so, the tenant ought to have questioned the same, at the earliest opportunity. Admittedly, the tenant has not raised about the maintainability of the petition, before the Rent Controller for the fixation of the fair rent, thereby allowing the Rent Controller to fix the fair rent, at the request of the land lords. In R.C.O.P.No.1730/2000 also, it is specifically stated in the petition, that the first petitioner is a 'private trust' represented by its Trustees viz., the petitioners 2 to 4. The character of the Trust, is once again reiterated in paragraph 4 of the petition, where it is stated "the petitioners further states that the 2nd to 4th petitioners are the trustees of the first petitioner, which is a private trust." It is not known whether any counter is filed in this petition, since counter is not supplied with, in the typed set. At the time of filing the M.P.No.463/2001 also, the 4th petitioner has filed an affidavit stating that the first petitioner is a private trust, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Act. For this petition, the tenant has filed the counter, wherein, I am unable to see any averments questioning the character of the Trust. It is not the case of the tenant in the counter, that the land lord Trust is a public trust and therefore, the buildings owned by the petitioner Trust are exempted from the purview of the provisions of the Rent Control Act, which follows, the petitions filed by the landlord for fixation of rent as well as for the eviction are not maintainable. On the other hand, the counter affidavit says, about the previous rent control proceedings, questioning the maintainability of the rent control proceedings for eviction, seeking protection under Section 10(4)(ii) of the Act, which is not applicable in this case and that is why, no argument was also advanced before me. At the end of the affidavit, it is stated "It is submitted that the petitioner Trust is Wakf and hence being a religious Trust, this petition cannot be maintained". Here also, it is not the case of the tenant, that the petitioner trust is a public trust, and therefore, the proceedings under the Rent Control Act are not maintainable. At the end of the affidavit, it is stated "It is submitted that the petitioner Trust is Wakf and hence being a religious Trust, this petition cannot be maintained". Here also, it is not the case of the tenant, that the petitioner trust is a public trust, and therefore, the proceedings under the Rent Control Act are not maintainable. All the trust properties are not exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Only the buildings, owned by the public Trust alone are exempted, from the provisions of the Rent Control Act, as per the Government Order. Therefore, if the tenant was certain, that the petitioner Trust is a public trust, he would have stated specifically, and undoubtedly, that the petitioner trust is a public trust and therefore, the rent control proceedings whether it is for fixation of fair rent or for eviction are not maintainable. In the absence of any such specific stand, even as per the pleadings of the parties, I am of the firm view, that the petitioner/tenant is not entitled to question the maintainability of the case, before the Rent Controller or he cannot ignore the fixation of fair rent by the Rent Controller, contending that even in the revision, he can say that the order passed by the Rent Controller fixing the fair rent is non-est or the same will not operate as res judicata. 15. In the counter filed in M.P.No.463/2001 it is stated that the landlord had instituted RCOP 5049/1982 for fixation of fair rent, and in the said petition, fair rent was fixed, which was assailed in R.C.A.No.1069/84 and the said appeal was also dismissed. These stated facts by the tenant himself, would show that the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, only because of the fact, that the Rent Control provisions are applicable to the demised premises, that too, for the respondents, since the Trust is not a public trust, whereas it should be only a private Trust. It is also not the case of the tenant, that the Trust was originally a private trust and later on converted as Public Trust or by its activities or otherwise, entered into the arena of Public Trust. It is also not the case of the tenant, that the Trust was originally a private trust and later on converted as Public Trust or by its activities or otherwise, entered into the arena of Public Trust. In the absence of any such plea and proof, in my considered opinion, it is futile on the part of the tenant, to contend that the order passed by the Rent Controller in fixing the fair rent will not operate as res judicata or he is not bound by the order or he is not liable to pay the rent as fixed by the Rent Controller or the Rent Control proceedings for eviction is not maintainable before the XV Small Causes Court, Chennai. 16. The landlord Trust is named 'Ajmunnisa Wakf Alal Aulad Trust'. In order to bring this kind of wakf, within the meaning of public trust, aid is sought from the decision in Tamil Nadu Wakf Board, v. M.E. Musuee (AIR 1979 Madras 231). A division bench of this Court has elaborately discussed about the wakfs, created by muslims and under what circumstances, the wakf created by muslims will come within the meaning of private wakf and which wakf will come within the meaning of public wakf and it has held as follows: "It may be stated that the wakfs created by Muslims generally fall into two categories. One is public wakfs in the sense that the beneficiaries are members of the public and the other is private wakfs in the sense that public as such are not the beneficiaries and certain specified individuals happen to be the beneficiaries. Even with regard to a private wakf there may be two kinds. One is a wakf-alal-aulad simpliciter as we have in the present case where the public in the form of the poor will come into the picture only when the line of the wakf becomes completely extinct at some future uncertain point of time. The second is a wakf in which there is a dedication or gift in praesenti in the sense that a portion of the income from the wakf property is reserved for being spent on strangers and other objects of piety or charity and the other portion being spent for the benefit of the wakif's relations and members of the family. The second is a wakf in which there is a dedication or gift in praesenti in the sense that a portion of the income from the wakf property is reserved for being spent on strangers and other objects of piety or charity and the other portion being spent for the benefit of the wakif's relations and members of the family. The latter category alone is called generally a composite wakf in the sense that even in presenting it takes the character of a private wakf as well as a public wakf simultaneously. In other words, it is partly private and partly public." As aforementioned, when the trust was specific in its stand that it is a private trust, thereby excluding the public nature, then it is for the tenant to say otherwise and nothing stated against the private trust. When the allegations of fact in the petition, have not been denied specifically or by necessary implication, then it should taken as admitted one. In that case, it could be safely stated, that the facts admitted, need not be proved. When the law says that there should be specific denial, and when the same is not followed, the averments made in the petition should be taken as admitted, by their pleadings. Therefore, as observed in the above ruling also, a wakf alal-aulad simplicter, must be construed only as a private wakf and it cannot be termed as public wakf, in order to say that the Trust should come within the meaning of public trust, thereby getting the exemption under the G.O. 17. A decree or any order passed by a Court, without jurisdiction is nullity and certainly it will not operate as res judicata even against the party, who suffered such order. As early as 1954 itself, the Apex Court of this land in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ) has held: "It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter or the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." In order to apply the above principle of law, it must be shown that the fixation of fair rent was made by the Rent Controller, without jurisdiction. If that is not made out, this ruling will not come to the aid of the petitioner. As aforementioned, no case is made out that the landlord trust is a public trust, in order to say that is excluded or exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. 18. In Sushil Kumar Mehta vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (1990) 1 SCC 193 , the Apex Court has ruled, that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is nullity and the plea can be set up whenever and wherever the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon, and even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. This principle is certainly applicable, if it is shown or proved that the landlord trust is a public trust, which is not the case before me. In the case involved in the above ruling, it seems, from the facts admitted, the Civil Court has passed a decree, having no jurisdiction. Only on that basis, the Apex Court has ruled so and the same could not be made applicable to our case, in view of the fact, that the tenant has failed, even to deny specifically, the nature of the Trust. True, the principle of estoppel also could not be made applicable, even in the case of decree granted by the Court, by consent, when that Court had no jurisdiction to decide the case. In this view, when the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction, but decree is passed, by the consent of the parties, later if it is shown that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction, that decree passed, will not operate as estoppel, as pointed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon a decision in Smt. Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Susai ( AIR 1991 SC 993 ), wherein the Supreme Court has observed: "A Court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. Further, it is well settled that there can be no estoppel on a pure question of law and the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law." 19. In our case, when the landlord has filed the petition for fixation of fair rent, though it was made known to the tenant, viz., the revision petitioner, he has not contested. It seems, in one of the proceedings, when the Rent Controller had fixed the fair rent, the tenant had questioned in the appeal also, as narrated in the counter affidavit. Even after the ex-parte decree of fixing the fair rent, the same is not questioned. Therefore, as per the materials available before this Court, it cannot be said that the Rent Controller in this case viz., XV Small Causes Judge, Chennai has no jurisdiction in law, to fix the fair rent. Therefore, I am of the view, on the basis that the Rent Controller has fixed the fair rent, without jurisdiction and for the non payment of that rent fixed by the Rent Controller, eviction petition filed, is not maintainable, could not be accepted. 20. In Karthikeya Press v. Madarsa Dawoodiya Arabic College Trust ( 2002(1) CTC 641 ), this Court has taken a view that in order to decide the jurisdiction about the applicability of the Rent Control Act, the nature of Trust must be decided and then only it could be said, whether the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit for recovery of possession on the ground that exemption order applies. In the case involved in the above decision, the nature of trust was questioned, when occasion had arisen and on that ground when the court below had erred in not deciding the nature of Trust, this Court took the view that the issue relating to the nature of trust, being not decided, it should be decided, thereby remanded the matter. In our case, the nature of trust is not in dispute, I should say, on the basis of the pleadings. Therefore, the above ruling is also not applicable and the same will not come to the aid of the petitioner, to question the fixation of fair rent, as narrated in this proceedings. 21. In our case, the nature of trust is not in dispute, I should say, on the basis of the pleadings. Therefore, the above ruling is also not applicable and the same will not come to the aid of the petitioner, to question the fixation of fair rent, as narrated in this proceedings. 21. For the foregoing reasons and in view of the fact that the nature of the trust is not disputed, the revision petitioner is not entitled to raise the new plea, in the revision and he is bound by the decision rendered by the Courts below in R.C.O.P. filed for fixation of fair rent, which is not set aside and the subsequent R.C.O.P. filed for eviction wherein a petition under Section 11(4) C.P.C. is also filed. The tenant instead of depositing the amount and to contest the application, has filed this revision, without any basis, raising the new plea. In this view, I am unable to interfere with the findings rendered by the trial Court as one passed, without jurisdiction. Hence, the revision petition is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. No costs. C.M.P. 2166 of 2003 is closed. ------------------------------------------------------ *The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submits that the tenant may be given two months time for vacating the premises. Two months time granted for the tenant/revision petitioner to vacate the premises.