K. SREEDHAR RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE Counsel for the appellant submits that the first respondent died on 11-11-2002 and the respondents 2 and 3 are his sons and they are already on record and they sufficiently represent the estate of the first respondent. Therefore, no need to bring on record any other L. Rs. ( 2 ) THE second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree passed by the Principal Munsiff, Sirsi in OS No. 255/89 and confirmed in appeal by the Civil Judge, Senior division, Sirsi in RA No. 8/95. The appellant is the unsuccessful plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that the sale deed obtained by the defendant/respondent dated 28-5-1959 is illegal and outcome of fraud. The plaintiff contends that the suit schedule landed property absolutely belongs to him and he was in government service. On account of his frequent transfer from place to place the defendant was made to stay in the suit property since 1956 and allowed him to manage the property as he was his sisters husband. The revenue records, however, continued to be in the name of the plaintiff. It is said that in the year 1986, the defendant tried to secure mutation of his name in the revenue records. The plaintiff, on coming to know about fraud and fabrication of records, challenged the orders of mutation before revenue appellate authorities and also filed the present suit seeking declaration that the document of sale is illegal and not binding, also sought for consequential relief of permanent injunction. In the alternate, it is contended that if for any reason the plaintiff is held to be not in the constructive possession, the relief of possession is sought for. ( 3 ) THE defendants in the written state ment stoutly denied the plaint allegations, contend that the sale is a genuine sale transaction for valid consideration. It is also contended that the suit is barred by limitation. Hence, prayed for dismissal. ( 4 ) THE trial Court and the first appellate court concurrently found that the sale deed has been executed by plaintiff in favour of the defendant and dismissed the suit. The following point of law is framed at the time of admission :whether the Courts below are right in holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the sale deed dated 28-5-1959 is vitiated by fraud? The following point of law is framed at the time of admission :whether the Courts below are right in holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the sale deed dated 28-5-1959 is vitiated by fraud? ( 5 ) AFTER hearing the Counsel an additional point of law is formulated in the following manner :whether the Courts below acted properly in invoking presumption under S. 90 of the evidence Act to hold that execution of Ex. P. \ is proved? ( 6 ) THE Counsel for the appellant contends that the findings of the Court below are totally perverse, contrary to law, facts and evidence on record. It is further submitted that the Courts below have not appreciated the material circumstances relating to proof of fraud and non-execution of the sale deed and thus erred in coming to a wrong conclusion. The Counsel for the appellant points out the following circumstances to assail the transaction. 1) The defendant in whose favour the sale deed is supposed to be executed has not examined himself. His son is examined, no reason is given for non-examination of the defendant. 2) The original of the sale deed is not produced and no convincing material is produced to introduce secondary evidence. That apart, the secondary evidence introduced does not clinchingly establish the execution of a sale deed by the plaintiff. 3) The attesting witnesses and the scribe are not examined and no reason is given by the defendant for non-examination of the said witness. 4) The conduct of defendant in remaining silent up to the year 1986 without taking mutation of his name in the revenue records and belated attempt to get his name mutated in the revenue records strongly suggests an allegation of fraud. ( 7 ) ON going through the judgments of the trial Court and the first appellate Court, i find the Courts below have not properly analysed and appreciated the facts and evidence in a scientific and a logical manner. A vague statement in the plaint about signing some blank papers and misuse of the papers for concocting sale deed is inferred as an admission of the execution of a sale deed by the Courts below. The said view is illegal and incorrect. To constitute an admission in law. the statement should be ex facie unequivocal and categorical. A vague statement cannot be construed as an admission. The said view is illegal and incorrect. To constitute an admission in law. the statement should be ex facie unequivocal and categorical. A vague statement cannot be construed as an admission. The courts below have also not properly appreciated the evidence of D. W. 3, the Sub- registrar. The evidence adduced by defendant through P. W. 3 has no useful purpose to prove the case of the defendant about the execution. The Volume-I a book regularly maintained by the office of the Sub-Registrar is summoned through. P. W. 3 and he has given evidence saying that the certified copy of the document would be delivered to the public with reference to the contents of volume-I. According to the procedure and practice whenever a document is registered, the copy of the document is recorded in Volume-I for the official purpose. The Vol. I does not contain the signatures or the LTM of the parties which are usually taken on the original of the document. There does not appear to be any substantial distinction between production of a certified copy and summoning of Volume-I. The contents of Volume-I are no better than a certified copy issued by the sub-Registrar. The trial Court comes to the conclusion that the entries in Volume-I relating to the transaction being 30 years old, a presumption is drawn under S. 90 of the evidence Act. ( 8 ) IN Pandappa Mahalingappa v. Shivalingappa Murteppa. AIR 1946 Bom 193 and the following observations at page 196 read thus :"in AIR 1934 Nag 67 : 30 NLR 155 : 148 ic 561, Gopinath Maharaj v. Moti Chiwa, it has been held that the presumption was equally applicable to copies as to the originals when the copy was proved to be a true copy of the original, but that view was expressly overruled by the Privy Council in 38 bom LR 593 : (AIR 1936 Bom 301), basangouda v. Basalingappa at page 602, it is held that when a certified copy is allowed to be produced under S. 65, Evidence Act, no presumption can be drawn under S. 90 as to the genuineness or execution of the original. It may, therefore, be said that the trial Court should not have admitted Ex. It may, therefore, be said that the trial Court should not have admitted Ex. 68 merely on the ground that it was a certified copy of a mortgage-deed more than 30 years old should have called for proof of the execution of the document. But such proof is to be found in the certified copy itself. The deed being registered, the certified copy bears the necessary endorsements of the Sub-Registrar before whom the executant acknowledged the execution and was duly identified. As held in (1907) 9 Bom LR 401, Thama v. Govind, Ss. 58, 9 and 60, Registration Act, provide that the facts mentioned in the endorsement may be proved by those endorsements, provided the provisions of S. 60 have been complied with. The facts in ILR 55 Bom 103 : 128 1c 901 : (AIR 1931 Bom 105), vishwanath Ramji v. Rabibai were quite akin to the facts of this case. There also the certified copy of a deed of adoption was admitted in evidence merely on the ground that the original was lost and that it was more than thirty years old. The first appellate Court held that as the execution of the deed had not been proved it should not have been exhibited. Then in second appeal Baker, J. , observed (p. 107) : "as to the proof, the document in this particular instance has been registered and bears the necessary endorsements by the sub-Registrar before whom the executant was identified by the Kulkarni of the village. The effect of registration has been considered by this Court in (1907) 9 Bom LR 401, thama v. Govind, where it was held that Ss. 58, 59 and 60, Registration Act provide that the facts mentioned in the endorsement may be proved by those endorsements, provided the provisions of S. 60 have been complied with. The endorsement of the Sub-Registrar in the present case shows that Ramji the executant admitted execution of the document and gave his thumb impression and that he was identified before the Sub-Registrar by Keshav Hari Talati who was known to the Sub-Registrar. In these circumstances the view of the first Court that the copy of the adoption deed is admissible in evidence and that it is sufficiently proved appears to be correct. In these circumstances the view of the first Court that the copy of the adoption deed is admissible in evidence and that it is sufficiently proved appears to be correct. "by parity of reasoning the certified copy of the mortgage-deed in this case also is admissible in evidence, as It bears the requisite endorsement of the Sub-Registrar regarding the admission of its execution by the executant. It is true that the decision of the privy Council is subsequent to the case in ilr 55 Bom 103, Vishwanath Ramji v. Rabivai. But there is no conflict between them. The document which the Privy Council was dealing with had not been registered, and all that the ruling lays down is that there can be no presumption under S. 90, Evidence act, when only a certified copy of a document is produced and, therefore, the execution of the original has to be proved, whereas the ruling in ILR 55 Bom 103 lays down that such proof can be afforded by the Sub-Registrars endorsement appearing on the certified copy. " ( 9 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in kalidindi Venkata Subbaraju v. Chintalapati subbaraju, 1968 (2) SCR 292 . At page 298 : ( AIR 1968 SC 947 at p. 950) it held thus :"where a certified copy of a document is produced the correct position is as stated in basant Singh v. Brij Rai (62 IA 180) : (AIR 1935 PC 132) where the Privy Council laid down that if the document produced is a copy admitted under S. 65 as secondary evidence and it is produced from proper custody and is over 30 years old only the signatures authenticating the copy can be presumed to be genuine. The production of a copy, therefore, does not warrant the presumption of due execution of the original document. The Privy council repelled the argument that where a copy of a Will has been admitted the Court is entitled to presume the genuineness of such will which purports to be 30 years old. The production of a copy, therefore, does not warrant the presumption of due execution of the original document. The Privy council repelled the argument that where a copy of a Will has been admitted the Court is entitled to presume the genuineness of such will which purports to be 30 years old. Relying on the words "where any document purporting or proved to be 30 years old" in S. 90, the Privy Council held that the production which entitles the Court to draw the presumption as to execution and attestation is of the original and not its copy and that the decisions of the High Courts of Calcutta and allahabad on which the argument was based were not correctly decided. This view has since then been approved of by this Court in harihar Prasad v. Must. of Munshi Nath prasad, 1956 SCR 1 at P. 19 : ( AIR 1956 SC 305 at p. 309 ). The High Court, therefore, was not entitled to presume from the production of the copy either the execution or the attestation of the said Will. " ( 10 ) IN Pandappas case, AIR 1946 Bom 193 (196) the executant Ramji admitted execution and affixed his thumb impression. One Keshav Hari Talati a person known to sub-Registrar and as well to the executant. Ramji identified the executant. It was a registered transaction. The endorsement of sub-Registrar testified those facts. Therefore, the said decision could be distinguished from the facts and ratio laid down in Kalidindi Venkata subbarajus case ( AIR 1968 SC 947 ) decided by the Supreme Court but the facts in the present case squarely covered by the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Kalidindi venkata Subbarajus case. In the first place the defendant-purchaser has not examined himself to lay a foundation for leading secondary evidence for production of secondary evidence by way of the certified copies. Nothing is said in the evidence of the defendants about the availability or otherwise of the attesting witnesses. In the judgment it is observed that in the course of arguments, it is contended by the Counsel for the defendants that the attesting witnesses and the scribe are dead. The said observations are untenable. The availability of the witnesses would be a matter of evidence to be testified by the defendant or any other competent witnesses to that effect. In the judgment it is observed that in the course of arguments, it is contended by the Counsel for the defendants that the attesting witnesses and the scribe are dead. The said observations are untenable. The availability of the witnesses would be a matter of evidence to be testified by the defendant or any other competent witnesses to that effect. It cannot be a matter of argument and surmises. In view of such serious lacunas, it is impermissible to invoke S. 90 to presume the genuineness and correctness of the contents of Ex. P. 5 on the basis of legal presumption. ( 11 ) THE sale deed is of the year 1959. Till 1986, no attempt is made by the defendants to get their name mutated in the revenue records. A belated attempt is made in the year 1986. At that time, the plaintiff coming to know about the fraud, has resisted the proceedings and filed the suit. In view of such suspicious circumstances and the dubious conduct of the defendants, it is incredible to accept the defendants version that the property is sold by the plaintiff under Exhibit P. 5. ( 12 ) IN view of the reasons and discussions made above, I find the first Appellate court has not appreciated the facts and evidence in proper perspective and thus the findings arrived at by the Courts below about the due execution of the sale deed is perverse, contrary to the evidence on record. ( 13 ) ON the question of limitation, the suit is to be filed within three years from the date of knowledge of fraud. According to plaintiff he comes to know of the fraud in the year 1986 when the defendant was making an attempt to get the names mutated in his favour. After long lapse of 27 years from the date of sale i. e. in the year 1959 Katha of the property in revenue records continued to be in the name of the plaintiff till 1986. Therefore, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to know about the transaction in question. Accordingly, I find no merit in the contention that the suit is barred by time. ( 14 ) IN view of the reasons and discussions made above, the points formulated is answered in the negative. Therefore, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to know about the transaction in question. Accordingly, I find no merit in the contention that the suit is barred by time. ( 14 ) IN view of the reasons and discussions made above, the points formulated is answered in the negative. The appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the Courts below set aside and the suit of the plaintiff for declaration is decreed with consequential relief of possession. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .