JUDGMENT 1. :- The petitioner State of Rajasthan through Executive Engineer, Mahi Project, Banswara has filed this writ petition challenging the award dated 30.4.1994 as contained in Annex. 14 passed by the Industrial Disputes and Labour Court, Udaipur by which the respondent No.1 Motilal has been ordered to be reinstated in service with 50% back wages. This award was passed after the Judge, Labour Court recorded a finding that the respondent No.1 had succeeded in establishing that he had completed 240 days of work in one calendar year in the Mahi Project, Banswara and his services were dispensed with in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as no notice was issued to him and his services were dispensed with by an oral order without even paying him on month's pay in lieu of notice. The learned Judge of the Labour Court was also of the opinion that the respondent workman is fit to be reinstated in service of the State of Rajasthan with 50% back wages as he has earned some wages as a labourer during the period during which he was out of service. 2. Assailing the aforesaid award of the Labour Court, Udaipur, learned counsel for the State Shri Bhansali submitted that the court below has committed an error in recording the finding that the respondent workman has completed 240 days of continuous work in one calendar year, as although he might have completed 240 days in Mahi Project but the same ought not to be construed as 240 days of work in one Division as he worked for some period in a particular Division of Mahi Project and, thereafter, discharged duties in another Division of this Project. 3. The Advocate of the respondent, on the other hand, submitted on this score that the workman-respondent No.1 had discharged duties under the Executive Engineer, Common Civil Works, Division Ist, Mahi Project, Banswara from 1.5.1984 to 31.12.1986 and thereafter, in L.M.C. Division, Mahi Project, Banswara from 1.1.1987 to 30.9.1987 which was more than 240 days and hence his termination from 1.10.1987 on the basis of verbal order of the Assistant Engineer without paying him the terminal benefits was clearly illegal as it was a statutory violation of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. 4. The point, therefore, which emerges for consideration of this Court is as to whether the duties discharged by respondent No.1 in different Divisions of one and the same Project could be counted as continuous duty as as to fulfil the requirement of continuous work of 240 days in one calendar year. 5. Shri Bhansali on behalf of the petitioner State endeavoured hard to impress upon this court that the statutory requirement of continuous discharge of 240 days in one calendar year cannot be counted by including the services of different Divisions even if the Project is one and the same, as it is the duty discharged in a particular Division only would hold the workman eligible for claiming regularisation on the basis of continuous service of 240 days. In support of this submission, he relied upon certain decisions of this Court and one of the authorities in this regard which has been relied upon by the petitioner's Advocate is R.L.W. 2002(1) Raj. 54 : {2002(7) SLR 219 (Raj.)] Karan Singh Saktawat v. State of Rajasthan and others, wherein, the learned Judges of the Division Bench while dismissing the appeal of the workman was pleased to hold that the services rendered by a person as work charged employee appointed on purely temporary daily wages as is under different appointing authorities cannot be clubbed together for the purpose of counting 240 days service under one employer so as to apply the provisions of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Another authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is the judgment and order of learned Single Judge of this Court (as he then was) reported in 2000(3) W.L.C. (Raj.) 70 : [2000(5) SLR 413 (Raj.)] delivered in the matter of State of Rajasthan and others v. Arun Kumar and others, wherein, it was held that counting of period of 240 days of the workman who although had completed work for 285 days yet, he having served in different units of the same department having no functional integrity with one another, cannot be said to have worked for 240 days, and hence was not entitled to the benefit of Section 25. This decision was delivered on the premise that in case an employer has different units through - out the India or all over the world, then each of the works of construction project undertaken by the employer represent distinct establishment and do not constitute units of single establishment and in case there is closure of one unit, the same does not lead to the closure of other, and therefore, it cannot be held that there is proximity between units/works undertaken by the employer, as a result of which in it will have to be held that thee is no functional integrity between the several units or several construction works undertaken by the employer so as to grant plank to the workman to urge that his services in different units should be counted for the purpose of granting him the benefit of the work of 240 days. 6. The respondent's Advocate in reply to these arguments submitted that the aforesaid judgments and orders cannot be allowed to apply in case of the workman who is specifically governed under the Mahi Standing Order, 1975 framed under the Standing Order Act which has a statutory force under Article 309 of the Constitution. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 50 of this Rule, the seniority of workman or quasi-permanent or temporary status shall not be counted for clubbing the services rendered in different units of the department, which means that the workman has discharged duties in one unit. The same shall not be counted in the subsequent unit for the purpose of counting seniority, but it is categorically and unambiguously laid down that the same will be counted for terminal benefits. Therefore, if the services of the workman were retrenched by the petitioner- Department which he rendered in different units, the same will be counted in order to calculate the grant of terminal benefits. It was therefore submitted that the learned Judge of the Tribunal had rightly counted the services rendered by the respondent workman in different units of Mahi Project in setting aside his oral termination. 7. It was therefore submitted that the learned Judge of the Tribunal had rightly counted the services rendered by the respondent workman in different units of Mahi Project in setting aside his oral termination. 7. Having considered the aforesaid arguments and counter arguments in regard to the plea as to whether the services rendered in different units of a particular department should be counted as continuous service or not, it is patently clear even from the judgment of Division Bench of this Court delivered in the case of Karan Singh (supra) relied upon by the petitioner's Advocate. Even the Division Bench of this Court had clearly held that if the services have been rendered by a person as a work- charged employee appointed on purely temporary basis on daily wages, his services will not be clubbed together for the purpose of counting 240 days of service under one employer if he has been appointed under different appointing authorities. The respondent workman is clearly not a workman who was appointed by different appointing authorities as admittedly he had discharged his duties in the Mahi Project and the appointing Authority is one and the same. Hence, reliance placed by the petitioner's Advocate on this judgment does not render any force to his argument. 8. Another judgment in the case of Arun Kumar (supra) of the learned Single Judge also does not assist the petitioner's Advocate in any manner as this judgment also clearly lays down that if there is no functional integrity between the several units, only then the workman would be denied the benefit of 240 days' of work. In the instant matter, it is not the case of the petitioner that several units of Mahi Project were so disintegrated that one unit had absolutely no nexus with the order unit, even if the employer is one. Hence, this decision also does assist the petitioner's Advocate in any manner. 9. Besides these judgments, it is difficult to ignore the Mahi Standing Order. 1975 having statutory force which under sub-rule (3) Rule 50 clearly lays down as follows : "3. A workman transferred to another unit at his own request will not be given benefit of past service in the new unit for the purpose of seniority. 9. Besides these judgments, it is difficult to ignore the Mahi Standing Order. 1975 having statutory force which under sub-rule (3) Rule 50 clearly lays down as follows : "3. A workman transferred to another unit at his own request will not be given benefit of past service in the new unit for the purpose of seniority. His past service, however, shall count for benefits due under law, at the time of termination of service." Sub-rule (4)(B) of Rule 50 also further lays down: "B. If a workman is quasi-permanent or temporary he shall not be allowed benefit of his past services for purpose of seniority and shall be placed at the bottom of the list of the quasi-permanent or temporary workmen of his category in the new unit. His past service will however, count for terminal benefits. 10. A perusal of the aforesaid rules clearly emphasises and indicates that while' terminating the services of workman, the services rendered by workman in different units will have to be counted as one and the same. So apart from the judgment relied upon the petitioner's Advocate which do not improve the petitioner's case, the Standing Order also clearly envisages that the services rendered by the workman in different units under one employer which has functional integrity will have to be counted as one and the same and benefit will accrue to the workman in this regard. In view of this clear and candid position, it is difficult to find fault with the finding recorded by the learned Judge of the Labour Court that the respondent workman had succeeded in proving his continuous service of more than 240 days under the Mahi Project, Banswara and his termination without complying the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was rightly set aside. 11. The next question under the circumstances which arises is whether Labour Court was justified in reinstating the respondent- workman by granting him 50% of back wages. In this regard also, it appears that the petitioner-state has not led any evidence in order to prove that the workman was gainfully employed elsewhere. Nevertheless, the learned Judge of the Labour Court appear to be fully cautious of the fact that the workman being a labourer must have been working as a labourer elsewhere, and hence, only 50% of back wages have been granted to him. Nevertheless, the learned Judge of the Labour Court appear to be fully cautious of the fact that the workman being a labourer must have been working as a labourer elsewhere, and hence, only 50% of back wages have been granted to him. In fact, there was no material before the Labour Court to infer that the workman was gainfully employed during all these years. But, relying upon the ratio of the authority of Supreme Court delivered in the case of Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow and another (2001)2 SCC 423 : [2001(1) SLR 535 (SC)], the grant of 50% of back wages considering that the services of respondent workman were terminated way back in 1985 is also not fit to be interfered with. In the case of Vikramaditya Pandey (supra), the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court have been pleased to hold that ordinarily if the termination of services of an employee is held to be wrong or illegal, the normal relief of reinstatement with full back wages, shall be available to the employee except under special circumstances where compensation can be paid in lieu of reinstatement. But considering the fact that termination of the workman took effect 15 1/2 years ago, reinstatement with only 50% of back wages was considered appropriate. In the instant matter, the Labour Court has already adopted this course as the respondent workman has been granted only 50% of back wages which, it was informed by the counsel for the parties, in terms of money would be less than a lack of rupees, as the workman was getting only Rs. 22/- per day. Hence, the impugned award does not require interference by this Court. However, it could be noticed that during pendency of this writ petition, the respondent workman had been receiving wages last drawn by him under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hence, while calculating the back wages to be extent of 50% the amount which the respondent workman has already received as wages last drawn under Section 17-B of the Act of 1947 shall be deducted. 12. The writ petition, under the circumstance, stands dismissed but without any order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******