JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—This revision is directed against the order passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala in CMA-Execution No. 17 of 1996, dated 25.9.2001. By means of impugned order application filed by the petitioners (here-in-after referred to as the Decree Holders), under Section 141, under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been rejected. 2. Admitted facts giving rise to this revision are that decree holders filed an execution petition, for executing the decree in Civil Suit No. 406 of 1971, dated 27.2.1981. For executing this decree, they had engaged late Kanwar Parkash Singh, Advocate. This execution was registered as Execution Petition No. 27 of 1993 in the court of learned Senior Sub Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. Record of the execution shows that power of attorney was executed by the decree holders in favour of Kanwar Parkash Singh, Advocate, Sh. Jatinder Sharma, Advocate, Dharamshala and Sh. S.R. Sood, Advocate, Palampur. Learned Counsel for the parties did not dispute that Kanwar Parkash Singh died on 21.5.1994. Execution was dismissed on 4.1.1995 for default of appearance on behalf of the decree holders, because none appeared on that date. 3. In the aforesaid background, an application for restoration of this execution petition, that was dismissed for default was filed on 4th March, 1995. For prosecuting this application, decree holders had engaged counsel. This was also dismissed for default on 1.6.1996 as no one appeared on their behalf. For restoring this application, another application was filed on 9.10.1996 by the decree holders. 4. This last application, that was filed on 9.10.1996 supra was contested and resisted by the respondents (here-in-after referred to as the judgment debtors). This application was registered as CMA Execution Petition No. 17 of 1996. After recording statements of two persons, namely, Govind Ram, one of the petitioners and their counsel as Mr. Ajay Sephiya, on behalf of the decree holders, and one of judgment debtors Subhash Chand, trial Court had dismissed the said application, hence this revision. 5. Shri Dadhwal, learned Counsel appearing for the decree holders, submitted that his clients did whatsoever possibly could be done by them by having recourse by engaging counsel one after the other, who for reasons best known to them did not appear. This resulted in dismissal of execution on 4.1.1995. 5. Shri Dadhwal, learned Counsel appearing for the decree holders, submitted that his clients did whatsoever possibly could be done by them by having recourse by engaging counsel one after the other, who for reasons best known to them did not appear. This resulted in dismissal of execution on 4.1.1995. Thereafter two applications were filed i.e. one on 4.3.1995 and the other on 4.6.1995 as noted here-in-above. Sum and substance of his submission was that for inaction, negligence and/or remissness on the part of the counsel, his clients should not be made to suffer. Thus he submitted that looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, interest of justice demands that the application filed on 9.10.1996 be allowed and as a consequence of it application filed on 4.3.1995 be ordered to be restored. 6. All these pleas have been controverted by Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the judgment debtors. He submitted that assuming for the sake of argument without conceding, that there was negligence on the part of the counsel, still no case is made out for restoration of the application. According to him even an erroneous finding given by the trial Court does not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC. Per Mr. Sharma even if again it be assumed that learned Counsel was negligent, remedy to the decree holders, if any, is elsewhere and not in maintaining the present revision. Thus he prayed for dismissal of this revision petition with costs. 7. Evidence examined in support of their respective pleas on application dated 10.6.1996 needs to be noted which is as under. 8. AW-1 Govind Ram stated that execution was being prosecuted by their counsel Kr. Parkash Singh, Advocate. This witness also used to attend court on some dates. Kr. Parkash Singh having died so this execution was dismissed on 21.5.1994. This witness, in an accident suffered injury in 1995 which resulted fracture of his spine. He was shifted to PGI Chandigarh for treatment. His family was attending upon him there. As such, he was not in a position to attend to the execution. Regarding dismissal of the application, lawyer did not inform them. It was only later on that they learnt regarding dismissal of restoration application on 1.10.1996. He was an indoor patient at PGI Chandigarh. His family was attending upon him there. As such, he was not in a position to attend to the execution. Regarding dismissal of the application, lawyer did not inform them. It was only later on that they learnt regarding dismissal of restoration application on 1.10.1996. He was an indoor patient at PGI Chandigarh. Thereafter for about one and half years he was confined to bed. His brother came to inquire, when he engaged a counsel and application in question was filed. This witness stated that they are eight brothers. Some of them are employed and posted out side and only two of them are residing in the village. Accident occurred on 15.10.1995. He denied the suggestion of judgment debtors that other petitioners did not accompany him to Chandigarh. He further stated that only those who were residing at village had accompanied him. During the pendency of the execution he and his elder brother used to go to Court. He stated that he only wrote letters enquiring about the date from the counsel. He denied that their lawyer informed either the witness or his brother about the date and they failed to appear. He however, admitted that it is the responsibility of the party instituting a case to enquire from the counsel. He also denied the suggestion that counsel was not negligent and the application for restoration was dismissed due to their negligence. 9. AW-2 is Ajay Sephiya, Advocate. He has stated that he alongwith one Mr. Jitender Sharma, Advocate, was working with late Kr. Parkash Singh, who died on 21.5.1994. Per him all clients were informed of this fact. According to him, Kr. Parkash Singh was Advocate in execution petition. And in the application for restoration of execution, he i.e. the witness and Jatinder Sharma filed Vakalatnama. Restoration application was filed on 4.3.1995. He admitted that the application was dismissed on 1.6.1996 for default. Per him letters were written, and this fact is noted on the brief. No register was being maintained by them, from which he can tell as to on what dates letters were written. Brief was taken by the parties. They did not obtain any receipt. In cross-examination he told that whenever client(s), decree holders did not come on the date of hearing, they used to get letters written from their Munshi (clerk). After dismissal of the restoration application, brief was handed over to the parties. Brief was taken by the parties. They did not obtain any receipt. In cross-examination he told that whenever client(s), decree holders did not come on the date of hearing, they used to get letters written from their Munshi (clerk). After dismissal of the restoration application, brief was handed over to the parties. He is unable to state anything else as to when party came. After dismissal of the restoration application party had collected all its papers. 10. On the other hand Subhash Chand one of the judgment debtors has appeared as RW-1. Per him, he used to prosecute case on behalf of all the judgment debtors along with his brother. The decree holders are eight brothers and Govind Ram himself is a lawyer. He practised at Baijnath. One of the brothers Raj Kumar lives outside. Rest are all residents of Palampur and Baijnath. Decree holders used to come to prosecute their case. They had come only once or twice for prosecuting this case. In 1996 their execution was dismissed. No one had appeared on their behalf on that date. He admitted that Govind Ram was sick due to accident for about 10 months and was coming and going for treatment at Chandigarh. Rest of the brothers were all right. Decree holders did not prosecute the case. Nor they enquired through correspondence from their counsel about the progress of the case. This case was dismissed for default of the decree holders. In cross-examination he stated that he was not in a position to state, as to when he and his brother attended the prosecution proceedings. He was unable to state as to whether his presence was recorded when he appeared in court or not. Same was his reply as to which of the decree holders appeared and on what date. He admitted that Kr. Parkash Singh was initially the counsel of decree holders. He however, feigned ignorance regarding his death during pendency of execution. Similarly he also feigned ignorance that his juniors Ajay Sephiya and Jatinder Nath Sharma were prosecuting this case. He however, voluntarily stated that Advocates were appearing, but he was unable to state their names. He admitted that Govind Ram, Advocate, had fractured his spine. This is what he had heard. In the next breath he stated that he had gone to enquire about his welfare. He however, voluntarily stated that Advocates were appearing, but he was unable to state their names. He admitted that Govind Ram, Advocate, had fractured his spine. This is what he had heard. In the next breath he stated that he had gone to enquire about his welfare. He was under plaster and had informed the witness that his spine had been injured. He denied the suggestion of decree holders that he was in PGI for one and half years. He however, voluntarily stated that he would go for check up there while he was under treatment. He denied the suggestion that the treatment continued for two and half years and he was unable to walk, with whom and when the decree-holders were in correspondence, witness was not aware. Regarding writing of letters by the lawyers it was his guess work only, when the decree holders did attend hearing of this case and then this is the only meaning. This is the entire evidence. 11. Learned trial Court while dismissing the application came to the conclusion that no sufficient cause is shown from the statements of two witnesses examined on behalf of the decree holders. Similarly, it also came to the conclusion that from the statement of AW-2, it was not made out as to what (written as "which") prevented the lawyers of the applicants (decree holders) from appearing in Court. Reason given by the trial Court is that no sufficient ground was shown as to what prevented the lawyers from appearing in the case. Thus it arrived at the conclusion that the plea of case having been dismissed for negligence on the part of their counsel is not sufficient ground. For taking this view, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court reported in case Rattan Singh v. Karam Chand and others, 1997 (1) Sim. L.C. 257, and thus it came to the conclusion that no ground is made out for restoration of the application and thus has dismissed the application dated 9.10.1996. 12. Another plea that was raised by Mr. Sharma while opposing this revision petition also needs to be noted here. It is to the effect that even while prosecuting the main execution petition and thereafter two applications referred to hereinabove, the decree holders were most negligent when they failed to take timely steps in prosecuting all these proceedings. 12. Another plea that was raised by Mr. Sharma while opposing this revision petition also needs to be noted here. It is to the effect that even while prosecuting the main execution petition and thereafter two applications referred to hereinabove, the decree holders were most negligent when they failed to take timely steps in prosecuting all these proceedings. He urged with great emphasis on the fact that steps were not being taken by them therefore, no exception can be taken to the impugned order and the trial Court was justified in passing the same. This plea though attractive but for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter it cannot be accepted. 13. Reason being that non prosecution on the part of the decree holders is not a ground on which they have been non suited either when execution was dismissed or thereafter two applications supra were dismissed. Here the statement of AW-2 assumes significance. Admittedly he alongwith his colleague were the Advocates on behalf of the decree holders in execution as well as in the application for its restoration filed on 4.3.1995. Not a word has been said by this witness as to why they could not appear when either the execution or the application to restore it, both were dismissed in default. 14. In this behalf it may be noted that reference to day to day orders passed in the execution as well as in the two applications, it is clearly made out that lawyers did not appear on both occasions. It would have been a totally different situation, if the lawyers or any one of them had appeared and had stated that though they had intimated their clients, decree holders of the date and no one came forward to prosecute the same, so they were helpless. If this was the situation, probably the argument of Mr. Sharma was justified. Why the counsel did not appear when either execution was dismissed or application to restore it was dismissed, not a word has been said by the counsel to justify their absence. It is high time that those who have joined this noble profession of law, realise their responsibility and duty towards their clients. And also ensure that they conduct themselves diligently and fairly in prosecuting the matters entrusted by their clients. It is high time that those who have joined this noble profession of law, realise their responsibility and duty towards their clients. And also ensure that they conduct themselves diligently and fairly in prosecuting the matters entrusted by their clients. In this case, while appearing as AW-2 counsel seems to have made an attempt to justify his action of non appearance on both occasions, by stating that intimation was got sent to the decree holders through their Munshi (Clerk), when they did not appear. Munshi who had sent the letter was the right person to have stated so. In case the plea of the counsel is accepted to be correct, he ought to have got that brief requisitioned from the decree holders and in any case after cross-examination of AW-2 it was incumbent upon the decree holders to have made an attempt by recalling AW-1 along with the brief that is stated to have been handed over by AW-2 to the decree holders. Plea of the learned Counsel that brief was delivered without receipt and no despatch register of letters being maintained by him cannot be accepted on its face value. By putting up such pleas an Advocate cannot be permitted to wash of his hands as is intended in his statement by AW-2 in this case. Why the counsel did not appear on all the two occasions i.e. in execution and in the application for its restoration, he could not say anything nor was in a position to explain such absence. Prima facie this is a case of gross negligence on the part of the counsel for the decree holders, more particularly when they were aware that because of their acts of omission, commission and negligence, their clients are going to be ruined because limitation will come in their way. They seem to have taken the matter very casually. In case decree holders were not forthcoming, it was necessary for the counsel to have appeared and stated so before the court. Instead of doing so they chose to keep away from the court. 15. So far reliance placed by Mr. Sharma on a decision of this Court in case Rattan Singh v. Karam Chand and others (supra) is concerned, no benefit can be derived by the judgment debtors on its basis. It is a judgment on its own facts and is clearly distinguishable. 15. So far reliance placed by Mr. Sharma on a decision of this Court in case Rattan Singh v. Karam Chand and others (supra) is concerned, no benefit can be derived by the judgment debtors on its basis. It is a judgment on its own facts and is clearly distinguishable. Fortunately for the decree holders in this revision why their counsel had not appeared on two occasions, AW-2 has not come out with any plausible reason, whatsoever. So far reasons given by him are concerned, they in no case absolve both the counsel " from their clear cut negligence in absenting from court when the execution and thereafter application to restore the execution that was filed. 16. Mr. Sharma also relied on a decision of Supreme Court in The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and another v. Ajit Parsad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores), Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad, AIR 1973 SC 76. Again this decision is of no consequence. This judgment is again on its own facts. As such no benefit can be derived by the judgment-debtors from this judgment. Respondent in this case was an employee of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. He was proceeded against departmentally Therefore, he was put under suspension pending enquiry. He immediately rushed to the court challenging the validity of enquiry ordered against him as also order of his suspension as this order was passed on malicious grounds. Trial Judge passed ex parte ad interim orders, but vacated it after hearing the parties. In appeal this order was modified. When this matter was taken up in revision to the High Court; revision was accepted. Thus the High Court stayed the operation of suspension order as also the proceedings in enquiry. In this peculiar background of the case, Supreme Court allowed the revision of the employer. So far present case is concerned, firstly it is not against an interim order and secondly in the circumstances of this case, the decision of Supreme Court has no applicability in this case. And in any case this decision cannot be read out of context. 17. How the negligence of learned Counsel is to be viewed, had been attending the attention of the Supreme Court. Some of such decisions are being referred to hereinafter. 18. And in any case this decision cannot be read out of context. 17. How the negligence of learned Counsel is to be viewed, had been attending the attention of the Supreme Court. Some of such decisions are being referred to hereinafter. 18. When a rule nisi obtained seven years ago was discharged for non-appearance of the petitioners, it was held that writ should be restored and nothing could be more expected of a petitioner who had engaged three lawyers. Thus while setting aside the judgment of Guhati High Court, application for restoration was allowed. What was held in the case of Smt. Lachi Twari and others v. Director of Land Records and others, AIR 1984 SC 41, in para 3 of the judgment was held as under: : ".....It appears that soon thereafter within a span of about 10 days an application was moved on behalf of the petitioner pointing out to the court the circumstances in which neither the petitioner nor his three learned Counsel were present and sought the indulgence of the court to recall the order dated April 21, 1983 on the ground that April 21,1983 happened to be a day on which the court reopened after Bihu holidays and that the learned Senior Counsel who had gone to Calcutta during the vacation had not been able to return on account of the irregularity of air services. It was further stated that the two other learned counsel were busy in Courts Nos. 2 and 3 when the matter was called for hearing and a request was made to pass over the matter. This ground did not find favour with the learned Judges of the High Court and the application for re-calling the order was rejected. Hence this appeal by special leave." 18. In Savithri Amma Seethamma v. Aratha Karthy and others, AIR 1983 SC 318, while considering the provisions of Section 115 and Order 41 Rule 21 of the CPC, it was held as under : "2. Now it is obvious that the appellant could not appear at the hearing of the revision application preferred by the first respondent because the Advocate engaged by him was occupied in another Court and this fact was stated by the learned Advocate in the affidavit made by him in support of the application for rehearing. Now it is obvious that the appellant could not appear at the hearing of the revision application preferred by the first respondent because the Advocate engaged by him was occupied in another Court and this fact was stated by the learned Advocate in the affidavit made by him in support of the application for rehearing. We are, therefore, of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant had sufficient cause for not being present at the hearing of the revision application and the learned single Judge of the High Court ought, in the circumstances, to have allowed the application and re-heard the civil revision petition applying the principle underlying Order XLI, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the orders dated 30th March, 1982 and 22nd June, 1982 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and remit the C.R.P. No. 766 of 1981 to the High Court for disposal on merits in accordance with law....." 19. Again in Rafiq and another v. Munshilal and another, AIR 1981 SC 1400, while considering the question of misdemeanour of inaction of the counsel it was held as under : "3. The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their Advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his Advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned Advocate to do the rest of the things. The parties may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the Courts procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he was neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watch-dog of the Advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like to particular Bench. May be we do not know, he is better informed in this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute. What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power and expected of him would suffer because of the default of his Advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. May be that the learned Advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen Advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the costs of the respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs. 200/should be recovered from the Advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. A.K. Sanghi." 20. In the instant case it may again be observed that Sh. 200/should be recovered from the Advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. A.K. Sanghi." 20. In the instant case it may again be observed that Sh. Sharma, learned Counsel for the judgment debtors laid great emphasis on the fact, that even if counsel was negligent in appearing in the execution as well as in the application to restore the execution, still no explanation is coming forth from the decree holders numbering eight as to why they did not appear when the execution was dismissed or application to restore it was dismissed. Suffice to say in this behalf that the system as is prevalent in this country, a litigant feels satisfied by engaging a counsel that he shall protect his (litigants) interest. As already noted, counsel were silent for their non appearance. That being the position above submission urged on behalf of the judgment debtors is neither sustainable on facts nor on the basis of law as noted hereinabove. 21. No other point is urged. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this revision petition is allowed. As a consequence of it, application filed by the decree holders being CMA Execution No. 17 of 1996 on 9.10.1996 is hereby allowed. What falls from this is that application being CMA 1 of 95, instituted on 4.3.1995 and decided on 1.6.1996, shall stand restored to its original number and date. Trial Court is directed to take up the said application and then dispose it of after hearing the parties and of course in accordance with law without being in any manner prejudiced from this order which is only meant to dispose of this revision petition and nothing more. Parties are directed through their learned Counsel to appear before the trial Court on 8.8.2003. Since date has been fixed by this Court, no fresh notice will be issued by the Court below. Trial Court is directed to take up the application restoration of the execution that was dismissed for default on day to day basis and dispose of the same as per law with utmost expedition and despatch. Record be sent back forthwith. Revision allowed.