M. KATJU, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition and connected writ petition nos. 33665 of 2002, 34179 of 2002, 37098 of 2002, 38346 of 2002, 38348 of 2002, 38352 of 2002, 41445 of 2002 41447 of 2002, 41448 of 2002 and 53829 of 2002 are being disposed off by a common judgment. ( 2 ) HEARD learned counsel for the parties. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing para 11 (c) (iv)of the Special Tender Conditions of tender No. JOINT/pol/02/16 (Annexure 5 to the petition) and for a mandamus directing the respondent authorities to permit the petitioner to participate in the tender in question dated 29. 7. 2002 without placing the restriction that vehicles should be less than 15 years old. ( 4 ) THE petitioner no. 1 is a partnership concern and petitioner no. 2 is one of his partners doing the business of maintaining a retail petrol and diesel outlet at Mughalsarai, District Chandauli for the purpose of transporting petrol and diesel from the Indian Oil Corporation terminals at Chandauli. The petitioner had also engaged their oil tankers with hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL ). The engagement of the oil tankers had been done by the HPCL by calling tenders from various oil tanker owners. Such tenders have been called every Two/three years for engaging oil tankers for the purpose of transporting petrol and diesel from the terminals to different petrol and diesel outlets within the local area of operation of the terminals. ( 5 ) IT is alleged in para 5 of the petition that the petitioners oil tankers were engaged by the Hindustan Petroleum corporations for the past several years on the basis of tenders, and work orders allotted to them. In the tender number joint/pol/002, the terms and conditions of engagement of oil tankers so far as the age of vehicle is concerned, was as follows: age OF THE VEHICLE "any quoted vehicle over 20 years old shall be replaced within one year from the date of the Work Order for the transport Contract. This condition will be superseded by the Court Order/statutory requirement, wherever applicable. However, no further extension of this time limit will be granted. This condition will be superseded by the Court Order/statutory requirement, wherever applicable. However, no further extension of this time limit will be granted. " ( 6 ) ON the basis of the above tender, three vehicles of the petitioner, which were more than 15 years old and are running with the Hindustan Petroleum corporation were engaged as stated in para 9 of the petition. It is alleged in para 10 of the petition that the above vehicles are in good running condition and having fitness certificates granted by the regional Transport Authorities under the motor Vehicles Act, vide Annexure-2. The vehicles also have necessary explosive licence granted by the Deputy chief Controller of Explosives, allahabad, vide Annexure-3 to the petition. They have also permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority vide annexure-4. ( 7 ) IN para 13 of the petition, it is alleged that the Indian Oil Corporation alongwith three other petroleum corporations namely HPCL, BPCL and ibp had called upon tenders for another term of two years from 1. 10. 2002 to 30. 9. 2004 (further extendable for a period of one year) being general tender no. JOINT/pol/02. For supply location of chandauli, the tender no. specified is joint/pol/02 which has been issued on 29. 7. 2002, fixing the last date for submission of tender as 21. 8. 2002, with new terms and conditions in so far as the age of vehicle is concerned which has been reduced to 15 years. ( 8 ) PARA 11 (c) (iv) of Annexure 5 to the petition may be seen in this connection, which states: "age of the vehicle should not exceed 15 years on the date of opening of tender. " ( 9 ) A perusal of the above clause shows that a vehicle which is over 15 years old, is debarred from participating in the tender on behalf of its owner. It is alleged in para 14 of the petition that on the basis of the above condition, the vehicles of the petitioner referred to above shall not be able to be included in the list of vehicles for the purposes of qualifying the tenders, though they are in perfect running condition and having fitness certificate, explosive license and permits issued by the authorities. ( 10 ) IT is alleged in para 15 of the petition that the operation of the limit of the petitioners vehicles is restricted to the retail outlets within the jurisdiction of the concerned oil terminal, and the same never exceeds 50 Kms. ( 11 ) IT is alleged that there in no age bar of transport vehicles mentioned in the motor Vehicles Act or Rules, and as such the age limit of 15 years is only illegal. ( 12 ) IT is alleged that the above condition is highly unreasonable and violates the principles of natural justice. ( 13 ) IN our opinion, there is no merit in these petitions. The special tender conditions, copy of which is Annexure-5 to the petition, embodies the terms on which the contract can be finalized. If the petitioner or any other party does not find any condition mentioned therein as acceptable, he is not obliged to make a bid for the contract. It is for the concerned corporation to decide about the terms and conditions on which they will give the contract. ( 14 ) A counter Affidavit has been filed by the Indian Oil Corporation reference has been made therein to the direction of the Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (1998) 6 SCC 63 in which direction was issued to restrict plying of commercial vehicles including Taxis which are 15 years old. In para 10 it is stated that the age of 15 years of vehicles is fixed as per policy guidelines and the judgment of the honble Supreme Court. It is a matter of policy involving not only safety of the traffic and the fact that the petroleum product is highly inflammable, but the object is also to maintain environment and ecological balance which is one of the directive principles in the Constitution. It is alleged that the petitioner has no legal right to have his aged vehicles considered for the contract. ( 15 ) IN para 14, it is stated that there is no question of giving any opportunity of hearing in the matter, since a policy decision has been taken. The petitioner has no legal right in his favour. The provisions of the Motor Vehicle Acts or rules are wholly irrelevant. ( 16 ) IN our opinion, there is no merit in these petitions. The petitioner has no legal right in his favour. The provisions of the Motor Vehicle Acts or rules are wholly irrelevant. ( 16 ) IN our opinion, there is no merit in these petitions. The matter is purely contractual and this Court cannot interfere in such matters. It is for the concerned authorities to decide what should be the proper age limit of the vehicles and it is not proper for this Court to interfere in such administrative matters as held by the supreme Court in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India AIR 1996 Supreme Court 11. The Court has very limited scope of judicial review in Administrative matters. In our opinion, there has been no arbitrariness in the matter and the decision of the respondents has been taken on sound reasons, namely, the public safety and ecology. ( 17 ) AS held by this Court in 2002 (4)AWC 3221 , Pramod Kumar Misra Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the decisions of the Administrative Authority. As Chief Justice Neely observed: "i have very few illusions about my own limitations as a judge. I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, flnancer, banker, stockbroker or system management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect Judge intelligently to review a 5000 page record addressing the intricacies of public utility operation. It is not the function of a Judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. " ( 18 ) IN Federation of Railway officers Association and others Vs. Union of India, (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 289, the Supreme Court observed that the court should not ordinarily interfere with policy matters requiring technical expertise. ( 19 ) THE submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no such age restriction in the Motor Vehicles acts or Rules, or that natural justice was violated, is wholly misconceived. The restriction in question has been placed by a party who wishes to enter into a contract. A contract by its very nature is a voluntary bilateral transaction, by which two parties enter into an agreement of their own freewill. The restriction in question has been placed by a party who wishes to enter into a contract. A contract by its very nature is a voluntary bilateral transaction, by which two parties enter into an agreement of their own freewill. Hence the corporation can decide the terms on which it is agreeable to give the contract, just as the petitioner is free to make a tender or not, and neither party can be compelled in this connection. Petitions dismissed. Interim orders vacated.