K. C. BHANU, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment in S. C. No. 540 of 1998 dated 16-03-2000 on the file of Additional Sessions Judge, Hindupur, wherein accused no. 1 was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month under Section 498 (A) I. P. C. and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months for the offence under Section 306 I. P. C. ( 2 ) THE brief facts that are necessary for disposal of the present appeal may be stated as follows:- the appellant herein who is arrayed as accused No. 1 is no other than the husband of the deceased Shaik Reshma (herein after referred to as deceased ), accused no. 2 is mother of accused No. 1 and accused No. 3 is brother of accused No. 1. The marriage of the deceased with the appellant took place eight months prior to her death at Kodipalli as per the custom in their community. The parents of the deceased gave cash of Rs. 25,000/- to the appellant herein at the time of marriage besides presenting 50 grams of gold ornaments to the deceased. After the marriage, the deceased joined her husband/appellant and started residing at rallapalli in Madakasira taluq. On 11-11-1997 at about 3-00 P. M. the deceased sustained burn injuries. She was admitted in Government Hospital, madakasira at about 4-45 P. M. P. W. 13 who is the Medical Officer sent Ex. P-15 intimation to the police. On receipt of Ex. P-15 intimation P. W. 12 went to the hospital and recorded Ex. P-16 statement from the deceased, on the point of jurisdiction P. W. 12 sent the statement and also the medical intimation to P. W. 15 who registered a case under Section 498 (A) I. P. C. As the condition of the deceased was critical she was shifted to Government Hospital, Hindupur, but she succumbed to the injuries. P-16 statement from the deceased, on the point of jurisdiction P. W. 12 sent the statement and also the medical intimation to P. W. 15 who registered a case under Section 498 (A) I. P. C. As the condition of the deceased was critical she was shifted to Government Hospital, Hindupur, but she succumbed to the injuries. On receipt of death intimation, P. W. 15 altered the section of Law to one under Section 304-B and 306 I. P. C. He informed about the alteration of Section to the Inspector of Police, P. W. 20. P. W. 20 took up investigation and proceeded to the Government Hospital, Hindupur, and examined the witnesses. On the requisition given by him, P. W. 11 conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased on 13-11-1997. After inquest the dead body was subjected to postmortem examination by P. W. 10 who found 90% of the burns are all over the body of the deceased. ( 3 ) THE Inspector of Police proceeded to Rallapalli village on 13-11-1997 and observed the scene of occurrence and seized certain incriminating material under cover of Ex. P-12 Mahazar and on 14-11-1997 at 11-20 A. M. he arrested accused nos. 1 and 2 and sent them to Court for judicial custody. After completion of the investigation, he filed charge sheet. A charge under Section 498 (A) I. P. C. was framed against accused No. 1 and charges under Section 304-B and 306 of i. P. C. were framed against accused Nos. 1 to 3. They pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against them. To substantiate the case of the prosecution pws. 1 to 20 were examined and Exs. P-1 to P-27 were marked. ( 4 ) THE learned Sessions Judge after appreciation of evidence by placing reliance on the testimony of P. W. 2 and Exs. P-16 and P-20 found the accused No. 1 guilty for the offence under Section 498 (A) and 306 I. P. C. and accordingly convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. The learned Sessions Judge found accused Nos. 2 and 3 not guilty for the charges levelled against them and accordingly acquitted them. ( 5 ) AS against the said conviction and sentence, the present appeal is filed by accused no. 1 questioning the legality and correctness thereof. The learned Sessions Judge found accused Nos. 2 and 3 not guilty for the charges levelled against them and accordingly acquitted them. ( 5 ) AS against the said conviction and sentence, the present appeal is filed by accused no. 1 questioning the legality and correctness thereof. It is contended by the learned Counsel for appellant that there is no evidence to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the appellant herein prior to her death. On the other hand the evidence of close relatives of the deceased would indicate that they were living together very happily, therefore, in the suspicious circumstances Ex. P-16 cannot be relied upon and Ex. P-20 does not make out any offence either under Section 498 (A) I. P. C. or 306 I. P. C. and that there was no evidence to show that the deceased was in a fit statement of mind to give a statement and therefore he prays to set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit him. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that the evidence of p. W. 2 coupled with the dying declarations recorded by P. W. 10 and P. W. 12 would clearly go to show that it is the appellant who has subjected the deceased to cruelty and unable to bear the said harassment she committed suicide and in these circumstances, it is tantamount to abetment within the meaning of Section 107 of I. P. C. and after appreciating the evidence on record and considering the matter elaborately, the learned Sessions Judge rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant and there are no grounds to interfere with the order of conviction. P. W. 11 is the Mandal Revenue Officer who conducted inquest on the dead body of the deceased on 13-11-1997 in Government Hospital, Hindupur, from 10-30 A. M. to 1-30 P. M. Ex. P-14 is the inquest report. A perusal of Ex. P-14 would clearly indicate that the deceased died as a result of burn injuries. P. W. 10 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased on 13-11-1997 along with Dr. P. Ramesh Babu. On External examination, they found, the entire body of the deceased was burnt except soles of foot and lower abdomen genetilia. ( 7 ) BLISTERS present all over the body and the skin was peeling of. P. W. 10 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased on 13-11-1997 along with Dr. P. Ramesh Babu. On External examination, they found, the entire body of the deceased was burnt except soles of foot and lower abdomen genetilia. ( 7 ) BLISTERS present all over the body and the skin was peeling of. The team of doctors opined that the deceased would appear to have died due to shock of burns, 12 to 24 hours prior to the postmortem examination. Ex. P-13 is the postmortem report issued by them. The cause of the death as spoken to by P. W. 10 and as recited in Ex. P-13 is not denied or disputed in the cross-examination. Therefore, the unnatural death of the deceased is established beyond all reasonable doubts. ( 8 ) THE first charge under which the appellant was convicted is under Section-498 i. P. C. , which reads as follows:-"husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty:- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation:- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means - (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman: or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing here or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. " ( 9 ) CONSEQUENCES of cruelty which are likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical of the woman are required to be established in order to bring home the guilt of the accused under Section 498 (A) I. P. C. ( 10 ) UNDER clause (a) to explanation to Section 498 (A) I. P. C. it is not enough that the conduct of the accused is wilful, and is offensively unjust to a woman, but it is further necessary that the degree of intensity of such unjust conduct on the part of the accused is such as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or such conduct is likely to cause grave injury or danger to her life or limb or to her mental or physical health. Sub-clause (b) does not make each and every harassment cruelty . The harassment has to be with a different object, namely, to coerce the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand. ( 11 ) THE second charge under Section 306 I. P. C. which deals with abetment of suicide, reads as follows:-"if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. " ( 12 ) WHAT is abetment is defined under Section 107 I. P. C. which reads as follows:-"abetment of a thing:-A person abets the doing of a thing, who- first:- Instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly:- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly:- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation-1:- A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation-1:- A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. " ( 13 ) UNDER what circumstances the conduct of the accused would attract Section 306 i. P. C. is clearly covered by a decision in STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. IQBAL SINGH wherein it was held as follows:-"then we have a situation where the husband or his relative by his wilful conduct creates a situation which he knows, will drive the woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the case would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 306 I. P. C. In such a case, the conduct of the person tantamount to inciting or provoking or virtually pushing the woman into a desperate situation of no return which would compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing suicide. " ( 14 ) BEARING the above principles in mind, it has to be seen whether the prosecution established its case beyond all reasonable doubt for the offences under Section 498 (A) I. P. C. and 306 I. P. C. against the appellant herein. The entire case resolves around the oral evidence of P. W. 2 and the documentary evidence Exs. P-16 and P-20. Exs. P-16 and P-20 are the dying declarations recorded by P. Ws. 12 and 10 respectively. P. W. 1 is the father of the deceased. He did not support the case of the prosecution. On the other hand he categorically stated that both the deceased and the appellant herein lived happily without any differences after the marriage. He did not say about the demand of dowry or any cruel treatment to the deceased. Therefore, his evidence did not incriminate anything against the appellant. P. W. 3 is the mother of the deceased. She also did not support the case of the prosecution. On the other hand she categorically stated that her daughter never informed anything against the appellant. P. W. 4 is brother of the deceased. He also did not support the case of the prosecution. P. Ws. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18 and 19 did not support the case of the prosecution. On the other hand she categorically stated that her daughter never informed anything against the appellant. P. W. 4 is brother of the deceased. He also did not support the case of the prosecution. P. Ws. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18 and 19 did not support the case of the prosecution. Then we have the evidence of P. W. 2 and two dying declarations. P. W. 2 is another brother of the deceased who is working as a registered medical practitioner. The lower Court placed implicit reliance on the evidence of P. W. 2 besides Exs. P-16 and P-20. The evidence of P. W. 2 would indicate that after the marriage both the appellant/accused and the deceased lived happily and the deceased did not inform him anything against the accused with regard to demand of dowry. On the other hand, in the chief-examination itself, he stated that on coming to know about the incident, he went to the Government Hospital, madakasira, and saw his sister with burn injuries. When they asked about the incident, the deceased informed him that due to burst of stove she caught fire. After the Judicial First Class Magistrate recorded her statement and went away, p. W. 2 again asked the deceased as to the reason for the incident, for which, the deceased stated that she set fire to herself by pouring kerosene unable to bear the harassment and cruelty by accused No. 1. P. W. 2 admitted that prior to her death, the deceased never told him that she was subjected to harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry. Ex. P-3 letter also does not show anything about the harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. Now, these two oral dying declarations, said to have been made by the deceased, have to be subjected to close scrutiny and evaluated in the light of the evidence of P. W. 2. The dying declarations are the statements of the persons dead. The statements written or oral, of the relevant facts as to the cause of the death and as to the nature and circumstances of the transactions which resulted in the death in cases in which the cause of death comes into question are admissible under Section 13 (1) of the Evidence Act. The statements written or oral, of the relevant facts as to the cause of the death and as to the nature and circumstances of the transactions which resulted in the death in cases in which the cause of death comes into question are admissible under Section 13 (1) of the Evidence Act. A dying declaration may be oral or it may be reduced in writing by another person, but in either case, it must be duly proved. Before the dying declaration can be admitted in evidence, it must be proved that; (1) a statement written or verbal is made by a person who is dead, as to the cause of his death or any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death; and (2) the cause of that person s death is in question. ( 15 ) IN a leading decision of Supreme Court in Kushal Rao Vs. State of Bombay it was held as follows:-"in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of cross-examination. But once the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was a truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. " ( 16 ) AS a matter of law, a dying declaration can be acted upon without corroboration. There is not even a rule of prudence, which has hardened into a rule of law that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon, unless it is corroborated. The primary effort of the Court has to find out whether the dying declaration is true. If it is, no question of corroboration arises. It is only if the circumstances surrounding the dying declaration are not clear or convincing, the court may, for its assurance, look for corroboration. Initially the deceased was admitted in Government Hospital, Madakasira on 11-11-1997 at 4-45 p. M. P. W. 13 sent Ex. P-5 medical intimation to the police basing on Ex. P-15. P. W. 12 who is the Head Constable rushed to the Government Hospital and recorded ex. P-16 statement. The duty Doctor made an endorsement to the effect that the patient was conscious. Ex. P-5 medical intimation to the police basing on Ex. P-15. P. W. 12 who is the Head Constable rushed to the Government Hospital and recorded ex. P-16 statement. The duty Doctor made an endorsement to the effect that the patient was conscious. Ex. P-16 dying declaration was recorded at 5-00 P. M. Though the Doctor made an endorsement, Ex. P-17, about the mental state of the deceased, P. W. 13 admitted that as soon as the deceased was admitted in the hospital, he administered sedative drugs to her. Basing on the said admission the learned Counsel for the accused contended that Ex. P-16 is not a true and correct statement. A perusal of this statement would indicate that three months prior to the incident, her husband was insisting to bring Rs. 5,000/- from her parents to install a dish antenna and she told her husband that her parents even did not discharge the debts incurred for performing their marriage and for that reason her husband was beating daily as she did not bring the amounts and on the date of incident her husband abused her and unable to bear the harassment she poured kerosene on her body and set fire to herself and her husband and husband s sister Mumtaz came and put off the flames and took her to hospital. On this document, the purported left thumb mark of the deceased was obtained. It is specifically suggested to P. W. 12 that Ex. P-16 was brought into existence subsequent to the death of the deceased but the same was denied. The medical evidence would indicate that the entire body of the deceased was burnt from head to toe except soles of foot and lower abdomen genetilia. The Magistrate who recorded the statement subsequently stated that he obtained the right thumb impression of the deceased as the left thumb was completely charred. If the statement of P. W. 14 is believed, it can be said that Ex. P-16 appears to have brought into existence for the purpose of this case. Further the statement under Ex. P-16 is quite contradictory to the recitals in Ex. P-20 which is the statement recorded by P. W. 14 on 12-11-1997 at 1-40 A. M. The dying declaration reads as follows:-"i got angry with my husband and set fire myself. My husband abused me. I myself set fire. Further the statement under Ex. P-16 is quite contradictory to the recitals in Ex. P-20 which is the statement recorded by P. W. 14 on 12-11-1997 at 1-40 A. M. The dying declaration reads as follows:-"i got angry with my husband and set fire myself. My husband abused me. I myself set fire. My husband told me that your parents have not given anything. They told that they will give later on. They have not given Rs. 5,000/ -. I got angry and self set fire as he abused me. My husband has not beat me. I cannot state anything. Do not harass me. You go away. I myself poured kerosene and set fire. Nothing, you go away. " ( 17 ) A perusal of the above dying declaration does not indicate that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with demand of dowry. The duty Doctor made an endorsement Ex. P-19 to the effect that the patient was conscious and in a fit state of mind to give statement. ( 18 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel for the accused, the circumstances under which the deceased died have narrated differently on five occasions i. e. (1) the version given in Ex. P-16; (2) the version given to P. W. 13; (3) the version given in the deposition of P. W. 2; (4) dying declaration recorded by P. W. 12; and (5) the dying declaration recorded by P. W. 14. The learned Counsel contended that each one of the versions is inconsistent with others and therefore taking an overall view as each one of the versions conflicts with the dying declaration (Ex. P-20), it would be unsafe to rely on the dying declarations to uphold the conviction of the appellant. ( 19 ) FIRST version of the incident as spoken to by P. W. 13 would indicate that the deceased sustained accidental burns. This can be seen from Ex. P-15 which is the hospital intimation sent to P. W. 12. Ex. P-18 also would indicate that the deceased sustained burn injuries accidentally. The said fact was evidenced from the testimony of P. W. 2 who in the first instance stated that the deceased informed him that due to burst of stove she caught fire. The second version was from Ex. Ex. P-18 also would indicate that the deceased sustained burn injuries accidentally. The said fact was evidenced from the testimony of P. W. 2 who in the first instance stated that the deceased informed him that due to burst of stove she caught fire. The second version was from Ex. P-16, which indicate that unable to bear the harassment of the appellant herein, she poured kerosene on her body and set fire to herself. This is also inconsistent with the statement recorded by P. W. 14 as in Ex. P-20 which would indicate that as the parents of the deceased did not give Rs. 5,000/-, she got angry and set fire to herself as the accused abused her. There was no mention in Ex. P-20 about the demand made by the appellant herein to get Rs. 5,000/- from the parents of the deceased. Immediate reason as stated in Ex. P-16 was that unable to bear the abuse, she set fire to herself, whereas the reason in Ex. P-20 was that as her parents did not give Rs. 5,000/- she got angry and set fire to herself. Another discrepancy as noticed in Ex. P-16 and P-20 is that, in Ex. P-16 the deceased stated that the accused used to beat the deceased daily but whereas in Ex. P-20 it is specifically stated that the appellant has not beaten her. A comparison of all these dying declarations shows that they do not tally with any material particulars. There is a conflict and inconsistency between these dying declarations. ( 20 ) THE ocular testimony reveals that both the appellant and the deceased lived happily without any differences and there was no demand of dowry by the accused at any point of time. Simply because P. Ws. 1 and 3 did not support the case of the prosecution, that does not mean that their evidence would efface from the record. Such part of their testimony which inspires the confidence of the Court can be used by prosecution to corroborate the other evidence on record if any. The dying declaration recorded by P. W. 12 cannot be said to be true and correct statement because there was no possibility for P. W. 12 to obtain the left thumb impression of the deceased as left hand thumb was completely charred. The dying declaration recorded by P. W. 12 cannot be said to be true and correct statement because there was no possibility for P. W. 12 to obtain the left thumb impression of the deceased as left hand thumb was completely charred. This appears to be correct in view of the evidence of P. W. 10 who categorically stated that the entire body was burnt except soles of foot and lower abdomen genetilia. In so far as the dying declaration recorded by P. W. 14 is concerned, it would not indicate about any cruel treatment for or in connection with demand of dowry or any abetment to the deceased to commit suicide. Even though, it is stated in ex. P-20 that the appellant abused the deceased and therefore she set fire to herself, but in the absence of nature of abuses, they are not of such nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. There was no evidence to show that the deceased was treated with a degree of kindness and consideration or that she was physically assaulted or virtually bullied. As seen from the evidence, the cruelty was not so grave as to virtually drive the deceased to a point of desperation, whereby she was left with no option except to commit suicide. So, in these circumstances, it is not safe to place an implicit reliance on Ex. P-20 so as to convict the accused for the offences under Sections 498 (A) and 306 I. P. C. It is also contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that Ex. P-20 was the result of tutoring or coaching by the relatives of the deceased. That possibility cannot be ruled out. Because in the first instance, the deceased is said to have stated to the Doctor that she sustained burns accidentally, so also the deceased stated to P. W. 2 that she sustained burn injuries accidentally. It is an admitted fact that several people from rallapalli village were talking with the deceased. P. W. 2 admitted that seven persons were talked with the deceased and consoled her before the arrival of the magistrate. So, the possibility of these persons tutoring the deceased to give a statement as in Ex. P-20 cannot be ruled out. But the learned Sessions Judge on perusal of Exs. P. W. 2 admitted that seven persons were talked with the deceased and consoled her before the arrival of the magistrate. So, the possibility of these persons tutoring the deceased to give a statement as in Ex. P-20 cannot be ruled out. But the learned Sessions Judge on perusal of Exs. P-16 and P-20 came to the conclusion that due to the harassment caused by accused No. 1, she committed suicide. It is also observed by the learned Sessions Judge that there was no chance for others to tutor the deceased to give a version as in Ex. P-20 against the appellant. The evidence on record would indicate that several persons were present with the deceased and talked with her even before the arrival of P. W. 14. For the reasons herein before mentioned have not been considered by the learned Sessions Judge. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the learned sessions Judge was not justified in relying upon the evidence of P. W. 2 and exs. P-16 and P-20 in convicting the accused. ( 21 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the prosecution failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. The possibility of the accused sustaining burns accidentally cannot be ruled out. Therefore, benefit of doubt should be given to the appellant/accused no. 1. ( 22 ) IN the result, the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant/accused is set aside and the appellant is acquitted for the offences under Section 498 (A) and 306 I. P. C. The bail bonds of the accused shall stand cancelled. The fine amount if any paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him. The criminal appeal is allowed accordingly.