JUDGMENT 1. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal has raised a short issue. 2. The appellants issued an advertisement dated 13.6.1998, inviting applications from eligible candidates for the post of Teacher Grade III under Panchayati Raj institutions of District Nagaur, as per Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996. The.total posts advertised were 257. 3. The respondent-petitioner Sanjay Kumar also applied in pursuance of aforesaid. advertisement and in the merit list published consequent to selection exercise, he was placed at serial No. 676. However, finding that non-petitioners No. 5 and 7, who have been placed at serial Nos. 800 and 1403 respectively in the merit list, have been appointed and the respondent-petitioner has not been offered appointment; by made a representation seeking appointment. He was informed on enquiry that an order has been made by the State Government on 25.11.1999, directing the Panchayati Raj institutions to appoint those candidates who were earlier appointed on the post of Teacher on contract basis and had qualification of Vocational course. Said communication was placed on record as Annx.2. The respondent-petitioner thereupon challenged the classification, giving separate treatment to erstwhile contractual teachers who had to their credit Vocational course, in preference to persons who were found higher in order of merit than said appointees. Therefore, the S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1043/2000 was preferred by respondent-Sanjay Kumar. 4. The appellants' plea to save such appointments to persons who were lower in order of merit than. respondent-petitioner was that the persons, who were earlier appointed on contract basis and had passed Vocational course, constitute a separate class and their recruitment was done on separate basis and the inter se merit of the petitioner could not be compared with the Inter se merit of said separate category. After excluding the separate category of erstwhile contract incumbents under aforesaid classification, the petitioner, who belong to category of OBC, does not find place high enough in the order of merit amongst OBC candidates inasmuch as last appointee among OBC candidate was having 78.236% whereas petitioner had obtained only 77.136%. 5. Learned Single Judge found that the classification devised by the appellants for the purpose of giving preferential treatment to erstwhile contract teachers, having Vocational qualification, had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and, therefore, can not be sustained. 5. Learned Single Judge found that the classification devised by the appellants for the purpose of giving preferential treatment to erstwhile contract teachers, having Vocational qualification, had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and, therefore, can not be sustained. It was also found that relaxation in qualification provided by the State Government in exercise of powers under rule 296 of the Rules of 1996, as has been amended in the year 1999, having been declared ultra vires by this Court in Renu Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1722/2000, decided on 12.2.2001 ; no benefit can be derived from that also. We are informed that appeal against said judgment is pending in this Court. 6. So far as present case is concerned, we are of the opinion that the question of vires of rule 296 of the Rules of 1996, which empowered the State Government to relax even basic eligibility criterion, instead of confining such power to relax criteria of age and experience; is not germane to the controversy. The rules of 1996 itself provided for the categories which have been classified separately, for a differential treatment. Rule 256 provided for reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and Other Backward Class and rule 262 provided reservation of vacancies for Physically Handicapped persons, in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Employment to Physically Handicapped Rules, 1976. The separate sources of recruitment, thus, have been classified under the Rules, it was, therefore, not given to the State Government to carve out any new basis for classifying another source of recruitment, by executive order, independent of what has been envisaged under the Rules, namely, persons appointed earlier on contract basis, having Vocational qualification, for the purpose of giving them preferential treatment, notwithstanding not finding place in the order of merit, prepared pursuant to very same recruitment exercise in which other candidates have been called upon to appear simultaneously. 7. It has not been disputed before us that respondents No. 5 and 7, whose cases have been illustratively pointed out by the petitioner that though they did find place lower in the order of merit than petitioner yet they were offered appointment, on the basis of above said new classification. Such classification, in our opinion, has been rightly struck down by the learned Single Judge in the matter stated above. 8. Such classification, in our opinion, has been rightly struck down by the learned Single Judge in the matter stated above. 8. The two annexures, which have been filed by the petitioner as impugned documents and which have been owned by the present appellants to be valid directions issued by them, also, in our opinion, do not support the stand taken by the appellants. 9. Annx. 3 dated 09.12.1999, which has been issued in pursuance of directions issued on 15.11.1999 and directions issued vide Annx. 2 dated 25.11.1999, clearly goes to show that it has not in any way directed to overlook the order of merit while offering appointments to those candidates who were earlier contract teachers and have passed Vocational course. Annx. 3 which reveals the method of giving effect to decision dated 15.11.1999, as conveyed by letter dated 25.11.1999, by ordering that those candidates who were earlier appointed on contract basis and had passed Vocational course, should be given appointment provided they come in order of merit. The directions vide Annx. 3 dated 09.12.1999 nowhere permitted the recruiting authority to overlook place of such candidates in the order of merit, amongst the class in which they fell; General, SC, ST, OBC or Physically Handicapped; amongst candidates who had applied in pursuance to advertisement No. 14/98 dated 13.6.1998 and does not envisage giving appointments, notwithstanding that they do not find place in the order of merit and not to offer appointment to those, who were higher in order of merit. 10. It is also not disputed before us that appellants have given appointment to persons lower in order of merit only on the basis of directions contained in Annxs. 2 dated 25.11.1999 and Annx. 3 dated 09.12.1999, by overlooking the order of merit, of other candidates included in the selection process in pursuance of advertisement No. 14/98. 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that so far a directions of learned Single Judge that no preferential treatment can be given to candidates lower in order of merit, on the basis of their earlier employment and their qualification as Vocational trainee, by overlooking their place in the order of merit amongst common selection process; nor any separate class providing different source of recruitment could be made, contrary to the Rules, which has no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In view thereof, the judgment under appeal does not call or any interference, to the extent we have stated above, in quashing the appointment of those candidates who were found to be lower in order of merit than persons who were not offered ~ appointment in pursuance of very same selection, solely on the basis of carving out a separate class, which can not be sustained on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution. 12. We are informed by the learned counsel for some appointees that not all the candidates so appointed were lower in order of merit. In fact, directions were given to give appointment to only such persons who were in order of merit but who were earlier employed on contract basis and were having Vocational qualification. The background of offering appointments in this manner was that the State Government was not treating Vocational qualification as equivalent to the qualification laid down for eligibility and therefore, such candidates were kept out of consideration. It was only by exercise of powers under rule 296 of the Rules that a relaxation was made in the eligibility criteria and they were included in the category of eligible candidates and further they were allowed to compete, otherwise they were to be treated alike as other candidates and were to be given appointment only if they were found in the order of merit. No preference was to be given by offering them appointment before persons higher in order of merit. It was also informed that said issue about validity of giving relaxation vide amended Rule is subject matter of appeals, pending before this Court on the merit about the order of such appointments. In that order, no person higher in merit has been kept aside without giving appointment. In this connection, Mr. M.S. Singhvi also contends that even without relaxation, the qualification of Vocational course is valid eligibility criterion. 13. We may clarify that we express no opinion about merit of that subject matter, including question of validity of amended rule 296 also. In that order, no person higher in merit has been kept aside without giving appointment. In this connection, Mr. M.S. Singhvi also contends that even without relaxation, the qualification of Vocational course is valid eligibility criterion. 13. We may clarify that we express no opinion about merit of that subject matter, including question of validity of amended rule 296 also. Said issue is subject matter of pending appeals and remain unaffected by this order.In our opinion, any appointment offered to any person lower than respondent-petitioner can not be sustained only for the reason that he had been earlier appointed on contract basis with Vocational qualification because the same is founded on an irrational classification of the candidates competing in very same selection. It may be noticed that earlier contract appointment with Vocational qualification only has been treated for differential treatment. Earlier appointment of any type other than contractual appointment or with qualification other than Vocational course, has not been considered for such classification, which makes the classification wholly without any reasonable basis. 14. It is als9 informed by learned counsel for Sanjay Kumar that the appeal filed by issue of man find place no perso otherwise sanjay Kumar against not granting relief to him by way of issue of Mandamus has also been dismissed because he did not otherwise order of merit amongst class to which he belongs so much so lower in merit amongst class to which he belongs had been otherwise Offered appointment. 15. Accordingly, the appeal filed by appellant-State is hereby dismissed. offered appointment. shall be no order as to costs.State Appeal Dismissed. *******