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2003 DIGILAW 1828 (ALL)

MOHD SHAHID v. STATE OF U P

2003-08-14

R.P.MISRA

body2003
R. P. MISRA, J. Heard Sri Vibhav Bhushan Upadhyay, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri S. F. A. Naqvi, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri L. P. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents and Sri Prem Chandra, learned Counsel for Nagar Nigam, Moradabad (in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 30982 of 2003 ). 2. At the very outset this Court is constrained to mention that it is very surprising and shocking that in spite of the fact that it is admitted between the parties that the building in question is more than hundred years old and is in dilapidated condition, the respondents are not vacating the same, despite orders passed by the Prescribed Authority which have been affirmed by this Court. 3. The factual matrix of the case is as under: The building in question is House No. 87-A/2, situate at Civil Lines in district Moradabad. On 20-1-1941, the Collector, Moradabad granted a perpetual lease of the building in question to one Govind Saran Kothiwal, who transferred the same to the petitioners on 29-4-1969 by means of a registered sale-deed. On 24-2-1963, when the building in question was in possession of the previous owner, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotted the same to the Employment Officer. 4. On 4-12-1989, the petitioners filed two cases for release of the building in question, under Section 21 (1) (b) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, (for short "the Act") one against the District Election Officer, which was numbered as P. A. Case No. 74 of 1989 and another against District Employment Officer, which was numbered as P. A. Case No. 75 of 1989. The ground for release was that building in question is dilapidated and is liable to be demolished for reconstruction. Both the release applications referred above were allowed by the Prescribed Authority by two separate orders dated 11-1-1994 and it was observed that after reconstruction of the building, the petitioners will let out the same again on fresh terms and conditions, if the tenants will so desire. 5. Against both the aforesaid orders dated 11-1-1994, the respondents filed two appeals, which were numbered as Appeal Nos. 3 and 4 of 1994 and were dismissed by order dated 12-5-1998 passed by IX Additional District Judge, Moradabad. 6. 5. Against both the aforesaid orders dated 11-1-1994, the respondents filed two appeals, which were numbered as Appeal Nos. 3 and 4 of 1994 and were dismissed by order dated 12-5-1998 passed by IX Additional District Judge, Moradabad. 6. Against the aforesaid order dated 12-5-1998, District Magistrate and District Election Officer filed a writ petition, numbered as Writ Petition No. 30988 of 1998 and the Regional Employment Officer, filed another writ petition, numbered as Writ Petition No. 26471 of 1998. It is relevant to mention here that during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions, on 27-6-2001 the Regional Employment Officer vacated the building in question and handed over the possession of the same to the petitioners. Therefore, on 3-4-2002, the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 26471 of 1998 filed by the Regional Employment Officer, was dismissed as infructuous and the Writ Petition No. 30988 of 1998 filed by the District Election Officer, was dismissed on merits. Thereafter on 25-9-2002, the District Election Officer sent a letter to the Chief Election Officer of Uttar Pradesh for granting permission to file Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid order dated 3-4-2002 passed by this Court. The Chief Election Officer of Uttar Pradesh on 11-12-2002 rejected the permission sought for filing the Special Leave Petition. The District Election Officer again on 22-1-2003, sought permission to file Special Leave Petition, which was also rejected on 27-1- 2003. Thus, the aforesaid orders dated 11-1-1994 passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the release applications of the petitioners, attained finality. 7. The petitioners filed Execution Proceeding No. 23 of 1998, under Section 23 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, before the Prescribed Authority. They also filed an application for issuing Parvana. The Prescribed Authority on 21-8-2002 allowed the aforesaid application and directed the respondents to hand over vacant possession of the building in question to the petitioners. The Prescribed Authority also directed S. H. O. Civil Lines, Moradabad to get the possession of the building in question, handed over to the petitioners. Against the aforesaid order dated 21-8-2002 passed by Prescribed Authority a revision was filed, which was dismissed by the District Judge, Moradabad as withdrawn on 23-9-2002. 8. The Prescribed Authority also directed S. H. O. Civil Lines, Moradabad to get the possession of the building in question, handed over to the petitioners. Against the aforesaid order dated 21-8-2002 passed by Prescribed Authority a revision was filed, which was dismissed by the District Judge, Moradabad as withdrawn on 23-9-2002. 8. Under the influence of the District Magistrate, on 2-9-2002, the Police submitted an irrelevant report before the Prescribed Authority to the effect that the boundaries of the building in question are not clear, upon which the Prescribed Authority by an order dated 5-9-2002 directed the police officer concerned to deliver possession to the petitioners. 9. Even then the District Election Officer/district Magistrate, Moradabad did not vacate the building in question and decided to start second inning. Consequently the State of Uttar Pradesh through District Magistrate and Additional District Magistrate (F&r) Moradabad, filed Original Suit No. 307 of 2002, (concealing entire litigation referred above as well as the ejectment order having been passed against them) for permanent injunction restraining the petitioners from demolishing the building in question. Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) passed an order dated 3-9-2003 for maintaining status quo, without giving any notice to the petitioners. Accordingly on 5-9-2002, the Police submitted another report that due to injunction order dated 3-9-2002, the possession of the building in question could not be handed over to the petitioners. However, learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) on 7-9-2002 vacated its aforesaid order dated 3-9-2002. 10. Thereafter, on 12-9-2002 petitioners filed Writ Petition No. 36601 of 2002, in which further proceedings of aforesaid Original Suit No. 307 were stayed and strictures were passed by this Court against the State authorities. 11. On the other hand, learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) again by an order dated 12-9-2002 granted statusquo order wrongly recording consent of the Counsel for the petitioners and the respondents filed an application in earlier P. A. Case No. 74 of 1989 referred above, on the ground that Nazul Prabhari was not made a party, therefore, entire proceeding is vitiated. This application was rejected by the Judge Small Causes Court in Misc. P. A. Case No. 11 of 2002 vide an order dated 18-9-2002. Against this order dated 18-9-2002, respondents preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the District Judge, Moradabad by an order dated 25-9-2002. 12. This application was rejected by the Judge Small Causes Court in Misc. P. A. Case No. 11 of 2002 vide an order dated 18-9-2002. Against this order dated 18-9-2002, respondents preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the District Judge, Moradabad by an order dated 25-9-2002. 12. Another application was also filed by Mukhya Nagar Adhikari of Nagar Nigam, Moradabad claiming to be the necessary party in earlier P. A. Case No. 74 of 1989 referred above, before the Prescribed Authority, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 14 of 2002 and the same was also rejected by learned Judge Small Causes Court/prescribed Authority vide an order dated 3- 10-2002. 13. That apart, another suit, being original suit No. 700 of 2002 was filed by Nagar Nigam, District Magistrate and Additional District Magistrate, Moradabad on 1-9-2002 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) seeking same reliefs, which were sought in original suit No. 307 of 2002. 14. The District Magistrate being Election Officer also filed on 23-10-2002, Original Suit No. 386 of 2002 before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) but no injunction was granted. 15. Then petitioners filed a writ of prohibition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 41652 of 2002, with regard to the suits, but it was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy by way of application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code before the Court concerned. The petitioners availed the said alternative remedy but no orders have been passed till date by the Court concerned. 16. It may be mentioned here that the State of Uttar Pradesh through District Magistrate and Election Officer, also filed a review/recall application before the IX Additional District Judge seeking review/recall of the aforesaid final judgment dated 12-5- 1998 passed in aforesaid appeals No. 3 and 4 of 1994. The learned IX Additional District Judge passed an stay order dated 28-9-2002 against which petitioners filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44565 of 2002, in which operation of the impugned order was stayed. Later on learned IX Additional District Judge rejected the aforesaid application by an order dated 22-10-2002. Thus, aforesaid Writ Petition No. 44565 of 2002 become infructuous. 17. The learned IX Additional District Judge passed an stay order dated 28-9-2002 against which petitioners filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44565 of 2002, in which operation of the impugned order was stayed. Later on learned IX Additional District Judge rejected the aforesaid application by an order dated 22-10-2002. Thus, aforesaid Writ Petition No. 44565 of 2002 become infructuous. 17. Thereafter, the State of U. P. and the District Election Officer filed another frivolous application which was numbered as 50 Ga in execution proceedings i. e. P. A. Case No. 23 of 1998 and the same was rejected by the Prescribed Authority by an order dated 22-10-2002. Then State of U. P. through District Magistrate and District Election Officer filed an application to the effect that they had applied for a transfer of the case but the same was also rejected by an order dated 23-10-2002. 18. It is also relevant to mention that the Nagar Nigam through its Mukhya Nagar Adhikari filed an appeal before the District Judge against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 11-1- 1994, whereby aforesaid release applications No. 74 and 75 of 1989 filed by the petitioners were allowed. This appeal was numbered as Misc. Case No. 473 of 2002, which was dismissed by the District Judge by an order dated 22-10-2002. 19. Not only that, the State of U. P. and the District Election Officer also filed a fresh set of applications before the Prescribed Authority, which was registered as P. A. Case No. 17 of 2002 and was rejected on 22-10-2002. On 22-10-2002, the Prescribed Authority also passed a fresh order for execution of release order. Then the S. H. O. Civil Lines, Moradabad submitted a false and baseless report declining to comply with the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 22-10-2002 on the pretext that some order of status- quo is operative in O. S. No. 307 of 2002, passed on 12-9-2002, ignoring the fact that entire proceeding of the said suit had been stayed by order dated 12-9- 2002 passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38601 of 2002. 20. Thereafter, the District Magistrate, Moradabad invented a fresh device to harass the petitioners and issued a notice dated 25-10-2002 to the petitioners, to show cause as to why the perpetual lease granted in their favour should not be cancelled. Writ Petition No. 38601 of 2002. 20. Thereafter, the District Magistrate, Moradabad invented a fresh device to harass the petitioners and issued a notice dated 25-10-2002 to the petitioners, to show cause as to why the perpetual lease granted in their favour should not be cancelled. The said notice was received by the petitioners on 27- 11-2002 against which, they filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 51777 of 2002 in which this Court stayed further proceedings consequent upon the said notice. 21. In the O. S. No. 700 of 2002, learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), rejected application 6-C of the respondents by an order dated 19-4-2003 against which the Nagar Nigam filed Misc. Appeal No. 44 of 2003 before the District Judge, in which ultimately 5-5-2003 was fixed for hearing and on 5-5-2003 learned XIV Additiional District Judge, passed an order of status quo. Against this order dated 5-5-2003, petitioners preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20922 of 2003 in which this Court stayed operation of the said order dated 5-5-2003 and also directed the respondents to hand over the peaceful possession of the building in question within 4 months. 22. In the O. S. No. 386 of 2002 also, learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Moradabad rejected the application 6-C of the respondents by an order dated 8-4-2003 against which a Misc. Appeal No. 40 of 2003 was preferred by District Election Officer, Moradabad, but no interim order was passed therein. However, in this appeal, learned Special Judge, Moradabad, passed the impugned order dated 30-5- 2003, against which instant writ petition has been filed. 23. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in nut shell, when as landlord of the building in question petitioners initiated the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act and the contesting respondents contested the said proceedings as tenant of the building in question upto the High Court and the said proceeding has become final, then under law they have no option except to vacate the building in question but instead of vacating the building they are abusing the process of Court by filing suits after suits and applications after applications as referred above, which is not permissible under law, therefore, it is a fit case for interfere by this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India for doing substantial justice between the parties. 24. 24. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the respondent No. 4, the Special Judge, Moradabad, has no power, authority or jurisdiction to sit over the judgment and orders passed by this Court, therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 25. Refuting the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel Sri Lalta Prasad Tiwari vehemently contended that in view of the obsernations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Contempt Petition No. 39 of 2002, Mohd. Shahid and another v. Hemant Rao, D. M. Moradabad, the writ petition is barred by alternative remedy available to the petitioners by way of application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the Code) and thereafter appeal. 26. In reply, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the alternative remedy is not absolute bar for filing the writ petitions under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India and placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in Smt. Mahadevi and others v. Civil Judge, Farrukhabad and others, 1987 (1) Alld. Rent Cases 406. 27. In this case it has been held by this Court that it is no dispute that an appeal lies, but the mere fact, that there is an alternative remedy does not absolutely bar the filing of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is always in the discretion of the High Court whether to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or, not even though an alternative remedy is available, they depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Similar view in similar circumstances has also been taken by this Court in Smt. Chandan Devi v. II Additional District Judge, Nainital and others, 1997 (2) JCLR 745 (All) (1997 (2) Alld. Rent Cases 433 ). 28. From the facts and circumstances of this case as stated above, it is abundantly clear that it is a case of gross abuse of the process of the Court and therefore, the interest of justice demands interference by this Court. Therefore, the technical objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy, is not sustainable and consequently it is overruled. 29. Therefore, the technical objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy, is not sustainable and consequently it is overruled. 29. Learned Standing Counsel then contended that the building in question is situated on Nazul land therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act, the provisions of this Act will not apply to the building in question. The provisions of Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act read as under: "2. Exemption from operation of Act.- (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to the following, namely - (a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector Corporation (or a Cantonment Board) is the landlord;. . . . " 30. A bare perusal of this provision makes it crystal clear that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation is the landlord. In the instant case, as stated above, the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act were duly contested by the contesting respondents as a tenant of the building in question and during the said proceedings they never claimed themselves to be landlord of the building and they are paying rent of the building in question to the petitioners. It is very surprising that after loosing the case up to High Court in those proceedings, how can now they transform their status from tenant to landlord for the purposes of second inning. In the opinion of this Court, in view of the perpetual lease having been granted in favour of the petitioners and in view of the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act having become final between the parties coupled with the fact that the contesting respondents are paying rent of the building in question to the petitioners, this argument raised by the learned Standing Counsel has no legs to stand and therefore, it is rejected. In similar circumstances, in Ganga Prasad Misra v. State of U. P. and others, 2003 (2) ARC 132, this Court held that the plea of escheat raised by State is not tenable and it cannot transform its status from a tenant to that of a landlord. 31. In similar circumstances, in Ganga Prasad Misra v. State of U. P. and others, 2003 (2) ARC 132, this Court held that the plea of escheat raised by State is not tenable and it cannot transform its status from a tenant to that of a landlord. 31. In the instant case, admittedly the orders of the Prescribed Authority, directing the contesting respondents, to vacate the building in question, passed in proceeding under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act, have become final, therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the binding effect and nature of those orders on the concerned parties, will continue to exist unless they are set aside by the competent Court of law and the contesting respondents having failed in getting those orders set aside, cannot be allowed to circumvent those orders by hook or crook. The facts and circumstances of this case narrated above, leave no room for doubt that the contesting respondents have no right or authority under law to continue in possession over the building in question and the subsequent proceedings initiated by way of suits or applications by or at the behest of the District Election Officer/district Magistrate, Moradabad, with an evil design to obstruct their lawful eviction is nothing but a grossest abuse of the process of Court and all these subsequent suit proceedings are sham, illusory, collusive and inspired by nefarious and vexatious design. 32. In somewhat similar circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court in Gulab Chandra v. Munsif West Allahabad, 1988 ALJ 852, held that where it is established that the litigation is sham, illusory, collusive and inspired by nefarious and vexatious design, Courts not only have jurisdiction but also owe a duty to throttle such litigation at the threshold. 33. In the instant case, due to sham litigation inspired by vexatious design, the petitioners have already been harassed a lot, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents No. 2 and 3 are directed to see that the vacant possession of the building in question is delivered to the petitioners within a fortnight from today. 33. In the instant case, due to sham litigation inspired by vexatious design, the petitioners have already been harassed a lot, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents No. 2 and 3 are directed to see that the vacant possession of the building in question is delivered to the petitioners within a fortnight from today. The District Magistrate, Moradabad and the Additional District Magistrate (F & R), Moradabad, the respondents No. 2 and 3, are further directed to appear in person before this Court on 3-9-2003 and to file the compliance report specifically stating as to on which date and time the possession of the building is handed over to the petitioners and the order is complied with. 34. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs, which is assessed Rs. 15,000 payable to petitioners within a fortnight from today. The impugned order dated 30-5-2003 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) passed by Special Judge, Moradabad, in Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2003 is quashed. 35. Certified copies of this order may be given to the learned Counsel for the parties by 18-8-2003 in accordance with the Rules and a copy of the same be handed over to Sri Lalta Prasad Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel for necessary follow up action. Petition allowed. .