JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This revision has arisen out of the order, dated 29.08.2002, passed by learned Civil Judge(Sr. Divn.) No. 2, Guwahati, in Title Execution No. 2/2001 arising out of Title Suit No. 22/84, whereby the Petitioner's application made under Order 21 Rule 99 and 101 read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure was rejected. 2. In a nutshell, material facts and various stages, which have led to rise to this revision, may be narrated as follows: For execution of the decree granted in Title Suit No. 22/84, Title Execution No. 2/01 aforementioned was commenced, the opposite party Nos. 1 to 8 being the decree holders and opposite party No. 9 being the judgment debtor. The Petitioner, who was not a party to the suit or to the execution proceeding, made an application in the execution proceeding under Order 21 Rule 99 and101 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, his case being that he had been in occupation and use of a portion of the suit property since 1972 by constructing his dwelling house thereon, which he had let out to tenants, but he was never made a party to the suit and though he was a stranger to the suit, he was, now, being sought to be evicted from the said portion of the suit land. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the learned executing Court passed the impugned order rejecting the Petitioner's prayer for allowing him to resist the execution of the decree. Aggrieved by this order, the revision Petitioner has approached this Court. 3. I have perused the materials on record including the impugned order. I have heard Mr. S.P. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and Mr. P.K. Khataniar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party. 4. While considering the above petition of the Petitioner, the learned trial Court has observed to the effect, inter alia, that a third party can seek relief under Order 21 Rule 99 Code of Civil Procedure not only after he has been dispossessed in execution of the decree, but also before such dispossession takes place. 4. While considering the above petition of the Petitioner, the learned trial Court has observed to the effect, inter alia, that a third party can seek relief under Order 21 Rule 99 Code of Civil Procedure not only after he has been dispossessed in execution of the decree, but also before such dispossession takes place. Having held so, the learned trial Court, has however, turned down the prayer of the Petitioner on the ground that the said petition had been made under Rules 99 and 101 and not under Order 21 Rule 97 Code of Civil Procedure and that the said petition was not maintainable. 5. Before entering into the merit of the impugned order, it needs to be noted that Order 21 Rule 35 Code of Civil Procedure deals with cases of delivery of actual physical possession of immovable property to the decree-holder by removing the person in possession thereof, who is bound by the decree; whereas under Order 21 Rule 36, only symbolical possession is delivered to the decree-holder. 6. Order 21 Rule 97 Code of Civil Procedure comes into play when the delivery of possession of an immovable property in execution of a decree is resisted by a person, who may even be a stranger to the suit. If the decree-holder receives such a resistance, he can make an application to the Executing Court complaining of such resistance and when such application is made, the Court has to dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of Order 21 Rules 97. As far as Order 21 Rule 99 Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, it lays down that where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed from an immovable property by the holder of a decree for possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession and when such an application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate the application in accordance with the provisions contained therein. 7. 7. In short, thus, Order 21 Rule 97 can be invoked by a decree-holder, who receives resistance from any person including a stranger to the suit in execution of the decree aimed at giving delivery of possession of the decretal property to the decree-holder, whereas Order 21 Rule 99 can be invoked by a person other than the judgment-debtor, who is dispossessed by execution of such a decree. 8. The question, which, now, arises is as to whether a stranger to a suit, who is sought to be removed/evicted from the possession of a property by holder of a decree of such property, can approach the Court offering resistance to execution of such a decree or shall he wait until the time he stands evicted in execution of the decree so as to enable him to approach the Court for invoking the provisions of Order 21 Rule 99? The answer to this vital question has been succinctly laid down by the Apex Court in Brahmadeo Chaudhury v. Hrishikesh AIR 1997 SC 856 wherein the Apex Court, while dealing with the scope and ambit of Order 21 Rules 97 and 99, has laid down as follows: 5. In short, the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order XXI lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the Executing Court as well as by the decree holder, the remedy available to the decree-holder against such an obstructionist is only under Order XXI, Rule 97Sub-rule (1) and he cannot by-pass such obstruction and insist on re-issuance of warrant for possession under Order XXI, Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to by-passing and circumventing the procedures laid down under Order XXI, Rules 97 in connection with removal of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree. Once such an obstruction is on the record of the Executing Court, it is difficult to appreciate how the Executing Court can tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order XXI, Rule 99, Code of Civil Procedure and pray for restoration of possession. Once such an obstruction is on the record of the Executing Court, it is difficult to appreciate how the Executing Court can tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order XXI, Rule 99, Code of Civil Procedure and pray for restoration of possession. The High Court by the impugned order and judgment has taken the view that the only remedy available to a stranger to the decree, who claims any independent right, title or interest in the decretal property, is to go by Order XXI, Rule 99. This view of the High Court on the aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order XXI, Rule 99, Order XXI, Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree holder. While Order XXI, Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming execution proceedings where a stranger any right, title and interest in the decretal property claiming might have got actually dispossessed and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and interest dehors the interest of the judgment-debtors. Both these types of enquiries in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order XXI and it is not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the final stage after losing the possession and not before it if he is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets actually executed against him. With respect the High Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order XXI, Rule 97 in this connection by taking the view that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order XXI, Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High Court in this connection also results in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard on merit and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merit and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the Executing Court, therefore, would fail also on the ground on non-compliance with basic principles of natural justice. On the contrary, the statutory scheme envisaged by Order XXI, Rule 97, Code of Civil Procedure as discussed earlier clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both the decree-holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the Executing Court and it is that adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order XXI, Rules 97 to 103 would remain a complete code and the sole remedy for the concerned parties to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves. (Emphasis is added) 9. From the above observations, it is clear that a person need not wait for being dispossessed in execution of a decree before approaching the Court and he may make an application under Order 21 Rule 97 for adjudication of the dispute raised by him. 10. (Emphasis is added) 9. From the above observations, it is clear that a person need not wait for being dispossessed in execution of a decree before approaching the Court and he may make an application under Order 21 Rule 97 for adjudication of the dispute raised by him. 10. In other words, Rule 97 comes into play, when a person other than the judgment-debtor, either offers resistance or wants to offer resistance to the execution of a decree, whereas Rule 99 will come into play, when the person concerned stands dispossessed and seeks restoration of his possession. Viewed from this angle, when the Petitioner claimed that he owned a part of the suit land with dwelling houses standing thereon, which he had let out and had been collecting rents from tenants, it was clear that he had claimed constructive possession over the suit/decretal property. Since the Petitioner, according to his petition, had resisted the decree before the same could be executed against him, the learned trial Court was bound to consider his objection in terms of Order 21 Rule 97 and Order 21 Rule 99 had no application to such a case inasmuch as the Petitioner had not yet been dispossessed. Learned trial Court, however, rejected the petition on mere technicalities that the Petitioner had not quoted the correct provisions under which he had made the said petition. It is trite that notwithstanding as to what section of law a party to any legal proceeding may quote, it is entirely for the Court to determine as to what law will govern the case of the party concerned. Reference may be made, in this regard, to the decision of the Apex Court in Bhanwarlal v. Satyanarayan (AIR 1995 SC358). 11. Thus, what crystallizes from the above discussion is that the petition made by the revision Petitioner ought to have been considered by the learned trial Court in terms of the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 Code of Civil Procedure and other relevant provisions of law, but having not done so, the learned trial Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction, which stood vested in it by law. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from serious infirmity of law and cannot be allowed to stand good on record. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from serious infirmity of law and cannot be allowed to stand good on record. At the same time, the decree-holder appears to have been knocking the doors of the Court since 1984 and such an execution proceeding cannot brook any further delay. 12. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety, the impugned order, dated 29.08.2002, aforementioned is hereby set aside and the dispute raised by the Petitioner by his petition aforementioned is remanded to the learned trial Court for adjudication in accordance with law. 13. In order to ensure expeditious disposal of the entire matter pending before the Executing Court, the parties to the proceeding are hereby directed to appear before the learned Court below, on 28.04.2003, for further necessary orders. It is further directed that the learned Court below shall dispose of the entire matter within a period of two months from the date of appearance of the parties in the Court by holding, if necessary, day to day hearing. 14. No formal notice need be served on the parties concerned for appearance in as much as this judgment and order has been dictated and delivered in presence of the learned Counsel for the parties. 15. No order as to costs. 16. Send forthwith a copy of this judgment' and order to the learned Court below along with the LCR, if any. 17. Bring the above directions to the notice of the Deputy Registrar (I and E).