M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) WE have heard the learned Govt. Pleader on merits and we have also heard the learned counsel who represents the respondent-accused. Prima facie, we were impressed by the initial submission of the learned Govt. Pleader that this is a case in which admittedly an injury of some seriousness has occurred. There can be little dispute about the fact that the injury was inflicted by the accused and the trial Court has essentially proceeded on the basis of various infirmities in the record and acquitted the accused and it did appear to us that the case does require interference. ( 2 ) THE respondent's learned counsel has pointed out an entirely different facet to us which essentially hinges on a point of law. We need to also record that he has very effectively and very competently demonstrated that the nature of the incident will have to be seen and the Court will also have to evaluate one fact, namely, that the accused was hopelessly out numbered because P. W. 1 had come along with a whole group of persons, they were armed with some sort of weapons but more importantly they made no secret of the fact that they had come there to demolish the cow shed of the accused and secondly, to take forcible possession of that area. He has also pointed out that what emerges from the evidence is that there was a verbal altercation in the sense that the accused pointed out that he is in possession, that his application for regularisation is pending and furthermore, that he has approached the Civil Court for certain reliefs. Learned advocate submits that in this background, where there is a clear intention to take the law into one's own hands and where the accused was left with absolutely no other option except to fight back in the case, the accused contends that P. W. 1 used force and even pushed him down and threatened to kill him. The submission is that if in such a situation the accused has dealt one blow in self-defence that he comes clearly within the ambit of the general exceptions and that consequently, this act would not constitute an offence. The submission is that if in such a situation the accused has dealt one blow in self-defence that he comes clearly within the ambit of the general exceptions and that consequently, this act would not constitute an offence. We do concede that the learned counsel is right as far as this submission on a point of law is concerned, because the facts do support the situation wherein the accused was left with no option except to fight to defend his property and person. ( 3 ) THERE is however another angle namely, that the law which entitled a person acting in his defence to use force also postulates that more force than is reasonable or necessary for purpose of defence cannot be used and the interesting aspect of the law is that if excessive force is used, then the benefit of the plea disappears because the accused is really taking the offensive and in that case he will have to take the consequence of the act. To our query as to whether the accused was justified in inflicting a blow on the back of the neck of some seriousness and whether this action is not in excess of the right of his defence, the learned counsel submitted that the court has to virtually recreate the incident and the Court has also got to evaluate as to what was the status of the accused, the mental make up, the time available etc. , in taking the delicate decision as to whether the force used was permissible or excessive. ( 4 ) AS far as the last aspect of the law is concerned, though many views have been expressed, ultimately guiding principles have been laid down by the Supreme Court in Buta Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 sc 1316 : (1991 Cri LJ 1464) wherein the apex Court has very rightly pointed out that when an accused has to take a split second decision, it is not possible to weigh in golden scales the exact level and extent of the nature offeree that is required to be used. The respondent's learned counsel did bring it to our notice that even if the plea of self defence has not been very specifically pleaded, that the law is well settled on the point to the extent that if the facts justify the invocation of this plea, that the Court can extend the benefit to the accused. This proposition is perfectly correct and it is precisely for this reason we have considered it in the present case. ( 5 ) ANOTHER important aspect of the law emerges in the recent decision of the Supreme court reported in 2003 SAR (Cri) 884 : (2003 Cri LJ 4478) in the case of Laxman singh v. Poonam Singh. The respondent's learned counsel has submitted that the supreme Court in this decision has amplified the law as laid down in Buta Singh's case and has very justifiably recorded that courts will not hold against the accused slight excesses or what has been the finding as marginal overstepping in the matter of degree offeree that is permissible. It would be useful to reproduce Para 11 of the aforesaid decision which reads thus:"11. As noted in Buta Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 1316 : (1991 Cri LJ 1464), a person who is apprehending death or bodily injury cannot weigh in golden scales in the spur of moment and in the heat of moment, the number of injuries required to disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In moments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties to preserve composure and use only so much force in retaliation commensurate with the danger apprehended to him where assault is imminent by use of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self defence and the right of private defence commences, as soon as the threat becomes so imminent. Such situations have to be pragmatically viewed and not with high powered spectacles or microscopes to detect slight or even marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper-technical approach has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of the moment in the spot and keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct, where self preservation is the paramount consideration. Due weightage has to be given to, and hyper-technical approach has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of the moment in the spot and keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct, where self preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact situation shows that in the guise of self preservation, what really has been done is to assault the original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable apprehension has disappeared, the plea of right of private defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court ealing with the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is essentially a finding of fact. Though acquittal in respect of offence punishable under Section 447, IPC is not always determinative of the question whether right of private defence has been exceeded, in a given case the same assume importance as in the present case, it has been significantly noted by both Courts below that the attacks were not premeditated. On the contrary, for several hours, the parties were discussing their respective stands (may be with some amount of verbal aggression), and that aspect has indelible importance while assessing the basic issue regarding exercise of the right of private defence. " ( 6 ) LASTLY, what was submitted before us is that in an appeal against acquittal where the High Court is dealing with well considered judgments, where the findings of the trial Court are quite tenable, that merely because another view is possible, that the law very clearly provides that no interference would be competent. We do concede that in an appeal against acquittal unless it is demonstrated that the reasoning of the trial Court is perverse, or that it has resulted in failure of justice or miscarriage of justice, it would not be permissible for the State to ask for interference. This is a case in which we are more than satisfied with the reasoning and conclusions of the trial Court and consequently, no interference is permissible. ( 7 ) LASTLY, the learned Govt. Pleader submitted that where the plea of his defence is taken up that the onus shifts to the accused and that it is for the accused to establish the defence and this cannot merely be pleaded. ( 7 ) LASTLY, the learned Govt. Pleader submitted that where the plea of his defence is taken up that the onus shifts to the accused and that it is for the accused to establish the defence and this cannot merely be pleaded. We are not in agreement with this proposition because, the correct position in law is that in a criminal case there are many methods of establishing a defence which can even be done by building up a case in cross-examination or in the alternative, it is equally permissible to argue that the facts on the basis of the record spell out a defence on a point of law as has been done in the present case. Also, one needs to bear in mind the fact that where such a defence is pleaded that it has got to be established only to the extent of prepondrance of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. That burden has been discharged by the accused in the present case. ( 8 ) IN the result, having reconsidered the appeal on merits both on point of facts and law, in our considered view, no interference is called for. The appeal fails on merits and stands dismissed. The order of acquittal stands confirmed. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons set out in I. A. I, the delay is condoned and I. A. I. is allowed. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .