JUDGMENT 1. :- This civil first appeal by the defendant is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.3.2000 passed by learned Additional District Judge No.1, Jaipur City, Jaipur by which the civil suit No. 62/1995 for specific performance of the contract filed by the plaintiff-respondent No.1 has been decreed. 2. The plaintiff-respondent Prabhu Narain filed a civil suit on 26.3.1987 against 5 defendants-respondents including the present appellant as defendant No.2 with the averments that there is a Haweli of the defendant No.1 known as Bagavas House in Khajanewalon Ka Rasta, Jaipur. Since the plaintiff was residing in rented house at Jaipur, he contacted the defendant No.1 to sell some vacant land. Thereupon, the defendant No.1 agreed to sell land lying on both the sides of 13 feet wide passage in front of the western gate of this Haweli. On 22.9.1974 the defendant No.1 executed an agreement to sell the above land measuring 63 ft x 63 ft lying in the middle of the aforesaid passage @ Rs. 100/- per Sq. yard for a total consideration of Rs. 35,000/- with stipulation to give possession of the above property after getting it vacated from the servants of Thikana i.e. defendants. 2 to 5 who were in possession of the aforesaid property on behalf of the defendant No.1. The plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 4000/- as advance on the same day and Rs. 893/- on 18.9.1977. 3. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that he approached the defendant No.1 a number of times for registration of sale deed and handing over possession of the land. But the defendant extended the period of the aforesaid agreement from time to time on the ground that the remaining defendants have not vacated this land. At last on 28.3.1983 the defendant No.1 extended the period of this agreement for delivery of vacant possession upto 31.3.1984 and for registration of sale deed upto 30.6.1984. It was also pleased that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract to pay the balance amount, but the defendant No.1 failed to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff served notices dated 2.2.1985 and 20.2.1987 upon the defendant No.1. But on account of escalation in price of the land, the defendant No.1 is now not interested to perform his part of the contract.4-5. The plaintiff served notices dated 2.2.1985 and 20.2.1987 upon the defendant No.1. But on account of escalation in price of the land, the defendant No.1 is now not interested to perform his part of the contract.4-5. The defendant No.1 in his written statement filed on 19.5.1988 while admitting the execution of the agreement pleaded that it was agreed upon between him and the plaintiff that the plaintiff would obtain written permission of Smt. Icharaj Kanwar for sale of this property. Since the plaintiff did not obtain such permission, he failed to fulfil the terms and conditions of the agreement. It was pleaded that since the defendants. 2 to 5 occupying this land with ermission of Smt. Icharaj Kanwar did not vacant the same, it was not possible for him to execute the sale deed and deliver the possession. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff was neither ready and willing to perform his part of the contract nor he offered the balance price. It was further pleaded that the defendant No.1 alone was not empowered to execute sale-deed and the plaintiff himself failed to obtain written permission of Smt. Icharaj Kanwar as agreed upon between them and as such the defendant No.1 did not commit any breach of this agreement. Objections with regard to limitation and non-joinder of Smt. Icharaj Kanwar as necessary party were raised. The remaining defendants did not appear. Following issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties were framed. HINDI MATTER 360530 6. The plaintiff examined 4 witnesses including himself while the defendant No.1 examined himself and 4 other witnesses. Learned trial Judge vide impugned judgment, decided issue Nos.2 to 6 and 8 in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No.1 was deleted vide order dated 1.6.1991 on the basis of the admission of the defendant. Issue No.7 was decided in the manner that now the defendants No.2 to 5 are not in possession of the disputed property. Consequently, decree for specific performance of the contract was passed in favour of the plaintiff with a direction that the plaintiff would deposit the balance amount of price within 30 days in the Court. The amount has already been deposited by the plaintiff.7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The first point for consideration arises is that whether the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?8. The amount has already been deposited by the plaintiff.7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The first point for consideration arises is that whether the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?8. In a suit for specific performance, it is well settled that the plaintiff has to plead and prove that he was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of agreement to the date of filing of the suit. Learned counsel for the parties cited a number of cases during the course of arguments. In Pushparani S. Sundaram and Others v. Pauline Manomani James (Deceased) and Others, (2002) 9 SCC 582 , it was held that mere filing suit for specific performance and taking the plea that he was ready and willing by themselves are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Similar view was taken in N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by L.Rs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 116 , Jugraj Singh and another v. Labh Singh and others, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 945 , Smt. Indira Kaur and others Vs. Sheo Lal Kapoor, (1988) 2 SCC 488 , N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others, (1995) 5 SCC 115 , P.R. Deb and Associates v. Sunanda Roy, (1996) 4 SCC 423 , Smt. Dhanbai v. Pherozshah, R.L.W. 1970 page 59 and in one judgment of this Court delivered in Dr. Sardar Khan Vs. Shri Noor Mohammed and others, S.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. 38/1978 decidd on 3.12.1967 all relied upon by learned counsel for the defendant- appellant and in Pandurant Ganpat Tanwade Vs. Ganpat Bhairu Kadam & Ors., J.T. 1996 (9) S.C. 18 , Syed Dastgir Vs. T.R. Gopalakrishnashetty, J.T. 1999 (5) S.C. 642 , Sukhbir Singh & Ors. Vs. Brij Pal Singh & Ors., J.T. 1996 (6) S.C. 389 , V. Pechimuthu V. Gowarammal, J.T. 2001 (6) S.C. 162 relied upon by learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent.9. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that it was neither pleaded nor proved that the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of agreement till filing the suit; that the plaintiff paid only a sum of Rs. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that it was neither pleaded nor proved that the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of agreement till filing the suit; that the plaintiff paid only a sum of Rs. 4000/- on the date of agreement and another sum of Rs. 893/- on 18.9.1977 after a period of three years of the agreement and thereafter he did not offer any payment; that he did not plead and prove that he had sufficient funds to pay the balance amount of rupees more than 30,000/-; that the plaintiff prior to first notice dated 2.2.1985 did not take any step to perform his part of the contract; that the plaintiff was interested only in vacant possession of the land but he was never interested in getting the sale deed executed for its registration; that the plaintiff neither purchased necessary stamps nor presented any draft of the sale deed; that he filed the suit after a period of about 13 years and all these facts clearly show that the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the period of this agreement was extended for eight times and all the writings are in the hand of the defendant-appellant and not a single writing states that the plaintiff sought time to pay the balance price or the plaintiff was having no means to pay, rather the time was extended by the defendant-appellant himself stating that he could not get the vacant possession of the land from the defendants No.2 to 5 and there was no such agreement between the parties that the plaintiff would get the draft of the sale deed prepared for presentation to the defendant or he would purchase stamps in advance. It was also contended that firstly there was no delay in filing the suit on the part of the plaintiff and secondly only on this ground it cannot be said that thx plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.10. I have considered the rival submissions, pleadings and evidence of the parties. Ex.2 dated 22.9.1974 is the agreement of sale. This agreement is in the and writing of the defendant. I have considered the rival submissions, pleadings and evidence of the parties. Ex.2 dated 22.9.1974 is the agreement of sale. This agreement is in the and writing of the defendant. The main terms of the agreement are (i) that the defendant agreed to sell the disputed land to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 100 per Sq. yard (ii) that the expenses of the registration would be borne by the purchaser (iii) that Rs. 4,000/- had been received by the defendant at the time of execution of this agreement on 22.9.1974 and the balance amount would be received from time to time and thereafter registration of the sale deed would take place (iv) that servants of Thikana are presently residing there and the defendant would hand over the vacant possession of this land after getting the same vacated from servants of Thikana i.e. defendants No. 2 to 5 (v) that it would be the responsibility of the defendant to get this land vacated from the servants of Thikana.11. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendant put much stress upon two judgments of this Court as reported in Smt. Dhanbai and Dr. Sardar Khan's case (both supra). According to Smt. Dhanbai's case (supra) there was no averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in view of total absence of such pleadings, it was observed that since there was no contract to the contrary, it was the duty of the buyer to tender a proper conveyance of the property to the seller for execution at a proper time and place and so also it was his duty to bear the expenses for the purchase of the proper stamp for the conveyance and further it was the plaintiff's duty to make a general averment of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract or to plead specifically that he was ready to tender the conveyance and pay the expenses for the purchase of the stamps. In Dr. Sardar Khan's case (supra), one of the terms and conditions of the agreement was that the purchaser within a period of four months will hand over the sale deed in his own name or in the name of some other person and then the vendors would get the same executed and produced for registration. In Dr. Sardar Khan's case (supra), one of the terms and conditions of the agreement was that the purchaser within a period of four months will hand over the sale deed in his own name or in the name of some other person and then the vendors would get the same executed and produced for registration. In view of these specific term and condition, this Court held that the pleading of the plaintiff that documents of the title of the disputed property were not shown to him by the vendor was not acceptable and thus the plaintiff failed to prove his readiness and willingness. In the instant case, there was no such term and condition in this agreement and the plaintiff specifically pleaded in the plaint that he was always ready and willing and still ready to perform his part of the contract by making the payment of the balance price and he approached the defendant a number of times but the defendant extended the period of the contract from time to time with a plea that he could not get the vacant possession of this land. This plea of the plaintiff find corroboration from the writings relating to extension of period for eight times. It is not in dispute that all the eight writings extending the period of this agreement are in the hand of the defendant himself. First entry for extending the period of contract is dated 18.9.1977. By this entry, the period of this agreement was extended upto 30.6.1978. The defendant thereafter continued to extend the time of this agreement by writings dated 4.7.1978, 12.3.1979, 28.4.1979, 31.12.1979, 30.6.1980, 31.12.1981 and lastly 28.9.1983. All these entries go to show that whenever the plaintiff approached the defendant, he extended time of agreement only on the ground that he could not get the vacant possession of the land. Only vide writing dated 31.12.1981, the defendant stated that he would hand over the possession by 30.9.1983 and would get the sale deed registered, otherwise he will refund the amount and as per last writing dated 28.9.1983, it was agreed by the defendant that he will hand over vacant possession to the plaintiff by 31.3.1984 and would get the sale deed registered by 30.6.1984. At no point of time, it was mentioned by the defendant that the plaintiff failed to make the payment or he had no money to pay. At no point of time, it was mentioned by the defendant that the plaintiff failed to make the payment or he had no money to pay. In view of these writings, the submission made by Mr. Kasliwal cannot be accepted that since the plaintiff did not purchase the requisite stamps and failed to prepare draft sale deed, it, is proved that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Next contention with regard to delay in filing the present suit after about a period of 13 years showing that he was never ready and willing to get the sale deed executed, also appears to be without merit as the period of getting the sale deed registered was extended by the defendant himself upto 30.6.1984. The plaintiff Sh. Prabhu Narayan Sharma clearly explained this delay by stating before the trial court that it was the defendant who continued to extend the period from time to time whenever he approached the defendant for execution of the sale deed. After that, he served two notices dated 2.2.1985 and 20.2.1987 upon the defendant No.1. It is also not in dispute now that the defendants. 2 to 5 had already vacated the disputed land. In view of these facts, firstly there seems to be no material delay on the part of the plaintiff and secondly no such presumption can be drawn only on account of some delay that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Rather the defendant took a contrary plea from the terms of the agreement. The plea that it was agreed that plaintiff would obtain the written permission of Maji Smt. Icharaj Kanwar-step mother of the defendant No.1 is without any basis. Likewise other pleas that the defendants 2 to 5 were in possession of the disputed land on behalf of Smt. Icharaj Kanwar, that it was not within the competence of the defendant No.1 to dispossess them, that the plaintiff never offered the balance price, that he extended the period of agreement on pressure put by the plaintiff and that the defendant No.1 alone was not competent to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff are also found without merit. It is significant to say here that all these objections raised in the written statement were not mentioned in the agreement to sell Ex.2 or in subsequent writings made from 1977 to 1983 by the defendant himself. Thus the learned trial court rightly disbelieved the evidence of the defendant. Mr. Farooq learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff rightly contended on the basis of evidence that the plaintiff was having means to pay the balance price. The plaintiff stated that he was serving in Jaipur Metals on monthly salary of Rs. 1500/-. P.W.3 Smt. Mridula Sharma-plaintiff's wife corroborated his statement. Minor discrepancies in the evidence is no ground to discard their evidence. In examination-in-chief, the defendant Tej Singh stated that the plaintiff never came to pay the balance price. In cross-examination, a question was put to him that the plaintiff was and still ready to pay the balance price, he evaded the answer by saying that he was not in a position to execute the sale deed as this land did not belong to him. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that at no point of time the defendant raised this objection or made any reference in the writings extending the period of the agreement for eight times. The defendant No.1 did not even reply the notices given by the plaintiff. In view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, this point was rightly decided by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.12. The second point for consideration is as to whether the defendant No.1 alone was not the owner of the land in question, hence he was unable to execute the sale deed ? Learned counsel for the appellant-defendant contended that the defendant No.1 not being the sole owner of this property was not competent to execute the agreement of sale Ex.2 and thus he was not empowered to get the sale deed executed and registered and the plaintiff would not be in a position to have this property if he gets the sale deed registered in his name. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that defect in title cannot be pleaded by the vendor and he placed reliance upon Netya Venkataramanna Vs. Mahankali Narasimhan, AIR 1994 Andhra Pradesh 244 , Deenanath Vs. Chunnilal, AIR 1975 Rajasthan 69 , Mir Abdul Hakeem Khan Vs. Abdul Mannan Khadri, AIR 1972 Andhra Pradesh 178 , Ram Karan & Ors. Vs. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that defect in title cannot be pleaded by the vendor and he placed reliance upon Netya Venkataramanna Vs. Mahankali Narasimhan, AIR 1994 Andhra Pradesh 244 , Deenanath Vs. Chunnilal, AIR 1975 Rajasthan 69 , Mir Abdul Hakeem Khan Vs. Abdul Mannan Khadri, AIR 1972 Andhra Pradesh 178 , Ram Karan & Ors. Vs. Govind Lal & Anr., 1999 (1) W.L.C. 120 , Deenanath Vs. Chunnilal, R.L.W. 1974 page 383 .13. I have considered the said submissions. In view of the judgments referred hereinabove, it is true that vendor cannot be permitted to set up the defence that he had no title or had defective title to the property which he had agreed to sell. Thus, this point is decided accordingly.14. Next submission made by learned counsel Mr. Kasliwal is that decree of specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such a relief merely because it is lawful to do so. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short the Act, 1963) is as under : Discretion as to decreeing specific performance (1) the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance : (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1 : Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation 2 : The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in case where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of contract. (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party. Thus, Section 20 of the Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable and guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, 1963 that the Court may exercise such discretion not to decree specific performance, if under the terms of the contract, the plaintiff gets unfair advantage over the defendant, the Court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, decree of specific performance may not be passed if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is equitable to grant specific relief, then also the Court may refuse to grant decree of specific performance. 15. Mr. Kasliwal relying upon K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd., (1999) 5 SCC 77 , Gobind Ram v. Gian Chand, (2000) 7 SCC 548 & Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal and others, (1996) 4 SCC 593 , contended that since decree of specific performance is equitable relief in nature, therefore "Doctrine of comparative hardship" is applicable. According to Mr. Kasliwal relying upon K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd., (1999) 5 SCC 77 , Gobind Ram v. Gian Chand, (2000) 7 SCC 548 & Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal and others, (1996) 4 SCC 593 , contended that since decree of specific performance is equitable relief in nature, therefore "Doctrine of comparative hardship" is applicable. According to Mr. Kasliwal there are certain circumstances in this case wherein decree of specific performance would not put the appellant to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of this agreement and the same are that the agreement Ex.2 was executed way back in September, 1974 and thus a period of more than 29 years has passed; that the present suit was filed more that after a period of 12 years; that out of total sale price of Rs. 35,000/-, only a sum of Rs. 4893/- has been paid by the plaintiff; that map for construction of multistoreyed building upon Haveli's land including the disputed land has already been got approved and the disputed land is situated in front of Sadar gate of the Haveli and if the same is given to the plaintiff, it will prove to be an eyesore and on the other hand the property which the plaintiff is asking for is two separate strips of land measuring 25x63 feet which independently cannot be used for construction of residential house and as such the plaintiff can well be compensated by payment of money. Mr. Kasliwal made an offer of Rs. 5 lacs with further submission that the Court may grant more and the appellant would pay that amount within 15 days from the date of the order of this Court. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the plaintiff had no house of his own at Jaipur, hence he entered into an agreement with the appellant for this peace of land and paid a sum of Rs. 4000/- on the very day as advance; that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to pay the balance price but it was the appellant-defendant who whenever approached by the plaintiff extended the period of agreement for eight times; that the defendant-appellant did not make any plea/prayer in written statement that the plaintiff may be compensated by way of compensation and thus this Court cannot go beyond the pleadings/prayers. Mr. Mr. Paker Farooq counsel for the plaintiff- respondent No.1 also made an offer of Rs. 5 lacs or more amount as may be considered reasonable by the Court for payment to the appellant in addition to sale price agreed upon vide agreement Ex.2. Relying upon Gobind Ram and Kanshi Ram's case (both supra) Mr. Paker Farooq also relied upon M.L. Devender Singh and others v. Syed Khaja, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2457 , Smt. Shakuntla Devi v. M/s Mohanlal Amrit Raj Jain Market, Pali, 1994(2) RLR 81 = AIR 1994 Rajasthan 259 , K.M Madhavakrishnan v. S.R. Swami and another, AIR 1995 Madras 318 , Ram Dass v. Ram Lubhaya, AIR 1998 Punjab and Haryana 233 , V.Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal, J.T. 2001 (6) SC 162 and A. Maria Angelena (d) & Ors. Vs. A.G. Balkis Bee, J.T. 2001 (10) S. C. 262 .16. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submission in the light of the judgments referred hereinabove. In K. Narendra's case (supra) the appellant on 25.7.1972 entered into an agreement to sell a plot of land to respondent to construct multi-storyed building in an area covered by master/zonal plan and requiring several sanctions and clearances which were not within the power of the parties but the parties knowingly depended on the respondent for securing the requisite sanctions and clearances. Sanction of construction of multi-storeyed building once granted by the competent authority was subsequently withdrawn in June, 1993. It was also not in dispute that the land forming subject matter of the agreement included an excess land as per the provisions of the ULCR Act. On 26.4.1985 the competent authority passed an order exempting the excess vacant land from the provisions of this Act subject to certain terms and conditions. In view of the withdrawal of sanction of construction of multi-storeyed building and terms and conditions No.6 & 7 of exemption order dated 26.4.1985, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that now this agreement dated 25.7.1972 has become incapable of specific performance. It was also held that the present one is a case where the discretionary jurisdiction to decree the specific performance ought not to be exercised in flavour of the respondents. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing the suit for specific performance ordered the appellant to return the amount of consideration with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. and also an amount of Rs. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing the suit for specific performance ordered the appellant to return the amount of consideration with interest at the rate of 12% p.a. and also an amount of Rs. 3,25,000/- by way of compensation in lieu of the specific performance. But in the instant case, the agreement Ex.2 has not become incapable of specific performance.17. In Gobind Ram's case (supra) the appellant agreed to sell the disputed property for a consideration of Rs. 16,000/- to the respondent on 24.1.1973 and a sum of Rs. 1,000/- was paid as earnest money to the appellant. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance, which was decreed by the trial court. The appeal filed by the appellant in the High Court was also dismissed. However, to mitigate the hardship to the appellant and as the respondent agreed to pay more sum, the High Court directed the respondent to deposit a further sum of Rs. 1 lac. The only contention urged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the appellant was that instead of decree of specific performance, compensation may be awarded. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 7 of this judgment observed that it is the settled position of law that grant of decree for specific performance of contract is not automatic and is one of the discretion of the Court and the Court has to consider whether it will be fair, just and equitable. The Court is guided by principle of justice, equity and good conscience. In para 9, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Court was of the view that the appellant tried to wriggle of the contract because of escalation in prices of real estate properties and thus the respondent is entitled to get a decree as he has not taken any undue or unfair advantage over the appellant-defendant. To mitigate the hardship to the appellant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the respondent to deposit a further sum of Rs. 3 lacs within four months for payment to the appellant. In Kanshi Ram's case (supra), an agreement of sale dated 7.4.1969 was executed to convey the plot of land of 100 sq. yards for Rs. 16,000/- and Rs. 2,500/- was paid as earnest money. The respondent filed suit for specific performance and also claimed alternatively damages with interest. The courts below granted decree for specific performance. In Kanshi Ram's case (supra), an agreement of sale dated 7.4.1969 was executed to convey the plot of land of 100 sq. yards for Rs. 16,000/- and Rs. 2,500/- was paid as earnest money. The respondent filed suit for specific performance and also claimed alternatively damages with interest. The courts below granted decree for specific performance. Learned counsel for appellant contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the appellant is prepared to pay a sum of Rs. 10 lacs as alternative relief, though the respondent claimed Rs. 12,000/- instead of specific performance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it is true that rise in prices of the property during the pendency of the suit may not be the sole consideration for refusing to decree the suit for specific performance but keeping in view equity and good conscience held that the decree for specific performance is inequitable and unjust to the appellant and according ordered that the plaintiff-respondent will be paid a sum of Rs. 10 lacs within a period of three months with a condition that the appellant shall not again sell the property for five years. In M.L. Devender Singh & Other's case (supra) it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of specific performance that provision for damages or penalty for breach is not sufficient to rebut the presumption as provided under Section 10 of the Act, 1963. Similar view was taken by this Court in Smt. Shankuntla Devi's case (supra). In K.M. Madhavakrishnan's case (supra) it was held by Madras High Court that increase in price of properties cannot be ground for refusing decree for specific performance. In Ram Dass's case (supra) Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the defendant took false stand before the Court and failed to perform his part of the contract in spite of notice from the plaintiff, decree for specific performance is justified. In V. Pechimuthu's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Court cannot reverse concurrent findings of fact on construction of the plaint on a point not raised by the respondent at any stage of the proceedings. In A. Maria Angelena (d) & Ors.'s case (supra), the predecessor-in-interest of defendant-appellant No.1 to 7 executed an agreement for sale of a house for a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/-. The plaintiff-respondent paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as earnest money. In A. Maria Angelena (d) & Ors.'s case (supra), the predecessor-in-interest of defendant-appellant No.1 to 7 executed an agreement for sale of a house for a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/-. The plaintiff-respondent paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as earnest money. The plaintiff brought the suit for specific performance of agreement dated 6.4.1979. During the pendency of the suit the legal representatives of the vendor sold the suit house to appellant Nos. 8 & 9. The subsequent purchasers were also impleaded as defendants in the suit. The trial court decreed the suit. Appeal preferred by the defendants was also dismissed by the High Court. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellants submitted that in view of the subsequent events, the appellants 8 & 9 shall be put to a great hardship and therefore it is a case where the plaintiff-respondent could be compensated in terms of money. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in any event of the matter no hardship as now stated was pleaded in the written statement. Further no issue was framed that the plaintiff-respondent could be compensated in terms of money in lieu of the decree for specific performance. In the absence of such a plea and issue, we are not inclined to entertain the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants and since the plaintiff was and is always ready and willing to perform his paft of the contract, the appeal was dismissed.18. In the instant case, the appellant-defendant did not plead in the written statement that any hardship would be caused to him or that the plaintiff took any undue advantage over him, or that agreed price of the land in question was inadquated or that the plaintiff could be compensated in terms of money in lieu of the decree for specific performance. In the absence of such plea and issue, the offer made by learned counsel for the appellant- defendant before this Court cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in A. Maria Angelena (d) & Ors. case (supra).19. However, to mitigate the hardship to the appellant-defendant and as learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondent agreed to pay more sum i.e. Rs. 5 lacs or more as may be directed by this Court and in view of the tremendous escalation of prices of real estates properties, the respondent-plaintiff is directed to deposit a further sum of Rs. case (supra).19. However, to mitigate the hardship to the appellant-defendant and as learned counsel for the plaintiff- respondent agreed to pay more sum i.e. Rs. 5 lacs or more as may be directed by this Court and in view of the tremendous escalation of prices of real estates properties, the respondent-plaintiff is directed to deposit a further sum of Rs. 6 (six) Lacs within a period of five months from today in the trial court and the amount would be kept in short term deposit in a nationalised bank. This amount along with the balance of the consideration already deposited in the trial court is to be paid to the appellant on his giving possession of the suit property to the respondent.20. With the above modification of the impugned judgment and decree, this appeal is dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******