S. P. MEHROTRA, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for quashing the judgment and order dated 11-10-2002 (Annexure 6 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut (Respondent No. 2) and the order dated 21-10-2000 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut (Respondent No. 3 ). 2. The dispute relates to shop No. 45 (New No. 47) situate at Ahmad Road, Meerut. The said shop has, hereinafter been referred to "the disputed shop. " 3. From the allegations made in the writ petition, it appears that the respondent No. 1 (Plaintiff) filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent etc. under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act") against the petitioner in respect of the disputed shop. It was, inter alia, alleged that the petitioner was the tenant in the disputed shop at the rate of Rs. 375 per month as rent and that the petitioner was in arrears of rent with effect from 1-10-1989 to 6-9-1996 which was not paid to the respondent No. 1 (Plaintiff); and that the tenancy of the petitioner was determined by serving a legal notice. The said suit was registered as S. C. C. Suit No. 186 of 1996. 4. It further appears from the perusal of the impugned orders that the said suit was filed on 23rd October, 1996 whereupon summons were issued to the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1, despite service of summons, did not appear in the suit. Thereupon, 15th May, 1997 was fixed for ex parte evidence. On 15th May, 1997, the petitioner appeared before the Court, and moved an application for setting aside the order for recording ex parte evidence. The said application of the petitioner was allowed on 22-12-1997, and 15-1-1998 was fixed for filing written statement. Thereafter, on 17-2-1998, 17-3-1998 and 1-4-1998, the petitioner took time for filing written statement by moving applications. On 1-4-1998, on an application filed by the petitioner, 10-4-1998 was fixed for filing written statement, and 28-5-1998 was fixed for evidence. 5. On 10-4-1998 again, the petitioner did not file the written statement, and instead moved an application No. 27-Ga praying for one months time for filing written statement. On 1-4-1998, on an application filed by the petitioner, 10-4-1998 was fixed for filing written statement, and 28-5-1998 was fixed for evidence. 5. On 10-4-1998 again, the petitioner did not file the written statement, and instead moved an application No. 27-Ga praying for one months time for filing written statement. Thereupon, the petitioner was granted 15 days time for filing written statement. Even after the expiry of 15 days, no written, statement was filed by the petitioner on 25-4-1998 nor did the petitioner appear on the said date. In the circumstances, the Court on 25-4-1998 directed the suit to proceed ex parte, and 28-5-1998 (which had already been fixed in the suit) was fixed for ex parte evidence. On 28-5-1998, the Presiding Officer was not present, and as such, 10-8-1998 was fixed in the suit. 6. On 10-8-1998, the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was present. The ex parte evidence of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was recorded, and ex parte arguments were heard on the said date i. e. on 10-8-1998. Thereafter, 11-8-1998 was fixed for judgment. 7. On 11-8-1998, the judgment was pronounced by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut whereby, the said suit filed by the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was decreed ex parte. 8. Thereafter, an application dated 8-9-1998 under Order IX, Rule 13 read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner. The said application was supported by an affidavit of the petitioner sworn on 8-9-1998. A copy of the said application dated 8-9-1998 alongwith its supporting affidavit has been filed as Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition. The application dated 8-9-1998 under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was filed on behalf of the petitioner. 9. Initially, on the said application filed under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act filed on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut gave a direction to the petitioner to furnish security to the extent of half of the amount of the decreetal amount and to deposit remaining half of the decreetal amount. The petitioner furnished the said security which was accepted by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court by an order dated 29-9-1998. Thereafter, the petitioner moved another application on 9-10-1998 praying for permission to furnish security for the remaining half of the decreetal amount. The petitioner furnished the said security which was accepted by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court by an order dated 29-9-1998. Thereafter, the petitioner moved another application on 9-10-1998 praying for permission to furnish security for the remaining half of the decreetal amount. The said application filed by the petitioner was allowed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut. Thereupon, the petitioner furnished the security for the remaining half of the decreetal amount also. 10. Against the said application dated 8-9-1998 filed on behalf of the petitioner under Order IX, Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) filed objection dated 23-11-1998. A copy of the said objection dated 23-11-1998 has been filed as Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition. 11. Sri Jain has fairly conceded that the respondent No. 1 reiterated the same assertions in the counter- affidavit as were made in the said objection dated 23-11-1998. The affidavit of Jamshad, husband of the respondent No. 1 was also filed in support of the said objection dated 23-11-1998. It is further stated by Sri Jain that another affidavit of Mohd. Ashraf was also filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 in support of the said objection dated 23-11-1998. 12. Thereafter, the petitioner filed rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 4-2-2000. A copy of the said rejoinder- affidavit has been filed during the course of arguments on behalf of the petitioner alongwith supplementary-affidavit, which is taken on record. 13. Learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut by an order dated 21-10-2000 rejected the said application filed on behalf of the petitioner under Order IX, Rule 13 and Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure. It was, inter alia, held that there was no sufficient cause because of which the petitioner was prevented from attending the Court when the said ex parte order was passed. 14. Against the said order dated 21-10-2000, the petitioner filed a Revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The said Revision was registered as SCC Revision No. 251 of 2000. 15. By the judgment and order dated 11-10-2002, the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut dismissed the said revision filed by the petitioner, and confirmed the said order dated 21-10- 2000 passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut. 16. The said Revision was registered as SCC Revision No. 251 of 2000. 15. By the judgment and order dated 11-10-2002, the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut dismissed the said revision filed by the petitioner, and confirmed the said order dated 21-10- 2000 passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut. 16. It was, inter alia, held in the said judgment and order dated 11-10-2002 that the petitioner deliberately did not appear in the Court on 10-8-1998, and no proper explanation had been given by the petitioner for his absence on that date i. e. on 10-8-1998. In recording the said finding, the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut, inter alia, considered the medical certificate submitted by the petitioner, and found the same to be false. The learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut, further emphasized that there was contradiction in the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner, inasmuch as in the affidavit accompanying the restoration application dated 8-9-1998, the petitioner alleged that his daughter was ill on 26-8-1998 while in the rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 4-2- 2000, it was alleged that his daughter was ill on 10-8-1998. 17. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking the reliefs mentioned above. 18. I have heard Sri Pramod Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri K. K. Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent No. 1. 19. Sri Pramod Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that while the judgment decreeing the said suit ex parte was pronounced on 11-8-1998, the Courts below have decided the restoration matter on the ground of absence of the petitioner on 10-8-1998. It is submitted that as the suit was decreed ex parte on 11-8-1998, the Courts below ought to have considered the question of absence on 11-8-1998. I have considered the submission made by Sri Jain. 20. Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows : "13. It is submitted that as the suit was decreed ex parte on 11-8-1998, the Courts below ought to have considered the question of absence on 11-8-1998. I have considered the submission made by Sri Jain. 20. Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows : "13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendants.- In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit: Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also : [provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim. ] [explanation.- Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside the ex parte decree. ]" 21. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that in the application filed by the defendant for setting aside an ex parte decree, the defendant is required to show "that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing". Therefore, the defendant is required to show sufficient cause for absence on the date when the suit was called on for hearing. 22. The aforesaid narration of the facts shows that on 10-8-1998, the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was present. Therefore, the defendant is required to show sufficient cause for absence on the date when the suit was called on for hearing. 22. The aforesaid narration of the facts shows that on 10-8-1998, the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was present. The ex parte evidence of the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was recorded, and ex parte arguments were heard on the said date i. e. 10-8-1998. Thereafter, 11-8-1998 was fixed for judgment. On 11-8- 1998, the judgment was pronounced by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut whereby the said suit filed by the respondent No. 1 (plaintiff) was decreed ex parte. 23. It is thus evident that the hearing in the suit was fixed for 10-8-1998, and that hearing in fact took place on the same date. Thereafter, 11-8-1998 was fixed for judgment, and the judgment was pronounced on 11-8-1998. Thus, as the date for hearing fixed was 11-8-1998 and the suit was taken up for hearing on the said date, the petitioner was evidently required to show sufficient cause for his absence on 10-8-1998. 11-8-1998 was the date fixed for judgment after the hearing had concluded on 10-8-1998. Therefore, the Courts below have not committed any illegality in considering the restoration application filed on behalf of the petitioner with reference to 10-8-1998. The submission made by Sri Pramod Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. 24. Sri Pramod Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner then submits that the Courts below have considered the past conduct of the petitioner in deciding the restoration application filed on behalf of the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte decree passed on 11-8-1998. It is submitted by Sri Jain that the petitioner was required to show sufficient cause for not appearing on 10-8-1998, and his past conduct with reference to the suit was not relevant for deciding the said question. It is submitted by Sri Jain that the Courts below have committed patently illegality in taking into consideration the past conduct of the petitioner with reference to the suit while deciding the restoration application filed on behalf of the petitioner. Shri Jain has placed reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Phool Chand v. Vth Additional District Judge, Aligarh, reported in 1983 A. R. C. 637. 25. Shri Jain has placed reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Phool Chand v. Vth Additional District Judge, Aligarh, reported in 1983 A. R. C. 637. 25. In reply, Sri K. K. Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator- respondent No. 1 submits that it is true that the past conduct of the petitioner could not be considered for deciding the question of sufficient cause for absence on 10-8-1998, but in the present case, the Courts below have only considered the chain of events in the suit in order to decide whether the cause set-up by the petitioner for his absence on 10-8- 1998 could be believed or not. 26. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the submission made by Sri Pramod Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. In Phool Chand case (supra), it was laid down as follows (paragraph 1 of the said ARC): " (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . It is well-settled that in deciding the restoration application for setting aside an ex parte decree the merits of the case or conduct of the applicant should not be taken into account. And this error in deciding the application vitiates the finding. " 27. There is no dispute that in deciding the application for setting aside ex parte decree, the past conduct of the applicant should not be taken into account. However, a perusal of the orders passed by the Courts below shows that the restoration application filed on behalf of the petitioner has not been rejected on account of the past conduct of the petitioner with reference to the suit. The chain of events occurring in the suit has been considered in order to decide whether the cause shown by the petitioner for his absence on 10-8-1998 could be believed or not. No illegality, in my opinion, has therefore, been committed by the Courts below in this regard. 28. Sri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner next submits that the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut in passing the impugned judgment and order dated 11-10-2002 has misconstrued, the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner in concluding that the petitioner had given two different versions in the said affidavits for his absence on 10-8-1998. 28. Sri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner next submits that the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut in passing the impugned judgment and order dated 11-10-2002 has misconstrued, the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner in concluding that the petitioner had given two different versions in the said affidavits for his absence on 10-8-1998. It is submitted by Sri Jain that in the affidavit sworn on 8-9-1998, the petitioner in paragraph 6 alleged that he fell ill in the night on 9-8-1998 while in paragraph 7 of the said affidavit, the petitioner alleged that his daughter fell ill on 26-8-1998. Therefore, the contention proceeds, the averments made in the rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 4-2-2000 (a copy whereof has been filed as Annexure SA-1 to the supplementary-affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner) should be construed in the light of the averments made in the said affidavit sworn on 8-9- 1998. Reading two affidavits together, it is submitted, there was no contradiction in the averments made on behalf of the petitioner. 29. In reply, Sri Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent No. 1 submits that in the affidavits as well as in the objection filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1, it was categorically pointed out that the husband of the respondent No. 1 had seen the petitioner sitting in his shop for the entire day on 10- 8-1998. When the said fact was brought on record on behalf of the respondent No. 1, the contention proceeds, the petitioner changed his version in the rejoinder-affidavit and asserted that his daughter was ill on 10-8-1998 which was evidently contrary to the assertions made in the affidavit sworn on 8-9- 1998. 30. It is further submitted by Sri K. K. Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent No. 1 that in any case, if two interpretations or constructions of the evidence are reasonably possible, and the Courts below have taken one view of the evidence, then no interference can be made in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the Courts below should have taken the other view of the evidence. 31. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 31. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. The learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut in his judgment and order dated 11-10-2002 has considered the averments made in various affidavits filed on behalf of the parties as well as other material on record, and, thereafter, he has concluded that the petitioner has given two different versions regarding his absence on 10-8-1998 in the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner. I do not find any illegality or perversity in the said conclusion arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut. 32. A perusal of the affidavit sworn on 8-9-1998 and the rejoinder-affidavit sworn on 4-2-2000 filed on behalf of the petitioner shows that the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut has given a construction/interpretation to the contents of the said affidavits which was reasonably possible, and therefore, no interference is called for with the said conclusion drawn by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut regarding the variance in the versions of the petitioner in the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner, on the ground that another construction/interpretation of the contents of the said affidavits was possible, and the Courts below should have adopted the said other construction/interpretation. It is well-settled that if two interpretations or constructions of the evidence on the record are reasonably possible, and the Courts below have taken one view of the evidence, then no interference can be made in the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the Courts below should have taken the other view of the evidence. 33. In M/s. India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M. A. Baker & Anr. , AIR 1978 SC 45 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as under (paragraphs numbers 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the said AIR): " (5) The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution is well- settled. Power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however erroneous those may be. Power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however erroneous those may be. It is well-settled and perhaps too late in the day to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, 1954 SCR 565 : AIR 1954 SC 215 , where the principles have been clearly laid down as follows: - (at p. 217 of AIR ). "this power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C. J. , in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal. 193 (SB), to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". 34. The same view was reiterated by another Constitution Bench of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals. Assam, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 . Even recently in Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmi-bai R. Tarte, (1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297 , dealing with a litigation between a landlord and tenant under Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court relying on its earlier decisions observed as follows (at pp. 1301, 1302 of AIR): "if an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a fortiori that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior Court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a Court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate Court or tribunal final on facts. " (6) Whether the landlords requirement is bona fide and reasonable has been concurrently found by the two Courts below against the landlord by appreciating the entire evidence. " (6) Whether the landlords requirement is bona fide and reasonable has been concurrently found by the two Courts below against the landlord by appreciating the entire evidence. After examining the reasons given by both the Courts it is not possible to hold that the conclusions are "perverse" or even that these are against the weight of evidence on record. It is a case of reasonably possible factual appreciation of the entire evidence and circumstances brought on the record. (7) It is possible that another Court may be able to take a different view of the matter by appreciating the evidence in a different manner, if it determinedly chooses to do so. However, with respect to the learned Judge (Vaidya, J.) that will not be justice administered according to law to which Courts are committed notwithstanding dissertation, in season and out of season, about philosophies. (8) We are clearly of opinion that there was no justification for interference in this case with the conclusions of facts by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are also unable to agree with the High Court that there was anything so grossly wrong and unjust or shocking the Courts "conscience" that it was absolutely necessary in the interest of justice for the High Court to step in under Article 227 of the Constitution. Counsel for both sides took us through the reasonings given by the High Court as well as by the Courts below and we are unable to hold that the High Court was at all correct in exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with the decisions of the Courts below. In our opinion the High Court arrogated to itself the powers of a Court of appeal, which it did not possess under the law, and has exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. " 35. Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner next submits that the medical certificate dated 7-9-1998 in respect of the alleged illness of the petitioner has been discarded by the learned Additional District Judge, Court number 18, Meerut on pure technicalities without giving any valid reason, even though the said medical certificate mentioned the illness of the petitioner as "typhoid". 36. Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner next submits that the medical certificate dated 7-9-1998 in respect of the alleged illness of the petitioner has been discarded by the learned Additional District Judge, Court number 18, Meerut on pure technicalities without giving any valid reason, even though the said medical certificate mentioned the illness of the petitioner as "typhoid". 36. In reply, Shri Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent No. 1 submits that the said medical certificate dated 7-9-1998 though mentioned the illness of the petitioner as "typhoid", merely advised the petitioner to take rest for ten days with effect from 9-8-1998. The medical certificate filed by the petitioner should have shown that the illness of the petitioner was such that the petitioner could not move about and discharge his normal functions. There being no such indication in the medical certificate dated 7-9-1998, the same was rightly discarded by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut in passing the impugned judgment and order dated 11-10- 2002. Reliance is placed by Shri Arora on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Om Prakash v. District Judge, Udham Singh Nagar & Ors. , 1999 (1) ARC 559. 37. It is further submitted by Shri Arora that the petitioner did not file any medical prescription regarding his alleged illness (i. e. , typhoid), nor did he file any report of pathological test. Shri Arora submits that the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut in passing the said judgment and order dated 11-10-2002 has considered the entire evidence on record, and has discarded the said medical certificate giving cogent reasons, and no interference is called for with the said conclusion of the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 38. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 39. Whether a particular piece of evidence is to be believed or not, is basically a question of fact. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with the conclusions of the Courts below on the said question, unless the said conclusions are shown to be perverse or patently illegal. 40. I have perused the impugned judgment and order dated 11-10- 2002. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with the conclusions of the Courts below on the said question, unless the said conclusions are shown to be perverse or patently illegal. 40. I have perused the impugned judgment and order dated 11-10- 2002. The learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut has considered the evidence on record including the medical certificates, and cogent reasons have been given by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut for discarding the said medical certificate dated 7-9-1998 in respect of the alleged illness of the petitioner as well as the medical certificate dated 26-8-1998 in respect of the alleged illness of the daughter of the petitioner. No perversity or illegality has been shown in the said conclusions of fact drawn by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut, and no interference is, therefore, called for with the said conclusions by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 41. As regards the medical certificate dated 7-9-1998 which mentioned the illness of the petitioner as "typhoid", it is noteworthy that the said medical certificate merely advised the petitioner to take rest for ten days with effect from 9-8-1998, and it did not indicate that the illness of the petitioner was of such an order that prevented the petitioner from discharging his normal functions and prevented him from taking legal steps. Therefore, in my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut did not commit any illegality in discarding the said medical certificate dated 7-9-1998. 42. In Om Prakash case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court laid down as follows (paragraph 3 of the said ARC): " (3) It is not enough to say that a person is ill and attending physician has advised him rest. What has to be shown is that the illness was of an order that prevented the applicant from discharging his normal functions and prevented him from taking legal steps. Nothing of the sort was made out. It is contended that the Court should take a liberal view in the matter of limitation. The Court in my view cannot be so liberal as to make the law of limitation a dead letter. Nothing of the sort was made out. It is contended that the Court should take a liberal view in the matter of limitation. The Court in my view cannot be so liberal as to make the law of limitation a dead letter. The applicant has to make out a sufficient cause for delay and this requirement cannot be dispensed with by taking a liberal view as contended. In my view there is no illegality in the impugned order. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. " 43. Shri Jain next submits that just as in case of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the words "sufficient cause" occurring in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be liberally construed. It is submitted by Shri Jain that it is well established from various judicial decisions that the Court should lean in favour of giving hearing to both the sides. He has placed reliance on the following decisions: (1) Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr. , AIR 1955 SC 425 . (2) Ramji Dass & Ors. v. Mohan Singh, 1978 ARC 496 (SC ). (3) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. , 1987 (1) ARC 288 (SC ). (4) Surjeet Kumar v. Prescribed Authority, under U. P. Act Number 13 of 1972, Moradabad & Anr. , 1993 (2) AWC 1517. (5) Hafiz Fazal Haq v. VIIth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Agra & Ors. , 1997 (1) JCLR 456 (All) : 1997 (1) AWC 321. 44. In reply, Shri Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent No. 1 submits that the question of taking a liberal view regarding the cause shown by the petitioner being sufficient could only arise if the alleged cause shown by the petitioner was found to be true. It is submitted that in the present case, the alleged cause shown by the petitioner has been found to be false, and as such, there was no occasion for taking a liberal view on the question of sufficient cause in the present case. 45. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 46. The principle is well-settled that the Court should take a liberal view on the question of "sufficient cause", and should lean in favour of giving hearing to both the sides. 45. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 46. The principle is well-settled that the Court should take a liberal view on the question of "sufficient cause", and should lean in favour of giving hearing to both the sides. However, a perusal of Order IX, Rule 13 shows that two things are required to be shown by the defendant who has applied for setting aside the ex parte decree: (i) There was cause which prevented the defendant from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. In other words, the defendant must show that there was cause for his absence in the suit at the time of hearing on the particular date. (ii) The said cause shown by the defendant was sufficient cause. In other words, the defendant should establish that the cause shown by him was sufficient cause. 47. The above principle regarding liberal approach on the question of "sufficient cause" applies when the aforesaid requirement number (ii) is being considered. 48. If the cause shown by the defendant (i. e. , requirement (i) above) is found to be true, then only the question would arise as to whether the said cause is sufficient or not (i. e. , requirement (ii) above ). It is at this stage that the above principle regarding liberal approach on the question of "sufficient cause" applies. In other words, once the cause shown by the defendant is found to be true, the Court should be liberal in deciding as to whether such cause is sufficient or not. 49. On the other hand, if the cause shown by the defendant is itself found to be false (i. e. , requirement (i) above), then the question of considering as to whether such cause is sufficient or not (i. e. , requirement (ii) above), does not arise. Hence, in such a case, no occasion arises for applying the above principle regarding liberal approach on the question of "sufficient cause. " 50. In short, the applicability of the above principle regarding liberal approach on the question of "sufficient cause" pre-supposes that the cause shown by the defendant has been found to be true, and the question to be considered is as to whether such cause is sufficient or not. " 50. In short, the applicability of the above principle regarding liberal approach on the question of "sufficient cause" pre-supposes that the cause shown by the defendant has been found to be true, and the question to be considered is as to whether such cause is sufficient or not. In case, the cause shown by the defendant is itself found to be untrue, no question of adopting liberal approach in deciding such cause to be sufficient or not, arises. 51. In the present case, the cause shown by the petitioner (defendant) for his absence on 10-8-1998 (i. e. , requirement (i) above) was found to be untrue by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 18, Meerut in the impugned judgment and order dated 11-10-2002. Hence, the question of considering as to whether such cause was sufficient or not (i. e. , requirement (ii) above), does not arise. Consequently, there is no occasion for applying the above principle regarding liberal approach on the question of "sufficient cause" in the present case. The submission made by Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. 52. Let us now consider the decisions cited by Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 53. In Sangram Singh case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows (paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said AIR): " (16) Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is `procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore, be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to `both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. (17) Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. " 54. Thus, this decision lays down that the Court should lean in favour of giving hearing to both the sides. However, there is no occasion for applying the said principle in the present case as the cause shown by the petitioner for his absence on 10-8-1998 has itself been found to be untrue. 55. In Ramji Dass case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows: "an ex parte decree passed eight years ago was set aside by the Court which passed it and the order was confirmed in revision by the District Court. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 115 C. P. C. , set aside on various grounds. After having heard Counsel, we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. Therefore, we think that the order of the High Court should not have been passed in the interests of justice which always informs the power under Section 115 C. P. C. We, therefore, set aside that order and also the ex parte decree. We direct the trial Court to take back the suit on file and proceed forthwith to trial. The suit is very old and it should be disposed of within six months from the receipt of this order by the trial Court. We further direct that as a condition for setting aside the ex parte decree, the appellants shall pay to the respondent within one month from today a sum of Rs. 250 by way of costs. " 56. The facts of the present case are distinguishable from those of Ramji Dass case. In Ramji Dass case, as is evident from the passage quoted above, the Court which had passed the ex parte decree, passed an order setting-aside the said ex parte decree. The said order setting aside the ex parte decree was confirmed by the District Court. The High Court in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure set-aside the said order of the Court below. The said order setting aside the ex parte decree was confirmed by the District Court. The High Court in exercise of its power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure set-aside the said order of the Court below. Having considered the circumstances of the case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Courts discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out a hearing, and that the order of the High Court should not have been passed in the interest of justice. 57. On the other hand, in the present case, the Courts below have rejected the application of the petitioner (defendant) for setting aside the ex parte decree, The cause shown by the petitioner for his absence on 10-8-1998 has been found to be untrue. Hence, the principle of leaning in favour of giving hearing to both the sides, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 58. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was laid down as follows (paragraph 3 of the said A. R. C.): " (3) The legislature has conferred to power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on `merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice -that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) "every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 59. Thus, according to this decision, the expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 should be interpreted in a flexible manner so as to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. The Court should adopt liberal approach in deciding the question of "substantial cause". When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. The judiciary should remove injustice, and not legalize injustice on technical grounds. 60. The expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been defined. Therefore, the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case with reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 may be applied for interpreting the expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 61. However, the said decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 61. However, the said decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. As noted above, the question of adopting liberal approach in deciding the question of "sufficient cause" arises only when the defendant is able to establish "cause" for his absence on the date of hearing. In the present case, the cause shown by the petitioner defendant was found to be untrue. Evidently, the question of considering as to whether the said cause was sufficient or not, and of adopting liberal approach in determining the said question, did not arise in the present case. 62. In Surjeet Kumar case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court held as follows (paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 21 of the said AWC): " (13) Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions contained in Order IX, Rule 7 provide that where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance. The provisions contained in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide that in any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. (14) A perusal of the aforesaid provisions indicate that while for setting aside an ex parte order, the defendant is required to assign good cause for his previous non-appearance, the provisions contained in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide that in order to set aside an ex parte decree, the defendant has to establish that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. The distinction is obvious. While, in the proceedings under Order IX, Rule 7 the defendant has to make out a good cause, in the proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13 he has to make out a sufficient cause. While nothing this distinction, the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 , had observed that the only difference between the two can be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of sufficient cause. This distinction however, is not maintained in the proceedings before the prescribed authority under the provisions of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as is apparent from the fact that in Rule 22 (b) of the Rules framed under the said Act an ex parte order of whatever nature, it may be, can be set aside only for sufficient cause. To this extent, therefore, the provisions contained in Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure stand modified in their application to the proceedings under the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. (15) The ex parte order granting the release and thereby terminating the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act can be set aside in the Proceedings of the nature contemplated under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure which applies mutatis mutandis to such a proceeding. Thus, if the prescribed Authority is satisfied that the tenant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the case was called on for hearing it has to make an order setting aside the ex parte order of release passed against the tenant upon such terms as to costs, payment before it or otherwise, it thinks fit and has to appoint a day for proceeding with the case. The second proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically prohibits the setting aside of ex parte order if the prescribed authority is satisfied that the tenant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the application for release. (16) In the aforesaid circumstances, it is apparent that sufficient cause has to be made out for non- appearance when the case was called for hearing. Further in case, the tenant had notice of the date of hearing he has to establish that he did not have sufficient time to appear and answer the landlords claim. (17) A look at the various provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure establishes one fact that the word hearing has not been used in the same sense throughout in the Code. It is in this view of the matter, that this Court in its decision in the case of Kallu v. Musammat Imaman, AIR 1949 Alld. 445, had pointed out that the first hearing in a suit commences when the Court looks into the pleadings in order to formulate the points in controversy between the parties. However, this Court had pointed out that in cases in which the issues are framed, the hearing no doubt will be deemed to commence on that date. It was observed in that case that where issues had to be framed on a date fixed for that purpose, the hearing certainly commences when the Court takes up a case to frame the issues. This is possible only after the tenant has filed his written statement. (21) However, certain provisions from the Code of Civil Procedure have been borrowed and are made applicable to the proceedings under the Act with some modifications. In the matters relating to procedure, the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 , cannot go unnoticed. Taking into consideration these observations, it is clear that the procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends, and is never designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of section that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore, be guarded against (Provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Too technical a construction of section that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore, be guarded against (Provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. " 63. This decision again emphasizes the principle of adopting liberal approach in deciding the question of "sufficient cause". This decision is also not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reasons discussed above. 64. In Hafiz Fazal Haq case (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court laid down as under (paragraphs 3,4 and 5 of the said AWC): " (3) The petitioner has claimed that he is the owner of House No. 10/89 situated in Katra Madari Khan, Agra. It is alleged in paragraph 2 of the writ petition that the respondent No. 3 Abdul Aziz on the basis of forged sale-deed dated 7-2-1987 alleged to have been executed by the petitioner claims to be the owner of the said house. The said respondent No. 3 filed a Civil Suit No. 678 of 1992 against the petitioner which was decreed ex parte on 3-12-92 vide Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The petitioner has alleged that he was not served summons or notice of the said suit and he came to know about it for the first time on 7-1-93. Hence, he immediately contacted a local Counsel and on 8-1-93 he filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. , true copy of which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition. He also filed an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. The respondent No. 3 contested this application by filing a counter-affidavit, true copy of which is Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition. The petitioners rejoinder-affidavit is Annexure-4 to the writ petition. The application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. was rejected on 17-4-93 vide Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The petitioner filed an appeal against that order which was dismissed on 2-11-94 vide Annexure-6 to the writ petition and hence this writ petition. (4) I have carefully perused the impugned order dated 2-11-94 and in my opinion, the Court below has taken a hyper-technical view in this matter. The petitioner filed an appeal against that order which was dismissed on 2-11-94 vide Annexure-6 to the writ petition and hence this writ petition. (4) I have carefully perused the impugned order dated 2-11-94 and in my opinion, the Court below has taken a hyper-technical view in this matter. No doubt this Court does not normally interfere with a finding of fact, but in the present case while the ex parte judgment was delivered on 3-12-92, the restoration application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. was filed on 8-1-94. Thus, there was not much delay in filing the restoration application. The Court below has observed that the restoration application was filed on 8-1-93 while the inspection of the record was done on 12-1-93. In my opinion, this fact alone could not have justified the Court below in rejecting the restoration application. It is quite possible that the petitioner got some information that an ex parte decree has been passed against him and then he applied for restoration immediately so that there could not be delay in filing the same, and the inspection was done later. In my opinion, a liberal view should have taken by the Court below and the restoration application should not have been rejected on such a hyper-technical ground. (5) Hence, I allow this petition and set aside the impugned ex parte decree dated 3-12-92 as well as orders dated 14-7-93 and 2-11-94. The application under Order IX, Rule 13 C. P. C. shall stand allowed but I direct that the suit will be decided within four months of the productions of the certified copy of this order before the trial Court. The parties will co-operate in deciding the suit and not seem adjournments. The writ petition No. 15822 of 1996 has consequently become infructuous, and is dismissed as such. " 65. A perusal of paragraphs quoted above shows that in Hafiz Fazal Haq case (supra) the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the petitioner/defendant for setting aside ex parte decree on the ground that the summons or notice of the suit was not served on him. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed. The said restoration application under Order IX, Rule 13 was rejected by the Court below on the ground of delay in filing the same. 66. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed. The said restoration application under Order IX, Rule 13 was rejected by the Court below on the ground of delay in filing the same. 66. Thus, the facts in the above decision are distinguishable from those of the present case. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 67. Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner then submits that the High Court should exercise its inherent powers in the present case and permit the petitioner to participate in the suit after setting aside the ex parte decree. He has placed reliance on the following decisions in support of his submission : (i) M/s. Express Cables Pvt. Ltd. v. N. S. Mukherjee & Anr. , AIR 1983 Patna 269. (ii) Sarupsing Mangatsing v. Nilkant Bhaskar, AIR 1953 Bombay 109. 68. In reply, Shri Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator-respondent No. 1 submits that in view of the fact that there is an express provision in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside ex parte decree if sufficient cause for the absence is shown, there is no occasion to resort to the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 of the said Code. It is submitted that as the petitioner failed to show-cause for his absence on the date of hearing, and thus, failed to bring his case within the ambit of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he cannot be granted the same relief by exercising inherent power under Section 151 of the said Code. It is further submitted by Shri Arora that even if this Court has inherent power to set aside ex parte decree, the present is not a fit case for exercising such power. It is further submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable jurisdiction. The petitioner, the submission proceeds, has not paid anything for the last number of years. Even when the petitioner sought for setting aside the ex parte decree, he gave only security as regards the requirements of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Therefore, it is submitted, the present is not a fit case for exercising equitable jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. Even when the petitioner sought for setting aside the ex parte decree, he gave only security as regards the requirements of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Therefore, it is submitted, the present is not a fit case for exercising equitable jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner. Shri Arora has placed reliance on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in (Smt.) Shahjahan Begum v. XVIIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut & Ors. , 2001 (2) JCLR 554 (All) : 2001 (43) A. L. R. 832. 69. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure which saves inherent powers of Court, provides as follows : "151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. " 70. Dealing with the scope of inherent powers, it was laid down by the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar & Ors. , AIR 1964 SC 993 , as under (paragraph 19 of the said AIR): " (19) On this submission, which we might mention has been urged for first time in this Court, the first question that arises is whether the Court has the inherent jurisdiction which learned Counsel contends that it has. For the purpose of the discussion of the question in the context of the relevant provisions of the Code, it is unnecessary to embark on any detailed or exhaustive examination of the circumstances and situations in which it could be predicated that a Court has the inherent jurisdiction which is saved by Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is sufficient if we proceed on the accepted and admitted limitations to the existence of such a jurisdiction. It is common ground that the inherent power of the Court cannot override the express provisions of the law. It is sufficient if we proceed on the accepted and admitted limitations to the existence of such a jurisdiction. It is common ground that the inherent power of the Court cannot override the express provisions of the law. In other words if there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code need not be express but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates. We shall confine our attention to the topic on hand namely applications by defendants to set aside ex parte orders passed against them and reopen the proceedings which had been conducted in their absence. Order IX, Rule 1 requires the parties to attend on the day fixed for their appearance to answer the claim of the defendant. Rule 2 deals with a case where the defendant is absent but the Court from its own record is apprised of the fact that the summons has not been duly served on the defendant in order to acquaint him with the proceedings before the Court. Rule 2 contains a proviso applicable to cases where notwithstanding the absence of service of summons, the defendant appears. Rule 3 deals with a case where the plaintiff alongwith the defendant is absent when the suit is called on and empowers the Court to dismiss the suit. Rule 5 deals with a case where the defendant is not served properly and there is default on the part of the plaintiff having this done. Having thus exhausted the cases where the defendant is not properly served Rule 6 (1) (a) enables the Court to proceed ex parte where the defendant is absent even after due service. Rule 5 deals with a case where the defendant is not served properly and there is default on the part of the plaintiff having this done. Having thus exhausted the cases where the defendant is not properly served Rule 6 (1) (a) enables the Court to proceed ex parte where the defendant is absent even after due service. Rule 6 contemplates two cases: (1) The day on which the defendant fails to appear is one of which the defendant has no intimation that the suit will be taken up for final hearing for example, where the hearing is only the first hearing of the suit, and (2) where the state of the first hearing is passed and the hearing which is fixed is for the disposal of the suit and the defendant is not present on such a day. The effect of proceeding ex parte in the two sets of cases would obviously mean a great difference in the result. So far as the first type of cases is concerned it has to be adjourned for final disposal and, as already seen, it would be open to the defendant to appear on that date and defend the suit. In the second type of cases, however, one of two things might happen. The evidence of the plaintiff might be taken then and there and judgment might be pronounced. In that case Order IX, Rule 13 would come in. The defendant can, besides filing an appeal or an application for review have recourse to an application under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree. The entirety of the evidence of the plaintiff might not be concluded on the hearing day on which the defendant is absent and something might remain so far as the trial of the suit is concerned for which purpose there might be a hearing on an adjourned date. On the terms of Order IX, Rule 7 if the defendant appears on such adjourned date and satisfies the Court by showing good cause for his non- appearance on the previous day or days he might have the earlier proceedings recalled - "set the clock back" and have the suit heard in his presence. On the other hand, he might fail in showing good cause. On the other hand, he might fail in showing good cause. Even in such a case he is not penalized in the sense of being forbidden to take part in the further proceedings of the suit or whatever might still remain of the trial, only he cannot claim to be relegated to the position that he occupied at the commencement of the trial. Thus every contingency which is likely to happen in the trial vis-a-vis the non-appearance of the defendant at the hearing of a suit has been provided for and Order IX, Rule 7 and Order IX, Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut of situations that might arise during the course of the trial. If, thus provision has been made for every contingency, it stands to reason that there is no scope for the invocation of the inherent powers of the Court to make an order necessary for the ends of justice. Mr. Pathak, however, strenuously contended that a case of the sort now on hand where a defendant appeared after the conclusion of the hearing but before the pronouncing of the judgment had not been provided for. We consider that the suggestion that there is such a stage is, on the scheme of the Code, wholly unrealistic. In the present context when once the hearing starts, the Code contemplates only two stages in the trial of the suit: (1) where the hearing is adjourned or (2) where the hearing, is completed. Where the hearing is completed the parties have no further rights or privileges in the matter and it is only for the convenience of the Court that Order XX, Rule 1 permits, judgment to be delivered after an interval after the hearing is completed. It would, therefore, follow that after the stage contemplated by Order IX, Rule 7 is passed the next stage is only the passing of a decree which on the terms of Order IX, Rule 6 the Court is competent to pass. And then follows the remedy of the party to have that decree set aside by application under Order IX, Rule 13. There is thus no hiatus between the two stages of reservation of judgment and pronouncing the judgment so as to make it necessary for the Court to afford to the party the remedy of getting orders passed on the lines of Order IX, Rule 7. There is thus no hiatus between the two stages of reservation of judgment and pronouncing the judgment so as to make it necessary for the Court to afford to the party the remedy of getting orders passed on the lines of Order IX, Rule 7. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Civil Judge was not competent to entertain the application dated May 31, 1958 purporting to be under Order IX, Rule 7 and that consequently the reasons given in the order passed would not be res-judicata to bar the hearing of the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 filed by the appellant. " 71. In Padam Sen v. State of U. P. , AIR 1961 SC 218 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows (paragraph 8 of the said AIR): " (8 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognized that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code. " 72. In Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Private Ltd. v. Kanhayalal, AIR 1966 SC 1899 , it was held as follows (paragraph 5 of the said AIR): " (5 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Having regard to the said decisions, the scope of the inherent power of a Court under Section 151 of the Code may be defined thus. The inherent power of a Court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Having regard to the said decisions, the scope of the inherent power of a Court under Section 151 of the Code may be defined thus. The inherent power of a Court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code. But that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to a necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. Whatever limitations are imposed by construction on the provisions of Section 151 of the Code, they do not control the undoubted power of the Court conferred under Section 151 of the Code to make a suitable order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. " 73. In Gadi Neelaveni v. Marappareddigari Narayana Reddi, AIR 1920 Madras 640 (FB), the following question was referred to the Full Bench: "has a Court power, apart from the provisions of Rule 13, Order IX, C. P. C. , to set aside an ex parte decree passed by itself?" 74. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court answered the question in the negative. It was laid down as follows (at page 642 of the said AIR): ". . . . . . . . . . . . . I have no hesitation in holding that there is no inherent power in a Court to set aside an ex parte decree by summary procedure, but that the power of the Court in such connection is limited to the circumstances mentioned in Order IX, Rule 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 75. In Kallu & Anr. v. Nadir Baksh & Anr. , AIR 1922 Allahabad 441 (2), a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a Civil Revision against an order passed by the Munsif, Allahabad setting aside ex parte decree. It was held by the Division Bench as under: ". . . . . . . . . " 75. In Kallu & Anr. v. Nadir Baksh & Anr. , AIR 1922 Allahabad 441 (2), a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a Civil Revision against an order passed by the Munsif, Allahabad setting aside ex parte decree. It was held by the Division Bench as under: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . The only justification for such an order is Order IX, Rule 13, under which the applicant must satisfy the Court (1) that the summons was not duly served or (2) that he was prevented from sufficient cause from appearing. It is admitted that neither of these conditions occurred. The rule does not apply and the Munsif had no jurisdiction of any sort or kind to pass this order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 76. In Bhagwan Prasad v. Madan Murari Lal & Ors. , AIR 1929 Allahabad 811, a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a Civil Revision against an order of the Sub-Judge, Ghazipur restoring a case. It was laid down as follows (at pages 811 and 812 of the said AIR): ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the adjourned date of hearing, the senior Vakil engaged did not turn up in time, and the junior Vakil for the plaintiffs stated that his client had gone to fetch the senior Vakil and he himself could not produce the evidence. The learned Subordinate Judge thought that this was a case of non-appearance on the part of the plaintiffs, and dismissed the suit under Order IX, Rule 8. That this was an error is now conceded by the Advocate for the applicant. Under Order XVII, Rule 2, as amended by this High Court no party is to be deemed to have failed to appear, if he is either present or is represented in Court by any pleader, though engaged only for the purpose of making applications. As the junior Vakil was present in Court, there was no default in appearance, and the learned Judge should not have dismissed the suit for default of appearance. As the junior Vakil was present in Court, there was no default in appearance, and the learned Judge should not have dismissed the suit for default of appearance. When an application for restoration was made, the learned Judge rectified his mistake and restored the case. It is rightly contended before us that the Court below should not have proceeded under Order IX, as the provisions in that order were not applicable; but it cannot be doubted that the Court had jurisdiction to rectify its own mistake. Even under Order XLVII, the Court could have set aside its own order because there was a mistake and error apparent on the face of the record. The Court, however, has not proceeded under Order XLVII, but under Section 151, C. P. C. If Order XLVII did not apply, then the Court would certainly have inherent jurisdiction to restore the case if it thought that such restoration was necessary for the ends of justice. " 77. In Radha Mohan Datt v. Abbas Ali Biswas & Ors. , AIR 1931 Allahabad 294 (FB), a Full Bench of this Court held as under (at page 296 of the said AIR): "if Order IX, Rule 13, applied to the case, the applicants had to satisfy, the Court (1) that the summons was not duly served, or (2) that they were prevented from appearing for sufficient cause. Neither of these conditions having been fulfilled, the Munsif had no jurisdiction to set aside the decree and restore the suit. It is clear however that Order IX, Rule 13, did not apply to the facts of the case. The decree passed against the applicants was not an ex parte decree. An issue was framed relating to their liability and that issue was decided on the merits. The defendants having appeared in the suit through their Counsel, they could not in law be deemed to have failed to appear in the action. Explanation to Order XVII, Rule 2 which we have set out above is clear and conclusive on this point. " 78. In U. Aung Gyi v. Government of Burma & Anr. The defendants having appeared in the suit through their Counsel, they could not in law be deemed to have failed to appear in the action. Explanation to Order XVII, Rule 2 which we have set out above is clear and conclusive on this point. " 78. In U. Aung Gyi v. Government of Burma & Anr. , AIR 1940 Rangoon 162 (F. B.), a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court laid down as follows (at pages 164 and 166 of the said AIR) : "this is an application in revision against an order of the Sub-divisional Judge of Zigon who restored to the file a suit which had been dismissed. He held that apart from the powers under Order IX, Rule 9, he could exercise the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 151, C. P. C. in a case to which Order IX, Rule 9 did not apply. The question is whether he was right in so holding. . . He thought that even if no sufficient cause were shown the Court had inherent power to restore suit, apart from the provisions of the Rule, provided there were just and reasonable cause for doing so. In the circumstances of the case he decided to restore the suit to the file whether there existed sufficient cause for non-appearance on the part of the plaintiff or not. . . . . " "where no sufficient cause is shown for non-appearance, there can be no grounds for the application ex debito justitice of any inherent power outside the rule. In the case under review, the order of the learned Sub-divisional Judge must accordingly be set aside as being in excess of his jurisdiction, and the suit of respondent 1 must stand dismissed for default of appearance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 79. In Raja Sriniwas Prasad Singh v. S. D. O. Mirzapur & Anr. , AIR 1962 Allahabad 590 (DB), it was held as follows (paragraph 42 of the said AIR): " (42) Sri Pathak tried to argue that as the compensation officer was not a Court and was only a tribunal he had no inherent jurisdiction to exercise. I find it difficult to accept this contention. Under Section 48 the compensation officer was to have all the powers of a Court. I find it difficult to accept this contention. Under Section 48 the compensation officer was to have all the powers of a Court. The powers of a Court include inherent powers to do anything in the interest of justice. These powers are specifically preserved under Section 151 of the C. P. C. If the compensation officer was to have all the powers of a Civil Court he had the inherent powers of the Civil Court also under which he could pass any orders in the interests of justice. But it is well established that inherent powers can be invoked only when the statute does not provide any other remedy. If another remedy is open but has not been pursued or has been allowed to become time-barred it is not open to the party concerned to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. In the present case as has already been shown the State was not without a remedy but it had not pursued those remedies and had allowed them to become time-barred. The compensation officer may have had inherent powers but those powers could not be invoked by the State. " 80. In Bajrang Rai & Ors. v. Ismail Mian & Ors. , AIR 1978 Patna 339 (FB), a Full Bench of the Patna High Court laid down as under (paragraph 17 of the said AIR): " (17) On a consideration of the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions, the following propositions, emerge: (1) The inherent powers of the Court are very wide and are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code. (2) They are in addition to the powers specially conferred on the Court by the Code and the Courts are free to exercise them. (3) The only limitation put on the exercise of the inherent powers is that when exercised, they are not in conflict with what has been expressly provided for, or those exhaustively covering a particular topic, or against the intention of the Legislature. These limitations are not due to the fact that the inherent power is controlled by the Code, but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice. (4) Inherent powers are to be exercised where specific provisions does not meet the necessities of the case. " 81. These limitations are not due to the fact that the inherent power is controlled by the Code, but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice. (4) Inherent powers are to be exercised where specific provisions does not meet the necessities of the case. " 81. In E. I. D. Parry Limited v. M/s. Agro Sales and Service & Ors. , AIR 1980 Orissa 162 (FB), a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court held as follows (paragraphs 6 & 7 of the said AIR): " (6) The principles that once statutory provisions has been made to cover a given field, application of inherent powers would stand regulated and in case statutory law covers the entire field, application of inherent powers would stand excluded appear to have been well recognized. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (7 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . In view of the catena of Supreme Court decisions covering the field, there can be no scope for entertaining the view accepted by the learned single Judge that even when the defendant failed to establish existence of sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date of trial, he could obtain vacation of the ex parte decree passed against him by invoking the inherent powers. The legal proposition indicated to the contrary by the learned single Judge in the decision reported in (1976) 42 Cut LT 1061, must, therefore, be reversed as contrary to law. We have not specifically dealt with several cases of this Court where different conclusions have been arrived at but we make it explicitly clear that Section 151 of the Code is not invocable when defendant fails to establish existence of sufficient cause for his non-appearance and this being the law, decisions to the contrary cannot be accepted as laying down the correct proposition of law. " 82. Following principles, amongst others, emerge from the above decisions: (i) The Court cannot exercise its inherent power saved under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure where there is an express provision of the Code applicable to the case. " 82. Following principles, amongst others, emerge from the above decisions: (i) The Court cannot exercise its inherent power saved under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure where there is an express provision of the Code applicable to the case. The inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code. (ii) The Court can exercise its inherent powers when the exercise of those powers is not in any way inconsistent with or in conflict with any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. (iii) If there are express provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to the said topic, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. In other words, in such a case, the Court can exercise only such powers as are conferred by the said provisions of the Code, and while exercising such powers, the Court must act in the manner prescribed by the said provisions of the Code. The Court cannot invoke its inherent powers in such a situation, nor can it act in a manner contrary to or different from the one prescribed in the said provisions. (iv) Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure makes provisions regarding consequences of non-appearance by either party to the suit (i. e. , the plaintiff or the defendant) and the remedies against such consequences. (v) If a case is covered by any of the provisions of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, then the Court will act only in accordance with such provisions. If the requirements of such provisions are not satisfied in a case, then it is not open to the Court to resort to its inherent powers to give relief in the case. If the requirements of such provisions are not satisfied in a case, then it is not open to the Court to resort to its inherent powers to give relief in the case. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to appear in the suit on the date fixed for hearing, and the suit is dismissed in default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, then the plaintiff may apply for restoration of the suit under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code on the ground that there was sufficient cause for his non- appearance on the said date. The suit will be restored if he proves any such sufficient cause. However, if he fails to show any sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the said date fixed for hearing, then the suit will not be restored. In such a situation, the Court cannot resort to its inherent powers for restoring the suit. Again, if an ex parte decree is passed against the defendant, he may apply for setting aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the defendant proves that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing in the suit on the date fixed for hearing, then the ex parte decree will be set-aside. However, if he neither proves that the summons was not duly served, nor does he prove that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing on the date fixed for hearing, then the application for setting aside ex parte decree will be dismissed. In such a situation, the Court cannot resort to its inherent powers for setting aside ex parte decree. (vi) If, however, the case is not covered by any of the relevant provisions of Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as such, none of the remedies provided for in various provisions of the said Order is available, then the Court can exercise its inherent powers saved under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. 83. Keeping in the mind the aforesaid propositions, let us now consider the facts of the present case. 83. Keeping in the mind the aforesaid propositions, let us now consider the facts of the present case. In the present case, as noted above, the dispute is regarding the rejection of the application of the petitioner (defendant) for setting aside the ex parte decree, and as such, Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is relevant in the present case. 84. Now, the petitioner (defendant) had already appeared in the suit, and as such, there was no question of non-service of summons on the petitioner (defendant ). The only question was as to whether there was any sufficient cause for non-appearance of the petitioner (defendant) on the date fixed for hearing, namely 10-8-1998. As noted above, the petitioner failed to establish any cause, much less sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the said date. Hence, the application for setting aside ex parte decree filed by the petitioner (defendant) was rightly dismissed. There is no occasion for resorting to inherent power of the Court for setting aside ex parte decree in such a case. Therefore, the submission made by Shri Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot be accepted. Let us consider the cases relied upon by Shri Jain. 85. In M/s. Express Cables Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held as follows (paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the said AIR): " (4) But the order of dismissal dated 13-2-1980 passed by the learned Court below, which is the subject- matter of this appeal, has to be set aside on another ground, namely, that the order of dismissal was passed on hearing made in the suit, though the suit was not ready for hearing. By referring to an order dated 2-11-1979 passed in the suit, it would appear that the suit was pending awaiting the receipt of the postal acknowledgment of the registered notice that had been sent to defendants 3 and 4 in the suit. The order dated 2-11-1979 is in Hindi, the English version of which is like this: "plaintiff files hazri. The defendants do not take any step. The postal acknowledgments with respect to notices issued to defendants 3 and 4 have not been received. Awaiting that put up on 10-11-79. The order dated 2-11-1979 is in Hindi, the English version of which is like this: "plaintiff files hazri. The defendants do not take any step. The postal acknowledgments with respect to notices issued to defendants 3 and 4 have not been received. Awaiting that put up on 10-11-79. " But on the next date i. e. on 10-11-1979 it appears that peculiarly a different order was passed which was like this: "hazri has been filed on behalf of both the parties. The Presiding Officer has been transferred and, therefore, let this suit be fixed on 24-11-79 for settlement of issues. " The Civil Procedure Code prescribes a procedure that it was only after the summonses and notices have been served on the defendants that the suit, will be taken up for filing of the written statement and for settlement of issues and for hearing. It may be mentioned at this place that some of the defendants of the suit had filed written statement but still service report of notices which were sent by registered post to defendants 3 and 4 had not been received and, therefore, the suit was not ready to be taken up for hearing or even for settlement of issues. It appears that there was a mistake committed by the Court below in its order dated 10-11-1979 and that the previous order awaiting the receipt of postal acknowledgment was overlooked and the suit was fixed for settlement of issues. Thereafter the same error in the order continued on subsequent dates putting up the suit for settlement of issues, and so it was on 13-2-1980 that the suit was put up for settlement of issues, and due to the absence of the plaintiff it was dismissed for default. The suit could not have been posted for settlement of issues, nor for hearing, when the postal acknowledgment with respect to the notices issued to defendants 3 and 4 was not received. (5) Learned Counsel for the respondents contends that even if the post acknowledgments with respect to the notices sent to defendants 3 and 4 were not received, the plaintiff could not take advantage of it. It is contended that it was those defendants whose postal acknowledgments were not received could have taken this ground. (5) Learned Counsel for the respondents contends that even if the post acknowledgments with respect to the notices sent to defendants 3 and 4 were not received, the plaintiff could not take advantage of it. It is contended that it was those defendants whose postal acknowledgments were not received could have taken this ground. But this contention of the learned Counsel does not appear to be correct because it was the procedure prescribed by the Code and that had to be followed for making the suit ready for hearing, and that in that condition the suit could be dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code which provides that on a date fixed for hearing if the plaintiff does not appear, the suit shall be dismissed for default. It could not be a date fixed for hearing because it was really a date awaiting the receipt of the postal acknowledgments of notices sent to some of the defendants. It could be at the stage after the Court was satisfied that service of summonses and notices issued to all the defendants were served or the postal acknowledgments were received that the suit could be posted for hearing Clause (2) of Order V, Rule 19-A of the Code provides a procedure that after a postal notice is sent to a defendant in the suit and the postal acknowledgment is received with an endorsement purported to have been made by a postal employee that the defendant or his agent refused to take delivery of the notice, the Court shall declare by its order that the summons had been duly served on the defendant. The Proviso to Clause (2) further provided that in a case where summons sent by registered post with acknowledgment due the postal acknowledgment is not received back within 30 days from the date of issue of the summons, the Court may make a declaration to the effect that the summonses were duly served notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgment having been lost or mislaid or for any other reason has not been received by the Court. This is a procedure which is mandatory to be followed in order to have on the record the satisfaction of the Court that summonses have been duly served on all the defendants of the suit because that is a condition precedent for the Court to proceed further with the hearing of the suit. This is a procedure which is mandatory to be followed in order to have on the record the satisfaction of the Court that summonses have been duly served on all the defendants of the suit because that is a condition precedent for the Court to proceed further with the hearing of the suit. Such declaration was not made by the Court in the present suit and, therefore, the suit could not be said to have been ready for hearing. In that view of the matter, the suit could not be dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code on account of the absence of the plaintiff on the date said to be fixed for hearing of the suit. The order of dismissal, therefore, passed by the learned Court below was illegal and, therefore, it has to be set aside. (6) It has been argued by learned Counsel for the respondents that the application of this appellant under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code was not maintainable in view of the fact that the order of dismissal which was passed by the learned Court below could not be under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code in view of the position of law stated above. This argument has no force as the application of this appellant was filed before the Court below was not only under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code, but was also under Section 151 of the Code. In view of the illegal nature of the order of dismissal, the same has to be set aside under the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 of the Code. The order of dismissal dated 13- 2-1980 is, therefore, set aside. The appeal is allowed. The suit will be restored to its original number and the Court below will proceed to dispose of the suit as soon as possible after complying with the provision of the Proviso to Clause (2) of Order V, Rule 19 A of the Code by making a declaration of the nature as indicated above, if materials in that respect are available on record. There will, however no order as to costs. Let the records of the case be sent down immediately. " 86. There will, however no order as to costs. Let the records of the case be sent down immediately. " 86. A perusal of the above passages of the decision shows that in the said case, as the suit was not ready to be taken up for hearing or even for settlement of issues, the dismissal of suit on account of the default of the plaintiff could not be covered under Order IX, Rule 8 Code of Civil Procedure. As the provisions of Order IX, Rule 8 Code of Civil Procedure were not attracted to the case, the plaintiff could not apply under Order IX, Rule 9 for getting the order of dismissal of the suit set aside. As the provisions of Order IX, Rules 8 and 9 Code of Civil Procedure were not attracted in the case, the Court resorted to its inherent powers saved under Section 151 of the Code. This is inconsonance with the principles deduced above from various judicial decisions. 87. In Sarupsing case (supra), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court laid down as under (paragraphs 2, 3,4, 5 and 6 of the said AIR): " (2) Now, dealing first with the narrow question as to whether there was any sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the defendant on June 27, 1951, we entirely agree with the view taken by the learned Judge below that there was not sufficient cause. Although Messrs. Mulla & Mulla were on the record, no written statement was filed and no proceedings were taken in the action by the defendant. Messrs. Mulla & Mulla were not even instructed to apply for an adjournment on June 27, 1951. The defendant has suggested that he was a displaced person, that he had to go from India to Pakistan from time to time in order to liquidate certain of his properties, and that thereafter he was in Nandurbar plying a motor lorry. But, as the learned Judge has pointed out, all this did not prevent him from keeping in touch with the suit of which he had notice and with regard to which he had actually instructed solicitors who were to act for him in that suit. But, as the learned Judge has pointed out, all this did not prevent him from keeping in touch with the suit of which he had notice and with regard to which he had actually instructed solicitors who were to act for him in that suit. The position might have been different if the defendant was unrepresented, but as he was represented, the failure on the part of the defendant to give proper instructions to his solicitors cannot possibly constitute a sufficient cause for his absence on June 27, 1951. (3) But a more important and more interesting question has been raised by Mr. Maneksha. In this case an Insurance Co. by the name of the Unique Motor and General Insurance Co. is concerned. The Motor Vehicles Act casts a liability upon an Insurance Co. which insures a motor vehicle and issues a certificate of insurance to the owner of the motor vehicle. The liability is cast under Section 96 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the liability is that the insurer shall pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment- debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. Now, before this liability can be imposed upon the Insurance Co. , a condition precedent has got to be satisfied, and that condition precedent is referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 96, and the condition precedent is: "no sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the Court of the bringing of the proceedings. . . " This notice was served by the plaintiff upon the Insurance Co. on June 21, 1951. Mr. Manekshas contention is that although the defendant might not have been able to show sufficient cause for his absence on June 27, 1951, there is sufficient cause as far as the Insurance Co. is concerned why it was not in a position to defend the action through the defendant on June 27, 1951. Mr. on June 21, 1951. Mr. Manekshas contention is that although the defendant might not have been able to show sufficient cause for his absence on June 27, 1951, there is sufficient cause as far as the Insurance Co. is concerned why it was not in a position to defend the action through the defendant on June 27, 1951. Mr. Maneksha says that the notice was served only on June 21, 1951, and the Insurance Co. had only six days time to prepare for the defence, and according to Mr. Maneksha this was not reasonable notice given to the Insurance Co. and therefore, the ex parte decree should be set aside in order to give an opportunity to the Insurance Co. to defend the suit through the defendant. (4) Now, on this submission various interesting questions arise. The first is whether it is open to the Insurance Co. , on a motion taken out by the defendant to set aside an ex parte decree, to plead sufficient cause in itself why it did not defend the action through the defendant, or must the notice of motion be disposed of only on the plea of the defendant that he had sufficient cause for not appearing when the suit reached hearing. Ordinarily, under Order IX, Rule 13, it is the party who applies to set aside an ex parte decree who has got to show sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte decree. But Mr. Maneksha is right that apart from Order IX, Rule 13, this Court has inherent jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte decree. See bilasrai Laxminarayan v. Cursondas Damodardas, 44 Bom 82. But even so the question arises whether in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction the Court can consider a cause put forward by a person who is not a party to the suit. Now, Section 96 was recently enacted and it casts a sort of vicarious liability upon an Insurance Co. , and although the statute makes it obligatory upon the plaintiff to serve a notice through the Court upon the Insurance Co. , if he wants to hold the Insurance Co. liable as if it were a judgment-debtor under the decree which he might obtain, the statute does not confer any right upon the Insurance Co. to defend the action on the same points in issue which the defendant would be entitled to defend. , if he wants to hold the Insurance Co. liable as if it were a judgment-debtor under the decree which he might obtain, the statute does not confer any right upon the Insurance Co. to defend the action on the same points in issue which the defendant would be entitled to defend. The right of the Insurance Co. to defend is restricted to the various matters set out in Section 96 (2), and obviously the right of the Insurance Co. to be made a party to the suit is also restricted to those matters where it could put forward a defence. It is not disputed that the matters which were in issue in this suit did not entitle the Insurance Co. either to be made a party or to defend the suit as provided by Section 96 (2), and the question that has to be considered is whether independently of Section 96 (2) the Insurance Co. could have been made a party to the suit under Order I, Rule 10, and could have defended the action. The jurisdiction of the Court to add parties to the suit is restricted to Order 1, Rule 10, and a person can only be added a party in two cases: one is when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant and is not so joined, and the other is when without his presence the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided. Now, it is clear that there was no obligation upon the plaintiff to join the Insurance Co. as a party defendant, there was no privity between the plaintiff and the Insurance Co. , and the plaintiff was seeking no relief against the Insurance Co. Can it be said that the case of the Insurance Co. would fall in the second category, or, in other words, can it be said that although the Insurance Co. was not a necessary party it was a proper party. There again it is difficult to see how it could possibly be urged that the question in the suit could not be completely decided in the absence of the Insurance Co. No issue arose as between the plaintiff and the Insurance Co. As we said before, the plaintiff was not seeking any relief against the Insurance Co. and the liability which the Insurance Co. No issue arose as between the plaintiff and the Insurance Co. As we said before, the plaintiff was not seeking any relief against the Insurance Co. and the liability which the Insurance Co. would incur would not arise from any decree that the Court would pass but would arise by reason of the statute. The decree that the Court would pass would not be directed against the Insurance Co. at all; the decree would be against the defendant; and it was not by reason of any order of the Court that the defendant would become liable to satisfy the decree; his liability would arise by reason of the statute intervening and casting that liability upon him. (5) If, therefore, the Insurance Co. could not be made a party under Order 1, Rule 10, the question is whether it could agitate the question, in an application made by the defendant to set aside an ex parte decree, whether the Insurance Co. had reasonable notice to defend the suit. We agree with Mr. Maneksha that it is indeed curious that although the Legislature has enjoined upon the plaintiff to serve a notice upon the Insurance Co. through the Court and although the Legislature has cast a liability upon the Insurance Co. , the Legislature has not given any right to the Insurance Co. to defend the action in its own name. The object of giving the notice obviously is to enable the Insurance Co. to defend the action through the defendant, but no right has been given to the Insurance Co. to defend the action in all cases in its own right or in its own name. But even so we have to consider a case where sufficient or reasonable notice was not given to the Insurance Co. to defend the action. If such reasonable and adequate notice was not given and an ex parte decree was passed against the defendant, could it be said that the Court would have no power to intervene and in the interest of justice set aside the ex parte decree ? There is a case very much in point reported in windsor v. Chalcraft, (1939) 1 KB 279. In that case a judgment was passed against the defendant in a running down action in default, and the Insurance Co. applied to set aside the judgment. The Master made an order in favour of the Insurance Co. There is a case very much in point reported in windsor v. Chalcraft, (1939) 1 KB 279. In that case a judgment was passed against the defendant in a running down action in default, and the Insurance Co. applied to set aside the judgment. The Master made an order in favour of the Insurance Co. The judge at chambers set aside the order of the Master and the matter came before the Court of appeal, and the two learned Lord Justices Greer and Mackinnon, Lord Justice Slesser dissenting, took the view that the Insurance Co. was aggrieved by the judgment and so was entitled to an order setting aside the judgment and leave was given to the Insurance Co. to enter an appearance in the action in the name of the defendant and to deliver a defence. Now, it is true that the corresponding English rule of the Supreme Court, Order XXVII, Rule 15, is wider than Order IX, Rule 13, and it is also true that if our jurisdiction was confined to Order IX, Rule 13, this decision would not be of much assistance. But if we have inherent jurisdiction apart from our jurisdiction under Order IX, Rule 13, to set-aside an ex parte decree, the question is whether we could not set-aside an ex parte decree at the instance of an Insurance Co. which is affected by the judgment in the sense that the statute casts a liability upon it in respect of that judgment to set aside the decree if we are of the opinion that the Insurance Co. had not reasonable notice to defend the action. (6) In our opinion, the only proper construction to give to Section 96 would be that when the Legislature required a notice to be served through Court, the notice must be of a reasonable duration, and if the ex parte decree was passed against the defendant and if the Insurance Co. through the defendant satisfied the Court that the Insurance Co. did not have reasonable opportunity to defend the action, then the Court acting under its inherent jurisdiction would set aside the ex parte decree, because although the defendant might have had sufficient cause to defend the action, if the defence was being conducted by the Insurance Co. through the defendant satisfied the Court that the Insurance Co. did not have reasonable opportunity to defend the action, then the Court acting under its inherent jurisdiction would set aside the ex parte decree, because although the defendant might have had sufficient cause to defend the action, if the defence was being conducted by the Insurance Co. and the defendant was only a nominal defendant, then it is not sufficient that the defendant should have had ample opportunity to defend the action, but the Insurance Co. should also be given ample opportunity to defend the action. In the view that we take of the law, if we are satisfied on the facts of this case that the Insurance Co. did not have a proper opportunity to defend the action, we would certainly have, under our inherent jurisdiction, set aside the decree, because the view we would then have taken would be that in the interest of justice the Insurance Co. should be given an opportunity to defend an action, the result of which would cast a liability upon it under the Motor Vehicles Act. " 88. It will thus be seen that in the above decision, it was held that the defendant failed to show sufficient cause for his absence. Evidently, he could not get the ex parte decree set aside under Order IX, Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure. However, the question arose regarding setting aside the ex parte decree at the instance of Insurance Company, which was not a defendant on the record of the suit. Therefore, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree could not be filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not attracted to the case so far as the application at the instance of the Insurance Company was concerned, inherent powers of the Court saved under Section 151 of the Code could be invoked for setting aside the ex parte decree. This case again is in consonance with the principles deduced above from various judicial decisions. 89. This case again is in consonance with the principles deduced above from various judicial decisions. 89. Coming now to the submission of Shri Jain that this Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the ex parte decree and giving opportunity to the petitioner (defendant), I am of the opinion that the writ jurisdiction though wide in amplitude, is to be exercised in accordance with law. If a particular course is not legally permissible, the High Court will not issue writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India compelling adoption of such a course. If an ex parte decree cannot be set aside on account of failure to show sufficient cause under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court will not issue writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India setting aside such ex parte decree. 90. Even otherwise, it is well established that writ jurisdiction is an equitable jurisdiction. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances, particularly the fact that the cause shown by the petitioner (defendant) has been found to be untrue, I am of the opinion that this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 91. In Smt. Shahjahan Begum case (supra), relied upon by Shri Arora, learned Counsel for the caveator- respondent No. 1, it was laid down by a learned Single Judge of this Court as follows (paragraph 2 of the said ALR): ". . . . . . . . On the basis of this, the Court below have held that the petitioner have knowledge of the proceeding after the suit was restored, and the purposely did not appear in this. It is for this reason, the Court below have dismissed the application to recall the ex parte order dated 2-9-94. This is a finding of fact. There is no illegality in the same. . . . . " 92. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that this writ petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .