Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 157 (HP)

LALITA DEVI v. LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR

2003-06-25

A.K.GOEL

body2003
JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Question involved in this writ petition is, that when compensation awarded in proceedings under Land Acquisition Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) is received by a person interested, like petitioner without protest, can he maintain the petition under Section 28-A of the Act or not. Admitted facts of this case are that the Land Acquisition Collector made an award and pronounced it on 17.7.1973. Annexure P-l attached by the petitioner reveals that compensation was received without protest. Thereafter reference under Section 18 was cLalmed by the petitioner. This was rejected on 3rd February, 1976. Petitioner did not question this order. 2. However, vide Annexure P-2 he submitted an application before the Land Acquisition Collector, Bias Dam Project, at Talwara. This was for determination of award under Section 28-A of the Act. Basis for cLalming redetermination by the petitioner was the award given by the Additional District Judge on 24.11.1987. Amongst other things in paragraph 5 of this application rates awarded by the Additional District Judge were also mentioned. And it was also pleaded that notification under Section 4 of the Act in respect of Tikka Katnaur Khas as well as regarding her land was the same. 3. By means of impugned order passed on this application for re-determination, it was held by the respondent, that the application was not maintainable in view of the decision of Supreme Court in Review Petition No. 364-65 of 1992, Civil Appeal No. 2320-21 of 1991, Union of India and another v. Pradeep Kumari and another, on 10th March, 1995. 4. In this petition reliance is being placed on behalf of the petitioner on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in CWP No. 796 of 1992, Bansi Lal v. L.A.C. Bias Dam Project, decided on 28.12.1992. Thus, the petitioner has prayed that Annexure P-2 may be quashed and direction may be issued to the respondent to redetermine the compensation and pay the same to her as per law. 5. Before proceeding further in this case, it may be noted that Bishanu alias Bishan Dass late husband of the petitioner was the person who had claimed the reference vide Annexure P-l, under Section 18 of the Act. It appears that after his death Annexure P-2, the application for re-determination was filed as noted hereinabove by the petitioner. 5. Before proceeding further in this case, it may be noted that Bishanu alias Bishan Dass late husband of the petitioner was the person who had claimed the reference vide Annexure P-l, under Section 18 of the Act. It appears that after his death Annexure P-2, the application for re-determination was filed as noted hereinabove by the petitioner. This application has been filed by Lalita Devi-petitioner, however, it is mentioned in it that the deceased has other legal representatives namely three daughters Om Piari Devi, Sundra Devi and Aruna- Devi. 6. Respondent when put to notice has tried to justify the order contained in Annexure P-2. As according to it, reference under Section 18 supra stood rejected vide Annexure P-l and looking to the decision of Supreme Court referred to in the impugned rejection order Annexure P-2, it suffers from no infirmity. 7. This matter is no more res-integra in view of the Constitution Bench decision by Supreme Court, in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi and others, and other connected cases, in 2002 AIR SCW 3755. What was held and is relevant in the context is that where a person like petitioner who had received the awarded compensation without protest and also his having not filed an application under Section 18 of the Act, Supreme Court held him to be a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 28-A supra. 8. Para from this judgment which is relevant in the context of present writ petition is extracted hereinbelow:— "Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of statute. The rule stated by Tindal, CJ. in Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Cl and F 85, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect : "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The rule stated by Tindal, CJ. in Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Cl and F 85, still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect : "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver." It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute that when language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co. Ltd., 1955 (2) All ER 345, Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of "ambiguous" and held that "a provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word which in different contest is capable of different meanings and it would be hard to find any where a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in that particular context is capable of having more than one meaning." It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, 1953 SCR 1, had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quabec Railway Light Heat and Power Co. v. Vandray, AIR 1920 PC 181, it had been observed that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. In Quabec Railway Light Heat and Power Co. v. Vandray, AIR 1920 PC 181, it had been observed that the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskillfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act to confer a right of making a reference, who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But the Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression "had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18" in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the land-owner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the land-owner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a land owner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumaris case the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated "the person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18". The expression "did not make an application", as observed by this Court would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly answer question No. l(a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894." In this very judgment, it has been also held that where an application under Section 18 of the Act (as in the present writ) is dismissed on the ground of delay even then the land owner is entitled to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act if other conditions prescribed therein were fulfilled. For ready reference what was held in this behalf is also extracted hereinbelow:— "So far as question l(b) is concerned, this is really the same question, as in question l(a) and, therefore, we reiterate that when an application of a land owner under Section 18 is dismissed on the ground of delay, then the said land owner is entitled to make an application under Section 28-A, if other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled." 9. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, learned Advocate General was not in a position to stress further his argument for upholding Annexure P-2. 10. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, learned Advocate General was not in a position to stress further his argument for upholding Annexure P-2. 10. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition is allowed, and as a consequence of it impugned order dated 28.9.1995 passed by the respondent, in case No. 17914 is hereby quashed and set-aside. He is directed to now dispose of the application for re-determination of the Award under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Looking to the fact that the matter is quite old. It is further ordered that the respondent shall dispose of the matter with utmost expedition and dispatch and final order will be passed by him at the earliest, and in no case later than 31st March, 2004. It is made clear that direction regarding time for disposal of the application for re-determination of the compensation is pre-emptory to be carried out by the Collector. Costs on the parties. Petition allowed.