JUDGMENT P. K. MOHANTY, J. — In this application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. the petitioner challenges the order of the learned S.D.J.M., Panposh in I.C.C. No. 2 of 1999 taking cognizance of the offences punishable under Section 498-A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and in issuing process against the petitioners. 2. The short fact of the case is that on 24.11.1997, opp. party No. 1 the present complainant lodged an F.I.R. with Rourkela Mahila P.S. alleging therein that she had married one Rakesh Chauhan on 30.5.1993 and since after the marriage, her husband was reluctant to consumate the marriage and was making persistent demand of additional dowry of Rs. 5 lakhs and a purchased house at Bombay, even though she had carried sufficient dowry articles approxi¬mately worth Rs. 1 lakh 50 thousand at the time of her marriage. The in-laws i.e. father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law Pramila (who is staying at Bombay) have been prevailing on her husband to insist for demand and they have restrained him from cohabiting with her, so long their demand is not fulfilled. The parents of the informant having failed to comply with the demand, they all started inflicting both mental and physical torture on her. Just after 10 days of the marriage, they drove her out and told to go with her brother with the condition that she can come back on fulfilment of the demand. However, pursuant to the negotiation with her brother, her father-in-law received her in October, 1996 since her husband was absent in matrimonial home for years together. However, he (the father-in-law) behaved irrationally and abnormally. During her stay there, the in-laws again started torture, used pungent words at her and at times assaulted her for no faults and so on. It is alleged, they also extracted her signature on a plain paper. She was asked to work like a maid servant. Her husband reached Rourkela in the last week of September, 1997 and then her husband, father-in-law and broth¬er-in-law arrived in her brother's quarter and picked up quarrel and enquired as to whether she had arranged the money for her husband’s business at Bombay and whether her brother was purchas¬ing a house at Bombay. On her answering in negative, her husband brutally assaulted her by giving successive kicks and fist blows an they left the place after giving threats. On her answering in negative, her husband brutally assaulted her by giving successive kicks and fist blows an they left the place after giving threats. It appears that after investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against her husband Rakesh Chand Chauhan and Radhashyam Chauhan, her father-in-law. On 12.6.1998, the learned S.D.J.M. by order dated 16.6.1998 took cognizance of the offences under Section 498-A/34, I.P.C. against the aforesaid two accused persons. 3. The informant-opp. party filed an application on 7.12.1998, which was taken up by the learned Magistrate on 8.12.1998 finding that there was no evidence against the afore¬said three accused persons, rejected the protest petition in G. R. Case No. 1906 of 1997. 4. The present complaint petition was presented on 5.1.1999 by the informant in the aforesaid G. R. Case, as com¬plainant against the present set of accused persons, who are the mother-in-law, brother and the married sister of her husband. The learned Magistrate recorded the initial statement of the com¬plainant-opp. party. 5. It appears from the complaint petition itself at para¬graph 6 thereof that after 10 days of marriage, the complainant was sent to her parents house with her brother and at that time all the three accused persons along with her husband and father-in-law warned the complainant not to return to their house without complying with the demands. In paragraph 7, the allegation ap¬pears to be that the aforesaid three accused persons including Radheshyam Chauhan instructed Rakesh, the husband of the peti¬tioner, before his departure to Bombay not to keep any physical relationship with the complainant unless and until her brother fulfilled the demand. They were also not making any arrangement for her comfortable stay and maintain her conjugal life. At sub-para of paragraph 10, the allegation is that the complainant stayed in the quarter No. C/265, Sector-7 with the father-in-law and mother-in-law and during her stay, they behaved irrationally and abnormally. In paragraph 11, it is stated that both the them started ill-treating and tortured her uttering obscene language and she was physically assaulted. They confined the complainant inside their quarter and did not allow her to mix with other persons. In paragraph 12, it is specifically averred that the mother-in-law and father-in-law of the complainant physically assaulted her and utilised her as a maid servant without provid¬ing adequate food. In paragraph 19 of the complaint it is averred : “19. They confined the complainant inside their quarter and did not allow her to mix with other persons. In paragraph 12, it is specifically averred that the mother-in-law and father-in-law of the complainant physically assaulted her and utilised her as a maid servant without provid¬ing adequate food. In paragraph 19 of the complaint it is averred : “19. That, subsequently, in the last week of September, 1997 all of a sudden the husband, father-in-law, and brother-in-law Ramesh Chauhan arrived in the quarter of the brother of the complainant a Railway Colony and picked up quarrel. All of them enquired as to whether the complainant have arranged R. 5,00,000/- (Rupees five lacs) only for her husband for business at Bombay and as to whether her brother was purchasing a house for him at Bombay. When the complainant replied in negative her brother-in-law abused her in filthy language and her husband brutally assaulted her by successive kicks and blows on her persons and they left the spot by giving threatening to kill her and her relations by deputing criminals. At the relevant time the complainant sustained seriously bodily pain and unable to report at the police station.” However, in paragraph 9 of the initial statement, the com¬plainant has deposed : “9. All the accused persons in the month of September, 98 came to my brother’s quarter at Railway Colony. My husband Rakesh assaulted me since my father could not be able to cater to their demand of dowry. They also threatened to kill all of us through goondas.” 6. The learned counsel vehemently and strenuously argued that second complaint I.C.C. No. 2 of 1999 was not maintainable in law, the first complaint under Section 203, Cr.P.C. having been dismissed on merits. It is further contended that the order of refusal to take cognizance on the protest petition filed by the opp. party having not been challenged, the order has reached its finality and basing on the self-same facts, the present com¬plaint is not maintainable in law and liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel has referred to the decision in Jatinder Singh and others v. Ranjit Kaur, (2001) 20 O.C.R. (SC) 374 and State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another 2002 Crl. Law Journal 998 (SC) in support of his contention. 7. The learned counsel has referred to the decision in Jatinder Singh and others v. Ranjit Kaur, (2001) 20 O.C.R. (SC) 374 and State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another 2002 Crl. Law Journal 998 (SC) in support of his contention. 7. Sri R. K. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the opposite party however submitted that there is no bar for entertaining a second complaint, inasmuch as, the complainant-opposite party having placed sufficient material before the learned S.D.J.M. and the learned Magistrate being satisfied about commission of the alleged offence, having taken cognizance and issued process, the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should not interfere in the said order. The learned counsel has relied on the decision reported in Manorama Mohapatra v. Harihar Sathua and others 1989 (II) O.L.R. 491 and Smt. Debaki Naik and others v. State of Orissa and another (2000) 18 O.C.R. 389 in support of his contention. 8. In Jatinder Singh and others v. Ranjit Kaur (supra), the Apex Court has taken the view that if the dismissal of the complaint was not on merit, but on default of the complainant to be present, there is no bar for the complainant to move the Magistrate again with a second complaint on the same facts. But if the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203, Cr.P.C. was on merit, the position would be different. The Apex Court ob¬served and reiterated the view taken in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar; AIR 1962 Supreme Court 876 to hold that an order of, dismissal under Section 203 of the Code is no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint of the same fact, but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances e.g. where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was mani¬festly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interests of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into. It cannot be said to be in the interests of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into. The Apex Court took the general view that a second complaint would be maintained if the dismissal of the first complaint was not on merit. 9. In Punjab National Bank and others v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1815, the Apex Court expressed the view that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The Court should be circumspect and judi¬cious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of private complain¬ant as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. 10. In the case at hand as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, on the basis of the F.I.R. lodged by the complainant-wife, after investigation, the police submitted the Charge Sheet against her husband and father-in-law and cognizance was taken thereon. The informant, the present complaint being not satisfied lodged a protest petition to include the present petitioners as accused persons, but the learned Magistrate on consideration of merits rejected the protest petition. The informant again has filed the present complaint against the present set of accused persons who are the mother-in-law, brother and married sister of her husband and on the basis of the initial statement, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance and issued process against the present petitioners. A perusal of the complaint petition, the initial statement along with the protest petition filed earlier and the materials on record it transpires that the entire allegations were duly considered by the learned Magistrate who found no prima facie case to proceed against the present petitioners and accordingly dismissed the protest petition. Again on the basis of self-same set of facts with little modification here and there the present complaint has been filed. Again on the basis of self-same set of facts with little modification here and there the present complaint has been filed. A perusal of the complaint petition and the initial statement recorded by the learned Magistrate disclosed a good prima facie case against the husband and the father-in-law against whom process was issued, but the allegations against the present petitioners are more or less repetition of the earlier complaint petition and the state¬ment in the F.I.R. The protest petition having been rejected mostly on the self- same fact, on merits. I am of the considered opinion that the learned Magistrate erred in law in enter¬taining the second complaint taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process against the present petitioners. It is the set¬tled position of law that the judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or harassment and the learned Magistrate exercising the discretion has to take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process against an accused person, otherwise the legal process would be an in¬strument of harassment at the instance of unscrupulous persons. 11. The conspectus of the decision of the Apex Court dis¬cussed in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment unerringly lays down that even though there is no absolute bar for entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts, but it would only be entertained in exceptional circumstances, where the previous order was passed in an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or new facts which could not with reasonable diligence have been brought on record in the previous proceeding, have been brought on record. If on full consideration of the available materials in the earlier proceeding the learned Magis¬trate felt inappropriate to proceed against the present petition¬ers, on a subsequent complaint being filed, it is impermissible to issue a process. The dismissal of the earlier protest petition was on merit and on full consideration of facts and circumstances of the case and as such, the second complaint almost on the self-same set of facts was not maintainable and, therefore, ought not to have been entertained by the learned Magistrate. In such view of the matter, the Criminal Misc. Case is allowed, the impugned order of cognizance and issuance of process against the present petitioners are quashed. Crl. Misc. case allowed.