S. U. KHAN, J. ( 1 ) THROUGH this writ petition-petitioner has challenged the order of D. I. O. S. dated 12. 5. 1995, holding that petitioner voluntarily resigned from the post of teacher in Janta Uchchattar madhyamik Vidyalay, Mursan, Aligarh on 19. 9. 1994. The said order of D. I. O. S. was passed in pursuance of order passed in earlier similar writ petition filed by the petitioner (Writ Petition No. 35963 of 1994, decided on 11. 11. 1994 ). ( 2 ) FROM the perusal of averments in the writ petition, it is clear that instead of concentrating on teaching work, petitioner devoted much of his time and energy in exposing the alleged misappropriation of funds by the Principal probably in order to shield his own misdeeds. Petitioner filed complaints to different authorities including District Magistrate, F. I. R. and application before the Magistrate concerned under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. In this background, the case set up by the petitioner that the Principal invited him over a cup of tea at his residence on 18. 9. 1994 and drugged him by adding some intoxicant in the tea and obtained his resignation in that state is not at all believable. Petitioner even though not unknown to the procedure of filing complaints, F. l. R. and applications under Section 156 (3) did not lodge any F. l. R. with the police with regard to the said incident. Even though in para 16 of the writ petition, it has been stated that wife of petitioner sent a complaint to the police but copy of the alleged complaint annexed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition does not show as to what manner was adopted to send the same to the police authorities. In para 16 of the writ petition also, there is no such mention. The D. I. O. S. in his impugned order has held that no such complaint was made. The finding recorded in the order passed by the D. I. O. S. dated 12. 5. 1995, that resignation was voluntarily given is perfectly in accordance with the material brought on record before him by the parties, i. e. , petitioner, management and the Principal. Very cogent reasons have been given by the D. I. O. S. to record the said findings. 5. 1995, that resignation was voluntarily given is perfectly in accordance with the material brought on record before him by the parties, i. e. , petitioner, management and the Principal. Very cogent reasons have been given by the D. I. O. S. to record the said findings. The material on record does not justify to take contrary view ; in any case the said findings being findings of fact cannot be reversed or interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The D. I. O. S. has also held that management was entitled to waive 3 months notice/salary, by virtue of Regulation 29 (4) of Chapter III of the regulations framed under U. P. Intermediate Education Act and it in fact waived its right to have the said notice/salary. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has argued that in view of the aforesaid Regulation 29 (4), resignation letter of the petitioner, even if voluntarily given, was not legal as petitioner neither paid 3 months salary nor gave notice of 3 months in advance. In this regard learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the following authorities : (1) 1982 UPLBEC 4 76 (DB) (2) 1983 UPLBEC 721 (SB) ; (3) 1985 UPLBEC 560 (SB) ; (4) 2000 (4) AWC 2767 (SB) ; ( 4 ) IN some of the aforesaid authorities, it has been held that if in such situation, resignation is withdrawn before the expiry of 3 months, teacher will continue to be in service. In the last authority of 2000, it has been held that filing of writ petition itself within 3 months of giving resignation amounts to withdrawal of the resignation. In fact, the latter three authorities have followed the ratio laid down in the first Division Bench authority of 1982, paragraph 9 of which is quoted below : "9. The statutory regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, control both the management as well as the teachers right to terminate or resign from service. Regulation 26 is in positive terms. Under it the management can terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him 3 months notice or 3 months pay in lieu thereof. Giving of the 3 months notice or pay in lieu thereof is a condition precedent for the management to exercise its right to terminate the services of an employee. Regulation 26 is in positive terms. Under it the management can terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him 3 months notice or 3 months pay in lieu thereof. Giving of the 3 months notice or pay in lieu thereof is a condition precedent for the management to exercise its right to terminate the services of an employee. Regulation 29 enables an employee to resign either by giving notice or pay in lieu thereof. The notice or pay refers to the notice or pay to which he would have been entitled in case of termination by the management. In other words, regulation 29 refers back to Regulation 26 in so far as the period of notice or pay is concerned. Accordingly an employee can resign only by giving a notice of 3 months or pay in lieu thereof. This shows that an employee has no unfettered right to resign. He can exercise the right of resignation only in accordance with the provision of Regulations 29 and 30. " ( 5 ) HOWEVER, Supreme Court in R. K. Singh v. Committee of management, AIR 1996 SC 3070 , has held that payment of one months notice or pay in lieu thereof under Regulation 25 is not a condition precedent to valid termination of service. Regulations 25 and 26 are pari materia, the only difference is that Regulation 25 deals with termination of service of temporary employee or probationer during the term of his probation while Regulation 26 deals with termination of services of permanent employees in certain contingencies. The other difference is that in regulation 25 words "at any time" are mentioned while in Regulation 26, these words are not there. This difference is also immaterial, as under Regulation 26 services cannot be terminated at any time but only on the happening of any of the events provided therein, i. e. , retrenchment for reasons of financial stringency, abolition of subject and abolition of section or class. Para 8 of the Supreme Court authority is quoted below : "8. A bare reading of Regulation 25 Indicates that it is more similar to the rule which fell for consideration in Dinanaths case. It gives an option to the management either to give one months notice or one months pay in lieu thereof. It does not provide for the mode or time for payment. A bare reading of Regulation 25 Indicates that it is more similar to the rule which fell for consideration in Dinanaths case. It gives an option to the management either to give one months notice or one months pay in lieu thereof. It does not provide for the mode or time for payment. Thus, the rule only entitles the temporary employee or the probationer to pay for the period of notice. As we are of the view that Regulation 25 does not provide payment, of one months pay in lieu of notice as a condition precedent to the effective termination of service, the High Court was right in setting aside the order of the Deputy Director who had taken a contrary view. The view taken by the High Court is correct and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed. " ( 6 ) THEREFORE, the view of the aforesaid Division Bench and aforesaid single Judge authorities which followed the said Division Bench that payment of salary is condition precedent is no more a good law in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court authorities. ( 7 ) ACCORDINGLY, I find no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. .