K. C. BHANU, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal is directed against the judgment in C. C. No. l 1 of 1997 on the file of XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, hyderabad dated 24. 8. 1999 whereunder the accused were acquitted for the offences under Section 12 of the Passport Act and section 120b read with Section 420 of the indian Penal Code. ( 2 ) THE brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of the present appeal may be stated as follows: ( 3 ) IT is alleged by the prosecution that accused 1 and 2 entered into a criminal conspiracy in the year 1992 and obtained three passports bearing Nos. M-729715, p252087 and M621674 in the name of A-2 from the Office of the Regional Passport officer, Hyderabad by suppressing the fact of issuance of previous passport and by furnishing false information, documents, certificates and dishonestly induced the competent authority and that Accused No. l produced the above passports before the u. S. Consulate at Madras for obtaining Visa to go to the U. S. A. and accordingly he attended the said office on 22. 7. 1993 and on 4. 8. 1993. In the month of October, 1993 p. W. I received a letter dated 19. 10. 1993 from the Office of the Consulate General of u. S. A. , Madras stating that the accused rakesh Kumar Devda appeared before him and represented that he did not appear for visa earlier but on verification of records they found that the said person appeared earlier for obtaining Visa on a different passport. Thereupon, PW-11 made enquiries in this regard in the Regional Passport office and informed the same to the superintendent of Police, P. W. I3 registered a case under Section 120b IPC and section 12 of the Passport Act. He visited the scene of occurrence and collected the documents from the Passport Office. He also visited the U. S. Consulate Office at madras and collected the copies of visa applications standing in the name of a-2 Rakesh Kumar Devda. Thereafter he collected the specimen writings of the accused under Ex. P-9 and sent the same to p. W.-12 Expert. P. W.-12, after comparison of the disputed handwriting with the handwriting sent by the police, opined that both were written by the same person. After completion of investigation and after obtaining sanction, P. W-13 filed the chargesheet. Thereafter he collected the specimen writings of the accused under Ex. P-9 and sent the same to p. W.-12 Expert. P. W.-12, after comparison of the disputed handwriting with the handwriting sent by the police, opined that both were written by the same person. After completion of investigation and after obtaining sanction, P. W-13 filed the chargesheet. ( 4 ) TO substantiate the case of the prosecution, it examined 13 witnesses and marked 25 documents. On an elaborate consideration of the evidence on record, the lower Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had entered into criminal conspiracy and cheated the passport authorities by furnishing false information and suppressing the real facts and accordingly both the accused were acquitted for the charges levelled against them. ( 5 ) THE first charge against the accused under Section 420 IPC is for giving false information and suppressing the real facts and dishonestly inducing the competent authority. The second charge is under section 120-B IPC on the ground that they entered into criminal conspiracy to obtain passports from the Regional passport Office, Hyderabad. The third charge is under Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967 on the ground that they gave false documents and certificates in order to obtain three passports. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the Public Prosecutor contends that on the basis of the information given by one Rakesh kumar Devda he processed the application ex. P-1 and Ex. P-2 passport was issued and the same is collected by Pax Tours and travels, Hyderabad and therefore it is clear that Rakesh Kumar Devda, who is no other than A-2, obtained passport by giving false information and the sample handwritings of A-2 were tallied with the disputed handwriting in certain documents as seen from the evidence of P. W-12 and the totality of the circumstances would indicate that it is A-2 who gave the false information and obtained passport and therefore the learned Magistrate ought to have convicted the accused for the charges levelled against them. ( 7 ) THERE was no representation on behalf of the accused-respondents. ( 8 ) IN dealing with the appeal against acquittal, the parameters of this Court are circumscribed. This Court can interfere with the judgment of acquittal only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. ( 7 ) THERE was no representation on behalf of the accused-respondents. ( 8 ) IN dealing with the appeal against acquittal, the parameters of this Court are circumscribed. This Court can interfere with the judgment of acquittal only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. When the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable or a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty, this Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. On this aspect it is necessary to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in state of Rajasthan v. Rajaram, 2003 (2) ald (Crl.) 444 (SC) = AIR 2003 SCW 4097 , wherein their Lordships held:"there is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". ( 9 ) BEARING the above principles in mind, it has to be seen whether the judgment under appeal is clearly unreasonable or not and whether the lower Court appreciated the evidence in a right perspective. ( 10 ) THE first charge against the accused is under Section 420 IPC. Section 420 IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing a person for delivery of any property. To establish a charge under Section 420 IPC, it must be proved not only that the accused has cheated someone but also that by doing so he has dishonestly induced the person who was cheated, to deliver any property etc. Section 420 IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing a person for delivery of any property. To establish a charge under Section 420 IPC, it must be proved not only that the accused has cheated someone but also that by doing so he has dishonestly induced the person who was cheated, to deliver any property etc. In this regard it is pertinent to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramnarain poply v. Central Bureau of Investigation, air 2003 SCW 3119, wherein their lordships held:"section 420 deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. The offence of cheating is made of two ingredients. Deception of any person and fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property. To put it differently, the ingredients of the offences are that the person deceived delivers to some one a valuable security or property, that the person so deceived was induced to do so, that such person acted on such inducement in consequence of his having been deceived by the accused and that the accused acted fraudulently or dishonestly when so inducing the person. To constitute the offence of cheating, it is not necessary that the deception should be by express words, but it may be by conduct or implied in the nature of the transaction itself. " ( 11 ) INSOFAR as the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120b IPC is concerned, the essential ingredient of it is an agreement to commit an offence. In dealing with the aspect of criminal conspiracy, it was observed by the Supreme Court in Nazir khan v. State of Delhi, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 651 (SC) = AIR 2003 SCW 5068, as follows:"as noted above, the essential ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. Where the conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature as contemplated in Section 120-B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 120-A, then in that event mere proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of such a crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction under Section 120-B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one of them would not be necessary. The provisions, in such a situation, do not require that each and every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some overt act towards the fulfilment of the object of conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these requirements and ingredients are established, the act would fall within the trapping of the provisions contained in section 120-B. " ( 12 ) THE next charge against the accused is under Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967. Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967 reads as follows:"12 (1 ). Whoever (a) contravenes the provisions of Section 3; or (b) knowingly furnishes any false information or suppresses any material information with a view to obtaining a passport or travel document under this Act or without lawful authority alters or attempts to alter or causes to alter the entries made in a passport or travel document; or (c) fails to produce for inspection his passport or travel document (whether issued under this Act or not) when called upon to do so by the prescribed authority; or (d) knowingly uses a passport or travel document issued to another person; or (e) knowingly allows another person to use a passport or travel document issued to him, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both". ( 13 ) A perusal of the above provision makes it very clear that if a person contravenes Section 3 of the Passport Act or knowingly furnishes any false information or suppresses any material information with a view to obtaining a passport or knowingly uses the passport or travel document issued to another person, he shall be punished. ( 14 ) IN the light of the aforesaid legal aspects, it has to be seen whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution made out a case against the accused for the charges levelled against them. There is no direct evidence to show that the accused cheated the Regional Passport Office by giving false information in the documents and obtained three passports and the same were presented to the U. S. Consulate at Madras for obtaining visa. So the entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence. When a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, the following points are required to be proved by the prosecution:1. The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be brought must be cogently and firmly established. 2. Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused. 3. The circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no scope from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should also be inconsistent with his innocence. ( 15 ) THE above points were highlighted in the decision reported in Pedda Veera reddy v. The State of A. P. , AIR 1990 SC 79 . ( 16 ) COMING to the factual matrix, P. W- 1, who is working as Upper Division Clerk in the Passport Office, stated that he processed ex. P-1 Passport Application No. 1/117429/ h/92 dated 15. 7. 1992 belonging to Rakesh kumar Devda. Ex. P-2 is the passport issued in the name of Rakesh Kumar Devda bearing no. M 729715 dated 10. 11. 1992. He did not identify the accused to show that Ex. P-1 was given by them. P-1 Passport Application No. 1/117429/ h/92 dated 15. 7. 1992 belonging to Rakesh kumar Devda. Ex. P-2 is the passport issued in the name of Rakesh Kumar Devda bearing no. M 729715 dated 10. 11. 1992. He did not identify the accused to show that Ex. P-1 was given by them. On the other hand, he admitted in the cross-examination that one smita World Travels submitted Ex. P-1. He also admitted that after Ex. P-1 was subjected to formalities and scrutiny, a passport has been issued. Therefore, the evidence of p. W-l would not go to show that the application under Ex. P-1 was given by rakesh Kumar Devda, A-2. ( 17 ) P. W-2 is another Upper Division clerk who stated that he scrutinized Ex. P-1 application, but he was declared hostile. Nothing was elicited even after his crossexamination to connect the accused with the crime. Even though Ex. P-1 application is said to have been presented by Smita world Travels in the Regional Passport office, no person connected with that Travel agency was examined to show that the accused presented Ex. P-1 to Smita Travels and they in turn presented it to the Passport office. ( 18 ) P. W. 3 is a practising advocate who identified the signatures of one G. Rajappa reddy, who, according to the prosecution, was bedridden due to paralysis. He identified the signatures of Rajappa Reddy, who attested Exs. P-4 and P-5 as a Notary. So, his evidence is also not helpful to the case of the prosecution except to the fact that a notary attested on Exs. P-4 and P-5. Exs. P-4 and P-5 affidavits stand in the name of rakesh Kumar Devda. There is no other evidence to show that these documents were in fact signed by A-2. ( 19 ) P. W-4 is another Upper Division clerk in the Passport Office who scrutinized the application Ex. P-1 and recommended to the Passport Officer for issuance of passport. According to him, Pax Tours and travels, Hyderabad collected the passport standing in the name of Rakesh Kumar devda. The verification certificate was issued by the then Additional Secretary to government but P. W-4 did not contact him and no reasons were mentioned for giving the passport on out of turn basis. For that there was no indication in Ex. P-6 that the applicant was interviewed by the Passport officer. The verification certificate was issued by the then Additional Secretary to government but P. W-4 did not contact him and no reasons were mentioned for giving the passport on out of turn basis. For that there was no indication in Ex. P-6 that the applicant was interviewed by the Passport officer. So, his evidence also does not indicate that the accused gave Ex. P-6 to him. Ex. P-6 was signed by Smita Travels. So his evidence also does not incriminate anything against the accused. P. W-5 is the person who processed Ex. P-6 application. His evidence also does not indicate anything against the accused. P. W-6 is the superintendent in the Office. He brought the Intimation Registers. As per the entries in the Intimation Register, he stated that a passport No. 729715 was issued in the name of Rakesh Kumar Devda and Ex. P-7 is the attested Xerox copy of the relevant entry. He did not say that Ex. P-7 was given by the accused and he is not the person who dealt with the documents Exs. P-7 to P-11. He did not say to whom Exs. P-2, P-8 and P-11, which are the passports, were delivered. Except the fact that they stand in the name of Rakesh Kumar Devda, his evidence does not incriminate anything against the accused. P. W-7 is the Head Constable working in the Special Branch at the relevant point of time. He simply stated that after verifying the antecedents of the applicant seeking for issuance of passport, they will prepare an index and send it to the concerned office. Therefore, his evidence is also not of much relevance. P. W. 8 is the notary and practising advocate. He stated that on 6-7-1992 he notarized the affidavit of Rakesh Kumar Devda but he did not know Rakesh Kumar Devda. Exs. P-12 and p-l3 are the affidavits containing the signatures of Rakesh Kumar Devda. P. W-9 is the owner of the House bearing No. 3-4-266/4. According to him, no person by name rakesh Kumar Devda resided in his house at any time and the photograph of the application Ex. P-4 belongs to his brother-in-law rahender. Therefore, his evidence is also not of much relevance. ( 20 ) P. W-10 is the Section Officer in the Secretariat, who speaks about issuance of sanction orders for prosecuting the accused as per Ex. P-15. P-4 belongs to his brother-in-law rahender. Therefore, his evidence is also not of much relevance. ( 20 ) P. W-10 is the Section Officer in the Secretariat, who speaks about issuance of sanction orders for prosecuting the accused as per Ex. P-15. P. W-11 is the inspector of Police who stated that he received a letter in the month of october, 1993 from the Office of Consulate general of U. S. A. , Madras to the effect that Rakesh Kumar Devda appeared before him and represented that he did not appear for Visa earlier, but from their files they found that he appeared earlier for visa on different passports. According to him, Rakesh Kumar Devda obtained two passports. His investigation discloses that the passport obtained in the name of rakesh Kumar Devda which was received by him from U. S. Consulate General Office, madras belongs to one Gopi Chetty. He did not go to Madras to examine the author of ex. P-16 with regard to its genuineness. He did not report the matter to the higher officials or has taken any steps to register a case basing on Ex. P-16. According to him, he cannot issue F. I. R. without the orders of the Superintendent of Police. He did not take any steps to register a case after obtaining permission from his superior officers. He did not give any report to the passport Officer. No explanation is given as to why he has not registered a case basing on Ex. P-16, which discloses that false information was given by the applicant therein, after obtaining permission from the superintendent of Police. ( 21 ) P. W-13 is the Inspector of Police who registered a case on 26. 9. 1994 i. e. , nearly one year after Ex. P-16. He collected the Xerox copies of the Visa applications in the name of Rakesh Kumar Devda and during the course of investigation he collected the specimen writings of the accused under Ex. P-19. He admitted in the crossexamination that he did not examine any person from Smita World Travels who submitted Ex. P-1 and he has not conducted any search in the Index Section of the passport Office. He has not seized the notary Registers. He did not examine the author of Ex. P-16. He did not call any mediators or panch witnesses at the time of taking specimen signatures of the accused. P-1 and he has not conducted any search in the Index Section of the passport Office. He has not seized the notary Registers. He did not examine the author of Ex. P-16. He did not call any mediators or panch witnesses at the time of taking specimen signatures of the accused. ( 22 ) IN view of the above discussion, it clearly goes to show that certain documents were presented to the Passport Officer in the name of Rakesh Kumar Devda but there is no other evidence to show that it is A-2 who alone signed in those applications or that the information given in the Application form was not true and correct. Therefore, the aforesaid evidence would not prove the charges with which the accused are facing trial beyond all reasonable doubt. ( 23 ) THE remaining evidence on record is the evidence of P. W. 12, who is a handwriting expert. His evidence would indicate that the disputed writings were compared with the specimen writings and both were written by the same person. As far as the evidence of handwriting expert is concerned, the law is well settled that such opinion evidence cannot be stated to be conclusive. Such evidence cannot be taken as a substantive piece of evidence but it can be taken into consideration to corroborate the other evidence, if any. So, basing on the expert opinion alone the accused cannot be convicted. ( 24 ) AFTER perusing the judgment under appeal, I am of the considered view that the learned Magistrate did not commit any error of law or fact in appreciating the evidence. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that the circumstantial evidence to support the case of the prosecution cannot be said to be conclusive with complete and unbroken chain of circumstances leading to irresistible and unmistakable conclusion that it is the accused and they alone who have committed this crime. Because the passport and other applications stand in the name of A-2, the only thing that can be inferred is that there is a strong suspicion and probability that those applications might have been presented by the accused. This, however, cannot take place of legal proof. ( 25 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not find any legal infirmity in the judgment of the lower Court in acquitting the accused. This, however, cannot take place of legal proof. ( 25 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not find any legal infirmity in the judgment of the lower Court in acquitting the accused. ( 26 ) THERE are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the judgment under appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.