BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for petitioner and Mr. V. R. N. Prasanth appearing for university of Hyderabad. ( 2 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of learned Single Judge in W. P. No. 4153 of 1994. The appellant/petitioner filed the Writ petition seeking extension of benefit of clause -16 of Section III Miscellaneous of chapter-II of the Non-teaching Employees rules of University Hyderabad. He also sought a direction that he should be treated to have been appointed on regular basis as office Assistant with effect from 11-1-1977 when he joined duty in pursuance of appointment order dated 8-1-1977. ( 3 ) THE facts leading to filing of the Writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed on ad hoc basis on 8-1-1977 as office Assistant. This appointment was made for a period of six months. It is the case of the parties that in January, 1977 Rules of service had not been framed therefore many appointments were made on ad hoc basis including the appointment of the petitioner. However, the petitioner was continued till 1979 when according to the petitioner he was regularized. In August, 1977 the rules by name. "non-teaching employees (Terms and Conditions of service) Rules, 1977" came into effect and according to the petitioner, in terms of Rule 16 he was entitled to have been regularized with effect from 8-1-1977 when he was appointed on ad hoc basis and not from the date when he was regularly appointed in march, 1979. ( 4 ) BEFORE adverting to the rule in question and the arguments made at the Bar it will be pertinent to mention that the petitioner continued to remain in service on ad hoc basis and his services were extended from to time after initial appointment was made on 8-1-1977. After the Rules came into force his services were not regularized but a notification was issued for appointment to the posts of Office Assistant. It is not disputed that in response to the notification the petitioner applied for the post of Office assistant but failed to qualify and was not appointed. Still his ad hoc appointment was continued and he again appeared in response to another notification in 1978 and ultimately he was appointed after having been selected in a selection process in march, 1979. Still his ad hoc appointment was continued and he again appeared in response to another notification in 1978 and ultimately he was appointed after having been selected in a selection process in march, 1979. Therefore, the appointment of the petitioner in March, 1979 was not a consequence of his ad hoc appointment in the year 1977 but as a consequence of his having faced the selection process and having got selected in that selection process. Therefore, his appointment in 1979 had nothing to do with his ad hoc appointment in the year 1977. Had he accrued any right by his appointment in 1977 in a stopgap arrangement for a period of six months he would have not volunteered himself to face the selection and then eventually got appointed. After his appointment in 1979, it appears that, he made representations that he should be given benefits of service from 8-1-77 and an order was communicated to him by the University authorities as early as on 14-9-1987 that his representation had been considered by the Grievance committee and negatived. This order has been reproduced by the learned Single judge in his Judgment. Although the petitioner had been appointed in 1979 on regular basis afresh and an order was communicated to him regarding rejection of his claim in 1987, he preferred to sit over the matter and, as far as the Court was concerned, approached the Court only in 1994. He submits that, after rejection of his representation he made another representation which was again rejected in 1992. Even after 1992 it took him two years to approach the Court. But, after rejection by the University authorities there was no point in making another representation before the same authority for consideration of the same relief. In our view, on this score alone the writ Petition was liable to be dismissed. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before the learned single Judge as well as before this Court that in terms of Rule-16 of the Rules the petitioner was entitled to be regularized from the date of his initial appointment, therefore this argument needs to be considered, Rule-16 lays down;"every person holding a post under the University at the commencement of these rules shall, on such commencement, be deemed to have been appointed under the provision of these rules and shall draw the pay drawn by him immediately before such commencement. "this rule merely safeguards the interests of the employees who were in the service of the university on the date of promulgation of these Rules. On that day the interest of the petitioner was only his ad hoc appointment and he had been appointed only for a period of six months by way of an ad hoc appointment. Ad hoc appointment is permissible under these Rules and Rule 7 is the relevant rule under which the University can make ad hoc appointments. Rule 16 would protect the petitioner s service as an ad hoc employee and nothing beyond that. Therefore, it cannot be said that an ad hoc appointee who was in service on the day when the Rules came into force would get regularization under Rule 16. This cannot be comprehended. Even otherwise, law is well settled that, where the appointment is made on ad hoc basis and later on the person gets a regular appointment the period spent by him on ad hoc appointment will not be counted for the purpose of seniority or other service benefits. In this case reliance can be placed on the Constitution Bench judgment in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers association v. State of Maharashtra as interpreted further by Supreme Court in chief of Naval Staff v. G. Gopalakrishna Pillai. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to two judgments of the supreme Court reported in Ombalika Das v. Hulisa Shaw and also Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S. A. . These judgments deal with an age old principle of interpretation of statutes and we have no quarrel with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court for interpreting a statute. ( 5 ) LASTLY an argument was made that some persons similarly placed like the petitioner were given different treatment and their service was counted from the date of their ad hoc appointment. Necessary details are not before us, but even if it were true, it would not give any benefit to the petitioner because if a wrong is committed by the respondents this Court cannot on interpretation of Article 14 of the constitution direct the respondents to multiply the wrongs as one wrong has been committed by them. ( 6 ) FOR these reasons, we do not find merit in this Writ Appeal which is accordingly dismissed.