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Jharkhand High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 170 (JHR)

Binod Kumar v. Senior Divisional Manager Life Insurance Corporation Of India

2003-02-04

R.K.MERATHIA

body2003
ORDER R.K. Merathia, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. The petitioner was appointed as an apprentice on 9.1.96 on a monthly stipend of Rs. 3502/- for a period of nine months starting from 15.1.96 (Annexure-1). He was terminated on 15.4.96 (Annexure-2). 3. The petitioner has challenged the order of his termination dated 15.4.96 (Annexure-2) passed by the respondents, which reads as under:-- "Dear Sir, Re : Your appointment as Apprentice Development Officer (Rural) This is to inform you that you have been terminated from the post of Apprentice Development Officer of L.I.C. of India on and from 15.4.96 since it was found that your performance and behaviours were not upto om satisfaction and in fact, it was detrimental to the interest of L.I.C. of India." 4. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order dated 27.9.96 (Annexure-4) whereby the petitioner was informed that his appeal can not be considered. The said order reads as under:-- "Dear Sir, Re : Your Appeal. We regret to inform you that your appeal dated nil submitted to Zonal Manager Calcutta cannot be considered." 5. Mr. A.K. Sinha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner argued that the said order of termination read with paragraphs 5 and 7 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1 clearly goes to show that the termination was not simplicitor. In the said paragraphs of the counter affidavit, it is stated that the petitioner behaved in a violent manner and created disturbance; he suffered from mental disorder; and his absence was unauthorized. The matter was reported by the Principal STC to the respondent No. 1 who is the appointing authority, who, on perusal of the case, terminated him as per fourth paragraph of the appointment letter. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr., in support of his contentions. 7. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that petitioner was appointed as an apprentice and as per paragraph 4 of the appointment letter dated 9.1.96 (Anexxure-1), petitioner was liable to be discharged from service without any notice. He has further pointed out that he has not followed the stipulations regarding leave in the said appointment letter. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that petitioner was appointed as an apprentice and as per paragraph 4 of the appointment letter dated 9.1.96 (Anexxure-1), petitioner was liable to be discharged from service without any notice. He has further pointed out that he has not followed the stipulations regarding leave in the said appointment letter. He has further argued that the petitioner has not disclosed about his said illness in the personal statement regarding health submitted on 9.1.96. 8. Mr. Banerjee has further submitted that the said statements have been made in the counter affidavit in order to satisfy the Court that the order of termination in question was rightly passed. There was no stigma in the order. The petitioner was terminated after three months. Before an apprentice is confirmed, it was necessary to see, whether his work was satisfactory or not. 9. After hearing the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that rules of natural justice should have been followed in this case before issuing the impugned order of termination. Even if the petitioner was an apprentice and there was stipulation of discharging such apprentice from service without any notice, the rules of natural justice and fair play demanded that before termination he should have been given an opportunity to explain. Even the appeal filed by the petitioner was not considered, as aforesaid. 10. In the result, the order of termination dated 15.4.96 (Annexure-2) is set aside. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, I am not inclined to allow back stipend to the petitioner. However, the respondents are at liberty to initiate such action against the petitioner as may be available to them under the law, but only after affording full opportunity to the petitioner to explain his case, and by passing a reasoned order. 11. This writ application is disposed of with the observations/directions as indicated above. No order as to costs.