Judgment Banerjea, J. The present appeal has been preferred by the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 as also under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ISKCON) and its Governing Council (Bureau) against a judgment and order dated March 7, 2002 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in G.A. No. 1896 of 2001 in connection with G.A. No. 1896 of 2001 (connected with C.S. No. 253 of 2001). 2. By the impugned order the learned Judge has allowed the application for injunction made by the plaintiff/respondent Adridharan Das in the suit, for restraining the appellant herein from giving effect to the notice dated February 2, 2001 and the resolution of the minutes of the meeting dated March 2, 2001 suspending the plaintiff to act as the temple president of the ISKCON till the disposal of the suit. 3. It is not disputed that the affairs of ISKCON are governed in accordance with its memorandum of association and rules and regulations. 4. On February 2, 2001, the General Secretary of the Bureau of the ISKCON sent a notice of the meeting to all the Bureau members, inter alia, for consideration in the meeting agenda item No. 5 for the suspension of the plaintiff from the post of Branch President of Calcutta and Bangalore Branch respectively. 5. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 thereafter filed a suit before the Original Side of this Court being C.S. No. 83 of 2001 challenging the said notice and also moved an interlocutory application, inter alia, praying for interim injunction. 6. The aforesaid prayer for interim order was refused by Justice D.K. Seth by an order dated 26th of February, 2001 and the appeal preferred by the plaintiff against such order was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court on 16th of May, 2001. 7. In the mean time, the meeting of the Bureau was held on 2nd March, 2001 and the plaintiff was suspended from the post of Branch President. 8. Thereafter, the instant suit being C.S. No. 252 of 2001 was filed by the plaintiff against the present appellants and other respondents for a declaration that the notice dated February 2, 2001 at the resolution of the Bureau dated March 2, 2001, suspending the plaintiff are void and illegal and also praying for perpetual injunction. 9. 8. Thereafter, the instant suit being C.S. No. 252 of 2001 was filed by the plaintiff against the present appellants and other respondents for a declaration that the notice dated February 2, 2001 at the resolution of the Bureau dated March 2, 2001, suspending the plaintiff are void and illegal and also praying for perpetual injunction. 9. In the said suit the plaintiff also moved an interlocutory application being G.A. No 1896 of 2001 praying for interim injunction restraining the Bureau from giving effect to the said notice the resolution and also for restraining the defendants from disturbing and/or interfering with the office and functioning of the petitioner as the temple president of the Calcutta Branch of the ISKCON. 10. On the said application for injunction also the plaintiff failed to obtain any interim order up to the Appeal Court. 11. Thereafter, the main injunction/application itself was heard by the Hon'ble Justice Ansari and by the impugned judgment and order the learned Judge has allowed the application restraining the Bureau from giving effect to the notice dated 2nd February, 2001 being Annexure 'G' to injunction application and also to the resolution being Item No. 6 of the minutes of the meeting of the Bureau dated March 2, 2001 being Annexure 'I' to the injunction application and from taking any step pursuant thereto or in connection therewith. 12. Such injunction has been granted by the learned Judge, intet alia, on the finding that the Bureau has no power to suspend an office-bearer. 13. By the impugned judgment and order the learned Judge, however, refused prayer for injunction of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 for restraining the Bureau and the other defendants in the suit from disturbing and/or interfering with the office and functioning of the plaintiff as a temple president of the Calcutta Branch of ISKCON, in any manner whatsoever. 14. Such prayer was refused on the ground that the same would curtail the power of the Bureau to take such action against the plaintiff, which it is empowered to take under the Rules. 15. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 has filed a cross-objection assailing the later part of the impugned judgment and order by which the prayer for injunction in terms of prayer 'B' of the injunction application has been refused by the Trial Court. 16. 15. The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 has filed a cross-objection assailing the later part of the impugned judgment and order by which the prayer for injunction in terms of prayer 'B' of the injunction application has been refused by the Trial Court. 16. While the appellant referring to the various provisions of the rules and regulations of the Memorandum of ISKCON, and the appellant society has contended that the appellants have suspended the plaintiff not from the membership of the society but from the office of the presidentship of the Calcutta Branch of ISKCON and under the rules and regulations, the appellants do posses such power, the plaintiff/respondent has contended, supporting the judgment of the Trial Court, that under the rules and regulations no express power has been conferred upon the Bureau to suspend an office-bearer of the society and such power cannot be implied in case of a member of an association. 17. Before going into the merits of such questions, after considering the entire material-on-records and after hearing the submissions of the respective parties, we are of the view, the learned Judge should not have granted the injunction under the facts and circumstances of this particular case. 18. Admittedly, the impugned notice of the meeting dated 2nd February, 2001 was issued by the Bureau, inter alia, containing an agenda for discussing the suspension of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 that was the subject matter of challenge in the earlier suit being C.S. No. 83 of 2001 before the Original Side of this Court. 19. Admittedly, the plaintiff failed to obtain an interim order on such application up to the Appeal Court. Thereafter, the meeting of the Bureau was held on 2nd March, 2001 and by resolution taken by the said meeting the plaintiff has been suspended from the post of Temple/Branch President. 20. Therefore, when the injunction application was heard by the Trial Court on 7th of March 2002, long prior thereto the plaintiff had already been suspended in view of the aforesaid resolution taken in the meeting of the Bureau held on 2nd of March, 2001 pursuant to the impugned notice dated 2nd February, 2001. 21. Nothing, therefore, really remained of the application for injunction, which really became infructuous as the said resolution was already given effect to. 22. 21. Nothing, therefore, really remained of the application for injunction, which really became infructuous as the said resolution was already given effect to. 22. There was, therefore, no occasion at such point of time for the learned Judge to decide the question even prima facie whether such order of suspension is ultra vires the rules and regulations of the Society and whether the appellants have the power to suspend an office-bearer of the Society. 23. The learned Judge has completely overlooked this aspect of the matter. 24. The learned Judge while granting the order of injunction has also not decided the question whether balance of convenience and inconvenience was in favour of granting of such injunction and whether in absence of injunction the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and injury. 25. It is well settled that making out a prima facie case alone will not entitle the plaintiff of obtain an injunction unless the Court is also satisfied on such questions of balance of convenience and inconvenience and suffering of irreparable loss and injury by the plaintiff in absence of such interim order. 26. In our view, the petitioner already having been suspended from the Temple/Branch President more than an year ago, the balance of convenience and inconvenience was certainly not in favour of granting an injunction in favour of the plaintiff one year after passing of such order of suspension and consequently the question of suffering of irreparable loss and injury by the plaintiff under such circumstances also could not arise. 27. We are further of the view under the facts and circumstances of the case, when the plaintiff failed to obtain an interim order and the order of suspension was passed and the same was subsisting for more than a year, granting of such interim order and that too on the finding on merits that the appellants do not have power to suspend, for all practical purposes has the effect of decreeing in the suit itself. 28. 28. As pointed out hereinbefore in the suit itself the plaintiff prayed for the declaration that the impugned notice dated February 2, 2001 and the resolution taken in the meeting held on March 2, 2001 are void, illegal and inoperative and ultra vires the rules and regulations and also for perpetual injunction, inter alia, restraning the defendants from giving effect to the notice dated February 2, 2001 and also to the said resolution taken in the meeting dated March 2, 2001 and from taking any step or in connection therewith. 29. Coming now to the merits of the matter, after considering the respective submission of the parties and the Memorandum of Association and the rules and regulations of ISKCON, we are unable to agree with the learned Judge that the appellants do not possess the power to suspend an office-bearer. 30. It is not disputed that the ISKCON is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 and also under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. 31. The object of the Society, inter alia, is to spread, transmit and propagate the teaching of Bhagavad Gita and the Shrimad Bhagvatam and the doctrines that manifest the religion of Krishna Consciousness. 32. It is not disputed that the Society is governed by its rules and regulations called the "International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) Rules and Regulations" (hereinafter referred to 'as Rules'). 33. ISKCON has branches all over India and every branch has a Branch President whose functions are defined in the rules. 34. As pointed out hereinbefore, admittedly, the defendant No. 1 was the President of Calcutta Branch of ISKCON which has a temple also. 35. Since the Trial Court, after referring to the various provisions of the rules, has come to a finding that the rules do not confer any express power upon the appellants to suspend an office-bearer of the Society, it will be necessary for us to refer to the relevant provisions of the rules. 36. Rule I provides that the Head Office of the Society shall be situated at Hare Krishna Land, Juhu, Bombay-400 049. But it empower, the Society from time to time to open, abolish and re-open any branch or branches, office or offices at such other place or places as the Governing Council of the Society (Bureau) from time to time decide, in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. 37. But it empower, the Society from time to time to open, abolish and re-open any branch or branches, office or offices at such other place or places as the Governing Council of the Society (Bureau) from time to time decide, in accordance with the Rules and Regulations. 37. Rule II provides who will be eligible to become a member of the Society of any class and the procedure in respect thereof. 38. Rule II-C provides that there shall be two kinds of members of the Society, one Practicing Member or other Voluntary Member and defines who will be Practicing Member and who will be the Voluntary Member. 39. Rule IV lays down the rights of the members wherefrom it appears each practicing and voluntary member shall have a right to be eligible to be elected or nominated as a member of the Governing Council. 40. It is not disputed that the plaintiff is a practicing member and member of the Governing Council. 41. Rule V deals with Cessation of Membership. 42. Sub-Rule E provides inter alia that any member determined to have acted and/or to be acting contrary to the interest of the Society or for any other reasons which may appear to the Bureau just and sufficient by the resolution of the two-thirds majority of the total number of Bureau members of the Society either in writing or by meeting, can be expelled. 43. From Rule VII deals with the power of the Governing Council (Bureau). 44. Sub-Rule C provides clearly that the Bureau is vested with all the powers necessary for the Society's management, administration, functioning, collection and disbursement of funds making of donations and investments and carrying out the aims and objects of the Society and everything incidental thereto. 45. Under the said Rule all the powers necessary for the Society's management, administration and functioning and everything incidental thereto thus having vested with the Bureau, the same will clearly include in our view even disciplinary powers. 46. Sub-Rules D and E of the Rule VIII empowers the Bureau to establish any branch or branches of the Society and to authorize, manage, direct and control any branch or branches, person or persons, committees, sub-committees and councils working for it and the society and to take all disciplinary action, as it may deem necessary against them. 47. 46. Sub-Rules D and E of the Rule VIII empowers the Bureau to establish any branch or branches of the Society and to authorize, manage, direct and control any branch or branches, person or persons, committees, sub-committees and councils working for it and the society and to take all disciplinary action, as it may deem necessary against them. 47. There cannot be any doubt after combined reading of the abovementioned two rules, that the Bureau, is vested with all the powers necessary for the management, administration and functioning of the Society and everything incidental thereto and also to establish any branch or branches of the society and exercise control over such branches, person or persons, committees, sub-committees etc. and to take disciplinary actions against them also. 48. When under Sub-Rule (E) of the Rule VIII, all branches, committees and persons are subject to the control of the Bureau and Bureau can exercise disciplinary action against them also, obviously Bureau is empowered to exercise such control and disciplinary power over the office-bearers of such branches or committees or sub-committees who are the persons within the meaning of Sub-Rule (E). 49. Under Sub-Rule (F) of the Rule VIII, any member, officer, representative and any person or persons working, in any capacity, for any branch or branches of the Society is duty bound to follow all resolutions, directives, regulatory codes and standards, or any of them, given, from time to time, by the Bureau. 50. Office-bearer of the Branch or any committee or sub-committee thereunder therefore, will certainly come within in the purview of the said Rule. 51. Sub-Rule (A) of the Rule X will also indicate that the officers of the Society will also- include a President of the Branch of the Society. 52. Sub-Rule (B) of the Rule X has made the same absolutely clear by providing that the officers of any branch or branches of the Society shall be Branch President, Branch Vice-President, Branch Secretary, Branch Treasurer and any other officer or officers deemed necessary by the Bureau. 53. There cannot be any doubt after reading of such rules that the plaintiff as a Branch President is an officer of the Calcutta Branch of the Society and accordingly he is very much subject to the control of the Bureau and the Bureau has power to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff under Rule VIII (E). 54. 53. There cannot be any doubt after reading of such rules that the plaintiff as a Branch President is an officer of the Calcutta Branch of the Society and accordingly he is very much subject to the control of the Bureau and the Bureau has power to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff under Rule VIII (E). 54. Under the aforesaid Sub-Rule (B)(1), the Branch President is obliged to follow the resolutions, directives, regulatory codes and standards, or any of them, given, from time to time, by the Governing Council. 55. It is also necessary, in our view, to refer to some more Rules, Rule VIII(J) empowers the Bureau to over-rule any decision or action taken on behalf of the Society and any Branch or Branches whether taken individually by any member or members of the Society and/or by any of the Society's representatives and the Bureau is further empowered to restrict the activities and responsibilities in relation to the Society of any member or the members of the Society and/or any other representatives, including their terms of office, rights and to remove, suspend or restrict their, voting rights. 56. Although the expression "the representative" has not been defined, it will appear from Rule X (B)(1) that a Branch President will not only be the formal head of the Branch but also a representative of the Branch. 57. But what is most vital for the present case is, that the aforesaid Sub-Rule (B), which provides that President, Branch Vice-President etc. will be the officers of the Branch, also empowers the Bureau in no unmistakable terms to assign to such officers such functions and specific duties from time to time and to appoint them, remove them, replace them or change them and appoint another or others as officers if the Bureau thinks it fit, in an appropriate meeting. 58. After reading all the above-mentioned Rules together we have got no doubt in our mind that the Bureau having vested with all powers for the proper administration and function of the Society and all matters incidental thereto have full power to take all disciplinary actions not only against all the members and representatives of the Society, but also against all officers of a Branch including the present plaintiff being the President of the Branch of the Society. 59. 59. Such power is derived by the Governing Body not only from said Rules which provide that the Bureau is vested with all powers necessary to exercise proper administration and functioning of the Society and all matters incidental thereto, but also because of the above-mentioned provisions of the rules making all branches, persons and officers subject to the control of the Bureau and disciplinary action and the Bureau is vested with the power to remove, appoint, replace or change any officer of the Branch. The power to take all disciplinary actions, to remove, replace or change an officer obvioulsy will include power to suspend an officer of the Society. 60. The learned Judge, in our view, therefore, went wrong in holding that the Bureau is not conferred with specific power of suspending an officer. 61. The power to appoint and to remove obviously includes the power to suspend as well. 62. That apart, it is also inconceivable that when the Bureau has been conferred with specific power of removal of an officer, it cannot suspend an officer, which is a lesser power than the power of the removal. 63. If Bureau is vested with power to exercise control and also to take disciplinary actions against the officers of a Branch the same obvioulsy will include power to take all disciplinary actions including suspension. 64. It will be clear from the resolution suspending the plaintiff that such suspension of the plaintiff as Branch President of Calcutta is subject to the final decision to be taken on 1he show-cause notice dated 13th September, 2000 and the new show-cause notice, which was proposed to be issued. 65. The learned Judge, in our view, erroneously applied the principle laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1144 . 66. In the said case, the Supreme Court was considering the power of expulsion of a member of a Masonic Lodge, Association and Club etc. 67. The present Society is neither a Club nor an Association but a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 as also under Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 and the Rules and Regulations of the Society, therefore, obvioulsy have been framed under the provisions of the said Acts. 68. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, is not applicable in the instant case. 69. 68. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, is not applicable in the instant case. 69. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers Union reported in AIR 1959 SC 1342 certainly will be more helpful in the context of the present issue in view of the Supreme Court's said decision, even if the Rule does not empower to suspend or a contract of the service does not make any such provision, it is always within the employer's prerogative to allot any to the employee, although no doubt in absence of any, Rule he has to pay full wages during such suspension. 70. The question of payment of any wages does not arise in the instant case in view of the fact the office of presidentship of the Branch under the Rules and Regulations does not attract any salary or wages. 71. The analogy, the learned Judge, has drawn from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Imperial, in our view, cannot be drawn. 72. We are unable to agree with the learned Judge that the suspension is not a part of the disciplinary action so far as an office-bearer of the Society is concerned. 73. As pointed out hereinabove under Rule VIII(E) all branches, person or persons, committees, sub-committees shall be subject to the control of the Bureau and the Bureau is empowered to take all disciplinary actions against all of them as would be necessary. Such power has been specifically conferred upon the Bureau relating to branches, persons and which cannot exclude the officer of the Branches. 74. As pointed out hereinbefore power to appoint, change officers and appoint another in his place certainly will include the power to suspend an office-bearer. 75. Lastly, the learned Judge also overlooked under the general power, all powers that are necessary for proper administration, functioning of the Society and relating to all matters incidental thereto is vested upon the Bureau and the same will certainly include power to take disciplinary actions and to suspend an officer is part of disciplinary action against an officer. 75. Lastly, the learned Judge also overlooked under the general power, all powers that are necessary for proper administration, functioning of the Society and relating to all matters incidental thereto is vested upon the Bureau and the same will certainly include power to take disciplinary actions and to suspend an officer is part of disciplinary action against an officer. Even if the theory of the contractual relation is applied in the instant case, even then the Bureau having the power to appoint and remove an officer can also suspend specially, when it is vested with all powers that will be necessary for the interest of the administration and functioning necessary of the Society and all matters analogous thereto. 76. The learned Judge, in our view, also overlooked that under the above-mentioned Rules, an office-bearer of the Branch and the plaintiff as the Branch President is also a representative of the Society and its Branch and therefore, under Rule VIII(J), the Bureau is empowerd to restrict their activities and their responsibilities in relation to the Societies or any of the Societies or any office relating to term of their office, to remove such officer or restrict his voting rights. Therefore, in our view, the Bureau also has power to suspend such representative. 77. That apart, the power to limit the term of office of their representative under the said Rule would also include the power to suspend. 78. Under Rule VIII(L) also the Bureau has the power to do anything except what is specifically prohibited under the Rules and Regulations. 79. Such residuary power obviously has to be read with the general power to take all actions necessary for administration, functioning etc. of the society and therefore, in exercise of such power too, in the interest of such Society and the functioning of the Society, Bureau can certainly suspend an officer of the Branch, the same not having been specifically prohibited under the Rules. 80. In the impugned judgment of the learned Judge is therefore liable to set aside. 81. As to the cross-objection of the respondent we are, however, of the view, the impugned judgment cannot be assailed on the ground that the order has been passed mala fide. 82. 80. In the impugned judgment of the learned Judge is therefore liable to set aside. 81. As to the cross-objection of the respondent we are, however, of the view, the impugned judgment cannot be assailed on the ground that the order has been passed mala fide. 82. That apart whether the action has been visited by malice, not only has to be specifically pleaded must be proved also by evidence, and at the interlocutory stage it is not for the Court to go into such questions. 83. It is clear from the pleadings that the plaintiff is of the view that he is following the correct path of the founder of the Society and the defendants are failing in the same, whereas the defendants are of the view that it is the plaintiff who in the name of revival of the movement is acting contrary to the path preached by Prabhu Pad. 84. It is obvious that the Bureau is of the view that it is the plaintiff who is in the wrong and for the aforesaid reasons if they choose to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff; in absence of any other evidence the same cannot be set to be a mala fide action. That apart, there allegations appear to have been made against the plaintiff about alleged financial irregularity and forgery of signatures. Such matters, however, are to be decided in the suit. 85. For the reasons stated above, we have no reason to interfere with the aforesaid finding of the Trial Court. 86. In the result, the appeal succeeds, the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is hereby set aside, so far as it granted injunction in favour of the plaintiff in terms of prayer 'A' of the application for injunction. 87. The cross-objection filed by the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 also fails for the reasons stated above and the same is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. All interim Orders, if any, stand vacated. Sinha, J. : I agree. Later-Xerox certified copy, if applied for, be given expeditiously.