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2003 DIGILAW 1669 (RAJ)

Satya Narain v. State of Rajasthan

2003-12-16

N.N.MATHUR, O.P.BISHNOI

body2003
JUDGMENT 1. :- Appellant Satya Narain, a Class IV employee, seeking promotion on the post of Lower Division Clerk, was granted relief by the order of this court dated 27.1.1993 directing the respondents to consider his case for promotion in case any person junior to him, has been promoted during the year 1975 to 1981. The order was not complied with. Hence, the appellant invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under Contempt of Courts Act 1971 but the same was declined on the ground of limitation. Thus, he filed a second writ petition seeking direction to give effect to the order of this court dated 27.1.1993 passed in earlier writ petition. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition, relegating the petitioner to remedy of contempt petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The brief impugned order dated 10.8.2001 reads as follows : "In view of the judgment of this court in Anwar Khan v. State of Raj., 1999 RLW 674, the petition is not maintainable. The petition is, therefore, dismissed." 2. In the said case, the petitioner Anwar Khan was initially appointed on daily wages in the year 1984 as a Class IV employee. He filed a writ petition seeking direction for regularisation and grant of equal pay for equal work. The writ petition was partly allowed by the judgment dated 6.9.1993. The Court directed that the petitioner will be entitled to get equal wages as being given to the similarly situated Class IV employees. The said order as not complied with. The application for contempt was also rejected. Thus, petitioner filed a subsequent petition seeking direction to respondents to comply with the order of this Court passed in earlier writ petition, i.e., the order dated 6.9.1993. The learned Single Judge hearing the writ petition in para 5 of the judgment posed the question as follows : "Whether the present writ petition is. maintainable or not, as the relief claimed by the petitioner in the present writ petition, had already been sought by him in the earlier writ petition decided on 6.9.1993." 3. The learned Single Judge answered the question posed against the petitioner. The relevant observations of the court are extract as follows : "(i) That petitioner ought to have approached the Court within limitation provided under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. The learned Single Judge answered the question posed against the petitioner. The relevant observations of the court are extract as follows : "(i) That petitioner ought to have approached the Court within limitation provided under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. Even if the limitation has expired, the petitioner can still approach to the Court under Article 215 of the Constitution within a reasonable period. (ii) That the writ petition cannot be the appropriate and effective remedy which can be entertained by the Court to enforce its judgment." 4. Thus, the learned Single Judge refused to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to give effect to its own order given in earlier writ petition in second round, but advised to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution by way of second contempt petition. The learned Single Judge in arriving at the said conclusion has referred to the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code and the case law dealing with the said provisions. Thus, a question arises where an extraordinary situation calls for extraordinary remedy, whether the court should hold up its hand and withhold relief on the limitations imposed by the conventional and technical rules of the Code of Civil Procedure ? As we know, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, being extraordinary and discretionary, cannot be encapsulated and confined in terminological and technical formulations so as to limit its plenitude. Instead of entering into a long academic exercise, and ultimately driving out the sufferer with a soft advice to come back after changing the label i.e. Article 215 instead of Article 226, the ends of justice would be best served by calling upon the respondent, may it be under the label of Article 226 or 215 to report if directions given in earlier petition have been complied with. The Court will issue appropriate writ ensuring the faithful compliance of the order alleged to have not been complied with. 5. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court has answered the question posed in Anwar Khan's case in affirmative in Prakash Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan "D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5735/1990 decided on 30.1.1991. The Court will issue appropriate writ ensuring the faithful compliance of the order alleged to have not been complied with. 5. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court has answered the question posed in Anwar Khan's case in affirmative in Prakash Chaturvedi v. State of Rajasthan "D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5735/1990 decided on 30.1.1991. The said judgment has been referred by the learned Single Judge in pars 8 of the said judgment, which is extracted as follows: "In contempt petition as such, this Court may or may not be able to direct the contemnors to comply with the orders of the Court as they are liable to be punished. Thus, so far as the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, we are of the opinion that this Court can make orders in the nature of orders made in the execution proceedings, to see that earlier directions/orders made by it are complied with." 6. In para 10, another judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court has been referred and quoted, which is also extracted as follows : "(10). However, in a recent case, my reverened brother Hon'ble Justice R.R. Yadav, rejected the writ petition No. 2497/1998 vide judgment and order dated 14.9.1998 on the ground that it was not maintainable. While rejecting the writ petition, the Hon'ble Court observed as under : "Sufficie it to say in this regard that the present writ petition is barred by the principle of res judicata and as such is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone with an observation that the petitioner, if so advised, can move a petition under Article 215 of the Constitution. Regarding apprehension of the petitioner that no contempt petition is maintainable after expiry of one year from the date of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, suffice it to observe that for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution, there is no time limit prescribed. It is further to be noticed that the power of this court under Article 215 is over and above the provisions of the Contempt of Co" Act, 1971." 7. It is further to be noticed that the power of this court under Article 215 is over and above the provisions of the Contempt of Co" Act, 1971." 7. The learned Single Judge preferred the view of the Single Bench referred to in para 10 as against the binding decision of the Division Bench, having made sweeping observation that the view of the Division Bench runs counter to the law laid by the Apex Court, as follows: "I am in respectful agreement with Hon'ble Yadav J. that the writ petition is not the appropriate remedy and is not maintainable in the fact-situation like in the instant case. The view taken by the Division Bench that the contempt jurisdiction may not be appropriate in a case for enforcing the judgment, runs counter to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court." 8. Thus, in quest to locate the authority of the Apex Court laying down that the writ petition is not the appropriate remedy for enforcing a judgment, as such, not maintainable and the petitioner is to be relegated to remedy of contempt, we propose to go through the judgments referred to in Anwar Khan's case in seriatim. 9. The first case referred in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate, AIR 1987 SC 88 , wherein the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was challenged by way of petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The petition was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 4.10.1985, as follows : "Shri Y.S. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the petition. He is permitted to do so. The petition is dismissed as withdrawn." 10. The petitioner filed a second writ petition challenging the same order of S.T.A.T. High Court dismissed the second writ for the same relief as not maintainable, as follows : "No second writ petition lies against the same order. The earlier petition was not withdrawn with permission to file a fresh petition." 11. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court. The Court took guidance from some of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure i.e. Order 23 Rule I Civil Procedure Code and also discussed the evil practice of bench hunting by the litigants..The court held that appeal against the order withdrawing the writ petition was not maintainable. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court. The Court took guidance from some of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure i.e. Order 23 Rule I Civil Procedure Code and also discussed the evil practice of bench hunting by the litigants..The court held that appeal against the order withdrawing the writ petition was not maintainable. "It is common knowledge that very often after a writ petition is heard for some time when the petitioner or his counsel finds that the Court is not likely to pass an order admitting the petition, request is made by the petitioner or by his counsel to permit the petitioner to withdraw from the writ petition without seeking permission to institute a fresh writ petition. A Court which is unwilling to admit the petition would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may just agree to permit the withdrawal of the petition. It is plain that when once a writ petition filed in a High Court is withdrawn by the petitioner himself he is precluded from filing an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition because he cannot be considered as a party aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court." 12. This case has no bearing on the controversy involved, as it pertains to successive writ petition in the context of withdrawal of a writ petition after sensing the mood of the court and to filing fresh petition keeping view of the bench. In the instant matter controversy does not pertain to withdrawal of writ petition, but obtaining a decision on merit and subsequent writ against non action in not complying with the direction given in earlier writ petition. By no stretch of imagination such petitions can be placed in the category of successive writ petition. 13. In Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Development Authority, (1994)6 SCC 97 , the Apex Court while disposing the Special Appeal filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, directed the Delhi Development Authority to intimate the respondents therein the amount required to be paid by them depending upon size of the plots and on such payment allotment within one month in their favour. A fresh writ petition under Article 32 was filed seeking mandamus against the demand of the excess amount. A fresh writ petition under Article 32 was filed seeking mandamus against the demand of the excess amount. The Apex Court found the writ petition as sheer abuse of the process of the Court and dismissed the same with costs of rupees thirty thousand. This case has also no bearing on the controversy involved in the instant case. 14. In Ghulam Mohammad v. Taj Mohammad reported in AIR 1995 Allahabad 333, the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court found a review application under Order 47 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code in a second appeal, not tenable in absence of assertion of right by licensee as donee. This case is not even remotely connected with the controversy involved in the instant petition. 15. In Uda Ram v. Central State Farm, 1998(1) RLW 376, a review petition was filed on the ground that the relief claimed by him in the writ petition had not been considered as the petitioner had claimed the benefit not only of regularisation but also challenged the order dated 20.1.1989 by which the services of the petitioner on ad hoc basis had been terminated. He also claimed the benefit of the provisions of Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India. The Court held that a successive petition claiming same relief, which ought to have been claimed in the earlier writ petition, cannot be filed. Thus, the review application was rejected as not maintainable. In our view, this case has also no bearing on the controversy involved. 16. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. T.P. Kumaran reported in (1996)10 SCC 561 : [1996(5) SLR 675 (SC)], the employee challenged the order of dismissal by way of filing a civil suit, which was decreed and consequently reinstated. Subsequently, he filed a writ petition seeking direction to pay all the arrears. He succeeded in the writ petition and the arrears were also paid. Thereafter, he filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking direction for payment of interest on the arrears. The said Original Application was also allowed. The matter was taken by the department before the Apex Court. The Court held that when the claim was made on earlier occasion, he should have or might have sought and secured decree for interest. He did not seek so and, therefore, it operates as res judicata. The said Original Application was also allowed. The matter was taken by the department before the Apex Court. The Court held that when the claim was made on earlier occasion, he should have or might have sought and secured decree for interest. He did not seek so and, therefore, it operates as res judicata. The Court held that when he fled a suit and specifically did not claim the same, Order 2 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code prohibits the petitioner to seek the remedy separately. In the opinion of the Apex Court, the Original Application was not sustainable. This case has also no relevance with the controversy involved. 17. In Union of India v. Punnilal , (1996)11 SCC 112 : [1997(1) SLR 33 (SC)], the Supreme Court held that where an employee filed a civil suit seeking a declaration for entitlement to promotion but did not seek in that suit the consequential relief of back wages and consequently obtained the declaration for promotion which became final, such employee stood barred fro,n claiming relief of back wages thereafter. In these circumstances, in the opinion of the Apex Court, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for wages. This case also does no provide any assistance to resolve the controversy involved in the instant petition. 18. In D. Cawasji & Co. v. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1975 SC 813 , petitioner filed a writ petition before the Mysore High Court challenging levy of health cess under the Mysore Health Cess Act, 1951 on the ground that it was outside the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislation. Within two months of the disposal of appeals by the Court, the petitioner filed writ petition before the High Court challenging the validity of the Act of 1951 and also for refund of the heath cess collected under the Act of 1951 for the period 1951 to 1962. The High Court held that there was inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions, and dismissed on the ground of delay alone. The matter was taken to the Apex Court., The Court held that the circumstances of the case having regard to the conduct of the petitioner not claiming the amount in the earlier petition, the Court refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court. The matter was taken to the Apex Court., The Court held that the circumstances of the case having regard to the conduct of the petitioner not claiming the amount in the earlier petition, the Court refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court. Apparently, the reference of the case is absolutely out of context. 19. In Rameshwar Lal v. Municipal Council , (1996)6 SCC 100 : [ 1996(5) SLR 674 (SC)], petitioner filed a writ petition seeking direction for payment of the salary for the period 10.9.1987 to 18.8.1988. The High Court relegated the petitioner to the remedy of civil suit. During pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, the limitation for filing of the suit expired. Considering the fact that a party cannot be left remedyless, the Court held that time spent in prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court is liable to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. This case has no relevance to the controversy involved in the matter on hand. 20. In Century Flour Mills v. S. Suppiah, AIR 1975 Madras 270, the Full Bench of the Madras High Court considered the scope and power of the High Court under Section 151 qua the limitations provided under Order 39 Civil Procedure Code The question had arisen as to holding of an extraordinary general body meeting of the share holders of the Company. The learned Single Judge has noted the ratio laid down in the said judgment in para 13 as follows : "(13) In Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah (11) and Surjit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Son (12), the Madras and Calcutta High Courts have taken the view that the parties cannot be permitted not be comply with the orders of the Court and it is the solemn duty of the Court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not to allow perpetuation of the wrong-doing and even if a wrong has been done, the Court must undo it in the interest of justice." 21. The observations in the Madras Case has no direct bearing on the controversy involved in the instant case. However, if powers of 151 Civil Procedure Code is read in Article 226 the ratio of the case is that the courts must exercise its inherant power to undone the wrong. The observations in the Madras Case has no direct bearing on the controversy involved in the instant case. However, if powers of 151 Civil Procedure Code is read in Article 226 the ratio of the case is that the courts must exercise its inherant power to undone the wrong. This case supports the exercise of power under Article 226 in case of complain of non-compliance of directions given in earlier petition. The perpetuation of the wrong done can be checked only by entertaining the writ petition and giving an effective direction to the respondents to carry-out the directions given in the earlier writ petition. 22. In Mohd. Idris v. Rustam Jehangir_ , AIR 1984 SC 1826 , the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay found the appellants guilty of contempt. The Division bench dismissed the appeal. The Apex Court held that the statutory right of appeal gets exhausted on filing an appeal before the Division Bench against the order of the learned Single Judge and, as such, there is no further right of appeal before the Supreme Court. In para 4 of the judgment, the Court rejected the contention of the learned counsel to the effect that the undertaking given was not in respect of the property concerned and that in any case the leaned Single Judge was not justified in giving certain directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of Court. The Court while rejecting the contention observed that there was a clear breach of the undertaking given by the petitioners and, as such, the Single Judge was right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach. The Single Judge has referred the said case in para 12 of the judgment, which reads as follows : "(12) In Mohammed Idris v. R.J. Babuji (10), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate direction for remedy and rectify the things done in violation of its order." 23. We have read the judgment of the Apex Courtin Mohd. Idris's case (supra) carefully. Though, we have not been able to located the observations as referred, perhaps the learned Single Judge wanted to say that the petitioner can claim a relief as given in the earlier writ petition even in the contempt proceedings. 24. We have read the judgment of the Apex Courtin Mohd. Idris's case (supra) carefully. Though, we have not been able to located the observations as referred, perhaps the learned Single Judge wanted to say that the petitioner can claim a relief as given in the earlier writ petition even in the contempt proceedings. 24. In Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, AIR 1986 Calcutta 220, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that in case of forcible dispossession of the plaintiff in violation of interim injunction, inherent power cannot be invoked to grant temporary mandatory injunction by directing the police to restore possession. The case is not even remotely connected with the controversy involved in the instant case.25. Next case referred is Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company , AIR 1996 SC 2005 : [1995(8) SLR 221 (SC)]. The learned Single Judge has referred the said case in pars 14. We can do no better than to extract the same as follows : "(14) Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Delhi Development Corporation v. Skippers Constitution Company (13), has observed that there can be no doubt that the salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by the Court, if necessary, by over- ruling any procedural or technical faults under Article 129 of the Constitution and the Court must ensure full justice between the parties before it, even while entertaining the contempt petition. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Court has placed reliance upon the judgment in Clarke v. Chadburn (14), wherein it has been observed as under : "I need not cite authorities for the purpose that it is of high importance that the orders of the Court should be obeyed. Wilful defiance of the order of the Court is punishable as a contempt of the Court, and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly be described as illegal. If by such disobedience the persons enjoy claim that they have validly effectsome charges in the rights and liberties of others, I cannot see why it should be said that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of Court for doing what they did, nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of course, if an act is done it is not undone merely by pointing-out that it was done in breach of law. Of course, if an act is done it is not undone merely by pointing-out that it was done in breach of law. If a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held, but the legal consequence of what has been done in breach of law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It seems to be one the principle that those who defy a prohibition be not able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good, and not tainted by the illegality that produced them." 26. In the said case, it is held that the provisions of Article 129 can be invoked by the Court to ensure full justice between the parties, even while entertaining the contempt petition. Thus, instead of driving out a party to seek remedy by way of petition under Article 215 of the Constitution, justice oriented approach would be to treat the writ petition as petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India if there exist compelling circumstances to adopt such recourse.27. In the case of Ajay Kumar Pandey reported in (1996)6 SCC 510 , the view taken by the Supreme Court in Skippers Construction Company's case (supra) has been reiterated.28. The State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Singh , 1995 (Supp.) 2 SCC 153 is authority for the proposition that the Court in a contempt jurisdiction can enforce the order passed by it in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court while disposing the contempt petition, directed the respondents to implement the order within the stipulated period. The same view has been taken by the Apex Court in Balram Singh v. Bhikam Chand reported in AIR 1985 SC 1726 . In the case of State of Rajasthan V. Mohan Singh, a difficulty was felt in complying with the directions of the High Court. Inspite of repeated opportunities given, the orders were not complied with. In those peculiar circumstances, the Apex Court directed the State Government to comply with the directions of the High Court within the stipulated period.29. In the case of State of Rajasthan V. Mohan Singh, a difficulty was felt in complying with the directions of the High Court. Inspite of repeated opportunities given, the orders were not complied with. In those peculiar circumstances, the Apex Court directed the State Government to comply with the directions of the High Court within the stipulated period.29. J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar reported in AIR 1997 SC 113 :[1996(6) SLR 723 (SC)] has been referred by the learned Single Judge in pars 17, which reads as follows: "(17) In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar (18), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not permissible for the Court, in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, to consider the matter on merit and to pass an order modifying the order passed earlier as contempt jurisdiction does not confer any power on the court to re-exercise the judicial review and to issue a fresh direction." 30. In the said case, the question was as to whether the seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceeding to find out whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier bench. The Court observed that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The Court further observed that preparation of seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may not be in conformity with the directions but that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. In these circumstances, in the opinion of the Court, it could not be a case of wilful violation of the order. Thus, this case does not throw any light on the controversy involved in the instant case.31. In Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty, AIR 1990 SC 464 , the Court considered that as there was a breach of undertaking by the tenant, mere imposition of fine would not meet the ends of justice and it was necessary to order to file the contempt by directing the contemner to deliver the vacant possession. immediately. The Court issued further directions for enforcing the order.32. immediately. The Court issued further directions for enforcing the order.32. In R.L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1972 SC 858 , the Apex Court held that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution to punish for contempt of itself is a special one. It has a power to order satisfaction of and the order passed by it earlier in favour of the party. 33. In Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1992 SC 904 : [1992(2) SLR 16 (SC)], it is held that the High Court being the Court of Record as embodied under Article 215 of the Constitution cannot be restricted by any ordinary legislature including the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act.34. Some of the cases referred by the learned Single Judge lay down that the High Court has power under Article 215 of the Constitution to issue appropriate directions for enforcing the order while exercising the power of contempt and further it does not restrict such power by any ordinary legislation including the Contempt of Courts, Act, 1973. However, there is no authority which says that the High Court has no power under Article 226 of the Constitution to pass an order in the nature of an order made in execution of a proceeding so as to see that the earlier directions or orders made by it are complied with. Thus, we do not find any authority running counter to the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Prakash Chandra's case (supra). On the contrary, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court finds support from the various decisions of the Apex Court referred-to hereinafter.35. In Capt. Dushyant Somal v. Smt. Sushma Somal, (1981)2 SCC 277 , the Apex Court rejecting the contention of the respondent that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure observed that where what is complained of, is an impudent disregard of an order of a Court, the fact certainly cries out that a prerogative writ shall issue. 36. 36. In Food Corporation of India v. S.N. Nagarkar , (2002)2 SCC 475 : [ 2002(1) SLR 739 (SC)] , the writ petition filed by the respondent before the Punjab & Haryana High Court was allowed and direction was given to the appellant-Corporation to give him the benefits of the pay fixation as Assistant Or. II and Assistant Gr. I and also to consider his case for promotion to the post of Assistant Manager (D) from the date persons junior to him were promoted. Further direction was given to pay the arrears within a period of one month. In case arrears were not paid within the said period, the respondent shall get interest at the rate of 18% from the date of the order. As the directions were not complied with, the respondent filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court. The writ petition was not entertained, as in effect, it was for execution of an order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The respondent filed second writ petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court. The application was rejected on the ground that it was in the nature of an application for execution and, as such, it was not maintainable. The Court however advised the respondent to file an application for executing the order passed in the earlier writ petition. In view of the observations of the High Court, the respondent filed a third writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Order 21 Rule 10 and 11 (2) read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code praying that application for execution of the order dated 6.5.94 be allowed and the full amount/arrears with interest may be ordered to be paid. This application was also dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the respondent had earlier filed a contempt petition which came to be dismissed. The respondent approached to the Apex Court by way of Special Leave Petition. Before the Apex Court, there was a doubt as to the nature of the order of the High Court. As the High Court directed for filing an application for execution, it must be construed to have relegated the remedy of approaching the civil Court by way of filing a fresh suit for recovery of arrears. Before the Apex Court, there was a doubt as to the nature of the order of the High Court. As the High Court directed for filing an application for execution, it must be construed to have relegated the remedy of approaching the civil Court by way of filing a fresh suit for recovery of arrears. In these circumstances, the Apex Court gave liberty to the respondents to file a review application for clarification of the order passed by the High Court. The review application was granted by the high Court The Single Judge directed the appellant-Corporation to pay arrears to the respondent in terms of the order of the Court dated 6.5.1994. The Corporation took up the matter before the Division Bench by way of Letters Patent Appeal, which was also dismissed. The matter was carried by the Corporation to the Supreme Court. The Apex Court affirmed the order of the Single Judge as confirmed by the Division Bench. The Court reiterated the well settled proposition of law that in exercise of writ jurisdiction, the court may mould the relief having regard to the facts of the case and the interest of justice.37. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Salkia Businessmen's Association v. Howrah Municipal Corporation, JT 2001(6) SC 173, an application for settling the dispute was filed by the parties. Before the High Court, learned counsel appearing for the parties also submitted that the writ petition be disposed of in terms of the said application for settlement. The learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition as follows : "Let there be an order that the writ petition is disposed of in terms of the settlement made by the parties. Xerox copy of the application for settlement and the order passed today be given to the parties. Let the writ petition be disposed of accordingly." 38. The authorities instead of abiding by the terms of the order, offered alternate accommodation on the ownership basis to the writ petitioner. Thus, a second petition was filed seeking direction to allot the alternate accommodation in terms of the earlier order of the Court. The second writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench also dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal, as such, the petitioner approached to the Apex Court. The approach adopted by the High Court was disapproved by the Apex Court. The second writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench also dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal, as such, the petitioner approached to the Apex Court. The approach adopted by the High Court was disapproved by the Apex Court. The Apex Court observed that if the Courts are not to honour and implement their own orders, the rule of law will certainly become a casualty. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are extracted as follows : "The High Court failed to do justice to its own orders. If courts are not to honour and implement their own orders and encourage party litigants - be they public authorities, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go-bye to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders of the court - the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the process-a costly consequence to be jealously averted by all and at any rate by the highest Courts in States in the country." 39. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can make appropriate orders in the nature of orders made in the execution proceedings to ensure that earlier directions/orders made by it are complied with. The court may mould the relief having regard to the facts of the case and the interest of the justice. May it be a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or a Contempt petition under Article 215 or under the Contempt of Courts Act, the anxiety of this Court would be to ensure that the orders of this Court are honoured and implemented.40. Consequently, we allow the Special Appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 10.8.2001. The matter be placed before the learned Single Judge for decision on merit. No order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******