Judgment Satish Kumar Mittal, J. 1. Augur Nath petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the landlord) has filed the instant petition against the order passed by Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, exercising the powers of Appellate Authority under the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 , (hereinafter referred to as the Act) vide which the order of rent Controller, Jalandhar, ejecting the respondent Kishan Chand (now deceased through his legal representatives) (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) on the ground of change of user, was reversed. 2. The demised premises, in the present case, is a shop, situated at Attari Bazar, Jalandhar. It was let out by the landlord to the tenant vide rent note dated 4.8.1961 at monthly rent of Rs. 23.50. In the year 1982, the landlord filed the ejectment application under Section 13 of the Act for ejectment of the tenant from the demised shop on the grounds of non-payment of rent, change of user of the demised shop to godown and the premises having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, the tenant contested the ejectment application. He tendered the claimed rent on the fist date of hearing and denied the allegations of the landlord on the other two grounds. The learned Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the evidence led by both the parties, passed the order of ejectment against the tenant on the ground of change of user. The other ground of ejectment was held to be not proved by the landlord. Regarding change of user, the learned rent Controller has hold that the tenant, who took the shop in question for running the business of cloth, is using the same as a godown, which amounts to change of user and the tenant is liable for ejectment from the demised shop. 3. On appeal by the tenant, the aforesaid order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller was set aside by the Appellate Authority. It was held that the landlord, upon whom the burden of proof lies to prove the alleged change of user, has failed to discharge his onus. The evidence, produced by him in this regard, was found to be not sufficient to establish the alleged change of user. 4. Aggrieved against the said order, the landlord has filed the present revision petition. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records of the case. 6. The evidence, produced by him in this regard, was found to be not sufficient to establish the alleged change of user. 4. Aggrieved against the said order, the landlord has filed the present revision petition. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records of the case. 6. Mr. Gopal Mahajan, learned counsel for the landlord submitted that the learned Appellate Authority has reversed the well considered and well reasoned finding of the learned Rent Controller on the issue of change of user without properly considering the reasoning given by the learned Rent Controller; and based its order merely on surmises and conjectures. He canvassed that, primarily, the learned appellate Authority has proceeded on the assumption that the landlord has not discharged his burden to prove the issue of change of user and the evidence led by him is not sufficient to prove this issue. According to him the learned Appellate Authority presumed that this burden of proof remained stagnant, and it was never shifted. In view of this wrong assumption, the learned appellate Authority has observed that the evidence produced by the landlord was not sufficient to discharge the onus placed upon him. Learned counsel further submitted that the landlord examined three witnesses, namely AW. 1 Nirmala Devi, AW2 Chanan Singh and AW3 Parbodh Chander and has proved on record the report of Expert as Ex.AX, which clearly prove that the tenant was not using the shop in question as a shop; rather he has changed the same into godown. On the other hand, the evidence led by the tenant in the shape of RW2 Kanshi Ram, who was the ex-tenant of the landlord and RW3 Ravinder Vinod Sharma, was not relied upon by the learned Rent Controller. He further submitted that in spite of the fact that the tenant himself admitted in his statement that he is doing the business of selling of cloth at some other place, the learned Appellate Authority has wrongly observed that the landlord has failed to prove that the tenant was using some other placed as his shop. Similarly, the learned Rent Controller, while appreciating the evidence led by both the parties, had come to the conclusion that in the demised shop there is no Gaddi; and the same is being used as a godown. Similarly, the learned Rent Controller, while appreciating the evidence led by both the parties, had come to the conclusion that in the demised shop there is no Gaddi; and the same is being used as a godown. He further submitted that the learned rent Controller, after taking into consideration the facts that the tenant did not produce any books of accounts, bill of sale and purchase of clothes, licence under the Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Shop Act) and the electricity charges paid by the tenant, drew an adverse inference against the tenant. The said finding has been reversed by the learned Appellate Authority by illegally observing that the learned rent Controller should not have drawn such an inference against the tenant for not bringing on record such documents, because the burden of proof lies on the landlord. While relying upon the decision of Honble Supreme Court in Sawarni v. Smt. Inder Kaur, 1997(1) Recent Civil Reports 41, learned counsel for the landlord submitted that the learned Appellate Authority has reversed the well considered and well reasoned judgment of the learned Rent Controller without examining the material evidence available on the record and such decision is liable to be set aside. He further submitted that the Full Bench of this court in Des Raj v. Sham Lal, (1980)82 P.L.R. 647, has held that if the shop is leased out to the tenant, even though the lease deed is silent regarding the purpose for which it was let out, the same cannot be used as a godown and it amounts to change of user which renders the tenant liable to be ejected. He submitted that in the present case, the tenant is liable to be ejected on the ground that he is using the demised shop as a go-down, which has been duly established on record. 7. On the other hand, Sh. Sandeep Garg, learned counsel for the tenant submitted that as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proof lies upon the landlord to prove that the shop in question is being used by the tenant as a godown. He submitted that the said burden has not been discharged, as concluded by the learned Appellate Authority. Sandeep Garg, learned counsel for the tenant submitted that as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proof lies upon the landlord to prove that the shop in question is being used by the tenant as a godown. He submitted that the said burden has not been discharged, as concluded by the learned Appellate Authority. He further submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the learned Appellate Authority, therefore, the revision petition filed by the landlord is liable to be dismissed. 8. After hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that this revision petition filed by the landlord should be allowed; and the order passed by the learned Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside. The order of ejectment passed by the learned Rent Controller is well reasoned. After considering and appreciating the evidence led by both the parties, the learned Rent Controller has recorded a finding that the tenant has changed the use of shop and as such is using the same as a go-down. This finding was recorded by the learned Rent Controller on the basis of the oral evidence led by the landlord. The learned Rent Controller, while considering the evidence led by the tenant has rightly discarded the testimony of RW. 2 Kanshi Ram because he was previously a tenant of the landlord; and his testimony to the effect that the demised shop is being used as a shop by the tenant was rightly not believed by the learned Rent Controller. Regarding the other witness, namely RW, 3 Ravinder Vinod Sharma, the learned Rent Controller has observed that this witness has not uttered a word regarding the use of the demised premises as a shop by the tenant. Except these two witnesses, the tenant did not produce any other evidence or any witness from the neighbourhood. The learned Rent Controller has further rightly drawn an adverse inference against the tenant for not producing the book of accounts, bills regarding sale and purchase of clothes and the licence under the Shops Act. These documents were in possession of the tenant, which could have established that he was running his shop in the demised premises. The learned Rent Controller has further rightly drawn an adverse inference against the tenant for not producing the book of accounts, bills regarding sale and purchase of clothes and the licence under the Shops Act. These documents were in possession of the tenant, which could have established that he was running his shop in the demised premises. When these documents were not produced and when no other witness from the locality was examined, the learned Rent Controller has rightly drawn an adverse inference against the tenant. In his cross-examination, the tenant has specifically admitted that he is doing the business of cloth in a different shop. Admittedly, the shop in question is situated in a lane. The learned Rent Controller, after taking into consideration all these facts, has rightly come to the conclusion that the tenant has changed use of the demised shop to a godown. 9. The contention of leaned counsel for the tenant is that as per Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden to prove that the tenant is liable to be ejected on the ground of change of user, lies on the landlord; and that since initially, the said burden was not discharged, therefore, there is no question of shifting the burden on the tenant to prove by producing evidence on record the account books, bills of sale and purchase of cloth and the licence under the Shops Act. The contention of learned counsel for the tenant is not acceptable. It is well settled that there is difference between burden of proof and onus of proof. The initial onus of proving a case is always on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff discharges that onus and makes out a case which entitle him to the relief, the onus shifts on to the defendant to prove the circumstances, if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to that relief. In the present case, the landlord discharged the initial burden, but on the other hand, the tenant did not produce the evidence to establish that he was using the demised premises as a shop. The learned Appellate Authority has wrongly set aside the well considered and well reasoned judgment of the learned Rent Controller. The learned Appellate Authority has discarded the statements of AW. 1 Nirmala Devi and AS.2 Chanan Singh without any sufficient reason. The learned Appellate Authority has wrongly set aside the well considered and well reasoned judgment of the learned Rent Controller. The learned Appellate Authority has discarded the statements of AW. 1 Nirmala Devi and AS.2 Chanan Singh without any sufficient reason. Admittedly, the tenant is doing his business of cloth in a different shop. He has failed to prove that he is doing any business in the demised shop. I am of the opinion that the landlord has sufficiently discharged the initial burden of proof and on the other hand, the tenant could not lead any evidence, which may falsify the stand taken by the landlord. From the evidence, available on the record, it is clear that the tenant has changed the use of the demised shop as a godown and he is liable to be ejected therefrom, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Des Raj v. Sham Lal (supra). 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the revision petition is allowed and the order dated 3.1.1986 passed by the learned Appellate Authority is set aside. The legal representatives of the deceased respondent are ordered to be ejected from the shop in question. However, they are granted three months time to hand over the vacant possession of the demised shop. 11. No order as to costs.