P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri B. Mahender Reddy, learned counsel representing the appellants. One Vannela Muthanna filed O. S. No. 79 of 1980 against Vannela Linganna on the file of the District Munsif, Metpalli, praying for the relief of declaration of title and perpetual injunction in regard to Sy. No. 31, to an extent of Ac. 2. 00 wet land, situated at Kushtapur village, Metpalli Taluk described in the plaint schedule. ( 2 ) THE defendant in the said suit had contested the matter and on 6-8-1980, the following Judgment was made:"p. W. 1 is examined. Exs. A1 to A4 marked. Suit claim is proved. Suit is decreed as prayed for, with costs". ( 3 ) AGGRIEVED by the same, Vannela Linganna, the defendant in the suit had preferred appeal A. S. No. 2 of 1986, on the file of Subordinate Judge, Jagtial and inasmuch as the first appellant died, appellants 2 to 5 were brought on record as legal representatives as per order dated 28-12-1984, made in I. A. No. 305 of 1984. The appellate Court by its Judgment dated 9-07-1990, had dismissed the appeal on the ground that the Court of first instance had committed no error and aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal is preferred. ( 4 ) THE 2nd respondent in the present appeal died and respondents 3 to 6 are brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased-2nd respondent as per orders dated 31-10-2003, in C. M. P. No. 10591 of 2003. The only contention raised by the learned counsel, representing the appellants Sri B. Mahender Reddi is that the judgment made is not in conformity with Section 2 (9) of the Code of Civil procedure (for short "the Code") and whether it is a Judgment made on contest, whether it is a Judgment made exparte, unless it is in conformity with the provisions of Section 2 (9) of the Code, such Judgment cannot be sustained in law. ( 5 ) STRONG reliance was placed in a case in BALRAJ TANEJA V SUNIL MADAN, wherein the Apex Court while dealing with this aspect had observed hereunder: in Thippaiah V Kuri Obaiah (ILR (1980) 2 Karnataka 1028), it was laid down that the Court must state the grounds for its conclusion in the judgment and the judgment should be in conformity with the provisions of Section 2 (9) of the code. In Dineshwar Prasad Bakshi V Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha (AIR 1989 Patna 139: 1988 BBCJ 449), it was held that the judgment pronounced under Order 8 Rule 10 must satisfy the requirements of "judgment" as defined in Section 2 (9) of the code. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the 1st respondent contended that the provisions of Order 20 rule 4 (2) of the Code would apply only to contested cases as it is only in those cases that "the points for determination" as mentioned in this rule will have to be indicated, and not in a case in which the written statement has not been filed by the defendants and the facts set out in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted. We do not agree. Whether it is a case which is contested by the defendants by filing a written statement, or a case which proceeds ex parte and is ultimately decided as an ex parte case, or is a case in which the written statement is not filed and the case is decided under Order 8 Rule 10, the Court has to write a judgment which must be in conformity with the provisions of the Code or at least set out the reasoning by which the controversy is resolved. ( 7 ) AN attempt was made to contend that the definition of judgment as set out in section 2 (9) of the Code would not be applicable to the judgment passed by the delhi High Court in its original jurisdiction wherein the proceedings are regulated by the provisions of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966. It is contended that the word "judgment used in the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 would not take its colour from the definition of "judgment" contained in Section 2 (9) of the code. It is contended that the word "judgment used in the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 would not take its colour from the definition of "judgment" contained in Section 2 (9) of the code. We do not intend to enter into this controversy, fortunately as it is not contended that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply, but we cannot refrain from expressing that even if it were so, the Delhi High Court is not absolved of its obligation to write a judgment as understood in common parlance. Even if the definition were not contained in Section 2 (9) or the contents thereof were not indicated in Order 20 Rule 4 (2) of the Code, the judgment would still mean the process of reasoning by which a Judge decides a case in favour of one party and against the other. In judicial proceedings, there cannot be arbitrary orders. A Judge cannot merely say "suit decreed" or "suit dismissed". The whole process of reasoning has to be set out for deciding the case one way or the other. This infirmity in the present judgment is glaring and for that reason also the judgment cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) EXCEPT this point, no other point had been urged. A reading of the Judgment made by the Court of first instance, which had been confirmed in a routine way by the appellate Court would definitely go to show that the said Judgment was not made in conformity with the provisions of the Code. In the light of the same, the impugned Judgment is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate Court to decide the matter in the light of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court specified supra. ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY, the second appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.