D. P. SINGH, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition is directed against an award of the labour Court dated 2nd February, 1990 by which the respondent workman has been granted the post and pay scale of Automobile Mechanic in the petitioner organization. 3. Brief facts are that the respondent workman was appointed as Helper on 1-4-1969 and on 25-6-1982 he was promoted as a skilled mazdoor. By a letter dated 31st December, 1980 he was appointed in adhoc arrangement to the post of Fitter Grade-II to discharge the functions of Auto Mechanic w. e. f. 1- 11-1980 to 31-12-1980. This adhoc appointment was further extended from 1st of January, 1981 to 31st of April, 1981. The arrangement was necessitated by the death of one Pooran Singh. The petitioner was also recommended for being given regular appointment on the said post, but he was not granted regular appointment and when reverted to his original post, he lodged a conciliation case and upon a failure report, the matter was referred under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputed Act, which was registered as Adjudication Case No. 104 of 1988 by the Labour Court. The case of the petitioner before the labour Court was that the promotion of the workman was not in accordance with the U. P. State Electricity Board Operating Service Regulations, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Regulations) and further the workman was not qualified in view of the qualifications prescribed in the 1977 Regulations. It was also urged that the workman was given only temporary appointment for six months and in fact was not discharging the functions of an Automobile mechanic. The labour Court found that the 1972 Regulations were not applicable as the same were not approved by the Board. Relying on the two orders granting temporary promotion, the labour Court held that the workman was entitled to be designated as automobile mechanic with its pay scale. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that 1972 Regulations had been framed under Section 79-C of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the same had been approved by the Board and were in vogue. It is also contended that the workman had never raised this plea before the labour Court. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that 1972 Regulations had been framed under Section 79-C of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and the same had been approved by the Board and were in vogue. It is also contended that the workman had never raised this plea before the labour Court. It has also been urged that the post of Automobile mechanic was created for the first time under the year 1972 Regulations. In the alternative, it has been urged that prior to 1972 regulations, the Electricity Operating Staff Service Rules, 1955 were in force. In both these Rules recruitment and promotion to any skilled post was through a examination conducted by a committee so constituted under the aforesaid Rules. learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to paragraphs 4 and 47 of the writ petition wherein it has been categorically stated that the 1972 Regulations apply to the workman. This specific averments in paragraph 7 has not been denied in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit. Further in paragraph 47 of the writ petition, it has been categorically stated that the finding of the labour Court that the 1972 Regulations were not approved by the Board was factually incorrect, as the said Regulations govern the service conditions of the employees in the project, again this specific averments has not been denied in paragraph 23 of the counter affidavit. From a perusal of the written statement filed on behalf of the management it is clear that the management has set up the case that the qualifications as prescribed in the Rules were lacking, so far as the workman is concerned. The only basis of the aforesaid finding recorded by the labour Court was that the copy of the 1972 Regulations which was presented before it contained an endorsement to the effect that it was subject to the approval of the Board. But was never the case of the workman that 1972 Regulations do not apply. Before this Court also, the workman does not say that the 1972 Regulations do not apply. In fact, his non-denial before this Court, amounts to admission of this fact. Therefore, in my opinion, this finding of the labour Court was without any basis or evidence on the record. Thus, it can safely be held that the service conditions of the workman were governed by 1972 Regulations. 5. In fact, his non-denial before this Court, amounts to admission of this fact. Therefore, in my opinion, this finding of the labour Court was without any basis or evidence on the record. Thus, it can safely be held that the service conditions of the workman were governed by 1972 Regulations. 5. From a perusal of the Regulation 10 it is evident that the qualification for promotion or appointment to the post of Automobile Mechanic was High School together with I. T. I. certification along with atleast three years experience. It is not denied that the post of Automobile Mechanic is a skilled post and the procedure for recruitment as provided in Regulation 14 is through a Committee constituted for such purpose. It is not the case of the workman that he was ever selected by the Committee under Regulation 14 and also that he possessed the minimum qualification prescribed in 1972 Regulations. Therefore, it is apparent that the workman was not even eligible to be appointed under the Rules. 6. It would be useful also to examine the 1955 Rules. Under the 1955 Rules which have been produced before this Court, there is no post of Automobile Mechanic, therefore, the source of recruitment/promotion for the post of Automobile Mechanic has not been provided. Nevertheless, in Part V, procedure for recruitment has been laid down. Rule 13 provides that all recruitment to skilled post should be by a committee consisting either of the Superintending Engineer and two senior most Executive Engineers or a committee consisting of three Executive Engineers nominated by the Superintending Engineer. Only unskilled staff can be appointed by the Executive Engineer of the division. Sub-clause (ii) of Rule 13 provides that recruitment will be through a practical or theoretical examinations and in case an incumbent is already in service, his service record would also be considered. Further, qualification has been provided in Rule 10 of the 1955 Rules. For posts under skilled staffs the qualification is atleast High School and five years experience. As already noted above, it is not the case of the workman that he was selected through any committee or held the minimum qualification. 7. Therefore, examining the issue from either angle, it is apparent that the workman was not appointed either following the 1972 Regulations or 1955 Rules, therefore, his appointment was de-hors the Rules. As already noted above, it is not the case of the workman that he was selected through any committee or held the minimum qualification. 7. Therefore, examining the issue from either angle, it is apparent that the workman was not appointed either following the 1972 Regulations or 1955 Rules, therefore, his appointment was de-hors the Rules. The apex Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1997 SC 1628 , has held that there could be no regularization de-hors the Rules. Further in the case of Subedar Singh and others v. District Judge, Mirzapur and others, 2001 (1) LBESR 969 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 201 , the apex Court has held that where the qualification is prescribed under the Rules, no one could be appointed de- hors the Rules. In my opinion, the workman had absolutely no right to the post or the pay scale of the said post. Therefore, the finding of the labour Court that the workman had a right to be designated as Automobile Mechanic was perverse. 8. Counsel for the workman has then urged that his case had been recommended by the Superintending Engineer for being regularized on the post of Automobile Mechanic. In support of his contention, he has relied upon Annexure-2 to the counter-affidavit. The said document extends his temporary appointment on the post of Automobile Mechanic for a further period of four months and also recommends regularization of the workman. No doubt, the recommendation was made, but, mere recommendation could not clothe the workman with any legal right of either being designated or being appointed on the said post. In fact under the 1972 Regulations the Superintending Engineer had no authority to make any regular appointment on the post. Even under the 1955 Rules, the appointment to skilled post could only be made by a committee consisting of a Superintending Engineer and two Executive Engineers. Therefore, in either case mere recommendation would not entitle the workman to claim the post. 9. However, learned counsel for the workman has urged that he has been working on the post since 1972 and at such a late stage the establishment could not deny him the benefit of his long officiation and he would be entitled to be granted atleast the minimum of the pay scales prescribed for the post of Automobile Mechanic. 9. However, learned counsel for the workman has urged that he has been working on the post since 1972 and at such a late stage the establishment could not deny him the benefit of his long officiation and he would be entitled to be granted atleast the minimum of the pay scales prescribed for the post of Automobile Mechanic. Before the labour Court both the parties had laid evidence. The consistent case of the petitioner was that the workman had only worked in a stop gap arrangement for a limited period. However, the workman claimed that he in fact was working since 1972. Apart from his statement the workman had filed two documents to show that he in fact was discharging the functions of a Automobile Mechanic. The said documents are annexed as Annexures-1 and 2 to the counter affidavit. From a perusal of the said documents, it is clear that it relates only for an period of six months. Once the petitioner had denied that the workman was not discharging the functions of the said post, it was incumbent upon the workman to establish by some cogent evidence to prove his case. Apart from his statement, there is nothing on record to show that in fact he was continuously working since 1972. From a perusal of the aforesaid two documents, it is clear that the workman was asked to discharge the functions of the post only in November, 1980. In this long period of twelve years from 1976 to 1988, except for these two documents relating to a period of six months, there was no cogent evidence before the labour Court to have recorded a finding that the workman in fact was discharging the functions of a Automobile Mechanic. This finding of the labour Court is also perverse. 10. It has been urged on behalf of the workman that even the previous incumbent Pooran Singh did not have the prescribed qualification and was not selected in accordance with the procedure prescribed either under 1972 Regulations or 1955 Rules. Therefore, he claims that his appointment should be regularized. Though the foundation of this argument was neither laid before the labour Court nor the labour Court has returned any finding on the issue. Nevertheless, it is well settled principle that two wrongs cannot make one right. Therefore, he claims that his appointment should be regularized. Though the foundation of this argument was neither laid before the labour Court nor the labour Court has returned any finding on the issue. Nevertheless, it is well settled principle that two wrongs cannot make one right. The apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another, AIR 2000 SC 2306 , when confronted with some what similar arguments, repelled it holding that concept of equity is a positive concept and a wrong decision cannot be a precedent for another wrong decision. Therefore, in my opinion, even this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted. 11. In view of the discussions hereinabove, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the award dated 2nd February, 1990 is hereby quashed. No orders as to costs. Petition allowed. .