JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J.—This order is meant to dispose of the question as to whether in case of disobedience of an order passed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the proceedings to punish for disobedience of the order will be maintainable under Order 39 Rule 2-A only or under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which has arisen for determination in the present petition. 2. In brief, the material facts for answering the aforesaid question are that the petitioner instituted a suit for possession of suit property, situate in Mohal Paddal, Mandi, which was dismissed by the learned trial Judge. Appeal preferred by the petitioner was allowed by the learned District Judge and the case was remanded for retrial. Against the remand order, the respondents filed an appeal in this Court. Alongwith the appeal, an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC (CMP No. 82 of 2002) was also filed wherein this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo qua the suit land vide order dated 18.1.2002. Since the petitioner was unaware of the order passed by this Court and the case stood remanded to the trial Court, it moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC in the trial Court with the prayer for restraining the respondent from raising any construction over the suit land. In the said application, the trial Court, vide order dated 29.1.2002, passed an order restraining the respondent from raising any construction on and changing the nature of the suit land. The respondent however, without caring for these orders, continued with the construction and thereby violated the status quo order passed by this Court and the restraint order passed by the trial Court. Hence this petition under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India, with the prayer that the respondent may be dealt with for having committed contempt of this Court. 3. The respondent contested the petition and filed reply wherein one of the grounds of defence is that an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC has already been filed in the trial Court for the alleged disobedience of the restraint order passed by that Court and thus, the present petition is not maintainable. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 5. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. 5. It may be pointed out at the very outset that insofar as the alleged disobedience of the order passed by the trial Court restraining the respondent from raising any construction on and changing the nature of the suit land is concerned, the petitioner has admittedly filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC in the trial Court and despite having made allegations of disobedience of the said order of the trial Court, has not sought any relief against the respondent in the present petition and has confined the relief prayed for only with regard to the violation of the status quo order dated 18.1.2002 granted by this Court. 6. It is not in dispute that the order dated 18.1.2002, passed by this Court directing the parties to maintain status quo qua the suit land, has been passed on an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The Code makes special provision vide Rule 2-A for consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction and, thus, special remedy has been provided thereunder to deal with disobedience or breach of injunction, whether ad interim or temporary granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Once such provisions are made, ordinarily the remedy to the aggrieved party is available under the provisions of Rule 2-A and in the ordinary course, recourse cannot be taken to the general provisions for punishing for contempt of the Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is more so when the alleged facts constituting disobedience and the reply thereto requires a detailed inquiry and leading of evidence. 7. In Ram Rup Pandey v. R.K. Bhargava and others, AIR 1971 Allahabad 231, while dealing with a similar question. Allahabad High Court held as under: "7. Mr. K.N. Singh, appearing for the Adhyaksha, relied on A. Ramalingam v. V.V. Mahalinga Nadar, (1965) 2 Mad LJ 162 : (AIR 1966 Mad 21) where it was held that the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under the Act in a case where a detailed enquiry could be made under Order 39 Rule 2, sub-rule (3), Civil P.C. by the Court which had passed the injunction order. This case is a direct authority which supports the submission of the alleged contemners". This case is a direct authority which supports the submission of the alleged contemners". It was further held : "The applicant could, if so advised proceed under Order 39 Rule 2 (3) CPC and show the Court of the Munsif now the Adyksha had disobeyed its order notwithstanding its communication to the Adhyaksha in a reliable manner. The evidence here is not sufficient for a satisfactory decision of this question. And, it is not a case in which this court should, in exercise of its discretionary powers to take proceedings for contempt of the authority of a subordinate court, proceed further notwithstanding the existence of an alternative procedure provided by Order 39 Rule 2(3) Civil P.C. for punishing disobedience of an injunction granted under Order 39, Rule 1, Civil PC." 8. In Smt. Indu Tewari v. Ram Bahadur Chaudhari and others, AIR 1981 Allahabad 309, it was held as under : "It is well settled that the matter of contempt is always an issue between the court and the contemner. No right vests in a private party to get any person punished for contempt. He can only inform the Court of the contempt committed by any person and thereafter it is for the Court to deal with the contemner. The party which informs the Court about the alleged contempt can only assist the Court in coming to the conclusion whether any contempt has been committed or not. As opposed to this, if a person obtains an interim injunction or a final decree for injunction, he gets a right to enforce it. The provision for enforcement of an interim injunction is contained in Order XXXIX Rule 2-A, Civil P.C. and the provision for enforcement of a decree for injunction is contained in Order XXI, Rule 32, Civil P.C. According to the said provision, a person who disobeys an injunction order can be put into prison and his property can also be attached. The attachment can continue for one year and if the party against whom the order or decree is passed refused to comply, the property can even be sold. The orders passed in proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A as well as the orders passed in execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure are appealable orders. The orders passed in proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A as well as the orders passed in execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure are appealable orders. Further the proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A as well as execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 32 are elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and they can examine and cross-examine the witnesses. As opposed to this, the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are of summary nature. In my opinion, a person who has got an effective alternative remedy of the nature specified under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A or under Order XXI, Rule 32, Civil RC. should not be permitted to skip over that remedy and take resort to initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. The least that can be said in that it would not be a proper exercise of discretion on the part of this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act when such an effective and alternative remedy is available to any person. I am fortified in taking this view by the observations made in Ram Rup Pandey v. R.K. Bhargava, AIR 1971 All 231 and Calcutta Medical Stores v. Stadmed Private Ltd., (1977) 81 Cal WN 209. Relying on these two decisions I myself took the same view recently in Abdul Sattar v. Hira Lal (Civil Misc. Contempt Case No. 96 of 1979 decided on 20.2.1981." 9. It was further held : "As already stated, in the instant petition, the petitioner had an effective alternative remedy of enforcing the decree passed in her favour by putting the same in execution under Order XXI, Rule 32, Civil RC. It is, therefore, not a fit case in which this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act." 10. In Rudraiah v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1982 Karnataka 182, while dealing with a similar question. Karnataka High Court held as under : "In cases of disobedience or breach of injunction order issued temporarily during the pendency of a suit, either under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39, CPC action is contemplated by the very court which issues the injunction order under Rule 2-A of Order 39, CPC. Karnataka High Court held as under : "In cases of disobedience or breach of injunction order issued temporarily during the pendency of a suit, either under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39, CPC action is contemplated by the very court which issues the injunction order under Rule 2-A of Order 39, CPC. It contemplates the forefeiture of property as also putting of the person who commits breach into civil prison for a period not exceeding three months. The provision thereunder is obviously based on the principle of Contempt of Court. That being so, the general provisions made under the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be invoked by the decree holder, for forcing the party to obey the injunction order. It is a well settled principle of law that when there is special law and general law, the provisions of the special law prevail over the general law and when special procedure and special provision are contained in the CPC itself under Order 39 Rule 2-A for taking action for the disobedience of an order of injunction, the general law of contempt of Court cannot be invoked. If such a course encouraged holding that it amounts to contempt of Court, when an order of subordinate court is not obeyed, it is sure to throw open a floodgate of litigation under contempt jurisdiction. Every decree holder can rush to this court stating that the decree passed by a subordinate court is not obeyed. That is not the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act". It was further held :— "Hence, we hold that the present petition which is merely directed by way of speedy execution of an interim injunction order, which requires a detailed enquiry with regard to suit land and the scope of the order, which can be entertained and enquired into more properly under Rule 2-A of Order 39 CPC cannot entertained under contempt jurisdiction and accordingly we dismiss it." 11. The Honble Supreme Court in Perspective Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221, held as under:— "The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice. (Per Grover), Contempt of Court is essentially a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and authority of judicial tribunals. (Per Grover), Contempt of Court is essentially a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and authority of judicial tribunals. It is not a right of a party to be invoked for the redress of his grievances. It is not also a mode by which the rights of a party, adjudicated upon by a Tribunal can be enforced against another party. Moreover, if the matter, as in the present case, requires a detailed enquiry, it must be left to the court which passed the order and which presumably is fully acquainted with the subject matter of its own order. When the matter relates to mere infringement of an order as between parties, it is clearly inexpedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction as a mode of executing the order, merely because other remedies may take time or are more circumlocutory in character. Contempt jurisdiction should be reserved for what essentially brings the administration of justice into contempt or unduly weakens it (vide 1964) 68 Cal WN 148, AIR 1951 Pat 231; AIR 1966 Mad 21 and AIR 1971 All 231." 12. In the case in hand, the order passed by this Court directs the parties to maintain status qua the suit land. It is matter of evidence as to what was the status of the property at the relevant time and what acts have been committed by the respondent after passing of the status quo order by this Court which may constitute disobedience. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this is not a case which requires to be dealt with summarily under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, the present petition under the Contempt of Courts Act is held not maintainable. 13. It may, however, be pointed out that allegations in the petition prima facie disclose disobedience of the status quo order passed by this Court under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter requires to be dealt with on merits. Thus, irrespective of the specified provisions under which the present petition purports to have been filed, this shall be treated as an application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC and shall be dealt with accordingly. The question is accordingly disposed of. Petition disposed of