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2003 DIGILAW 173 (HP)

LEKH RAJ v. INDIAN BANK

2003-07-03

K.C.SOOD, V.K.GUPTA

body2003
JUDGMENT Kuldip Chand Sood, J.—Property of Bhagwan Dass Verma and his mother Smt. Shanti Devi, predecessor-in-interest of respondents No. 2 to 4, hereinafter referred to as judgment debtors, was sold in an auction towards the satisfaction of the decree passed in civil suit No. 75 of 1979 in January 9, 1981 by this Court. The immovable property, subject matter of dispute, was purchased by S/Shri Kapil Dev Sood and Karam Chand in equal shares on 16.12.1983. Respondents No. 5 to 9 are successors-in-interest of Kapil Dev Sood. 2. It appears respondents No.2 and 3 filed objections (OMP No. 481 of 1983) under Section 47 read with order 21 rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure on December 30,1983 saying that the property, subject of auction, was succeeded by them under a will by their grand-father and did not belong to the original judgment debtors Bhagwan Dass and Shanti Devi. These objections were dismissed for want of prosecution on May 18, 1984. On the same day, the sale of property was confirmed in favour of Karam Chand and Kapil Dev Sood. On an application made by Hardayal Verma and Deepak Verma, the order dated May 18, 1994 was recalled and the objection petition was restored to its original number. The objections were ultimately dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on October 9, 1991. 3. Auction purchasers moved an application on December 19, 1991 (OMP No. 7/92) for the delivery of possession of the property in question. On August 27, 1999, appellant Lekh Raj filed objections (OMP No. 419 of 1999) under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However these objections were treated under Order 21 Rule 97, 98, 99 and 101 of the Code. According to the objector/appellants by an agreement dated September 25, 1997, Kapil Dev Sood inducted him as tenant in two rooms, kitchen, a bath room and open verandah on the third storey and one room on the top floor of the building in dispute on a monthly rental of rupees 300. He paid rupees 900 as advance rent for three months to the auction purchaser Kapil Dev Sood. Kapil Dev Sood, it be noticed, expired on February 3, 1998. The Objection Petition was resisted by auction purchaser Karam Chand and legal heirs of the other auction purchaser Kapil Dev Sood. He paid rupees 900 as advance rent for three months to the auction purchaser Kapil Dev Sood. Kapil Dev Sood, it be noticed, expired on February 3, 1998. The Objection Petition was resisted by auction purchaser Karam Chand and legal heirs of the other auction purchaser Kapil Dev Sood. According to the auction purchasers the objector was never inducted as tenant by deceased Kapil Dev Sood. Learned Single Judge on the appreciation of the evidence led by the Objector and the auction purchaser, held that the objector was never inducted as tenant by deceased Kapil Dev. Learned Single Judge noticed that the original agreement was not filed by the Objector. Only Xerox copy, of the agreement was placed on record, which contained signatures of the parties and the witnesses. However, the evidence led by the objector to show that Xerox copy of the agreement was taken before the signing of the agreement. The deposition of the objector was not found to be reliable. 4. The other objection raised by the Objector was that the application of the auction purchasers for delivery of possession was barred by the period of limitation. Learned Single Judge concluded that the period of limitation was one year, under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, and this period is to be computed from October 9, 1991 when the objection under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code were finally dismissed and order became final. 5. Dis-satisfied, the objector is in this appeal. 6. We have heard Mr; G.D. Verma, Senior Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, Senior Advocate learned Counsel for the respondents. 7. An half-hearted contention was made by Mr. Verma, that the objector was inducted as tenant by the auction purchaser Kapil Dev Sood. Mr. Verma was unable to point out any evidence, which was not considered by the learned Single Judge. In fact, preponderance of evidence, as discussed by the learned Single Judge proves the contrary. 8. So far the question of limitation is concerned, Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides a period of one year for filing an application for possession under Order 21 Rule 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree. The period of limitation starts running from the date from which sale becomes absolute. The period of limitation starts running from the date from which sale becomes absolute. Thus, terminus a quo under this Article is the date when the sale becomes absolute. 9. Now in the present case, as noticed earlier, respondents No. 2 and 3 sons of judgment debtor Bhagwan Dass had filed objections under order 21 Rule 90 of the Code. These objections were dismissed in May 18, 1984 and the sale was confirmed on the same day. It is admitted position that this order was re-called on an application made by Objector Hardayal Verma and Deepak Verma and their objection petition was restored to its original number. As the order dated May 18, 1984 was re-called, therefore, order regarding confirmation of the sale too stood re-called. The objection petition was finally disposed, on merits on October 9, 1991. The sale, thus, became absolute only on October 9, 1991. The application for delivery of possession of the property was made on December 19, 1991 within one year of the period of limitation. 10. This apart, expression "when the sale becomes absolute", has to be read not only in reference to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 92(i) of the Code but also with the other sections and orders of the court. It is well settled position that limitation will start running from the date when all proceedings to set aside the sale terminate. In our view, for the purpose of limitation under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, the sale becomes absolute not on the date when the formal order of confirmation is passed but on the final termination of all the objections to such sale. The crucial test to ascertain whether the sale has become absolute is whether any contemporaneous proceedings were taken by any party questioning the sale or to postpone it or avoid it and if any such proceedings were pending when sale was confirmed then the finality to such a sale cannot be attached. 11. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge. There is no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed. No costs. CMP No. 86 of 2003. Heard. Allowed. CMP No. 17 of 2003. No order in view of the disposal of the main appeal.