ORDER 1. This appeal is against an order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (for short "CEGAT") dated 25-11-1997. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: The appellants applied for exemption from payment of duty under Notification No. 68/71-CE dated 25-5-1971. The said notification, inter alia, reads as follows: "GSR No. 821: In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby exempts articles made of plastics, all sorts, falling under Sub-Item (2) of Item 15-A of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), except- (i) rigid plastic boards, sheeting, sheets, and films, whether laminated or not; and (ii) flexible polyvinyl chloride sheeting, sheets, films and lay-flat tubings not containing any textile material, from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon: Provided that- (a) such articles are produced out of the artificial resins or plastic materials in any form falling under Sub-Item (1) of the said item, on which the duty of excise or the additional duty under Section 2-A of the Indian Tariff Act, 1934 (32 of 1934), as the case may be, has already been paid; or (b) such articles are produced out of scrap of plastics." 3. The appellants also claimed exemption on the ground that the tapes manufactured by them were used for captive consumption and therefore no duty was payable under Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules (as they then stood). 4. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise rejected the appellants application. However the Appellate Collector, by an order dated 18-2-1982, partly accepted the appellants contention. It was held that the tapes were used within the factory i.e. for captive consumption and therefore duty was not leviable. On the question whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the abovesaid notification, it was held as follows: "The question of application of exemption notification cited by the appellants would arise only if any quantity of tape is cleared as such and not otherwise." 5. It is thus to be seen that the Appellate Collector specifically did not go into the question as to whether or not the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the notification. This question was left open on the basis that such exemption would only be available if tapes were being cleared. It is thus to be seen that the Appellate Collector specifically did not go into the question as to whether or not the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the notification. This question was left open on the basis that such exemption would only be available if tapes were being cleared. This indicates that the Appellate Collector did not decide whether the appellants were manufacturing tapes. 6. On 20-2-1982 Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules were retrospectively amended and duty became payable even on goods consumed captively. The appellants filed a refund claim on 13-4-1982. On 1-4-1985 a show-cause notice was issued to the appellants as to why their refund claim should not be rejected in view of the amendment of Rules 9 and 49. The appellants filed their written submission and contended that the order of the Appellate Collector dated 18-2-1982 had become final and that, therefore, the appellants were entitled to refund. This contention was rejected by the Assistant Collector. It was held that the appellants were manufacturing sheets and not tapes and therefore the benefit of the abovementioned notification was not available. It was held that in view of amendment of Rules 9 and 49 the appellants were bound to pay duty. The appeal before the Appellate Collector, Central Excise was rejected on 31-5-1991. CEGAT has also dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. 7. We are unable to accept the submission that in view of the order of the Appellate Collector dated 18-2-1982 it was not open to the Department to raise a contention that the appellants were manufacturing sheets and not tapes. As has been set out hereinabove, the Appellate Collector left this question open. Merely because the appellants had claimed exemption from duty also on the ground that they were entitled to the benefit of notification would not entitle them to avail of such benefit unless the question was specifically decided in those proceedings. As the question was left open the Department could continue to contend that what was being manufactured was sheets and not tapes. 8. We also see no substance in the submission that the show-cause notice was restricted to retrospective applicability of Rules 9 and 49 and that it was, therefore, not open to the Department to contend that the benefit of the notification was not available. 8. We also see no substance in the submission that the show-cause notice was restricted to retrospective applicability of Rules 9 and 49 and that it was, therefore, not open to the Department to contend that the benefit of the notification was not available. In reply to this show-cause notice the appellants contended that they were entitled to the benefit of the aforementioned notification. This contention had to be answered. If it was found that there was no substance in this contention it had to be rejected by giving reasons. 9. In the above view, we see no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. The appeal stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.