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2003 DIGILAW 184 (HP)

SIKAND & COMPANY CHAMBAGHAT, SOLAN v. SANEH CHAUDHARY, PROPRIETOR

2003-07-10

ONKAR CHAND THAKUR, PREM CHAUHAN, SURINDER SARUP

body2003
ORDER Mr. Justice Surinder Sarup (Retd.) President: This appeal: is against the order dated 3.4.2002 of the District Forum, Kangra at Dharamshala as also the subsequent order dated 23.7.2002 passed on the application for clarification at the instance of the complainant/respondent. By the substantive order of 3.4.2002, the appellants were directed to replace the chassis of the vehicle. In question, within 30 days after the receipt of a copy of the said order, otherwise it was held that the respondent would be entitled to the entire money spent by her for the purchase of the vehicle with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of purchase costs of Rs. 2,000/- have also been imposed against the appellants. By the subsequent order dated 23.7.2002, it has been clarified that the expression Chassis would include the entire engine of the vehicle, as well as the axle and supporting system excluding tyres and body, which would have to be replaced by the appellants within the period already indicated in the earlier order. I has also been stated in the said clarificatory order that the earlier order of 3.4.2002 would merge in the subsequent order dated 23.7.2003. 2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and we have examined the record. At the outset, the learned Counsel for the appellants has not challenged the initial order passed on 3.4.2002, the direction contained therein has already been stated above. His objection is to the subsequent clarificatory order of 23.7.2002 whereby the expression Chassis has been amplified and enlarged to include, apart from the Chassis of the vehicle, in question, also its entire engine etc. We find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants, especially when the learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to justify the passing of the clarificatory order, which is palpably without jurisdiction. 3. It is manifest that the complaint of the respondent was finally disposed of by the order dated 3.4.2002, it passes our comprehension as to how more than three months later, an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure could be entertained at the instance of the respondent for clarification of the operative part of the said order dated 3.4.2002, as has been done by the subsequent order dated 23.7.2002. Neither the law, nor any precedent permits such a course of action to be adopted by the District Forum. The fact remains that the complaint having been final disposed of by the order dated; 3.4.2002, the learned Forum below had become functus officio in the matter. If the respondent still had any grievance in the matter, the only remedy available to her was to file an appeal, which admittedly has not been filed. Moreover, under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as amended upto date only, principles of Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable and not the provisions thereof, except to the extent as provided under the said Act. As we understand the Consumer Protection law, there is no provision under the same permitting an application under Section 151 C.P.C. to be filed at the instance of any party to the consumer dispute which already stands decided and disposed of by the District Forum, as has happened in the instant case. 4. Apart from the above illegality, a perusal of the application on the record shows that it has not been signed by the complainant, as it has been admitted her learned Counsel that only he had signed the application. It would be pertinent to point out here that it was the learned Counsel for the respondent himself who had represented her in the proceedings before the learned Forum below also, including the filing of the application for clarification under consideration. Thus, viewed from any angle, the order passed in 23.7.2002 cannot be sustained. 5. For the reasons recorded above, we allow this appeal only to the extent that the order dated 23.7.2002 passed on the application for clarification of the respondent is set aside. The substantive and earlier order dated 3.4.2002 passed on her complaint is, however, upheld in toto. The stay of the operation of the impugned order i.e. the order dated 3.4.2002 granted at the time of admission of this appeal on 4.9.2002 is hereby vacated. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.