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2003 DIGILAW 1592 (MAD)

K. R. Sekar v. The Director of School Education & Others

2003-10-08

P.K.MISRA

body2003
Judgment :- Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents 1 to 3. There is no appearance on behalf of the 4th respondent. 2. The petitioner has prayed for recalling the order of suspension. The petitioner was employed under the fourth respondent, which is an aided School. The petitioner was placed under suspension on the ground that a criminal case has been initiated against him. 3. It is stated by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents 1 to 3 that the criminal case which is now pending is likely to be finalised within a short period. 4. Section 22(3) of the Tamil Nadu Recongised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974) is to the following effect: "(3)(a) No teacher or other person employed in any private school shall be placed under suspension except when an inquiry into the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 21, of such teacher or other person is contemplated. (b) No such suspension shall remain in force more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such enquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher or other person shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher on other employee: Provided that the competent authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the said period of two months, for a further period not exceeding two months, if, in the opinion of such competent authority, the inquiry could not be completed within the said period of two months for reasons directly attributable to such teacher or other person". 5. From the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the order of suspension can be passed for a period of two months and thereafter it can be extended for a further period of two months. Provision under Section 22(3)(b) further makes it clear that if such enquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher. 6. Provision under Section 22(3)(b) further makes it clear that if such enquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher. 6. Considering the aforesaid provisions, it has been observed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of G. Anbarasan vs. District Educational Officer, Cuddalore reported in 2001 (1) CTC 292 wherein the paragraph 27 and 29 are to the following effect: "27. Though the statutory provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder do not make a provision for placing a teacher or other person employed in a school under suspension pending investigation or the crime or a complaint or pending of a criminal case, the employer of such a teacher could very well place him under suspension even when the statutory provision do not provide for such a contingency, by exercise of its powers of suspension, but the employer has to pay the salary. 29. One other incidental question that has been raised is whether the suspension could be continued beyond two months or the extend the period as provided in Section 20(3) of the Act. The statutory provision provides the period of suspension to be confined to two months at the first instance and an extension for identical period shall be by appropriate authority. The object of the statutory provision being that there shall not be any delay in the disciplinary proceedings against a teacher working in a private school. Merely because a restriction is imposed, it cannot be held that beyond the said period the teacher cannot be placed under suspension. However if a teacher is kept under suspension beyond the period stipulated in Section 20(3), the employer namely the school Management has to pay full salary for any period beyond the period stipulated by the statutory provisions or extended under the proviso to Section 20(3) from its funds". 7. The aforesaid observation of the learned Single Judge is obviously on the footing that apart from any provision relating to suspension, an employer has got the inherent right to place an employee under suspension. However, in such an event, the employer is to pay full salary to the concerned employee. 8. 7. The aforesaid observation of the learned Single Judge is obviously on the footing that apart from any provision relating to suspension, an employer has got the inherent right to place an employee under suspension. However, in such an event, the employer is to pay full salary to the concerned employee. 8. Following the aforesaid decision, while refusing to recall the order of suspension, I make it clear that the petitioner is entitled to get the salary for the entire period except the initial period of four months suspension. Such amount should be paid by the fourth respondent from its own funds. It would be open to the fourth petitioner to recall the order of suspension or to continue with the order of suspension. In case the suspension order is to continue, the fourth respondent would be liable to pay the full salary except for the period stipulated under Section 22(3). This payment should be made within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order. Subject to the aforesaid observation, the writ petition is allowed to such extent. No costs.